Andra M. Pollak

The defendants brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's action for negligence, breach of Charter rights, and defamation arising from his suspension from practice.

The plaintiff argued that the defendants exceeded their statutory authority by demanding client files without reasonable suspicion on a file-by-file basis.

The court granted the motion and dismissed the action, finding that the plaintiff's claims constituted an impermissible collateral attack on unappealed Law Society Tribunal proceedings, and that the defendants were protected by statutory immunity under s. 9 of the Law Society Act as there was no evidence of bad faith.

The defendant employer brought a motion to stay the plaintiff's wrongful dismissal action, arguing the dispute fell within the scope of an arbitration clause in the employment agreement.

The plaintiff opposed the stay, arguing the arbitration clause was void for lack of consideration and that subsequent amendments to the agreement conferred exclusive jurisdiction to the courts.

Applying the competence-competence principle, the court found it was arguable that the claims fell within the scope of the arbitration clause and that the plaintiff had not established a clear case of invalidity.

The motion for a stay of proceedings was granted, leaving the jurisdictional challenge to be resolved first by the arbitrator.

The applicant, a self-represented defendant in a defamation action, brought a Rowbotham application seeking publicly funded counsel to defend against a civil contempt motion for allegedly breaching an injunction.

The Attorney General opposed the application, arguing that Rowbotham principles do not apply to civil contempt proceedings between private parties and that the applicant did not meet the test.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the issues in the contempt motion were not legally complex and the applicant had the necessary factual knowledge to defend herself, meaning her Charter rights would not be violated without counsel.

The City of Toronto brought a motion for an interlocutory injunction to shut down several medical cannabis dispensaries operating in violation of its zoning by-laws.

The dispensary operators brought a cross-motion seeking an interlocutory exemption from the by-laws and the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, arguing that the existing regulatory scheme failed to provide reasonable access to medical cannabis.

Applying the RJR-MacDonald test, the court found that the balance of convenience favoured the City, as there is a presumption that validly enacted laws serve the public interest.

The court granted the City's injunction but declined to issue an order directing police enforcement, noting the lack of statutory authority for such an order in a civil proceeding.

The operators' cross-motion was dismissed.

The plaintiff, IMG Canada Limited, sued General Motors of Canada Limited and MacLaren McCann Canada Inc. for breach of an alleged oral two-year sponsorship agreement and, alternatively, for negligent misrepresentation.

IMG claimed an oral contract was formed on November 3, 2015, for Cadillac's sponsorship of Taste of Toronto 2016 and 2017.

The court found no oral agreement due to a lack of certainty of essential terms (specifically price) and no intention to create a legally binding agreement, as evidenced by ongoing negotiations and the requirement for a formal written contract.

The negligent misrepresentation claim, alleging Momentum failed to communicate Cadillac's concerns, was also dismissed because the plaintiff could not prove damages resulted from the alleged misrepresentation, as it was too late to mitigate losses by the time the misrepresentation occurred.

All claims were dismissed.

The Buyer (Mt.

Pleasant Roehampton Developments Limited) brought an application seeking a declaration that an Agreement of Purchase and Sale (APS) was in full force and an order for specific performance.

The Vendor (Friedrich Christof Haussmann) brought a cross-application seeking a declaration that the APS was null and void and removal of a caution registered against title.

The central dispute concerned the interpretation of the "Investigation Period" deadline in the APS, with the Buyer arguing for March 31, 2017, and the Vendor for March 29, 2017.

The court found the plain wording of the APS established the deadline as March 29, 2017, and that the Buyer failed to waive conditions by that date, rendering the APS null and void.

The Buyer's alternative arguments of estoppel by convention and mutual mistake were rejected due to a lack of shared assumption or clear misrepresentation.

The plaintiffs, Chinese companies, sued the defendants in Ontario for alleged fraud, claiming the defendants stripped assets from two non-party Chinese companies, making them unable to satisfy Chinese default judgments.

