Seth P. Weinstein

The accused applied for a mistrial due to the Crown's late disclosure of information, including an agreement not to use a witness's statements against him and email exchanges questioning the authenticity of an exhibit.

The court applied the Stinchcombe and Dixon principles on disclosure and the right to make full answer and defence.

The court found that while disclosure was late, the accused failed to demonstrate a reasonable possibility that the late disclosure affected the trial's outcome or fairness, or impaired their ability to make full answer and defence.

The remedy granted was to prevent the Crown from calling reply evidence, including recalling the witness to change his testimony, thereby preserving the accused's tactical position.

The defendant applied under section 276 of the Criminal Code to admit evidence of the complainant's prior sexual history at trial for a sexual assault charge.

The defendant sought to introduce evidence of prior consensual physical contact between the parties to rebut the complainant's anticipated testimony that they had no previous "relationship" or sexual contact, and to provide context regarding the nature of their relationship.

The court granted the application, finding the evidence admissible for purposes of narrative context, consent, and credibility assessment, as it did not engage the "twin myths" prohibited by section 276(1) and was necessary for the defendant's full answer and defence.

The applicants, charged with offences under the Corruption of Foreign Public Officials Act, brought a motion for a stay of proceedings alleging their s. 11(b) Charter rights to be tried within a reasonable time were infringed.

The total delay from charges to the anticipated end of trial was 44 months.

The court applied the Jordan framework, confirming a 30-month presumptive ceiling for matters proceeding by preferred indictment in the Superior Court.

After deducting defence delay and time attributed to the extradition process as a discrete event (minus a period for Crown lack of diligence), the net delay was calculated at 27 months for one applicant and 26 months and 3 weeks for the other.

As the net delay fell below the 30-month ceiling and the case was particularly complex, the court dismissed the stay applications.

The Crown brought an application to admit evidence of the accused's prior discreditable conduct from 2008, involving domestic assault and unauthorized possession of a firearm, as similar fact evidence in a trial for similar charges.

The Crown argued the evidence was necessary to rebut the defence's assertion that the complainant planted the firearms.

The court applied the Handy framework and dismissed the application, finding the prior incident lacked sufficient similarity to the current charges and that its admission would be highly prejudicial.

The offender pleaded guilty to four counts of impaired driving causing death and two counts of impaired driving causing bodily harm after running a stop sign at excessive speed with a blood alcohol concentration nearly three times the legal limit.

The collision killed three young children and their grandfather, and injured two other family members.

The court weighed the offender's early guilty plea, lack of criminal record, and good character against the extreme gravity of the offence and high moral blameworthiness.

Emphasizing denunciation and general deterrence, the court imposed a total sentence of 10 years' imprisonment and a 12-year driving prohibition.

The Crown sought to admit a video and audio statement given by the accused to the police following his arrest for aggravated assault.

The defence argued the statement was involuntary due to oppressive conditions, sleep deprivation, and police trickery, including the use of the Reid Technique and false evidence.

The court found that while the police officer lied to the accused about the evidence against him, the overall circumstances of the interrogation were not oppressive.

The court concluded the Crown met its heavy burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the statement was voluntary and admissible.

The accused brought a Charter application seeking exclusion of cocaine and cash seized during a warrantless search following a traffic stop.

He alleged breaches of ss. 8, 10(a), and 10(b) of the Charter after police concealed the true reason for his detention and delayed advising him of his right to counsel.

The court found no s. 8 breach because reasonable and probable grounds existed based on wiretap intelligence and surveillance.

However, deliberate breaches of ss. 10(a) and 10(b) occurred when police misled the accused about the reason for detention and failed to promptly advise him of his right to counsel or facilitate a requested call.

Applying the s. 24(2) Grant analysis, the court held the breaches were brief and had minimal practical impact, and that society’s interest in adjudication on the merits favoured admission of the reliable physical evidence.

This is a retrial following a successful appeal in a criminal case involving six charges of sexual assault and sexual interference against the defendant MCJ.

