Wendy M. Matheson

The moving party sought leave to appeal three decisions of the Information and Privacy Commissioner to the Divisional Court.

The respondents requested the court initiate the process under Rule 2.1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to dismiss the proceeding.

The court found that there is no statutory right or jurisdiction to seek leave to appeal from a decision of the IPC to the Divisional Court.

The proceeding was dismissed as frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process under Rule 2.1.

The moving party sought leave to appeal a decision dated July 30, 2024.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal with costs fixed at $5,000.

Consequently, the responding party's cross-motion was dismissed as moot without costs.

The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal a prior decision.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal without costs.

The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal an earlier order.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and ordered the moving party to pay costs of $5,000 all inclusive to the responding party.

The applicant, a school board trustee, sought judicial review of the respondent school board's decision to sanction her for breaching its Code of Conduct.

The sanctions arose from the applicant's conduct and statements, including social media posts, criticizing the board and fellow trustees.

The applicant argued the decision infringed her freedom of expression under s. 2(b) of the Charter and that she was denied procedural fairness.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the board's decision was reasonable, proportionately balanced the applicant's expressive rights with the statutory objectives of the Education Act, and afforded her adequate procedural fairness.

The proposed interveners brought a late motion for leave to intervene in an application for judicial review.

The respondent opposed the motion, arguing the interveners lacked a distinct perspective and sought to supplement the evidentiary record.

The Divisional Court granted leave to intervene on strict terms, limiting the interveners to five minutes of oral submissions, prohibiting them from repeating the applicant's submissions, and barring them from supplementing the evidentiary record or taking a position on the ultimate disposition.

During the hearing, the interveners attempted to rely on new evidence, which the court rejected as procedurally unfair.

The moving party sought to quash the respondent's application for judicial review and motion for leave to appeal an Ontario Land Tribunal decision.

The moving party argued the proceedings were moot due to recent legislative amendments to the Planning Act under Bill 185.

The court dismissed the motion to quash, finding the moving party failed to meet the high threshold of showing the proceedings were manifestly devoid of merit, leaving the statutory interpretation and mootness issues to be decided by the panel hearing the merits.

The moving party sought leave to appeal a prior decision and brought a motion for the production of documents.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and dismissed the motion for document production without prejudice to steps that could be taken in the Superior Court.

Costs of $500 were awarded to the responding parties.

The appellant appealed a Landlord and Tenant Board decision finding that the Residential Tenancies Act did not apply to his occupation of an Airbnb unit.

The appellant had booked the unit for several months and alleged he was illegally locked out when the respondent refused a further extension.

The Divisional Court upheld the Board's finding that the unit fell within the section 5(a) exemption for temporary living accommodations, noting the unit was fully furnished and akin to a motel.

The court also found no breach of procedural fairness in the Board's decision to hear the jurisdiction and lockout applications together.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a Small Claims Court decision striking out his negligence claim against the Family Responsibility Office (FRO).

The appellant alleged that FRO was negligent in handling his child support payments and reporting him to a credit bureau, arguing FRO owed him a duty to reply to his correspondence.

The Divisional Court upheld the Deputy Judge's finding that FRO did not owe a duty of care to the appellant, applying the Cooper v. Hobart framework.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondent.

The tenant appealed a Landlord and Tenant Board review decision that upheld the dismissal of his application for failing to attend the hearing.

The tenant had requested an adjournment due to a scheduled rotator cuff surgery and provided medical letters, including one from his treating psychiatrist stating he would be unable to participate in the hearing process.

The LTB denied the adjournment, finding the medical opinion speculative, and proceeded in the tenant's absence.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, holding that the LTB superficially rejected the medical evidence and denied the tenant procedural fairness by depriving him of an adequate opportunity to be heard.

The matter was remitted to the LTB for a new hearing.

The moving party insurer sought an extension of time to commence an application for judicial review of a 2020 Licence Appeal Tribunal (LAT) decision regarding income replacement benefits.

