Susan E. Healey

The plaintiff brought a motion to compel answers to 79 refusals made by the defendants' representative during examinations for discovery in a 12-year-old action regarding frozen bank accounts.

The court applied the principles governing the scope of permissible discovery questions and ordered the defendants to answer only 6 of the 79 refusals.

The defendants were awarded partial indemnity costs of $9,211.37 for their substantial success on the motion.

The Crown brought an application at the outset of a jury trial for sexual assault to adduce uncharged discreditable conduct of the respondent.

The court ruled on the admissibility of various categories of evidence, including verbal and emotional abuse, shoving, and threats, balancing their probative value against potential prejudice.

The court admitted most of the proposed evidence, with some exclusions for hearsay or excessive prejudice, and provided a limiting instruction for the jury.

This medical negligence action involved cross-motions concerning the admissibility of expert evidence.

The plaintiff sought to admit five expert reports, arguing they fell within the scope of the Amended Statement of Claim, including claims for negligent post-operative care.

The defendants sought to declare portions of these reports inadmissible, arguing they concerned new causes of action (endoscopic exploration and orbital wall decompression) previously ruled statute-barred by a prior motion judge.

The court found that the Amended Claim did not plead general post-operative care and that the 'Other Procedures' were distinct surgical events, not post-operative care.

The court ruled that expert opinions on the statute-barred procedures were irrelevant and inadmissible, also applying the doctrine of res judicata as an exclusionary rule.

The plaintiff's motion was dismissed, and the defendants' motion was granted.

The plaintiffs commenced an action in 2020 alleging breach of an airport lease and negligent misrepresentation regarding a lease extension promised between 1985 and 1995.

The defendants moved to strike the claims under Rule 21.01(1) as statute-barred.

The plaintiffs argued the Real Property Limitations Act applied or that the breaches were ongoing.

The court rejected these arguments, finding the claims were subject to the Limitations Act, 2002 and the former Limitations Act.

The court held it was plain and obvious that the plaintiffs discovered their claims between 1999 and 2013, well beyond the applicable limitation periods.

The action was dismissed without leave to amend.

The defendant, Hantover Canada Inc., brought a motion for a permanent stay of proceedings or, alternatively, to strike the plaintiff's Amended Statement of Claim.

Hantover argued the action was an abuse of process and a duplicate of another ongoing action (the "Desiccare Action") involving similar factual allegations and claims.

The plaintiff, Guarav Tewari, argued the actions were distinct.

The court found substantial overlap in factual background and issues, concluding the Hantover Action was an abuse of process.

The court also found that the Amended Claim disclosed no reasonable causes of action for breach of contract, trade secret violation, fraudulent inducement, fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, or anti-trust/anti-competitiveness, as the plaintiff failed to plead material facts establishing a direct relationship or binding agreement with Hantover.

Leave to amend was denied as no viable claim against Hantover was possible and an unjust enrichment claim would likely be statute-barred.

The court ordered the claim permanently stayed.

The accused brought a mid-trial application alleging a breach of his s. 8 Charter rights, arguing that police exceeded the temporal scope of a search warrant when extracting data from his seized cell phones.

The Crown sought summary dismissal of the application.

The court found that the warrant's temporal limits applied only to usage timelines, not to communications related to trafficking, and that the accused failed to provide evidence that police actually examined data outside the warrant's scope.

The application was summarily dismissed as manifestly frivolous.

During a trial on liability for injuries sustained by the plaintiff while pitching in a school softball tournament, the plaintiff brought a motion to exclude the expert evidence of the defendant school board's proposed expert on student physical health and safety.

The proposed expert opined that the standard of care was strictly defined by the OPHEA Safety Guidelines, which did not mandate face masks for pitchers.

The court excluded the expert evidence, finding it was not necessary as the jury could understand the facts and assess the foreseeable risks without her assistance.

Furthermore, the court found the evidence would likely distort the fact-finding process because the expert acted as an advocate, rigidly adhered to an incorrect legal standard, and offered opinions beyond her expertise.

This decision addresses an application for directions by the accused (B.W.) in a criminal proceeding.

The applicant sought a ruling on whether certain emails in his possession were "records" under s. 278.1 of the Criminal Code and permission to use them for cross-examination of the complainant.

The court conducted an in camera review, classifying some emails as records due to their intimate and highly personal nature (e.g., marital difficulties, financial status) and others as not (mundane exchanges).

The application to use the emails deemed "records" was dismissed due to the applicant's non-compliance with procedural requirements, including late service and failure to provide detailed particulars.

The application to use the emails deemed "not records" was granted, subject to a potential s. 276 application for two specific emails and general rules of evidence.

The court also allowed the applicant to challenge the admissibility of prior discreditable conduct evidence, despite an earlier indication of no objection, emphasizing the right to a fair trial.

This was an application for a Norwich order seeking disclosure of an unredacted complaint and the identity of its anonymous author from Metrolinx, a non-party.

The applicants, Brandon Taylor, Sarah Taylor, and JAAX Inc., intended to sue the complainant for defamation, intentional infliction of mental distress, and intentional interference with economic relations, alleging significant personal and business harm.

Metrolinx opposed disclosure, citing confidentiality and privacy policies, and the complainant's refusal to consent due to safety concerns.

The court applied the five-part Norwich test, finding that the applicants had a bona fide claim and that the public interest in disclosure outweighed privacy concerns, particularly because the communication did not originate in confidence and confidentiality was not essential to the relationship between an unsolicited complainant and a Crown corporation.

The application was granted, ordering Metrolinx to disclose the complainant's identity.

The appellant moved for a stay pending appeal of a trial judgment ordering him to pay child and spousal support based on an imputed income of $156,841.89.