The charges involved three complainants: LJ (alleged offences between December 5, 1987 and December 5, 1992), KJ (alleged offences between June 15 and September 10, 2007), and LH (alleged offences in 1998 and July 23, 2005).

The defendant was the uncle of two complainants and the uncle of the mother of the third complainant.

The trial judge found that while the complainants were credible in their sincerity, their evidence was not reliable to the requisite degree due to numerous material inconsistencies, evolving allegations, and implausibilities.

All charges were dismissed.

The defendant pleaded guilty to three counts of gross indecency and admitted facts relating to a fourth incident involving sexual abuse of young boys in his position as a choir master in the 1970s and 1980s.

The Crown sought a custodial sentence of two years less a day, while the defence sought a conditional sentence of 12-15 months.

The court imposed an 18-month conditional sentence with 12 months of house arrest and 6 months of curfew, followed by 18 months of probation, finding that denunciation and deterrence could be achieved through a conditional sentence given the defendant's lack of prior record, genuine remorse, low risk of reoffending, and rehabilitation over 30+ years.

The accused lawyer was tried on two fraud counts arising from mortgage investments arranged for long-time clients whose funds were placed into several second mortgages and later rolled into a further mortgage.

The Crown alleged that the accused's failure to properly document and register the mortgages, culminating in registration of a third mortgage that became worthless on a power of sale, constituted intentional deceit causing deprivation or risk of deprivation.

The court found the evidence established serious negligence, conflicts of interest, fiduciary breaches, and substandard lawyering, but left a reasonable doubt as to whether the omissions were criminally dishonest or instead coincided with the complainants' own wish to keep the investments obscure.

The Crown failed to prove fraudulent mens rea beyond a reasonable doubt, and acquittals were entered on all counts.

The accused brought applications to stay charges under section 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging unreasonable delay.

The charges involved possession of property obtained by crime, money laundering, fraud, and drug trafficking offences spanning from January 2009 to June 2012.

The overall delay was 33 months from arrest to trial.

The court conducted a detailed analysis of the delay, attributing it to Crown delay (216 days), defence delay (235 days), inherent delay (457 days), and institutional delay (78 days).

The court found that the Crown and institutional delay combined amounted to just under 10 months, which was not unreasonable given the exceptional complexity of the case, particularly the Lavallee proceedings required to protect solicitor-client privilege following searches of the accused lawyer's office.

The court balanced the delay against society's strong interest in a trial on the merits given the serious allegations of money laundering by a lawyer involving millions of dollars.

The applications were dismissed.

The appellant, who was 17 at the time of the offences, appealed the imposition of an adult sentence following his conviction for second degree murder and offering an indignity to a dead body.

He argued that the sentencing judge mischaracterized the jury’s implied factual findings and erred in concluding that the presumption of diminished moral culpability under the Youth Criminal Justice Act had been rebutted.

The court held that, on the evidentiary record and jury instructions, the finding that the appellant inflicted at least one stab wound reasonably flowed from the verdict.

The court further held that the sentencing judge undertook a full and balanced analysis under s. 72 of the YCJA and properly concluded that a youth sentence would not be sufficient to hold the appellant accountable.

Fresh evidence concerning rehabilitation, institutional placement, and possible transfer to Germany did not alter that conclusion.

The accused was originally charged in 1987 with offences arising from a series of home invasion sexual assaults but was discharged at a preliminary inquiry in 1989.

In 2010, after advances in DNA technology linked him to the crime scenes, a new indictment was preferred.

The trial judge stayed the proceedings, finding that the accused's right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Charter was violated by including the 21-year 'gap' period in the delay calculation.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal, holding that the accused was not a 'person charged with an offence' during the gap period when he was unaware of any ongoing investigation, and therefore s. 11(b) was not engaged during that time.

Media organizations applied for access to previously sealed informations to obtain (ITOs) relating to a production order and search warrant issued during a criminal investigation.

The accused sought continuation of a publication ban, arguing that publication of intercepted communications referenced in the ITOs would compromise his right to a fair trial on an extortion charge.

