Andra M. Pollak

Following a long motion regarding retroactive spousal support and child support, both parties sought costs.

The applicant claimed $29,700, while the respondent argued for costs based on bad faith or, alternatively, that each party should bear their own costs due to divided success.

The court reviewed the settlement offers, the divided success across the temporary and long motions, and the conduct of the parties.

Ultimately, the court ordered that no costs be awarded to either party.

The parties brought cross-motions to vary a 2007 consent support order addressing child support, spousal support, and the sharing of postsecondary expenses.

The court found the respondent intentionally underemployed and imputed full‑time income based on her previous salary.

Applying principles governing entitlement to share in post‑separation income increases, the court held that the respondent had not established compensatory entitlement to benefit from the applicant’s increased earnings.

The court rejected the respondent’s claim for retroactive and increased future spousal support.

The consent order was varied to adjust child support and allocate expenses proportionate to the parties’ incomes while leaving spousal support unchanged.

The moving party brought a motion to change a consent order governing child and spousal support after losing employment and experiencing a substantial reduction in income.

The responding party argued that the original order reflected imputed income and that the payor continued to conceal income, relying on pleadings from unrelated litigation and alleged disclosure deficiencies.

The court held that the pleadings were not evidence and that there was no proof of hidden income.

Applying the definition of "true income" in the consent order and the test for variation established in Willick v. Willick and G.(L.) v. B.(G.), the court found a material change in circumstances due to the payor’s reduced income.

The court therefore varied the child support and spousal support provisions retroactively but declined to delete the arrears provision.

A former cohabiting partner sought half of the $410,000 increase in equity in the respondent’s home on the basis of unjust enrichment and an alleged joint family venture.

The court applied the framework from Kerr v. Baranow and assessed mutual effort, economic integration, actual intent, and priority of the family.

It found the parties maintained largely separate finances, had no children, and did not integrate their economic lives or demonstrate an intention to share property.

Most of the increase in equity was attributable to market forces rather than joint effort, and the applicant’s limited contributions, including a $5,000 payment toward the mortgage, were found to fall within the parties’ arrangement to share living expenses.

The court concluded that neither a joint family venture nor unjust enrichment was established.

Following a trial, the plaintiff sought full indemnity costs of $217,368.13 against all defendants on a joint and several basis.

The parties had previously agreed that $70,000 was a reasonable amount for partial indemnity costs.

The court found that the conduct of the participating defendant did not justify an award of full indemnity costs.

The court awarded partial indemnity costs in the agreed amount of $70,000, payable jointly and severally by all defendants.

Following a prior proceeding, the court determined the appropriate costs payable by the unsuccessful party.

The successful defendants sought costs under s. 131 of the Courts of Justice Act and rule 57.01(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court considered factors including indemnity, the reasonable expectations of the parties, and the fairness and reasonableness of the time and rates charged.

The court awarded the Drabble defendants the full amount claimed, finding the costs reasonable and reasonably anticipated, but reduced the costs sought by the Webb defendants after concluding their time spent was excessive in the circumstances.

The defendants moved for summary judgment dismissing a negligence and breach of contract claim against financial advisors on the basis that the action was statute‑barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The plaintiff alleged negligent investment advice relating to a 2010 flow‑through investment that generated significant capital gains tax.

The court applied the discoverability principle under ss. 4 and 5 of the Act and held that the plaintiff knew or ought reasonably to have known the material facts when he received and approved his 2010 income tax return in May 2011.

The plaintiff’s failure to carefully review the return did not postpone the commencement of the limitation period.

As the action was commenced more than two years later, the claim was barred.

Following judgment in a civil action, the court determined the issue of costs.

The plaintiff argued entitlement to enhanced costs on the basis that he had beaten his offer to settle, while the defendant disputed that claim and argued the action should have been brought in Small Claims Court.

The court accepted that the plaintiff had not beaten the offer to settle and found that the proceeding should properly have been brought in Small Claims Court, justifying the exercise of discretion under Rule 57.05 to decline awarding costs to the plaintiff.

However, the court also declined to award costs to the defendant due to misconduct by its agent.

As a result, no costs were awarded to either party.

The plaintiff creditor sought a declaration that a mortgage registered in favour of a third party constituted a fraudulent conveyance under s. 2 of the Fraudulent Conveyances Act.

The mortgage had been granted after the plaintiff had commenced legal proceedings and purportedly secured an alleged pre‑existing debt.

The court found the underlying debt was statute‑barred under the applicable limitation periods and therefore did not constitute valid consideration for the promissory note or mortgage.

The surrounding circumstances, including the timing of the security and the relationship between the parties, constituted badges of fraud.

The mortgage was declared void as against the plaintiff.

The plaintiff, a senior executive employed for approximately 14 months, sought damages for unpaid compensation allegedly owed under an employment agreement, including a relocation payment, termination pay, a retention bonus, and an annual incentive program payment.

The court interpreted the relocation clause using the contractual interpretation principles articulated in Sattva and held the plaintiff had not moved his primary residence to Toronto, as he maintained his family home and tax residency in the United States while commuting.

