Andrew J. Goodman

The accused were charged with multiple offences including aggravated assault, sexual assault, and unlawful confinement against their roommate, a vulnerable individual with cognitive limitations.

The complainant suffered severe burn injuries from boiling water, which she initially claimed were self-inflicted but later testified were caused by the accused.

The court found the complainant's evidence regarding the sexual assault, confinement, and assault with weapons to be inconsistent and unreliable, resulting in acquittals on those charges.

However, relying on expert medical evidence that the extensive burn patterns were inconsistent with self-harm, the court found both accused guilty of aggravated assault.

The appellant appealed a conviction for refusing to provide a breath sample following a roadside demand at a border crossing.

He argued that the trial judge misapprehended the evidence, failed to properly assess video evidence, failed to consider a medical condition affecting his ability to provide breath samples, and erred in rejecting a Charter s.10(b) right to counsel argument.

The court held that the trial judge properly applied the credibility framework in R. v. W.(D.), reasonably rejected the appellant’s evidence, and made no palpable and overriding error in assessing the evidence.

Allegations of judicial bias, collusion, and malicious prosecution were also rejected as unsupported.

The conviction and sentence were upheld.

The applicant mother brought a motion to change the primary residence of the parties' nine-year-old child from Grimsby to Ajax, Ontario, following her relocation to live with her common-law partner.

The parties previously shared joint custody with the child primarily residing with the mother.

The court applied the Gordon v. Goertz framework and found that the proposed move would significantly disrupt the child's life, particularly her close relationship with her father, stepmother, half-sibling, and extended family in Grimsby.

The court concluded that the relocation was not in the child's best interests and ordered that primary residence remain with the father in Grimsby, with the mother having liberal access.

In a contested estates proceeding, the applicants sought directions under Rule 75.06 concerning the proper party required to propound a 2013 will of the deceased.

The respondent challenged the validity of the will on the grounds of lack of testamentary capacity and undue influence and requested that the applicants be required to propound it.

The court held that the applicants had “intermeddled” in the estate by taking substantive steps such as applying for a certificate of appointment and administering assets, which precluded them from renouncing their role.

As the individuals most involved in the preparation and execution of the will, they were required to propound it.

The court also directed a trial of issues regarding testamentary capacity and undue influence while declining to adjudicate negligence and fiduciary duty claims within the directions motion.

The accused was charged with production of marihuana and possession of marihuana for the purpose of trafficking after police discovered a large commercial grow operation in a residence.

The prosecution relied primarily on circumstantial evidence, including surveillance showing the accused attending the premises multiple times and possessing keys to the residence.

The defence argued the accused merely attended the home to check on a tenant and had no knowledge of the grow operation.

The court rejected the defence evidence as implausible and found that the accused had knowledge and a measure of control over the premises, supporting constructive possession and party liability for production.

The accused was convicted on both counts.

The defendant sought leave to appeal an interlocutory order that bifurcated the trial into liability and damages phases.

The moving party argued that the bifurcation order conflicted with appellate jurisprudence, specifically the rule that a trial cannot be bifurcated without consent when a valid jury notice is in place.

The court found that there was a conflicting decision and good reason to doubt the correctness of the bifurcation order, satisfying the test for leave to appeal.

The motion for leave to appeal was granted.

The applicant, charged with drug offences and theft of electricity related to a marijuana grow operation, sought to exclude house keys seized by police during his arrest outside the residence.

The applicant argued the keys were obtained through an unlawful arrest and warrantless search, breaching his ss. 8, 9, and 10(b) Charter rights.

The court found that the applicant had abandoned the keys by tossing them onto the lawn upon seeing the police, meaning no search occurred and no s. 8 rights were violated.

The court further held that even if the arrest was arbitrary and a breach occurred, the evidence would be admissible under s. 24(2) of the Charter, as the police conduct was not deliberate and the evidence was highly reliable real evidence essential to the prosecution.

The application to exclude the evidence was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Discipline Committee of the Ontario College of Teachers finding him guilty of professional misconduct for engaging in an inappropriate sexual relationship with a student.

The appellant argued that the Panel disregarded evidence, failed to resolve inconsistencies, and improperly drew an adverse inference from his refusal to answer questions during the investigation.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the Panel's findings of fact and credibility were entitled to considerable deference and were reasonably supported by the evidence.

The applicant was charged with speeding and brought a preliminary motion at trial arguing the proceeding was out of time under s. 76(1) of the Provincial Offences Act, claiming 'proceeding' meant 'trial'.

The Justice of the Peace dismissed the motion.

The applicant sought prerogative relief in the Divisional Court.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, holding that interlocutory rulings in provincial offences proceedings should be challenged by appeal after trial, not by prerogative relief.

Furthermore, the court held that a 'proceeding' commences with the filing of a Certificate of Offence, not the trial itself, and thus the proceeding was commenced within the six-month limitation period.

The applicant sought judicial review of a Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario (HRTO) decision dismissing her nine applications on the basis of delay and having no reasonable prospect of success.

The applicant argued the HRTO failed to include all respondents she complained against.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the applicant failed to address why the HRTO's decisions were unreasonable and noting the HRTO correctly identified the named respondents.

The respondent submitted that the court should decline to hear the appeal based on the doctrine of mootness, as it had applied for a new building permit and appealed its refusal under s. 25 of the Building Code Act.

The Divisional Court exercised its discretion to hear the matter despite the lack of a live controversy, noting that the issue was important, had broader implications, and would clarify uncertainty in the law.

The appellant mother appealed a summary judgment order making her child a Crown ward without access for the purposes of adoption.