Applying the Dagenais/Mentuck test, the court held that the accused failed to demonstrate a real and serious risk to trial fairness, given existing publicity, the passage of time before trial, jury instructions, and the challenge for cause process.

A third party mentioned in the ITOs argued that publication would damage his reputation, but the court held that third parties generally lack standing to seek publication bans absent exceptional circumstances.

The court concluded that the open court principle prevailed and lifted the remaining publication bans.

The applicants sought judicial review of four decisions of the Ontario Labour Relations Board, including procedural decisions denying an adjournment and change of venue, and a final decision declaring the applicants to be one employer bound to certain collective agreements.

The applicants argued the Board breached natural justice by refusing to adjourn the hearing from Toronto to Thunder Bay.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the Board's travel policy reasonable and noting the applicants failed to provide adequate reasons for their non-attendance when invited to do so.

The Court also upheld the Board's document production order.

Media organizations applied for access to and the ability to publish the contents of an Information to Obtain supporting a search warrant in a major police investigation.

The Provincial Crown and an accused sought a publication ban on references to non-consensual intercepted private communications, arguing protection of the wiretap regime and fair trial rights.

Applying the Dagenais/Mentuck test, the court held that generalized concerns about the wiretap regime and speculative risks to a future jury trial were insufficient to justify restricting openness.

The court emphasized the strong presumption of open courts and the public interest in scrutiny of judicial authorizations and police investigations.

Balancing the competing interests, the court concluded that the salutary effects of a publication ban did not outweigh the significant deleterious effects on freedom of expression and public accountability.

Media organizations applied for access to portions of a sealed information to obtain (ITO) used to secure a search warrant in a criminal investigation.

The Crown had released a version with extensive edits, including redactions relating to innocent third parties.

Applying the open court principle and the Dagenais/Mentuck test under s. 487.3 of the Criminal Code, the court held that the Crown failed to establish a serious risk to the administration of justice justifying continued secrecy.

Assertions that the redacted material constituted non‑essential narrative or could harm innocent persons were unsupported by evidence.

The court ordered disclosure of the redacted material subject to limited exceptions for personal identifiers, certain references involving the mayor’s spouse, and portions potentially affecting the accused’s fair trial rights.

Two police officers appealed a finding of misconduct for making an unlawful or unnecessary arrest without good and sufficient cause.

The officers had arrested a driver leaving a laneway near a suspected drug dealer's residence without observing any drug transaction or confirming the driver's identity.

The Ontario Civilian Police Commission dismissed the appeal, finding that the Hearing Officer's reasons were adequate in the administrative law context and that the officers lacked objective reasonable and probable grounds to make the arrest.

The accused pleaded guilty to dangerous operation of a motor vehicle, assault with a weapon, criminal negligence causing bodily harm, and flight from police arising from a road rage incident.

The Crown sought 18 months custody (12 months concurrent for the primary offences and 6 months consecutive for flight from police).

The defence sought 6 to 9 months.

The court conducted a Gardiner hearing to determine whether the accused intentionally struck the victim with his vehicle.

The court found the Crown had not proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused intended to strike the victim, though he recklessly drove toward the van and used it as a weapon to threaten.

The court imposed 9 months total custody (7 months concurrent for the primary offences and 2 months consecutive for flight from police), followed by 18 months probation, a 3-year driving prohibition, DNA order, and a section 109 weapons prohibition order.

The accused was charged with multiple counts of home invasion sexual assault dating back to 1985-1987.

After being discharged at a preliminary inquiry in 1989, the police kept the investigation open pending advancements in DNA technology.

A preferred indictment was eventually obtained in 2010 after DNA linked the accused to the crimes.

The accused brought an application for a stay of proceedings, arguing his s. 11(b) Charter right to be tried within a reasonable time was infringed by the 25-year delay.

The court found that while much of the delay was inherent time required for DNA science to evolve, there were 32 months of unreasonable delay attributable to the Crown and police.

The court granted the stay of proceedings.