Vallery Marilyn Bayly

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual offences against his daughter, arguing the trial judge erred in refusing to review the complainant's personal journals, failing to consider her motive to lie, and assessing credibility.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's discretionary decision that reviewing the highly private journals was not necessary in the interests of justice, given the availability of other evidence to support the appellant's motive theory.

The Court also found the trial judge properly considered the motive theory and made reasonable credibility findings supported by the evidence.

The appellant appealed convictions for non-consensual distribution of intimate images, criminal harassment, extortion by libel, and mischief to computer data.

The appellant, who was self-represented at trial, argued that the trial judge failed to provide sufficient assistance and erred by allowing the trial to proceed without counsel.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial was fair, the judge provided adequate assistance, and the appellant's actions suggested an attempt to delay proceedings rather than a genuine inability to secure counsel.

The appellant, C.G., appealed his convictions for sexual assault, sexual interference, invitation to sexual touching, and breach of recognizance.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge made three fundamental errors: an inadequate analysis of "inadvertent collusion" concerning defence witnesses, a failure to analyze crucial competing exculpatory evidence (e.g., creaky floors, light sleepers, appellant's work schedule), and an improper application of the principles from R. v. W. (D.) by not explaining why the exculpatory evidence failed to raise a reasonable doubt.

The trial judge also erred by relying on a stereotype about sex offenders taking "incredible risks" without proper evidentiary foundation.

The appeal was allowed, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant was convicted of sexual contact and inciting sexual contact with a person under 14.

He appealed his convictions and sought leave to appeal his 30-month sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal against conviction, finding no error in the trial judge's assessment of the complainant's credibility, particularly regarding inconsistent statements about childhood events.

The court also granted leave to appeal the sentence but dismissed the appeal, affirming the trial judge's consideration of the appellant's age and health, and finding no exceptional circumstances due to the COVID-19 pandemic to warrant a reduced sentence.

The appellant appealed convictions for sexual assault and sexual interference.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in assessing the complainant's credibility by finding a lack of motive to fabricate, which was not supported by evidence and improperly bolstered the complainant's testimony.

The court also addressed the standard for production of Children's Aid Society records, noting a lower privacy interest than counselling records.

The appeal was allowed, and a new trial ordered due to the credibility assessment error.

The appellant, found not criminally responsible (NCR) for violent offences against intimate partners, appealed the Ontario Review Board's (ORB) disposition ordering his detention at the Centre for Addiction and Mental Health (CAMH).

He argued the ORB erred in finding him a significant threat and in failing to grant an absolute or conditional discharge, emphasizing a four-year period of stability while on bail.

The Court of Appeal upheld the ORB's decision, finding it reasonably concluded the appellant posed a significant threat due to his psychiatric history, ongoing symptoms, medication non-compliance, and impaired insight.

The court also found that a detention order was necessary given the inadequacy of the Mental Health Act to manage his risk, and that the ORB had implicitly considered and rejected a conditional discharge.

The appellant was convicted of sexual offences against his niece and appealed both his conviction and sentence.

The appeal challenged the trial judge's assessment of the complainant's credibility, specifically regarding the absence of a motive to fabricate, the use of prior consistent statements, the evaluation of inconsistencies in testimony, and the weight given to the complainant's demeanor.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal against conviction, finding no reversible error in the trial judge's credibility assessment, which properly considered the complainant's age and the context of the defence's arguments.

Leave to appeal the sentence was granted, but the appeal against sentence was also dismissed, as the sentence of two years less a day was deemed reasonable given the nature of the offences and the appellant's position of trust.

The accused, R.A., appealed a global sentence of five and one-half years' imprisonment (reduced to five years for time served) imposed after pleading guilty to sexual assault, making sexually explicit material available to a child, and two counts of child luring.

The complainant was 15 years old, and the accused also engaged with an undercover officer posing as a 14-year-old.

The sentencing judge considered significant mitigating factors, including a guilty plea, remorse, openness to therapeutic intervention, absence of a criminal record, and strong work history, alongside aggravating factors such as the victim's age, age gap, grooming techniques, and repeated sexual activity.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in principle by the sentencing judge and concluding that the sentence was not demonstrably unfit.

The court affirmed the importance of deterrence and denunciation for child sexual offences and noted that mid-single digit penitentiary terms are normal for such crimes.

The accused was convicted at trial of incest and sexual interference against the complainant, his daughter.

The accused appealed on the basis that the trial judge improperly extended or relied upon principles from governing cases regarding the timing of complaint, thereby sidestepping inconsistencies in the complainant's evidence, and that the trial judge failed to provide sufficient reasons on how he resolved those inconsistencies.

A majority of the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal and upheld the convictions.

The Supreme Court of Canada unanimously dismissed the further appeal, substantially for the reasons of the majority of the Court of Appeal.

The appellant was convicted of second-degree murder following a home invasion and robbery where a co-perpetrator shot and killed the victim.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on post-offence conduct, circumstantial evidence, and by failing to answer a withdrawn jury question regarding the mens rea for murder.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the jury instructions and concluding the trial judge appropriately accepted the jury's decision to withdraw their question after they resolved it themselves.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, arguing the trial judge erred in applying the W.(D.) test.

