Susan Ficek

The appellant applied for an adjournment of her conviction and sentence appeal to obtain transcripts and adduce fresh evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the adjournment request, noting the appellant had failed to take steps to obtain transcripts and the proposed fresh evidence was irrelevant.

The appellant then declined to participate in the appeal.

The Court reviewed the materials, found no basis to interfere with the convictions or sentence, and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant appealed a conviction entered by the Superior Court of Justice, arguing that the trial judge erred in findings of fact and credibility assessments.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no errors in the trial judge's assessment of the credibility of the complainant and another witness, and no basis to interfere with the conviction.

The appellant appealed his convictions for mischief and break and enter.

The Crown conceded that fresh evidence should be admitted and that, in light of this evidence, the appeal should be allowed.

The Court of Appeal agreed, set aside the convictions, and ordered a new trial on both charges.

The appellant appealed his sentence of 18 months' imprisonment (less 3 months for pre-trial custody) and a DNA order for assault and threatening offences.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the sentence and DNA order amply justified given the appellant's lengthy criminal record, which included break and enter and criminal harassment.

The court held that the sentence did not offend the jump principle and that specific deterrence was of special significance.

The appellant appealed from an order dismissing an application for certiorari to quash an order of the Ontario Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that on the facts, it was not an appropriate case to revisit the test in Mezzo.

The court concluded that under any test, there was sufficient evidence for the case to go to the jury.

The appellant was convicted of manslaughter following a group assault on a 15-year-old boy.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the trial judge's jury instructions regarding eyewitness identification, party liability, and the failure to give a Vetrovec warning for a specific witness.

The appellant also argued the trial judge erred in permitting the Crown to cross-examine a witness on prior inconsistent statements under section 9(2) of the Canada Evidence Act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no errors in the trial judge's instructions or evidentiary rulings.

The appellant appealed his convictions for break and enter with intent to commit murder, uttering threats, and criminal harassment, as well as his dangerous offender designation and indeterminate sentence.

He argued the sentencing judge erred in dismissing his application to withdraw his guilty pleas and in failing to consider the long-term offender provisions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the guilty pleas were valid and informed.

While the sentencing judge erred by not considering the long-term offender provisions, the Court applied the curative proviso, concluding there was no reasonable possibility of a different sentence given the uncontradicted psychiatric evidence of the appellant's untreatable psychopathy and sexual sadism.

The appellants were convicted of offences under the Safe Streets Act and the Highway Traffic Act for squeegeeing and soliciting money from drivers of stopped vehicles on roadways.

They appealed their convictions, arguing that the legislation was unconstitutional because it was ultra vires the province as criminal law, and that it violated their rights under sections 2(b), 7, and 15 of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the legislation was a valid exercise of provincial power to regulate roadways.

While the provisions infringed freedom of expression under section 2(b), the infringement was justified under section 1.

The court also found no violations of sections 7 or 15.

The appellant appealed his designation as a dangerous offender and indeterminate sentence following convictions for four counts of break and enter and sexual assault against elderly women.

He argued the trial judge erred in assessing his risk to re-offend, rejecting pharmacological treatment and community supervision, and failing to consider his age.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's reliance on expert evidence that the appellant posed a substantial risk to re-offend and that his risk could not be reasonably managed in the community.

The appellants were convicted of first-degree murder, conspiracy to murder, and possession of explosives in relation to a contract killing.

The Crown's case relied heavily on the testimony of an unsavoury witness who had pleaded guilty to manslaughter in exchange for his testimony.

The appellants appealed their convictions on multiple grounds, primarily focusing on errors in the trial judge's charge to the jury.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding that the trial judge failed to give an adequate Vetrovec warning regarding the unsavoury Crown witnesses, improperly gave a Vetrovec-like warning regarding a defence witness, and failed to instruct the jury properly on a hearsay statement.

The appellant appealed his convictions for arson and break and enter, arguing that the trial judge erred in assessing credibility, relying on post-offence conduct, and accepting the evidence of an unsavoury witness without confirmatory evidence.

