Warren K. Winkler

The appellant appealed his conviction for fraud on the public, arguing the trial judge provided inadequate reasons, failed to instruct herself on the dangers of unconfirmed evidence, and rendered inconsistent verdicts.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's decision rested on independent evidence establishing the appellant's intent to defraud by inflating revenue figures.

The court also found the verdicts were not inconsistent, as the fraudulent intent was formed after the loans were made but before the public relied on the false financial statements.

The Crown's appeal of the acquittals was dismissed as abandoned.

The appellant sought leave to appeal his conviction for driving with a blood alcohol level over 80.

The trial judge found a breach of the appellant's section 10(b) Charter rights because the police failed to adequately facilitate contact with his counsel of choice, but admitted the breathalyzer readings under section 24(2).

The Court of Appeal agreed with the lower courts that the evidence was admissible and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board, seeking an absolute discharge and community living privileges.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the Board's conclusion that the appellant continued to pose a significant risk to public safety was reasonable based on unchallenged evidence.

The Court also found the Board's assessment regarding community living privileges was reasonable, though it directed that future reviews include more information regarding the appellant's aboriginal status and a future-looking treatment plan.

The appellant appealed his 15-year sentence for manslaughter.

The Court of Appeal upheld the 15-year sentence, finding it fit for a brutal aggravated homicide and noting the sentencing judge made no errors regarding parity or the appellant's role.

However, the Court found the sentencing judge erred in granting only 1.22 days of credit for pre-trial custody based on a lack of pre-charge programming.

The Court increased the pre-trial custody credit to the standard 2-for-1 ratio, reducing the remaining sentence to eight years and six months.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment with a 15-year parole ineligibility period following a fatal shooting in a park.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred by failing to give a correcting instruction regarding unproven suggestions made during cross-examination and by improperly instructing the jury on post-offence conduct.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in the cross-examination instruction and applying the curative proviso to the post-offence conduct instruction error, given the overwhelming evidence against the appellant.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of her application from a forfeiture order.

The Crown conceded that the application judge erred in failing to address the matter on the merits and agreed not to argue estoppel.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, set aside the order, and remitted the matter back to the Superior Court of Justice to be dealt with on the merits.

The respondent pleaded guilty to aggravated assault after biting off part of the victim's finger during a fight.

The trial judge, upon learning a conditional sentence was unavailable for a serious personal injury offence, imposed a probation order with six months of house arrest.

The Crown appealed.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge erred in law by imposing a disguised conditional sentence that circumvented Parliament's intent.

Taking into account the respondent's status as a youthful first offender and the house arrest already served, the Court varied the sentence to 21 days of intermittent custody.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment regarding the equalization of net family property and spousal support.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge erred by failing to allow a deduction for reasonably foreseeable future legal costs related to ongoing litigation at the date of separation, allowing a $300,000 deduction.

The Court also corrected calculation errors in retroactive spousal support and adjusted ongoing spousal support to $1,400 per month.

The appeal was allowed in part, with the equalization payment and spousal support amounts reduced.

The appellant franchisor appealed a trial judgment finding it breached a franchise agreement and the statutory duty of good faith under the Arthur Wishart Act.

The trial judge found the franchisor deliberately withheld information from the franchisee regarding a new head lease and denied the franchisee's conditional right of renewal.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's interpretation of the contract, her decision to treat the individual franchisee and his corporation as a single entity, and the damages awarded for breach of contract, breach of good faith, and mental distress.

The appellant landlord appealed a decision dismissing its appeal from a claims officer's ruling in a receivership proceeding.

The appellant argued the claims officer erred in characterizing certain assets as chattels rather than fixtures, improperly placed the burden of proof on the appellant, rejected expert evidence regarding how the assets were secured, and erred in assessing damages.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the factual determination of chattels versus fixtures, and no error in principle regarding the burden of proof or damages assessment.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment order dismissing their action against the respondents, who had built the house in question.

The Court of Appeal found that while the motion judge misstated the test under the new summary judgment rule, the critical error was finding no evidence to establish knowledge or causation.

The Court concluded there was sufficient evidence for a trial judge to find knowledge and causation, particularly because the respondents built the house.

The appeal was allowed and the matter remitted for trial.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault and sexual assault with a weapon against his estranged spouse.

He argued the trial judge erred in relying on the complainant's post-offence demeanour, improperly rejected his evidence, and sought to introduce fresh expert evidence that a mark on his finger was not a bite mark.

The majority of the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly assessed credibility and that the fresh evidence, even if believed, could not reasonably be expected to have affected the result given the strength of the other evidence.

The self-represented appellant purported to appeal a costs-only order following the dismissal of his underlying action.

The Court of Appeal held that there is no right of appeal from a costs order and that leave is required.

Treating the materials as an application for leave to appeal costs, the Court refused leave and awarded costs of $1,000 to each of the four responding groups.

The appellants, two youthful aboriginal offenders, were convicted of offences arising from a home invasion and sentenced to four years' imprisonment.

On appeal, they argued the trial judge failed to properly apply the Gladue principles and erred in treating the sentencing range for home invasions as a mandatory minimum.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeals, finding the trial judge gave insufficient weight to restorative justice objectives and the recommendations of a sentencing circle.

The court varied Jacko's sentence to two years less a day conditional, given his extraordinary rehabilitative efforts, and varied Manitowabi's sentence to two years less a day in jail followed by probation.

The moving parties sought leave to appeal an order approving a settlement in the CCAA proceedings of Nortel Networks.

The Court of Appeal denied leave, finding no procedural or substantive unfairness in the settlement.

The motion judge had carefully balanced the various interests at stake and made no demonstrable error.

The appellant requested an adjournment of the appeal, which was denied because the appellant had known for five months that new counsel was needed and a previous order made the appeal peremptory.

On the merits, the Court of Appeal found no error in the lower court's judgment and dismissed the appeal, awarding costs to the respondents.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment finding him liable for libel arising from statements published on a personal website and posted on third-party websites about an interior designer.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred by applying a 'completely true' test instead of a 'substantially true' test, and erred in applying the doctrine of fair comment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge explicitly stated and properly applied the 'substantially true' test, and correctly concluded the defence of fair comment failed because the underlying facts were not true.

Gary McHale laid a private information alleging three individuals committed a crime.

A justice of the peace received the information.

Before the pre-enquete hearing under s. 507.1 of the Criminal Code could begin, a Crown Attorney intervened and withdrew the charges.

McHale successfully applied for mandamus in the Superior Court, which directed the pre-enquete to proceed.

The Crown appealed.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the Crown's common law authority to withdraw a private information does not crystallize until the justice determines to issue process at the conclusion of the pre-enquete.

The appellant appealed an order striking his claim for damages against his wife's lawyers in matrimonial proceedings.

The appellant alleged that his wife's share of the proceeds from the sale of the matrimonial home constituted trust funds, and that her lawyers were liable for knowing receipt of trust funds when they were paid from those proceeds.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the motion judge that the property in question was not impressed with a trust.

The appellant was convicted of first-degree murder after his common-law wife fell to her death from a cliff.

The Crown's case was circumstantial, relying on motive (an ongoing affair), opportunity, and the appellant's statements and after-the-fact conduct.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred in admitting hearsay statements made by the deceased to friends about her fear of the appellant, and in instructing the jury on the use of his out-of-court statements and after-the-fact conduct.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the admission of the hearsay evidence under the principled approach, and concluding that the jury instructions were adequate and fair.