The appellant had grabbed the complainant from behind, claiming he mistakenly believed she was his girlfriend.

The trial judge rejected the appellant's evidence and convicted him.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding the trial judge failed to properly apply the second step of the W.(D.) test by not considering whether the exculpatory evidence of the appellant's girlfriend raised a reasonable doubt.

The Crown appealed acquittals and sentence arising from offences involving the sale of sexual services by underage females.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge erred by defining 'procures' and 'harbours' too narrowly when directing the jury and granting a directed verdict, which materially affected several acquittals.

New trials were ordered on multiple counts.

The court also found significant errors in principle in sentencing, including minimizing the inherent exploitation of the offences, overemphasizing bail conditions, and improperly relying on media publicity to satisfy deterrence.

While upholding declarations that certain mandatory minimum sentences were unconstitutional under s. 12 of the Charter, the court substituted a global sentence of 15 months’ imprisonment followed by probation.

The Crown appealed acquittals for making and distributing child pornography and child luring arising from sexualized text messages sent by an adult to a 14‑year‑old boy about the boy's friend.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge committed legal errors in interpreting ss. 163.1 and 172.1 of the Criminal Code.

Private electronic communications can constitute “written material” capable of meeting the statutory definition of child pornography, and the analysis must focus objectively on the content of the communications rather than the accused's claimed joking motive.

The trial judge also erred by importing a requirement that luring be for a sexual purpose and by failing to consider the facilitation element of s. 172.1.

Because the legal errors affected the acquittals, the court set them aside and ordered a new trial on all counts.

L'appelant a interjeté appel de sa condamnation et de sa peine, alléguant une représentation inefficace de son avocat au procès.

Il a soutenu que son avocat n'avait pas informé la cour de son incapacité à subir son procès, n'avait pas présenté de preuve de son hospitalisation pour démontrer son impossibilité de participer à la fraude, et n'avait pas mené les enquêtes nécessaires pour sa défense.

La Cour d'appel a rejeté ces motifs, estimant que l'affidavit de l'avocat répondait de manière complète et crédible à toutes les allégations de négligence.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for child luring after communicating online with an undercover police officer posing as a 14-year-old.

The appellant claimed he knew the person was not a minor and only met them for a 'gotcha' moment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge properly applied the W.(D.) framework and drew logical inferences from the text messages.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, though the victim surcharge was set aside.

The Crown appealed the acquittal of the respondent on charges of assault with a weapon, breaking and entering, robbery, and aggravated assault.

The Crown argued that the trial judge erred in law by assessing the evidence piecemeal rather than considering it holistically, thereby failing to appreciate how the cumulative evidence built the strength of the Crown's case.

While the appellate court found that the trial judge did commit an error of law in her approach to the evidence, the appeal was dismissed because the victim—a Crown witness who knew the respondent well—testified with certainty that the attacker was not the respondent.

This independent exculpatory evidence raised a reasonable doubt that could not be overcome by the trial judge's error.

An appeal under Part XX.1 of the Criminal Code regarding the disposition of the Ontario Review Board dated March 14, 2019.

Although the parties agreed the appeal was moot, there was a dispute regarding the wording of the endorsement.

The court agreed with the appellant's proposed wording and dismissed the appeal as moot, noting that a subsequent Ontario Review Board hearing determined the appellant should be transferred to St. Joseph's Healthcare in Hamilton due to a treatment impasse with the Centre for Addiction and Mental Health.

Appeal from a conviction for sexual assault following a judge-alone trial.

The appellant and complainant were guests at the same hostel and shared a co-ed room.

The complainant alleged the appellant sexually assaulted her; the appellant claimed the sexual contact was consensual.

The trial judge convicted the appellant.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found that the trial judge's conduct and reasons for judgment gave rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias and an appearance of unfairness, warranting a new trial.

The Crown appealed the acquittal of the respondent on charges of human trafficking, procuring a person to offer or provide sexual services for consideration, and advertising sexual services for consideration.

The trial judge misdirected the jury on the interpretation of the statutory provisions governing these offences.

Specifically, the trial judge erred by: (1) instructing the jury to read the disjunctive conduct elements conjunctively, requiring proof of near-total control over the complainant's movements; (2) failing to distinguish between "direction" and "influence" as different degrees of coercion; and (3) improperly extending the immunity provision for advertising one's own sexual services to those who assist in such advertising.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial.

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board ordering his continued detention at the General Forensic Unit of the Centre for Addiction and Mental Health.

The appellant had been found not criminally responsible for assault and robbery offences committed in 2013 near Sudbury.

He sought an absolute or conditional discharge, arguing he posed no significant risk of serious harm to the public.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the Board's decision to be reasonable given concerns about the appellant's drug use triggering psychotic decompensation and his lack of community living experience.

However, the court expressed concern that the appellant's inability to abstain from drug use had become an insurmountable barrier to obtaining privileges and suggested the Board consider crafting a disposition to facilitate community living experience in future reviews.