The court also rejected arguments that termination and bonus provisions were void for potential violations of the Employment Standards Act, finding no actual or possible statutory breach in the circumstances.

Because the plaintiff had mitigated his losses and was not actively employed on the relevant payout dates, he was not entitled to the claimed payments.

All claims were dismissed.

Following dismissal of an application alleging privacy breaches and misrepresentations relating to the transfer of insurance assets and insured persons’ information, the court determined the appropriate costs award.

The unsuccessful applicant argued that no costs should be awarded because the matter raised issues of public interest and the law regarding enforcement of privacy rights was uncertain.

The court rejected those submissions, noting the seriousness of the allegations and the prior finding that the proceeding constituted an abuse of process.

Considering the factors under Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and the respondents’ reduced claim for costs, the court exercised its discretion to award a fixed amount.

Costs were ordered payable to the respondents.

The plaintiff brought a motion for summary judgment seeking repayment of funds withdrawn from his bank account for an alleged car loan arranged through a dealership acting as the bank’s agent.

The bank asserted that a valid loan agreement existed and relied on signed loan documentation and the plaintiff’s payment history.

The court held that the bank failed to establish that acceptance of the loan application was communicated to the borrower, a required element for contract formation.

Because the bank did not prove that a binding loan agreement existed, it had no legal right to withdraw the funds.

Summary judgment was granted requiring repayment of the withdrawn amount with interest, while additional damage claims were dismissed for lack of evidence.

Following a trial, the successful plaintiff sought costs.

The parties had agreed at trial that $23,000 on a partial indemnity basis would be paid to the successful party.

The court found no need for reaffirmation of the agreement and, applying the factors in the Rules of Civil Procedure and Boucher, awarded the agreed-upon amount of $23,000 to the plaintiff.

The moving parties (insurers) brought a motion to strike out an application seeking declaratory relief regarding alleged breaches of privacy and insurance legislation.

The responding party had commenced multiple other proceedings, including a tort claim, an accident benefits claim, and complaints to regulatory bodies.

The court granted the motion to strike, finding that the application was an abuse of process because declaratory relief would serve no practical purpose and the governing statutes provided their own mandatory procedures for resolving the disputes.

Following a motion where the plaintiff was successful, the court considered costs submissions.

The plaintiff sought substantial indemnity costs based on a settlement offer, which the court rejected.

Applying the factors in the Rules of Civil Procedure and Boucher, the court awarded the plaintiff partial indemnity costs of $22,500, in accordance with the parties' prior agreement on the quantum for partial indemnity costs.

In this costs endorsement arising from a wrongful dismissal proceeding, the plaintiff argued that his judgment for 27 months' notice exceeded both his own and the defendant's Offers to Settle, entitling him to substantial indemnity costs or, alternatively, partial indemnity costs forthwith.

The defendant responded that the monetary value of the judgment could not yet be fixed because mitigation income earned during the notice period remained to be deducted.

The court agreed that it was not yet possible to determine whether Rule 49 costs consequences applied.

If the parties could not later agree, costs for the motion could be addressed on a further motion or at trial together with remaining issues.

Following success on a summary judgment motion and dismissal of the plaintiffs' cross-motion, the defendant sought costs primarily on a substantial indemnity basis.

The court accepted the defendant's submissions that the litigation involved serious unproven allegations and that the contractual documents supported recovery of legal costs on a solicitor and own client basis, while declining to rely on one incomplete evidentiary submission regarding the plaintiffs' conduct.

Applying the Rule 57.01 factors and the governing reasonableness and fairness principles, the court awarded the full substantial indemnity amount requested.

The moving defendant sought to bifurcate the action so that the plaintiff's successor liability claim against it would be determined before the negligence and related claims against the remaining defendants.

Applying the governing bifurcation principles, the court held that bifurcation is an exceptional remedy available only in the clearest cases where the preponderance of factors favours severance and the proceeding will more likely than not be resolved justly, expeditiously, and inexpensively.

The court found the successor liability issue was not simple, the case was not extraordinary merely because it involved a novel American doctrine, and any clear advantage or costs savings were largely limited to the moving defendant.

The proposed procedure would also create delay, multiplicity of proceedings, and prejudice to the plaintiff.

The motion was dismissed, with costs to the plaintiff on a partial indemnity basis.

Following the defendants' successful motion for summary judgment which dismissed the action, the parties made submissions on costs.

The parties had previously agreed that the successful party on the motion would receive $10,000 in partial indemnity costs.

The court found this agreement did not preclude the defendants from seeking additional costs for the dismissal of the action.

The court awarded the defendants an additional $15,000 in fees plus $3,873.92 in disbursements on a partial indemnity basis.

The defendant bank moved for summary judgment dismissing the plaintiffs' claim and granting its counterclaim for outstanding loan balances and possession of the mortgaged property.

The plaintiffs alleged a bank teller misappropriated a cash payment, claiming this fundamental breach extinguished their debt obligations.

The court found no evidence that a cash payment was made, concluding the teller merely made a transactional error that caused no loss.

Finding no genuine issue for trial, the court dismissed the plaintiffs' claim and granted summary judgment to the bank on its counterclaim.