Susan E. Healey

The applicant, charged with drug trafficking and driving while prohibited, sought to exclude evidence obtained during a traffic stop, alleging violations of his Charter rights under sections 8, 9, and 10.

The court found that the police officer's stop was a pretextual investigative detention, not a legitimate Highway Traffic Act stop, and that the officer's testimony was not credible.

The court identified multiple, deliberate breaches of the applicant's rights, including arbitrary detention (s. 9), failure to inform of reasons for detention (s. 10(a)), and eliciting incriminating information before providing right to counsel (s. 10(b)).

While racial profiling was alleged, it was not established on the evidence.

Applying the Grant test, the court determined that the seriousness of the state's Charter-infringing conduct and the significant impact on the applicant's protected interests outweighed society's interest in an adjudication on the merits.

Consequently, the evidence was excluded, leading to an acquittal on all counts.

The applicant, charged with historical sexual offences, brought a motion to admit expert opinion evidence from Dr. Tim Moore regarding the psychology of children's memory, including concepts like "imagination inflation" and "source amnesia" and how police interview practices might affect the reliability of a child complainant's testimony.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the proposed expert evidence did not meet the necessity criterion for admissibility.

The judge concluded that the concepts were within the common experience and knowledge of a jury and that the evidence risked intruding on the jury's role as the ultimate arbiters of credibility and reliability.

The court issued supplementary reasons clarifying its prior ruling on a Charter application.

The applicant sought to exclude evidence, including cell phones and their contents, arguing a breach of s. 8 Charter rights.

The court reiterated that no Charter breach was established regarding the search of the applicant's person incident to a lawful arrest for firearm offences, and therefore, there was no basis to exclude the seized phones or their information under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The initial ruling dismissing the application remained unchanged.

This case involved a contract dispute between a general contractor (Harvie Construction Inc.) and its dewatering subcontractor (Atlas Dewatering Corporation) concerning unpaid invoices for a municipal reconstruction project.

Atlas claimed breach of contract and unjust enrichment for base contract work and additional services.

Harvie asserted a fixed-price contract, a "pay when paid" arrangement for extras, and challenged the validity of Atlas's construction lien.

The court found Atlas's lien properly preserved, dismissed Harvie's counterclaim, and determined the contract terms were reflected in Atlas's "Second Quote" which allowed for additional charges beyond the lump sum.

The court rejected the "pay when paid" defense, finding it unreliable and inconsistent with the parties' conduct.

Atlas was awarded judgment for the outstanding balance, including approved and disputed additional work.

The applicant, charged with dangerous operation causing death, sought to exclude his utterances, a statement, and observations of alcohol odour, alleging breaches of his Charter rights under sections 7, 10(a), and 10(b).

The court found the applicant was psychologically detained from the moment police took his documents and questioned him, and that his section 10 rights were breached.

Applying the Grant factors, the court determined that the seriousness of the state conduct and the significant impact on the applicant's Charter-protected interests outweighed society's interest in the evidence's admission.

Consequently, the court ordered the exclusion of the impugned evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter.

The applicants successfully obtained an order for forfeiture of a $150,000 deposit due to the respondent's breach of an agreement of purchase and sale.

The respondent sought to avoid costs by pleading impecuniosity.

The court rejected the impecuniosity plea, finding it unsubstantiated and noting the respondent's unreasonable litigation conduct, including failing to pursue a claim against her real estate agent and rejecting a reasonable offer to settle.

The court awarded costs to the applicants, fixed at $17,100.

The plaintiff, having successfully obtained judgment on a commercial lease claim, sought substantial indemnity costs.

The court awarded costs of $47,354 on a substantial indemnity scale, finding that the defendants' pre-litigation conduct (non-payment of rent, cessation of communication, deliberate breaking of locks, removal of fixtures, and causing damage) and their litigation conduct (failure to comply with Rules of Civil Procedure, not responding to timetables) were unreasonable and warranted a higher scale of costs.

The applicant, Noah Hope, brought a motion seeking to exclude evidence obtained from a search of his vehicle and backpack, arguing a breach of his s. 8 Charter rights.

The vehicle was involved in a single-car accident.

Police entered the vehicle without permission after a tow truck driver noted items left inside.

A gun was found, leading to the applicant's arrest and further searches.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the applicant failed to establish a reasonable expectation of privacy in the vehicle or its contents, primarily because he was not the lawful owner and had no legal right to control access, effectively being a trespasser.

The plaintiff, a commercial landlord, brought a motion for summary judgment against its tenant and personal indemnifiers for unpaid rent and damages following the tenant's default and early termination of a commercial lease.

The defendants argued frustration of contract due to COVID-19 lockdowns and disputed the extent of damages.

The court found that the lease was not frustrated by the pandemic, as the tenant's business model allowed for adaptation (online classes), and the landlord's mitigation efforts were reasonable.

The court granted summary judgment in favour of the plaintiff, holding all defendants jointly and severally liable for rental arrears, accelerated rent, property taxes, insurance, utilities, and repair costs, after making credibility findings against the self-represented defendants regarding the extent of damages.

The applicants (sellers) sought declarations that the respondent buyer breached an Agreement of Purchase and Sale (APS) for a property and that the $150,000 deposit be forfeited.

The buyer argued she did not properly sign the APS due to her agent's conduct (non est factum, undue influence) and sought to convert the application to an action to add her agent.

The court found the buyer had indeed signed and breached the APS, rejecting her defences as not vitiating the contract between the buyer and sellers.

