Suzanne Côté

The appellant was convicted by a jury of participation in the activities of a criminal organization for the purpose of weapons trafficking, contrary to s. 467.11 of the Criminal Code, following an investigation into illegal firearms trafficking.

On appeal, the appellant argued that the trial judge erred in law in his jury instructions on the definition of 'criminal organization' by failing to explain that such an organization must have structure and continuity, as required by R. v. Venneri.

The Supreme Court of Canada (majority) held that the trial judge's failure to instruct the jury that a criminal organization must pose an enhanced threat to society by virtue of its structure and continuity constituted an error of law, as the bare statutory definition is insufficient without this gloss from Venneri.

The majority further clarified the functional approach to appellate review of jury instructions, explaining that a properly equipped jury is one that is both accurately and sufficiently instructed, and that trial circumstances — including evidence, counsel's arguments, and the absence of objection — cannot substitute for a mandatory accurate and sufficient instruction on the law.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction on the criminal organization count set aside, and a new trial ordered on that count.

The appellant was charged with summary conviction impaired driving and released on an undertaking not to operate a motor vehicle for 21 months prior to sentencing.

At sentencing, the judge imposed the mandatory one-year driving prohibition under s. 259(1)(a) of the Criminal Code but backdated it to the commencement of the pre-sentence prohibition, effectively giving credit for time already served.

The Court of Appeal held that granting such credit was impermissible as it would reduce the sentence below the mandatory minimum.

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, holding that common law judicial discretion to grant credit for a pre-sentence driving prohibition — recognized in R. v. Lacasse — is not displaced by s. 259(1)(a) or s. 719(1) of the Criminal Code, as those provisions govern the imposition of a minimum punishment and the commencement of a sentence respectively, and do not preclude a sentencing court from crediting pre-sentence prohibition time served.

The appellants challenged the constitutional validity of s. 159.3 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations, which designates the United States as a safe third country, rendering refugee claimants arriving at Canadian land ports of entry from the United States ineligible to have their claims considered in Canada.

The Court held that s. 159.3 is not ultra vires the IRPA, as the validity of a regulation is assessed at the time of promulgation.

The Court further held that s. 159.3 does not breach s. 7 of the Charter: while some effects on liberty and security of the person are causally connected to Canadian state action, the legislative scheme is neither overbroad nor grossly disproportionate given the availability of statutory safety valves that guard against real and not speculative risks of refoulement.

The s. 15 equality rights challenge, based on the disproportionate impact on women fearing gender-based persecution, was remitted to the Federal Court for determination on the merits.

The appellant corporation, which held approximately $90 million in non-capital losses and other tax attributes it could not itself utilize, entered into a complex arrangement with a venture capital company to monetize those tax attributes.

Through a series of transactions, the appellant's assets and liabilities were stripped into a parent company, and the venture capital company obtained contractual control over the appellant's board composition and activities via an investment agreement, while never formally acquiring de jure control of its shares.

The appellant then carried on a new investment business using the tax attributes to shelter income.

The Supreme Court held, 7-1, that the transactions constituted abusive tax avoidance under the general anti-avoidance rule (GAAR) in s. 245 of the Income Tax Act.

The object, spirit and purpose of s. 111(5) is to prevent corporations from being acquired by unrelated parties in order to deduct unused losses against income from another business for the benefit of new shareholders; the transactions achieved the functional equivalent of an acquisition of control and frustrated that rationale.

A school board trustee sued a teachers' union president for defamation arising from public statements characterizing the trustee's online posts opposing a provincial sexual orientation and gender identity educational initiative as bigoted, transphobic, and hateful.

The defendant applied to dismiss the action under British Columbia's anti-SLAPP statute, the Protection of Public Participation Act.

The chambers judge dismissed the defamation action, finding a valid fair comment defence and that the public interest in protecting the defendant's counter-speech outweighed the limited harm to the plaintiff.

The Court of Appeal reinstated the action.

The Supreme Court of Canada majority restored the chambers judge's dismissal order, holding that the plaintiff failed to adduce sufficient evidence of serious harm causally linked to the defendant's statements, and that the defendant's expression as counter-speech on a matter of public interest relating to a marginalized group was deserving of significant protection under the public interest weighing exercise in s. 4(2)(b) of the PPPA.

Côté J. dissented, concluding the plaintiff was entitled to a day in court and that the chambers judge erred in failing to consider aggravating factors to harm and the quality of the expression at issue.

The appellant sought division of family property pursuant to Saskatchewan's Family Property Act after the parties executed a separation agreement without independent legal advice or financial disclosure.

The trial judge found the agreement not binding and equalized the family property, ordering the respondent to pay approximately $90,000.

The Court of Appeal applied the Miglin framework and found the agreement entitled to great weight, ordering the appellant to pay approximately $5,000.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the Miglin framework should not be transposed wholesale into provincial family property legislation, which requires a statute-specific analytical approach.

The Court found the agreement binding and procedurally sound, with no demonstrated prejudice from the absence of legal advice or disclosure.

