Susan Ficek

The appellant appealed his conviction for dangerous operation of a motor vehicle causing death.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding that the trial judge failed to apply the W.(D.) framework properly and misapprehended material evidence regarding the appellant's driving and alleged motive for racing.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for impaired driving causing death and breach of recognizance.

At trial, the central issue was whether the appellant or the deceased passenger was driving when the vehicle rolled into a ditch.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that the appellant was the driver, noting it was amply supported by witness testimony and expert evidence.

On the sentence appeal, the appellant argued for a conditional sentence based on his aboriginal background and Gladue principles.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the sentence appeal, finding the 12-month sentence was not demonstrably unfit given the aggravating factors, including a high blood alcohol level and a prior drinking and driving conviction.

The appellant was convicted of manslaughter following a fatal stabbing of his friend.

At trial, the appellant claimed self-defence, arguing the deceased had suffered a psychotic breakdown and attacked him.

On appeal, the appellant raised ten grounds of error, including improper jury instructions on self-defence, reasonable doubt, and motive, as well as erroneous evidentiary rulings regarding hearsay and expert testimony.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that while the trial judge erred in admitting certain hearsay evidence, the error did not result in a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice, and the jury instructions were overall adequate.

The appellant was convicted of the first-degree murder of a three-and-a-half-year-old child.

On appeal, he argued that the trial judge erred in his instructions to the jury regarding reasonable doubt, the assessment of evidence, and consciousness of guilt based on post-offence statements to the police.

The Court of Appeal found that the reasonable doubt instruction substantially complied with the law, the jury was properly instructed to consider all evidence, and any shortcomings in the consciousness of guilt instruction did not prejudice the appellant given the overwhelming DNA and forensic evidence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Crown appealed the acquittal of the respondent on a charge of second-degree murder.

The deceased was found with an electrical cord around her neck, initially thought to be suicide.

The Crown alleged the respondent strangled her and staged the suicide.

The trial judge excluded evidence of the respondent's former girlfriend regarding a prior incident where he tied her up with a phone cord.

The trial judge also allowed cross-examination of the deceased's sister about suicide letters and failed to instruct the jury on s. 229(a)(ii) of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in excluding the former girlfriend's evidence, no reversible error in the cross-examination, and that while the trial judge should have instructed on s. 229(a)(ii), the non-direction did not amount to reversible error.

The appellant was convicted of four counts of bank robbery and one count of disguise with intent.

He appealed on the grounds that his unrecorded inculpatory statements to police were involuntary and that the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on eyewitness identification.

The Court of Appeal found that the police deliberately interrogated the appellant without recording equipment, rendering the statements suspect and inadmissible.

The court also found errors in the jury charge on identification evidence.

Without the statements, the verdicts on four counts were unreasonable.

The appeal was allowed, acquittals entered on four counts, and a new trial ordered on the remaining count.

The applicant, who was self-represented, applied for bail pending his appeal from convictions for attempting to obstruct justice.

He had been sentenced to ten months' imprisonment.

The Crown conceded the appeal was not frivolous but opposed release on public interest grounds, citing the applicant's criminal record, which included breaches of court orders and forcible confinement.

The court denied the application, finding it was not in the public interest to release the applicant due to the risk that he would commit further offences, including offences against the administration of justice.

The appellants pleaded guilty to criminal negligence causing death, abandoning children, and fraud after leaving their five children in the care of a 10-year-old, during which time their six-month-old infant choked to death.

On appeal, they sought to introduce fresh evidence claiming they had left the children with an adult relative, which the court rejected as not reasonably capable of belief.

The court dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the guilty pleas were properly accepted.

However, the court allowed the sentence appeal on a joint submission, finding the sentencing judge erred in holding that a conditional sentence was unavailable for fraud involving a breach of trust, and imposed a nine-month conditional sentence.

The appellant was tried by a jury for attempted murder.

The jury intended to return a guilty verdict, but due to the foreman's stuttering or coughing, the trial judge and others heard 'not guilty'.

The verdict was recorded as not guilty, and the jury and accused were discharged.

Shortly after, a court officer discovered the error.

The trial judge reconvened the jury over the next few days and eventually changed the recorded verdict to guilty.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while a trial judge has a narrow post-discharge jurisdiction to correct a verdict if it does not require the jury to reconsider its decision, this jurisdiction is lost if there is a reasonable apprehension of bias.