The court ordered the forfeiture of the deposit, finding it was not disproportionate to the sellers' damages and that retaining it was not unconscionable.

The deposit held in trust was ordered released to the sellers.

The applicants were given a deadline to decide on pursuing further damages.

The appellant, Dinis DaSilva, appealed his conviction for sexual assault and sentence, which included a lifetime SOIRA order.

The appeal against conviction argued that the trial judge misapplied the burden of proof by neglecting the R. v. W.(D.) analysis, particularly concerning the complainant's inconsistent testimony (a five-year-old's police statement versus an eight-year-old's trial testimony).

The court found that the trial judge properly applied the criminal standard of proof and adequately addressed the inconsistencies, concluding that the conviction was reasonable.

The appeal against sentence challenged the lifetime SOIRA order, arguing it should have been for ten years given the summary prosecution.

The court dismissed the appeal against conviction but allowed the appeal against sentence, quashing the lifetime SOIRA order and replacing it with a 10-year order.

The defendants brought a motion to compel the plaintiff, Tristian Howell, to produce private electronic communications exchanged with the deceased, Sean McDonnell, to challenge Howell's status as a "spouse" under the Family Law Act for a damages claim.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the potential probative value of the messages was minimal compared to the significant time, expense, and undue prejudice to the plaintiff.

The decision emphasized the high expectation of privacy for intimate communications and the ample existing evidence supporting the cohabitation period.

Mohammad Bashi applied to extend the time for leave to appeal his conviction, which resulted from a guilty plea on March 23, 2023.

He claimed he was misled, did not commit all offenses, and was unaware of appeal rights/timelines.

The court reviewed the thorough plea comprehension inquiry conducted by Justice West and found no evidence of pressure or misrepresentation.

The complainant, Nisrin Aidak, never recanted her allegations.

The court dismissed the application, finding no bona fide intention to appeal within the period, no adequate explanation for the delay, and no merit to the proposed appeal, concluding that no injustice occurred.

This is a costs endorsement following a motion and cross-motion concerning spousal and child support.

The applicant was deemed the successful party on the underlying motion, as spousal support was ordered despite the respondent's consistent refusal to offer any.

The court found the respondent's approach unreasonable.

Although the applicant's offers to settle did not strictly conform to Rule 18(4) of the Family Law Rules, they were considered under Rule 18(6) and found to have been unreasonably rejected by the respondent.

The applicant sought full recovery costs, but the amount was reduced due to the inclusion of work unrelated to the specific motion.

The respondent was ordered to pay fixed costs of $7,500 to the applicant.

The applicant condominium corporation sought an order compelling the respondent unit owners to allow access to their penthouse unit so contractors could repair an adjacent common element riser.

The respondents refused access, arguing the situation was not an exigent health and safety issue and seeking mediation under s. 132 of the Condominium Act.

The court found that s. 132 does not mandate mediation for disagreements under the Act, and that the corporation had a duty to repair the failing risers to prevent water damage under s. 117(1).

The application was granted, and the respondents were ordered to pay the remobilization costs and full indemnity costs of the application.

The plaintiff trucking company sued the defendants for $33,900 in unpaid invoices.

The defendants counterclaimed for the same amount, alleging the parties reached an oral resolution agreement to set off the debt against the defendants' share of profits from a joint venture involving excavated soil.

The court reviewed the documentary evidence, including text messages, and found the defendants failed to prove the existence of the alleged resolution agreement.

The plaintiff's claim was granted and the counterclaim was dismissed.

The applicant mother brought a motion to change the school placement of the parties' two children from Orillia to Barrie.

The mother, who had historically been the primary caregiver, recently moved to Minesing and faced significant financial hardship and lengthy daily commutes to transport the children to their current schools.

The respondent father opposed the change, relying on the children's expressed preferences to remain at their current schools and the stability of the status quo.

The court granted the motion on a temporary basis, finding that the mother's financial desperation, the reduction in commute times, and her historical role as the primary caregiver outweighed the children's preferences and the status quo, making the change in the children's best interests.

The applicant sought spousal support, while the respondent sought child support and proportionate sharing of section 7 expenses.

The court imputed rental income to the respondent based on an underutilized basement apartment and determined the applicant's income primarily from income replacement benefits.

The court ordered temporary spousal support for the applicant and child support for the respondent, but dismissed the respondent's claims for uninsured dental, medication, and tutoring costs due to insufficient evidence and lack of prior consultation.

The applicant sought costs following a successful motion for temporary child and spousal support.

The court awarded the applicant $20,000 in costs, inclusive of HST, payable within 30 days.

The decision considered the respondent's unreasonable conduct, including his failure to provide adequate income disclosure and consistent underpayment of support, which necessitated the applicant's extensive efforts to prove his income.

The court applied Rule 24(12) of the Family Law Rules, emphasizing the objective of fixing a reasonable, fair, and proportionate amount of costs rather than merely actual costs incurred.

This decision concerns the costs of an anti-SLAPP motion brought by Eleanor and Patrick Coulson to dismiss a counterclaim by Alexander Muskoka (Gravenhurst) Inc. et al.

The Coulsons' motion was dismissed as they failed to establish the public interest threshold under s. 137.1(3) of the Courts of Justice Act.

Alexander Muskoka (Gravenhurst) Inc. sought partial indemnity costs.

The court, applying the presumption against costs in s. 137.1(8), declined to award costs to the responding party.

The judge found that the Coulsons had an arguable case, did not bring the motion for improper purposes, and that the counterclaim itself bore hallmarks of a SLAPP.

Consequently, each party was ordered to bear their own costs.