The appeal was allowed and the family home and household goods were divided as of the date of trial, resulting in a payment of $43,382.63 owed by the respondent to the appellant.

The appellant was charged with manslaughter and firearms offences in December 2015.

Trial was scheduled within the Jordan ceiling but delays arose when the Crown refused to consent to a judge-alone trial, causing the net delay to reach approximately 35 months, exceeding the 30-month ceiling.

The trial judge denied a stay of proceedings by applying a transitional exceptional circumstance, finding the parties had reasonably relied on pre-Jordan law.

The Supreme Court held that no transitional exceptional circumstance applied: after Jordan was decided in July 2016, the parties could not have reasonably relied on the prior state of the law, and the delay was attributable to the Crown's refusal to adapt rather than insufficient time for the system to do so.

The Court also rejected a bright-line rule that would characterize all delay following defence counsel's rejection of a court-offered date as defence delay.

The Crown appealed a Court of Appeal decision restoring stay applications for abuse of process that a trial judge had summarily dismissed following a Vukelich hearing.

The accused had alleged systemic police misconduct and inhumane conditions of confinement prejudicing their right to a fair trial.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the Crown's appeal and held that the correct threshold for summary dismissal of applications in the criminal law context is whether the application is manifestly frivolous — a rigorous standard requiring that the frivolous nature of the application be obvious on the face of the record.

The trial judge erred by failing to assume the truth of the alleged facts and inferences and by applying an insufficiently rigorous threshold that slid towards the merits of the underlying applications.

The appellant challenged provisions of Quebec's Cannabis Regulation Act that completely prohibit the possession and cultivation of cannabis plants in a dwelling-house, arguing they fell under federal criminal law power or were inoperative due to federal paramountcy.

The Supreme Court held that the impugned provisions are a valid exercise of provincial jurisdiction under ss. 92(13) and (16) of the Constitution Act, 1867, finding their pith and substance is to ensure the effectiveness of the state monopoly on cannabis sales to protect public health and security.

The Court further held that the provisions do not frustrate the purpose of the federal Cannabis Act, because Parliament's exemption of up to four home-grown plants does not confer positive rights to cultivate, and the provincial objectives are compatible with the federal scheme's goals of combating illicit cannabis activity.

The Crown appealed an acquittal entered by the Quebec Court of Appeal arising from the respondent's refusal to provide a roadside breath sample under s. 254(2)(b) of the Criminal Code when the demanding officer did not have an approved screening device (ASD) in his possession.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the word 'forthwith' in s. 254(2)(b) must be interpreted in accordance with its ordinary meaning — immediately or without delay — and that the absence of an ASD at the scene at the time a demand is made is not an unusual circumstance justifying a flexible interpretation of that requirement.

A demand made when no ASD is present is therefore invalid, and a driver cannot be criminally liable for refusing to comply with a demand that it was physically impossible to comply with.

The Crown bears the burden of establishing unusual circumstances to justify any departure from the immediacy requirement.

The appeal was dismissed and the acquittal upheld.

The Crown appealed an acquittal for impaired driving and driving with excessive blood alcohol after police conducted a random sobriety stop on private property.

The officers had formed the intention to stop the respondent while he was on the highway under s. 48(1) of the Highway Traffic Act, but only effected the stop after he had pulled onto a private driveway.

The Supreme Court held that s. 48(1) did not authorize random sobriety stops on private property, as the respondent was no longer a 'driver' within the HTA's definition when stopped, and the police breached his s. 9 Charter rights.

However, applying the Grant framework, the Court declined to exclude the evidence under s. 24(2), finding that the legal uncertainty at the time rendered the breach not egregious, and the reliable and crucial nature of the evidence combined with the serious public interest in combatting impaired driving outweighed the first two lines of inquiry.

The accused voluntarily made admissions during a treatment process concerning acts of a sexual nature committed against a child.

Those admissions were sent to the director of youth protection and then to police with the accused's consent.

The accused was charged with sexual assault and filed a motion to exclude the admissions, which the trial judge dismissed.

The Court of Appeal entered an acquittal on the basis that the admissions were inadmissible.

The Supreme Court, in a majority decision, allowed the Crown's appeal on the sole issue of the accused's consent to disclosure of his admissions, restoring the conviction.

The dissenting judge would have dismissed the appeal substantially for the reasons of the Court of Appeal majority.

The appellant was convicted of offences arising from a home invasion robbery on the basis of circumstantial evidence of identity, namely DNA found on a cigarette butt in a stolen vehicle and a victim's testimony that he may have heard the appellant's last name spoken during the robbery.

The majority of the Supreme Court of Canada found the verdicts unreasonable, holding that the DNA evidence alone did not establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and that the trial judge misapprehended the victim's testimony and failed to address serious concerns about his reliability.

The majority set aside the convictions and substituted verdicts of acquittal.

Côté and O'Bonsawin JJ. dissented, finding the combined effect of the DNA and identification evidence reasonably supported the inference of guilt.

A member of the Canadian Armed Forces posted abroad was convicted of voyeurism, possession of a device for surreptitious interception of private communications, sexual assault, and disgraceful conduct, following a search of his residence and electronic devices by Canadian military investigators and local police operating under a Virginia warrant.