Three motions were heard together: the defendants' motion to set aside an ex parte Certificate of Pending Litigation (CPL), and the plaintiffs' motions for a new CPL on another property and a Mareva injunction.

The court dismissed the plaintiffs' motions for a Mareva injunction and a new CPL, finding they failed to meet the strict requirements, including providing a proper undertaking for damages, establishing a strong prima facie case of fraud, or demonstrating a real risk of asset removal or irreparable harm.

The court granted the defendants' motion to set aside the existing ex parte CPL due to the plaintiffs' material non-disclosure on the original ex parte motion, including the dismissal of fraud complaints by Chinese police and the absence of fraud allegations in the Chinese litigation.

Costs were awarded to the defendants on a partial indemnity basis.

The Law Society of Upper Canada sought an injunction under the Law Society Act to prohibit a disbarred lawyer from providing legal services.

The Law Society alleged the respondent had violated the Act on at least two occasions, relying on client and investigator affidavits.

The respondent denied the allegations, presenting employee affidavits stating a licensed lawyer handled the client's file.

The court found the Law Society did not meet its burden of proof to establish a violation of the Act on a balance of probabilities, dismissing the application.

The court awarded substantial indemnity costs to Lixo Investments Limited and Granite Claims Solutions LP against AACR Inc. o/a Winmar Toronto/Brampton, following a set of three summary judgment motions.

Winmar's motion for summary judgment against all defendants was dismissed, while Granite's and Intact's motions to dismiss Winmar's claim against them were granted.

The court found Winmar acted unreasonably in bringing its summary judgment motion and in responding to Granite's motion.

The request for a Bullock Order and deferral of costs was denied, as these were deemed matters for the trial judge.

All cross-claims were dismissed without costs.

The applicant, Northbridge General Insurance Corporation, appealed an arbitration decision that found it was higher in priority to pay statutory accident benefits for an individual with advanced dementia.

The arbitrator had determined that the individual was not principally dependent on her daughter for care, which would have shifted priority to the daughter's insurer, RBC General Insurance Company.

The Superior Court reviewed the arbitration decision on a standard of reasonableness, finding no error in the arbitrator's assessment of dependency, which considered the extensive care provided by a long-term care facility versus the daughter's contributions.

The appeal was dismissed.

Following a successful motion for summary judgment and default judgment against the defendants, the plaintiffs sought substantial indemnity costs based on a term in the mortgage.

The court found the request for substantial indemnity costs premature, as the judgment might be paid without needing to enforce the mortgage.

The court awarded partial indemnity costs of $14,000 based on the parties' prior agreement, with directions for assessment if the parties could not agree on the total costs of the action.

The moving parties (defendants) brought a motion under Rule 21.01(3) to strike paragraphs from the plaintiff's statement of claim, arguing the claims were barred by res judicata and abuse of process due to a prior construction lien action.

The plaintiff had previously obtained a default judgment on a counterclaim in the lien action and now alleged the moving parties stripped the corporate defendant's assets to make it judgment proof.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the issues of fraud and asset stripping against the personal defendants were not and could not have been adjudicated in the prior lien action, as there was no judgment against the corporate defendant at that time.

Dr. Amir Gholami, a pediatric cardiac anaesthesiologist, sued The Hospital for Sick Children and two individual doctors for wrongful dismissal, breach of contract, various torts, and moral/punitive damages.

Dr. Gholami was employed under a restricted license (Pathway 4) requiring supervision, which was conditional on maintaining his certificate.

Concerns arose regarding his integration into the cardiac sub-group and his attitude.

He refused an offer to shift his focus from cardiac cases, insisting on his interpretation of the contract.

His supervisor subsequently resigned, leading to the automatic expiration of his certificate and the termination of his appointment.

The court found Dr. Gholami's interpretation of his contract to be misguided and unreasonable, and that his damages were directly caused by his own actions, including his refusal of reasonable offers and confrontational communications.

The court also noted his failure to exercise statutory rights under the Public Hospitals Act.

All of Dr. Gholami's claims were dismissed.

This costs endorsement followed a successful motion to strike brought by the defendant.

