Suzanne Côté

The appellant was part of a group that entered an apartment and assaulted several occupants, one of whom died from a single stab wound.

The trial judge acquitted the appellant on the basis that the Crown had not proven beyond a reasonable doubt that he inflicted the fatal stab wound.

The Court of Appeal set aside the acquittal and entered a conviction, holding that the trial judge erred in law by failing to assess the appellant's culpability as a co-principal to manslaughter.

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, affirming that the stabbing was not a discrete act outside the scope of the group attack.

The Court also clarified that joint/co-principal liability is not automatically eliminated merely because force was applied by only a single perpetrator, and that triers of fact should focus on whether an accused's actions were a significant contributing cause of death.

A consulting firm contracted with a manufacturing company to implement an integrated management system, including a limitation of liability clause that had been freely negotiated between sophisticated commercial parties.

When the system implementation failed, the lower courts declared the non-liability clause inoperative on the basis of the doctrine of breach of a fundamental obligation in Quebec civil law.

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, holding that neither of the two possible legal bases for the doctrine — public order or absence of an objective cause of the obligation — applied to render the clause inoperative in a contract by mutual agreement between sophisticated legal persons.

The Court confirmed that the Civil Code of Québec limits the doctrine of breach of a fundamental obligation to consumer contracts and contracts of adhesion under art. 1437 C.C.Q., and that the legislature deliberately chose not to extend such a mandatory rule to freely negotiated commercial contracts.

The clause did not deprive the debtor's obligation of its objective cause because specific performance and agreed damages remained available as sanctions for nonperformance.

The appellant was acquitted by jury of second degree murder after shooting a man he found breaking into his truck, claiming self-defence.

The trial judge failed to instruct the jury to consider the appellant's role in the incident under s. 34(2)(c) of the Criminal Code as a factor bearing on the reasonableness of his use of lethal force.

The majority held that the phrase 'the person's role in the incident' in s. 34(2)(c) captures the accused's conduct throughout the incident from beginning to end, without requiring that the conduct be unlawful, provocative or morally blameworthy.

The omission of this instruction was a material error that had a bearing on the acquittal, warranting a new trial.

The appeal was dismissed with Côté J. dissenting on the question of materiality.

Police unlawfully entered the accused's residence through an unlocked rear door to arrest him for robbery and firearms-related offences, then conducted a clearing search and subsequently obtained a search warrant based in part on observations from that search.

The trial judge found Charter breaches but admitted the evidence, holding the warrant valid.

The Court of Appeal majority excluded the evidence and ordered a new trial, finding the trial judge erred by treating Charter-compliant conduct as mitigating Charter-infringing conduct and by conducting overall balancing within the first two Grant factors rather than at the end.

The Supreme Court dismissed the Crown's appeal, agreeing the trial judge further erred by failing to consider all relevant Charter-infringing state conduct, including the clearing search, under the first Grant factor.

The Court affirmed that trial judges cannot selectively choose which Charter-infringing conduct to consider, and that overall balancing under s. 24(2) must occur only after all three Grant factors have been individually assessed.

Three accused were convicted of aggravated assault and firearm offences in connection with a drive-by shooting, with the Crown's case resting entirely on circumstantial evidence.

The trial judge found that the only rational inference from the evidence was that the Crown proved all essential elements beyond a reasonable doubt.

The majority of the British Columbia Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeals, holding the verdicts were not unreasonable.

The Supreme Court unanimously dismissed the further appeals, adopting the reasons of the Court of Appeal majority.

The Court confirmed that despite a misstatement of law regarding circumstantial evidence in the trial reasons, the trial judge correctly applied the law, making resort to the curative proviso unnecessary.

The appellant municipality challenged provincial legislation that reduced Toronto City Council's ward structure from 47 to 25 wards mid-election campaign, arguing it violated the Charter's freedom of expression guarantee and the unwritten constitutional principle of democracy.

The majority held that the appellant's claim was a positive rights claim governed by the Baier framework, requiring demonstration of radical frustration of expression effectively precluding meaningful expression, a threshold not met where candidates had 69 days to re-orient their campaigns under the new structure.

The majority further held that unwritten constitutional principles cannot serve as independent bases for invalidating legislation, and that the democratic principle cannot be used to narrow provincial authority over municipalities under s. 92(8) of the Constitution Act, 1867.

The dissent would have allowed the appeal, finding the timing of the legislation violated s. 2(b) and that Ontario offered no pressing and substantial justification for making the changes during an ongoing election.

The appellant media organization sought to set aside an indefinite publication ban ordered by the Manitoba Court of Appeal in connection with a sealed affidavit filed in criminal proceedings involving an alleged miscarriage of justice.

The Court of Appeal declined to hear the motion, holding that its jurisdiction was exhausted after it entered its formal judgment on the merits.

The majority of the Supreme Court held that courts retain supervisory jurisdiction over their court records — including the power to vary or set aside publication bans and sealing orders — even after entering formal judgment on the merits, as this authority exists independently of the doctrine of functus officio.