The appellant challenged the search as violating s. 8 of the Charter, arguing the search was unauthorized and unreasonably expanded to cover unanticipated offences.

The majority held that the search was authorized by law under the Virginia warrant, which expressly covered electronic devices; that the warrant met the Vu standard for specific prior authorization of digital searches; and that evidence of sexual assault discovered inadvertently during triage of electronic devices was admissible under the plain view doctrine.

The Court declined to reconsider the extraterritorial application of the Charter as established in R. v. Hape.

The appeal was dismissed and convictions affirmed.

The appellant pleaded guilty to intentionally discharging a firearm into or at a place knowing or being reckless as to whether another person was present, contrary to s. 244.2(1)(a) of the Criminal Code, and challenged the constitutionality of the mandatory minimum sentence of four years' imprisonment under s. 244.2(3)(b) on the basis of a reasonable hypothetical involving a young person firing an air-powered pistol or rifle at a residence incapable of perforating its walls.

The majority held that the mandatory minimum is grossly disproportionate under s. 12 of the Charter because the offence captures a wide spectrum of conduct ranging from acts that present little danger to the public to those that pose a grave risk, and the fit sentence for the hypothetical youthful offender would be a suspended sentence of up to 12 months' probation — rendering a four-year custodial term totally out of sync with sentencing norms and incompatible with human dignity.

The declaration of invalidity was applied retroactively and the three-and-a-half-year sentence imposed by the sentencing judge was reinstated.

Côté J. dissented, finding that the hypothetical was not a reasonably foreseeable application of the offence and that the mandatory minimum did not meet the high threshold for cruel and unusual punishment.

The Crown appealed declarations of unconstitutionality of mandatory minimum sentences for robbery with a restricted or prohibited firearm (five years under s. 344(1)(a)(i)) and robbery with an ordinary firearm (four years under the former s. 344(1)(a.1)) of the Criminal Code.

The majority held that neither mandatory minimum constituted cruel and unusual punishment under s. 12 of the Charter, finding the offences narrowly defined, high in gravity and moral culpability, and the minimums not grossly disproportionate even in reasonably foreseeable cases.

The Court affirmed the two-stage framework from the companion case R. v. Hills, 2023 SCC 2, and addressed the role of Indigeneity in the s. 12 analysis.

Karakatsanis and Jamal JJ. dissented, concluding both provisions were unconstitutional and should be struck down.

The Crown appealed a Court of Appeal decision that set aside the accused's conviction for sexual offences against a young child and entered an acquittal.

The trial judge had admitted the child's unsworn videotaped police statement under the principled exception to the hearsay rule after a psychologist concluded the child could not testify without undue trauma.

The Court of Appeal majority found the trial judge erred in the threshold reliability analysis by failing to address the role of cross-examination and making a positive finding of no motive to fabricate.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal, substantially adopting the reasons of the Court of Appeal dissent, and restored the conviction.

Two appellants were unlawfully detained by police under non-existent statutory authority after reporting their roommate's death, then later arrested for murder by a homicide detective who directed their continued questioning.

At issue were: the voluntariness of one appellant's confession, whether the police had reasonable and probable grounds for the murder arrests, and whether the confessions should be excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The majority dismissed the appeals, holding that one confession was voluntary, the arrests were lawful, and that although one confession was obtained in a manner connected to Charter breaches, admission would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The dissent would have allowed the appeals, finding the arrests were not supported by reasonable grounds and rejecting the 'fresh start' doctrine as a basis to sever the connection between Charter breaches and the evidence obtained.

The appellant was convicted of possession of a loaded restricted firearm and failure to comply with a condition of a recognizance after a firearm was found in his bag in the back seat of a car also occupied by two other individuals.

The trial judge rejected the appellant's testimony that he did not know the firearm was in his bag as not credible and concluded that the only reasonable inference from the circumstantial evidence was that the firearm had been concealed in the bag with the appellant's knowledge.

The appellant appealed to the Court of Appeal on the ground that the verdict was unreasonable; the majority dismissed that appeal.

The Supreme Court unanimously dismissed the further appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's application of the W.(D.) framework, no error in the Court of Appeal's application of Villaroman, and no error in the trial judge's use of the appellant's calm demeanour at arrest as one element of the circumstantial evidence of knowledge.

The appellant (mother) wrongfully retained two young children in Ontario after travelling from Dubai, UAE, where the children habitually resided.

The respondent father applied under s. 40 of the Children's Law Reform Act for a return order.

The trial judge declined jurisdiction under s. 23 of the CLRA, finding the serious harm threshold was not met, and ordered the children's return to Dubai.

The Supreme Court of Canada, 5-4, dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge committed no palpable and overriding error in concluding the children would not suffer serious harm, that separation from a primary caregiver does not automatically satisfy the serious harm threshold, and that the father's undertakings regarding the mother's residency should be included explicitly in the return order.

The dissent would have allowed the appeal on the basis that the trial judge materially misapprehended the evidence on both the likelihood and severity of harm.