Seth P. Weinstein

The defendants, commercial trucking companies, were charged under s. 84.1 of the Highway Traffic Act after wheels separated from their vehicles on a highway.

The offence is one of absolute liability, expressly precluding the defence of due diligence, but carries no risk of imprisonment.

The defendants argued that the creation of an absolute liability offence violated their rights under ss. 7 and 11(d) of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal held that s. 11(d) does not prevent the legislature from eliminating a common law defence.

Furthermore, the court found no violation of s. 7, concluding that the diminished stigma attached to a regulatory offence and the absence of imprisonment do not trigger the security of the person guarantee.

The Crown's appeal was allowed and the defendant's appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for impaired driving.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court judge noted the trial judge failed to elaborate on his conclusions and their foundation, but dismissed the appeal.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's failure to give adequate reasons for rejecting the defence evidence frustrated the appellant's appeal rights, contrary to the standard in R. v. Sheppard.

The conviction was set aside and a new trial was ordered on both the impaired driving and 'over 80' charges.

The appellant, a Catholic priest, appealed his convictions for gross indecency and indecent assault relating to historical sexual abuse of a male complainant.

The appeal centered on the trial judge's reliance on expert evidence regarding delayed recall and recovered memory to explain discrepancies in the complainant's testimony, including the appellant's arrival date and the absence of a described birthmark.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's use of the expert evidence, his assessment of the complainant's credibility, or his evaluation of the appellant's testimony.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant pleaded guilty to assaulting his former girlfriend with a machete.

Prior to sentencing, he brought a motion to strike his guilty plea, claiming he was confused and did not understand the proceedings.

The trial judge dismissed the motion, finding that the appellant comprehended the plea and inferring that his trial counsel had properly ensured he understood its nature and consequences.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decision, noting that a guilty plea entered by a represented accused is presumed valid and the appellant failed to discharge the onus of proving otherwise.

The appellant appealed his sentence for possession of stolen property and other offences.

At trial, the Crown sought a 12-month sentence, but the trial judge imposed a significantly longer sentence without providing reasons.

The Court of Appeal noted the appellant's youth, early guilty plea, history of childhood abuse, and pretrial custody.

The appeal was allowed, and the sentence was varied to 18 months' imprisonment, accomplished by reducing the sentence for possession of stolen property to five months concurrent.