The majority allowed the appeal from the 2019 Jurisdiction Judgment and remanded the matter to the Court of Appeal to decide the motion on its merits.

The appeal from the 2018 Publication Ban Judgment was adjourned sine die pending that determination.

Abella J. dissented, concluding that the appellant's undue delay in bringing its motion was determinative and both appeals should be dismissed.

A copyright collective society sought to enforce an interim tariff against a university that had refused to continue as a licensee, while the university counterclaimed for a declaration that its fair dealing guidelines protected its copying activities.

The Court held that Board-approved tariffs are not mandatory against users who choose not to be licensed, as the relevant statutory provision only gives a collective society the right to collect defaulted payments from voluntary licensees.

Because the tariff was unenforceable, there was no live dispute to ground the university's request for declaratory relief on fair dealing.

The Court nonetheless identified significant errors in the lower courts' fair dealing analysis, which wrongly focused exclusively on the institutional perspective rather than the perspective of the students as the ultimate users.

The appellant auditors sought to have the respondent province's negligence claim dismissed as statute-barred under a two-year limitation period.

The province had paid out $50 million in loan guarantees in reliance on the appellants' audit report, and later received a second firm's draft report revealing material misstatements in the audited financial statements.

The Court established that a claim is discovered when the plaintiff has actual or constructive knowledge of the material facts upon which a plausible inference of liability on the defendant's part can be drawn.

Applying this standard, the Court found the province discovered its claim when it received the draft report from the second firm, more than two years before commencing its action.

The appeals were allowed and the motions judge's summary judgment dismissing the province's claim as statute-barred was restored.

The appellant Crown challenged court-ordered super-priority priming charges granted to an interim lender, monitor, and directors in CCAA restructuring proceedings, arguing that its deemed trust for unremitted employee source deductions under s. 227(4.1) of the Income Tax Act took priority over those charges.

The majority dismissed the appeal, holding that s. 227(4.1) does not create a proprietary interest in specific debtor assets and that court-ordered super-priority charges under s. 11 of the CCAA are not security interests within the meaning of s. 224(1.3) of the ITA, so no conflict arises between the two statutes.

The concurring justices agreed there was no conflict but relied on the CCAA's remedial flexibility and s. 6(3)'s requirement that the Crown be paid in full under any plan of compromise.

Four justices dissented, concluding that Parliament's use of broad notwithstanding language in s. 227(4.1) granted the Crown's deemed trust absolute priority over all claims including CCAA priming charges.

The appeal was dismissed with costs, Abella, Moldaver, Brown and Rowe JJ. dissenting.

The respondent struck a municipal employee while driving and later settled a separate action against the municipality by signing a broad release.

Years after executing the release, the respondent brought a third party claim for contribution or indemnity against the municipality in the action commenced by the injured employee.

The Court held there is no special interpretive rule that applies to releases; they are contracts subject to the general principles of contractual interpretation set out in Sattva.

The Blackmore Rule, which limited general words in a release to what was specially in the contemplation of the parties, has been overtaken by Sattva and should no longer be referred to.

The application judge made no reviewable error, and his order staying the third party claim was reinstated.

The appellant First Nation's reserve land was flooded in the 1920s–1930s to power hydroelectricity generation without its consent, without compensation, and without lawful authorization.

The trial judge found Canada breached its fiduciary duty and awarded $30,000,000 in equitable compensation, valuing the flooded land based on general expropriation principles and excluding the land's value to the hydroelectricity project.

The majority of the Supreme Court held that the trial judge erred by treating compliance with minimum expropriation obligations as sufficient to discharge the fiduciary duty, which required Canada to negotiate compensation reflecting the full value of the land to the project.

The appeal was allowed and the equitable compensation award returned to the Federal Court for reassessment to include the value of the flooded land for hydroelectricity generation.

Côté J. dissented, finding no reviewable error in the trial judge's compensation assessment and no evidentiary basis for the majority's approach.

The Supreme Court considered whether article 35, paragraph 1 of Quebec's Code of Civil Procedure, which grants the Court of Québec exclusive jurisdiction over civil disputes valued at less than $85,000, is constitutional under section 96 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

The majority held that the provision unconstitutionally infringes on the core jurisdiction of the Superior Court by creating a prohibited parallel court, given the breadth of the jurisdiction, its exclusivity, the absence of accessible appeal to the superior court, and a monetary ceiling approximately 29 percent above the updated historical limit.

The second question, concerning whether the Court of Québec must apply judicial deference standards when hearing administrative appeals, was found to be moot following the combined effect of Vavilov and new legislation.

The Court dismissed the appeals but suspended the declaration of invalidity for 12 months to allow the Quebec legislature to enact a constitutional replacement.

The appellant Crown appealed a Court of Appeal decision ordering a new trial for the respondent, who had been convicted of first degree murder after jury selection proceeded without peremptory challenges on the day Bill C-75 came into force.