The defendant, Meghan Scott, sought costs, which the plaintiff, Althea Reyes, failed to provide submissions for despite an extension.

The court, considering Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and the serious allegations made against the defendant's professional integrity, awarded costs to the defendant on a substantial indemnity basis.

The plaintiff, Winmar, a contractor, brought a motion for summary judgment against the property owner (Lixo), the insurer (Intact), and the insurance adjuster (Granite) for unpaid work following a fire and subsequent flood.

Intact and Granite also brought motions for summary judgment to dismiss Winmar's claims against them.

The court found genuine issues requiring a trial regarding Winmar's claim against Lixo, particularly concerning the scope of work, the timing of the lien, and the quantum owed, as much of the work was related to a separate flood incident for a tenant (Club V) and not clearly authorized by Lixo.

Winmar's motion against Lixo was dismissed, but the action against Lixo was not dismissed.

The court granted Intact and Granite's motions for summary judgment, dismissing Winmar's claims against them, finding no direct contractual relationship, no benefit gained by them, and no jurisdiction under the Construction Lien Act for claims against non-owners or for quantum meruit/unjust enrichment against them.

Wittington Properties Limited applied for declarations that GoodLife Fitness Centres Inc. had lost its right to extend a lease due to ongoing breaches related to gross revenue reporting and a competition provision.

GoodLife brought a cross-application for declarations affirming its right to extend the lease and, in the alternative, relief from forfeiture.

The court found GoodLife was in default of the lease regarding both gross revenue reporting and the competition provision, and that GoodLife had not proven its breaches were de minimis or that Wittington had waived its rights or acted in bad faith.

Consequently, the court declared GoodLife had no right to extend the lease and ordered vacant possession.

The defendant, a Crown Attorney, moved to strike the plaintiff's defamation claim.

The court granted the motion, finding that the defendant was immune from personal suit under s. 8 of the Ministry of the Attorney General Act, as her actions were performed in the course of her duties.

Furthermore, the action against the Attorney General (who would be the proper defendant) was a nullity due to the plaintiff's failure to provide proper notice under s. 7 of the Proceedings Against the Crown Act and s. 8(5) of the MAG Act.

Leave to amend the statement of claim was denied as the defects were incurable.

The plaintiff, Mr. MacIvor, sought long-term disability (LTD) benefits from Manulife under a group insurance policy held by his former employer, Pitney Bowes, after being seriously injured.

Manulife denied liability, arguing that the plaintiff's coverage ceased when he resigned from Pitney Bowes and that his claim was made after the limitation period.

The court found that the plaintiff was not a "Covered Person" under the policy at the time he made his claim, as coverage terminated upon his resignation.

Section 297(1) of the Insurance Act was deemed inapplicable as the policy itself had not terminated.

Consequently, the plaintiff's action was dismissed.

The plaintiff claimed wrongful dismissal, asserting he was on a leave of absence to administer his father's estate and was not called back to work.

The defendant contended the plaintiff had resigned.

The court found that the plaintiff had indeed resigned, based on unchallenged evidence, the plaintiff's conduct, and his defence in a related loan claim, thereby dismissing the wrongful dismissal claim.

The plaintiff, Paul Holmes, brought a motion for summary judgment for wrongful dismissal and breach of contract against Hatch Ltd. after 17 years of employment.

The core issue was the enforceability and interpretation of a termination provision in his employment contract, which stated that the termination package would "take into account your years of service, position and age" as a minimum, or such greater amount as required by statute.

The court found that Hatch Ltd. failed to provide sufficient credible evidence that it genuinely considered these common law factors when determining the termination package, instead relying solely on its interpretation of "contractual obligations" to provide only ESA minimums.

This failure constituted a fundamental breach and repudiation of the employment agreement, rendering the termination clause invalid.

Consequently, the plaintiff was entitled to common law reasonable notice, which the court determined to be 18 months.

Partial summary judgment was granted, declaring this entitlement, with the calculation of specific damages and mitigation issues to be addressed in future proceedings.