The court applied the RJR-MacDonald test and found that the appellant failed to establish a serious issue to be tried, irreparable harm, or that the balance of convenience favoured a stay.

The motion was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondent.

The defendant, Randy Gliddon, brought a motion to set aside an ex parte order that permitted the plaintiffs to register a Certificate of Pending Litigation (CPL) against a property.

The defendant argued that the CPL was obtained without full and fair disclosure and that there was no triable issue.

The court found no material non-disclosure, noting that the plaintiffs' reliance on an alleged oral trust agreement between the deceased and the defendant, as evidenced by a lawyer's email, was sufficient to raise a triable issue regarding the severance of joint tenancy.

The motion to set aside the CPL order was dismissed, and costs were awarded to the plaintiffs.

The defendant, Simcoe Muskoka Catholic District School Board, brought a motion to bifurcate the issues of liability and damages in a personal injury action, seeking to have liability tried first.

The plaintiffs opposed the motion.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the defendant failed to demonstrate that bifurcation would certainly dispose of issues, shorten proceedings, or result in substantial cost savings.

The court also found that the issues were not clearly severable due to overlap in evidence and witnesses, and that bifurcating a jury trial would unduly prejudice the plaintiffs, given the right to a single jury and the practical difficulties of separate jury trials.

This decision addresses a long motion in family court concerning parenting time and reunification efforts for two daughters.

The court considered the applicant's compliance with previous orders, the implementation of therapist recommendations, and the issue of costs.

A significant aspect was the termination of orders affecting an adult child (Flora) based on a recent Court of Appeal decision (J.F.R. v. K.L.L.) which requires adult children to be heard before parenting orders are made concerning them.

The court found the applicant acted in bad faith and awarded substantial costs to the respondent.

The defendants, Steve and Caroline DeFreitas, brought a motion seeking a stay of enforcement of a default judgment for over $4.7 million, pending the hearing of their motion to set aside the default judgment.

The plaintiffs conceded to a stay for Caroline DeFreitas.

The court applied the three-part RJR-MacDonald test for a stay, considering serious issue, irreparable harm, and balance of convenience, while also addressing the "clean hands" doctrine.

The court found a serious issue to be tried regarding the motion to set aside default judgment, particularly concerning damages and service for Caroline DeFreitas.

Irreparable harm to the defendants was conceded if their principal residence was sold.

The balance of convenience favored granting the stay, despite allegations of continued illegal dumping by Steve DeFreitas.

The stay was granted on terms, including a prohibition on further dumping, with a provision for the plaintiffs to seek to lift the stay if the terms are breached.

Costs were fixed.

The plaintiffs brought an ex parte motion seeking a Mareva injunction, an interim order for the recovery of personal property, an order freezing assets, and leave to issue a Certificate of Pending Litigation (CPL) against the defendants.

The motion alleged extensive fraud, conversion, and other torts by the primary defendant, Yueh-Tang Yang, involving millions of dollars and real estate, and a serious risk of asset dissipation.

The court granted most of the requested relief, finding a prima facie case of fraud and a demonstrated risk of asset dissipation, satisfying the criteria for the extraordinary remedies sought.

The Plaintiffs, David Bruce Wynn and Jacqueline Mary Rocchio, brought a motion for summary judgment against the Defendants, George Kentris and Helga Kentris, for breach of an Agreement of Purchase and Sale (APS) of real property.

The Defendants failed to close the transaction.

The Plaintiffs also sought dismissal of the Defendants' counterclaim against them, which included allegations against the Plaintiffs' real estate agents.

The court found that the Defendants breached the APS and that the Plaintiffs had reasonably mitigated their damages.

The court granted summary judgment in favour of the Plaintiffs for damages and dismissed the counterclaim against the Plaintiffs, finding no genuine issue for trial and that partial summary judgment was appropriate given the severability of claims against the agents.

The Respondent brought a long motion seeking compliance with prior parenting orders, expanded parenting time, makeup time, enforcement, therapy provisions, access to information, termination of a restraining order, and possession of a child's passport.

The Applicant opposed the motion and was found to have actively undermined the children's relationship with the Respondent and failed to comply with court orders.

The court granted the Respondent's requests, terminating the restraining orders, ordering compliance, mandating therapeutic reintegration, granting access to information, and imposing fines for non-compliance with parenting time.

The court also declared the older child, Flora, to still be a "child of the marriage" due to her continued dependence and stunted development.

The parties reached an agreement on the calculation of prejudgment interest and costs following a previous court ruling.

Prejudgment interest was determined to be $51,619.51, and costs were agreed upon at $128,129.17.

The endorsement details the agreed terms, including the impact of Rule 49 offers to settle on the breakdown of partial and substantial indemnity costs.

The court ordered that the approved judgment reflecting these terms shall be issued.

Atlas Dewatering Corporation sought prejudgment interest at an average rate of 1.8% from the commencement of proceedings, while Harvie Construction Inc. argued for the presumptive rate of 0.8%.

The court, applying section 130 of the Courts of Justice Act and principles from Graham v. Rourke, found that the 1% difference between the average rate and the presumptive rate was not significant enough to warrant deviation from the presumptive rate.

The court ordered the prejudgment interest rate to be 0.8%.

The defendant, Aviva Insurance Company of Canada, brought a motion to strike two Requests to Admit (RTAs) or, in the alternative, to withdraw deemed admissions that arose from their failure to respond to the RTAs.

The plaintiff argued that the non-response was deliberate and part of a pattern of uncooperative litigation conduct.

The court found the RTAs were not an abuse of process but allowed the withdrawal of admissions, finding a reasonable explanation (inadvertence) and no uncompensable prejudice to the plaintiff.

Despite the defendant's success on the motion, the court deprived them of costs due to their overall pattern of non-responsiveness and lack of cooperation, sanctioning their litigation conduct.