The Crown's theory was that the appellant, while in custody, hired an accomplice to burn down his ex-girlfriend's chip stand and break into her home.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's application of the burden of proof, his use of a letter written by the appellant, or his reliance on the victim's testimony as confirmatory of the accomplice's evidence.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittal on two counts of sexual assault following a jury trial.

The Crown argued the trial judge erred by excluding the respondent's statement to police, improperly leaving the defence of honest but mistaken belief in consent to the jury, and refusing to allow expert DNA evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the complainant's evidence suffered from many frailties and improbabilities, and that any errors made by the trial judge were harmless and would not have affected the outcome.

The appellant appealed his convictions for rape and indecent assault, seeking to introduce fresh evidence of a letter authored by the complainant which she denied writing at trial.

The Court of Appeal admitted the evidence, finding that trial counsel exercised due diligence and the interests of justice compelled its admission.

The court held the evidence could have affected the verdict on all counts by impacting the complainant's credibility.

The court also noted the trial judge failed to provide an adequate limiting instruction regarding moral prejudice reasoning between the counts.

The appeal was allowed, convictions quashed, and a new trial ordered.

The Crown appealed a stay of proceedings ordered by the trial judge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in principle in the trial judge's exercise of discretion, despite the societal interest in having criminal cases proceed to trial.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that the trial judge erred by failing to advert to the possibility of collusion or tainting between the two complainants after ruling to that effect on a similar fact evidence voir dire.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge subjected the evidence of both complainants to careful scrutiny and did not accept much of the evidence of one complainant.

The Court also rejected arguments that the trial judge assumed the assault took place, relied on an improbable account, or made improper use of demeanour evidence.

The accused, an 18-year-old, was caught shoplifting and used an inoperable sawed-off shotgun to threaten security guards and escape custody.

He was convicted of multiple offences, including three counts of using an imitation firearm while committing an indictable offence.

The trial judge declared the mandatory consecutive sentencing provision in s. 85(4) of the Criminal Code unconstitutional under s. 12 of the Charter and imposed a suspended sentence with probation.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal applied the Kienapple principle to stay two of the three imitation firearm convictions, finding they arose from a single transaction.

The Court also set aside the declaration of unconstitutionality, holding that the trial judge erred in his s. 12 Charter analysis and that s. 85(4) does not impose grossly disproportionate punishment.

The sentence itself was not varied.

The appellant appealed her sentence for aggravated assault, arguing it exceeded the range suggested by Crown counsel.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the reformatory sentence and three years' probation to be fit and balanced.

The court noted the gravity of the crime and the appellant's lengthy record for violent offences, while also recognizing her remorse and efforts to overcome drug and alcohol problems.

The Crown appealed the acquittals of the respondents on charges of conspiracy to break and enter and commit theft.

The trial judge had excluded surreptitiously intercepted communications under s. 24(2) of the Charter, finding that the wiretap authorization breached s. 8 due to inaccurate information in the supporting affidavit.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the trial judge erred in the threshold required to name a party in an authorization and in classifying the intercepted communications as conscriptive evidence.

A new trial was ordered for both respondents.

The appellants were charged with cruelty to animals after a search of their property under the Ontario Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act (OSPCAA) resulted in the seizure of numerous animals.

The trial judge acquitted the appellants, finding the search warrant invalid because it authorized multiple officers to enter, which she held violated the OSPCAA.

On appeal, the Summary Conviction Appeal Court applied the Interpretation Act to find that the singular wording in the OSPCAA included the plural, validating the warrant and ordering a new trial.

The Court of Appeal upheld this decision, confirming that the Interpretation Act applied, the search was reasonable, and the presence of police officers to keep the peace did not violate the appellants' Charter rights.

The appellant pled guilty to impaired driving causing bodily harm and was sentenced to a fine, probation, and a three-year driving prohibition.

He appealed the driving prohibition, arguing it was outside the appropriate range and that the sentencing judge erred in thinking three years was the maximum.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the three-year prohibition was within the trial judge's discretion and appropriate given the overall sentence, which avoided incarceration due to the appellant's mitigating circumstances.