The mother argued the motion judge erred by relying on a previous judgment regarding her older child as evidence of past parenting and by finding there was no genuine issue for trial.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding the motion judge appropriately considered the past parenting evidence as a backdrop to measure change, correctly applied the summary judgment test, and properly determined that Crown wardship was in the child's best interests given the lack of cogent evidence demonstrating the mother's improved parenting capacity.

The applicant, charged with drug and firearms offences, brought a Charter motion to exclude evidence seized from his residence and vehicle.

The court initially denied standing regarding the residence but allowed the applicant to reopen evidence, ultimately finding he had a reasonable expectation of privacy.

The court found the Information to Obtain (ITO) the search warrant for the residence lacked sufficient corroboration, resulting in a section 8 Charter breach.

However, the court dismissed the section 7, 8, and 9 claims regarding the vehicle search and arrest, finding them lawful.

Applying the Grant framework under section 24(2), the court admitted the evidence from the residence, concluding the police acted in good faith and the highly reliable evidence was essential to the truth-seeking function of the trial.

The applicant lawyer sought a declaration that he had priority to non-forfeited cash bail funds based on an alleged assignment from the accused client, and an order setting aside or circumventing an estreatment order that had directed the balance to the respondent who had posted the bail money.

The court held that it had no jurisdiction to review, vary, or reconsider the criminal estreatment order under the Criminal Code, and that the proceeding was in substance an impermissible collateral attack.

In any event, the court found the applicant had no enforceable security interest under the Personal Property Security Act because the debtor had no rights in the collateral to assign after previously relinquishing all claims to the funds to the respondent.

The application was dismissed and the clerk was directed to release the funds to the respondent.

Following a fatal rear-end collision between a pickup truck and a tractor on a rural roadway, the accused challenged a search warrant used to obtain hospital records relating to blood testing.

Applying Garofoli and Grant, the court found the information to obtain was wholly deficient, the warrant violated s. 8 of the Charter, and the hospital records had to be excluded under s. 24(2).

The excluded records left insufficient evidence on the over-80 count, which was dismissed.

Relying on the breath reading, expert toxicology evidence, admissions, reconstruction evidence, speed, and delayed reaction, the court nevertheless found impaired driving causing death and dangerous driving causing death proved beyond a reasonable doubt.

Applicants who held private cottage interests on Crown land in a provincial park sought a determination that they were not obliged to reimburse the Crown for payments in lieu of municipal taxes.

The court held that s. 4(3) of the Municipal Tax Assistance Act created a statutory debt owed by tenants unless the parties had agreed otherwise, and no such agreement existed on the evidence.

The lease documents preserved the tenants' liability for taxes, rates, duties and assessments, and no implied variation could arise contrary to the written agreements.

The court also rejected waiver, promissory estoppel, and laches, finding no clear abandonment of rights, no representation altering legal relations, and no detrimental reliance.

The accused brought a pretrial motion seeking permission to pose a race‑based challenge for cause question to prospective jurors using a multiple‑choice format designed to detect conscious and unconscious racial bias.

The Crown did not oppose a race‑based challenge for cause but objected to the proposed form of questioning.

The court reviewed jurisprudence including the Parks question and later cases considering expanded questioning formats.

The judge concluded that while a race‑based challenge for cause was appropriate, there was no evidentiary basis to depart from the established Parks formulation in favour of a multiple‑choice question.

The court held that the standard Parks question, modified to refer to judging the evidence “fairly,” adequately addressed concerns about potential juror bias without unnecessarily complicating the jury selection process.

The moving defendants sought leave to appeal to the Divisional Court from a certification order in a class proceeding alleging a price‑fixing conspiracy in the market for polyether polyol products.

The motion argued that the pleadings were deficient, that the motions judge failed to review evidence supporting the proposed common issues, and that the plaintiff’s economist lacked the required expertise.

The court held that certification judges are entitled to deference and that the certification stage requires only some basis in fact that certification criteria are met, not proof of the underlying conspiracy.

Reading the certification reasons contextually, the court concluded that the motions judge had considered the applicable principles and that there was no serious doubt as to the correctness of the order.

The moving defendants therefore failed to satisfy the leave test under Rule 62.02(4).

The plaintiffs, owners of a long-standing apple farm and retail market, sought an interlocutory injunction to prevent the defendants from constructing berms on lands adjacent to a nearby landfill.

They argued the berms would eliminate buffer lands, violate environmental approvals, and cause nuisance by creating stigma that would harm their retail business.

The court applied the test for interlocutory injunctions from RJR MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General) and found that while there was a serious issue to be tried, primarily in nuisance, the plaintiffs failed to establish irreparable harm.

Evidence showed the market had achieved record sales after initial berm construction and any potential losses could be compensated by damages.

The balance of convenience also favoured the defendants due to delay in bringing the motion and the impact an injunction would have on the defendants’ construction plans.

The appellant appealed a conviction for assault simplicitor under s. 266 of the Criminal Code and the resulting sentence of four months’ imprisonment and probation.

The appellant argued that the trial judge erred in assessing credibility, improperly shifted the burden of proof, and failed to properly apply the W.(D.) framework in evaluating defence evidence.

The appeal court held that the trial judge properly assessed credibility, did not misapprehend the evidence, and did not shift the burden of proof, and therefore dismissed the conviction appeal.

However, the sentencing judge committed an error in principle by improperly discounting rehabilitation and effectively treating the accused’s decision to proceed to trial as indicative of a lack of remorse.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted and the custodial term was reduced to 75 days to be served intermittently.