Given the jury's extensive dispersal and potential exposure to media, a reasonable apprehension of bias existed.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant was convicted of the first degree murder of his brother.

The Crown's case relied heavily on circumstantial evidence and the testimony of a jailhouse informant who claimed the appellant confessed to the murder.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred in failing to give a Vetrovec warning regarding the informant, misdirected the jury on after-the-fact conduct, and provided an inadequate charge on reasonable doubt.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding that the informant's severe credibility issues necessitated a Vetrovec warning, the trial judge improperly left equivocal demeanour evidence to the jury as consciousness of guilt, and the pre-Lifchus reasonable doubt charge failed to properly locate the standard above probability.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The accused pleaded guilty to the attempted murder of his common-law spouse.

At the sentencing hearing, the Crown sought a life sentence based on the 'Hill principle', attempting to introduce evidence of untried and uncharged violent acts against the victim and a former spouse to demonstrate a pattern of violence.

The trial judge ruled the evidence inadmissible and, based on a joint submission, imposed an eight-year sentence.

The Crown appealed the sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that while evidence of untried offences can be admitted to show background and character, it cannot be used to increase a sentence beyond what is proportionate to the convicted offence.

The court found no error in the trial judge's exclusion of the evidence or the sentence imposed, particularly given the Crown's position at trial.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault with a weapon, sexual interference, and forcible confinement.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in his reasons by inappropriately considering what would happen to the complainant if the accused were not convicted, and by framing the credibility assessment as a contest of whether the complainant or the accused was 'guilty' of fabrication.

The appeal was allowed, the convictions were set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant was tried for attempted murder.

When the jury returned its verdict, the trial judge and others misheard the foreman say 'Not guilty as charged' instead of 'Guilty as charged'.

The verdict was recorded as not guilty and the jury was discharged.

Moments later, the error was discovered.

The trial judge recalled the jury, conducted an inquiry, and corrected the verdict to guilty.

The appellant appealed, arguing the trial judge was functus officio and lacked jurisdiction to change the verdict after discharge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge's mishearing of the verdict was an accidental slip that could be corrected, and that the inquiry did not violate the appellant's Charter rights or section 649 of the Criminal Code.

Joint criminal appeal from murder and attempted murder convictions arising out of a multiple-victim shooting in which both appellants admitted firing guns but relied principally on self-defence.

The court held that the trial judge committed multiple evidentiary and jury-charge errors, including admitting weak and highly prejudicial peaceful-disposition evidence from parents of deceased victims, admitting one witness's unsworn videotaped statement for its truth under the principled hearsay exception despite insufficient reliability safeguards, and improperly limiting the jury's use of translation evidence concerning another witness's adopted prior words.

The court further found errors in the treatment of after-the-fact conduct, co-accused bad character evidence, provocation, and the reopening issue.

Considering the cumulative effect of the errors, the curative proviso could not be applied.

A new trial was ordered on all charges.

The accused was charged with the murder of his estranged wife.

The trial judge directed a verdict of acquittal because the forensic evidence failed to establish definitively that the deceased had died from foul play, creating a gap in the evidence regarding causation.

The Court of Appeal set aside the directed verdict and ordered a new trial.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that there was sufficient circumstantial evidence of motive, opportunity, and premature knowledge of the manner of death from which a properly instructed jury could infer guilt, and that the trial judge erred in weighing the evidence and directing an acquittal.

The appellant was charged with making an obscene publication after a commercial film developer handed over a photograph to the police.

At the preliminary hearing, there was no evidence of an intent to publish.

The committing magistrate committed the appellant for trial, finding the word 'publication' in the indictment to be surplusage.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and quashed the committal.

The Court held that while the statutory test for obscenity applies to all charges whether publication is involved or not, the Crown's inclusion of the word 'publication' in the indictment meant it could not be disregarded as surplusage without prejudicing the accused.

Therefore, evidence of an intent to publish was required.

The appellant was convicted of gross indecency.

At trial, the Crown conducted an improper and unfairly prejudicial cross-examination regarding the appellant's previous sexual conduct, and the trial judge misdirected the jury on the alibi defence.

The Court of Appeal found these errors but applied the proviso in s. 613(1)(b)(iii) of the Criminal Code to uphold the conviction due to strong circumstantial evidence.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that the trial judge's failure to limit the cross-examination was an error of mixed law and fact, not an error of law alone, and therefore the proviso could not be applied.

The unfair prejudice resulted in a miscarriage of justice.