The moving party relied on the recent Supreme Court of Canada decision in Yatar to explain the delay.

The Divisional Court granted the motion on terms, noting that while finality is a central principle, the prejudice to the respondent was diluted by the fact that an appeal regarding the same benefits was still outstanding at the Court of Appeal.

The tenant appealed a Landlord and Tenant Board decision ordering her eviction for persistently failing to pay rent on time.

The tenant argued the LTB was procedurally unfair in scheduling the landlord's applications before her own and erred in law by not excusing her deliberate withholding of rent due to maintenance issues.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the LTB's scheduling was a discretionary matter that did not breach procedural fairness.

The Court further held that persistent late payment is a factual finding not subject to appeal, and the LTB properly considered the tenant's circumstances when declining to grant relief from eviction under section 83 of the Residential Tenancies Act.

The respondents brought a motion for security for costs of an appeal regarding a proposal to locate a homeless shelter.

The appellant, a corporation, admitted it had insufficient assets to pay costs but did not claim impecuniosity.

The court assessed the merits of the appeal, finding the grounds relating to prematurity and the rejection of expert evidence on domestic law to be weak.

Considering the holistic factors and the justice of the case, the court ordered the appellant to pay $7,500 into court as security for costs.

The moving party sought leave to appeal an interlocutory procedural order regarding amendments to a statement of claim.

The court issued a notice under Rule 2.1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, considering whether to dismiss the motion as frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process.

Noting the moving party's history of numerous dismissed proceedings and the fundamental flaws in the current motion, the court dismissed the proceeding under Rule 2.1.

The court also imposed terms requiring the moving party to obtain permission before commencing further proceedings or seeking fee waivers in the Divisional Court.

The moving party brought two motions: one to appoint a litigation guardian and another for an extension of time to appeal a trial decision.

The court granted the motion to appoint the moving party's common law spouse as litigation guardian, finding the requirements of Rule 7 were met.

The court also granted the extension of time to appeal on terms, noting the delay was largely explained by the self-represented moving party mistakenly filing the appeal in the Court of Appeal instead of the Divisional Court, and finding no real prejudice to the responding party.

The appellant, a registered mutual fund salesperson, appealed a decision finding he breached his duty to deal fairly, honestly, and in good faith with a vulnerable client by accepting power of attorney and being named sole beneficiary of her estate.

He also appealed the resulting sanctions, including a permanent ban and a $500,000 administrative penalty.

The respondent cross-appealed the Tribunal's refusal to order disgorgement of the testamentary benefit.

The Divisional Court dismissed both the appeal and the cross-appeal, finding no errors in the Tribunal's jurisdiction, factual findings, or penalty assessments.

The appellant appealed an Associate Justice's decision granting the respondent's motion to strike her statement of defence.

The appellant did not attend the motion hearing because she was unable to access the CaseLines program to obtain the virtual hearing link.

The Divisional Court found that this constituted a denial of procedural fairness, as the appellant was denied a reasonable opportunity to participate.

The appeal was granted and the motion remitted for a new hearing.

The landlord brought a motion to lift the stay of a Landlord and Tenant Board eviction order pending the tenant's appeal.

The tenant had failed to comply with a previous court order requiring him to make payments toward substantial rental arrears and ongoing monthly rent.

The tenant did not attend the motion hearing and informed the court via email that he had relocated overseas and was abandoning the appeal.

The court granted the unopposed motion, lifted the stay, dismissed the appeal as abandoned, and awarded costs to the landlord.

The appellant tenants appealed a Landlord and Tenant Board decision terminating their tenancy and ordering payment of rent arrears, as well as a subsequent review order denying their request for a review without a hearing.

The tenants had missed the original hearing due to confusion over receiving two different hearing notices.

The Divisional Court held that it was procedurally unfair for the Board to deny the review request at the preliminary stage without a hearing, given the genuine confusion.

The appeal was granted and the matter remitted to the Board for a new hearing solely on the issue of rent arrears, as the eviction had already been enforced.