The majority held that the statutory amendments abolishing peremptory challenges are constitutional because they do not infringe ss. 11(d) or 11(f) of the Charter, as the accused has no right to any particular jury selection procedure and adequate safeguards remain in place through challenges for cause, jury instructions, and the enhanced stand-aside power.

The majority further held that abolition of peremptory challenges is purely procedural and therefore applies retrospectively to all jury selections commencing on or after September 19, 2019.

Abella J. dissented in part, concluding that while the amendments are constitutional, they should apply only prospectively because they affect the accused's substantive right to meaningfully participate in jury selection.

Côté J. dissented in full, finding the abolition of peremptory challenges unconstitutional under s. 11(f) of the Charter as it substantially diminishes the core jury characteristics of impartiality, representativeness, and competence.

The appellant father applied to retroactively reduce child support and rescind approximately $170,000 in arrears accumulated over 16 years of non-payment, relying on alleged income decreases and a current inability to pay.

The motion judge retroactively reduced the arrears to $41,642 but the Court of Appeal reversed and ordered the full arrears paid.

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and established a unified framework under s. 17 of the Divorce Act governing both retroactive decreases and rescission of arrears.

For retroactive decreases, a presumption arises in favour of varying support back to the date of effective notice, up to three years before formal notice, with D.B.S. factors guiding any departure from that date.

For rescission of arrears, a strong presumption against rescission applies and is only rebutted where the payor establishes on a balance of probabilities that they cannot and will never be able to pay even with a flexible payment plan.

A newspaper publishing company applied to unseal a court record and access exhibits filed by a public institution in an action alleging misappropriation of public funds by a former manager.

Before the motion was heard, the public institution discontinued its action and retrieved its exhibits pursuant to article 108 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

The majority held that the right of access to court records under article 11 C.C.P. extends only to what is in the record at the time it is consulted, and does not give a right to access exhibits already retrieved by the parties.

The dissent held that a discontinuance cannot defeat an application for access filed prior to it, and that the court retained jurisdiction to apply the Dagenais/Mentuck framework to the appellant's motion.

The appeal was dismissed with the majority concluding that the Dagenais/Mentuck test does not apply where articles 11 and 108 C.C.P. confer no judicial discretion.

Five members were expelled from a religious congregation, and brought an action seeking a declaration that their expulsion was null and void for violating natural justice.

The appellant church sought summary judgment on the basis that the court lacked jurisdiction, as no underlying legal right existed.

The motion judge granted summary judgment dismissing the action, but the Court of Appeal allowed the respondents' appeal, holding that the church's written constitution and bylaws constituted a binding contract.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, restoring the motion judge's order, holding that membership in a voluntary association is not automatically contractual and that objective intention to create legal relations — which was absent on this record — is required before a court has jurisdiction to intervene.

The appellant was convicted of obstructing justice after attending the complainant's home uninvited to discuss the process for withdrawing criminal harassment charges she had recently laid against him.

The trial judge found the appellant's conduct was wilful and constituted an attempt to dissuade the complainant from giving evidence by corrupt means.

A majority of the Court of Appeal affirmed the conviction, and a majority of the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, substantially for the reasons of the Court of Appeal majority.

The majority held that the record clearly supported the inference that the appellant applied pressure on the complainant to manipulate her into dropping the charges.

Côté J. dissented, finding no evidence that the appellant used threats, bribes, or other corrupt means as required by s. 139(3) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown appealed a Court of Appeal order for a new trial on sexual assault charges arising from a camping trip on which the two accused engaged in sexual activity with a 16-year-old complainant who had consumed substantial alcohol.

The majority held that capacity to consent is a precondition to subjective consent, not a vitiating factor, so a trial judge need not address consent and capacity separately or in any particular order.

The majority further held that the trial judge's reasons were sufficient in the context of the case, as all parties agreed that the complainant's evidence — if accepted — established both incapacity and non-consent.

The concurring judges agreed on the result but found the trial judge's reasons insufficient on the capacity question, applying the curative proviso on the basis of overwhelming evidence of non-consent.

The dissent would have dismissed the appeal, concluding that the trial judge's errors were not trivial and the evidence was not sufficiently overwhelming to apply the curative proviso.

A young person convicted of sexual assault appealed on the basis that the verdict was unreasonable, arguing the trial judge illogically accepted selective parts of the accused's evidence while rejecting others due to intoxication.

The majority held the verdict was reasonable, finding the trial judge provided sound reasons for accepting some portions of the accused's evidence while rejecting others.

The appellant also challenged the constitutionality of s. 37(10) of the Youth Criminal Justice Act, which denies young persons the automatic appeal rights available to adults under s. 691 of the Criminal Code.

The majority upheld s. 37(10) as consistent with ss. 7 and 15 of the Charter, while Abella J. (with Karakatsanis and Martin JJ.) found it to be an unjustified breach of s. 15.

The appeal was dismissed, with Côté J. dissenting on the reasonableness of the verdict and declining to address the constitutional questions as moot.