Seth P. Weinstein

The accused, an OPP officer, was charged with attempted murder, arson, and administering a noxious substance after a fire broke out in her daughter-in-law's bedroom.

The Crown alleged the accused drugged the victim's drink with diphenhydramine during a visit to discuss a bitter custody dispute, then set fire to the bedroom closet once the victim was asleep.

The court applied the W.(D.) framework to assess credibility and expert evidence regarding the fire's origin and the toxicology results.

The accused was found guilty of arson and administering a noxious substance, but acquitted of attempted murder as the specific intent to kill was not proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

The appellant, a police informer, had their identity and confidential information inadvertently recorded during a police interview.

The police and Crown failed to verify the appellant's informer status or redact the transcript, resulting in the full interview being disclosed to defence counsel in another case.

The appellant suffered retribution in custody.

The trial judge dismissed the appellant's application for a stay of proceedings.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found the conduct of the police and Crown amounted to gross negligence and breached the absolute class privilege of informers.

The appeal was allowed and a stay of proceedings was entered.

L'appelant a plaidé coupable à de multiples chefs d'accusation de conduite en état d'ébriété et de conduite dangereuse causant la mort et des lésions corporelles après avoir causé un accident de la route mortel.

Le juge de première instance a imposé une peine d'emprisonnement de 8 ans.

L'appelant a interjeté appel, soutenant que la peine se situait en dehors de l'échelle établie par la jurisprudence.

La Cour d'appel a rejeté l'appel, concluant que la peine n'était pas manifestement inappropriée compte tenu des circonstances aggravantes extrêmes, notamment le taux d'alcoolémie élevé, la vitesse excessive et le dossier de conduite antérieur de l'appelant.

The appellant pled guilty to multiple counts of impaired and dangerous driving causing death and bodily harm after a high-speed collision that killed three people and seriously injured another.

The trial judge imposed an eight-year sentence.

On appeal, the appellant argued the sentence was outside the four- to five-year range established by previous jurisprudence for first-time offenders.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that previous cases do not cap sentences and that the catastrophic consequences, combined with the appellant's prior driving record and ignored warnings, justified the eight-year sentence.

The appellant appealed his convictions and sentences for impaired driving causing death, dangerous driving causing death, and related offences following a motor vehicle collision.

He argued that urinalysis results obtained in breach of section 8 of the Charter should have been excluded under section 24(2), that the jury charge was unfair, and that the Kienapple principle precluded convictions for both impaired and dangerous driving.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the evidence was properly admitted under the Grant framework, the jury charge was balanced, and Kienapple did not apply because impaired driving and dangerous driving address different legal elements.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, upholding the four-year penitentiary term as fit given the paramount need for general deterrence.

The appellant lawyer was found guilty of professional misconduct by a Law Society Hearing Panel for sexually harassing a client and an employee.

The case turned entirely on credibility, with the appellant denying all allegations.

The Hearing Panel's decision was overturned by the Appeal Panel but reinstated by the Divisional Court.

On further appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the Hearing Panel's reasons were so inadequate as to foreclose meaningful appellate review.

The reasons consisted of generic generalities, unexplained conclusory observations, and failed to articulate any analysis of the appellant's evidence.

The Court allowed the appeal and remitted the matter for a new hearing.

The appellant appealed from a conviction entered by the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal as abandoned.

The appellant pleaded guilty to dangerous driving causing death and dangerous driving causing bodily harm after a collision.

He was sentenced to 18 months' imprisonment and a five-year driving prohibition.

He appealed the sentence, arguing for a conditional sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's conclusion that a conditional sentence would not adequately address denunciation and general deterrence.

The appellant was convicted of criminal harassment and sentenced to two years' imprisonment plus three years' probation for sending a letter to a victim he had previously harassed.

On appeal, he argued the sentencing judge erred in assessing the purpose of the letter and that the penitentiary sentence was harsh and excessive.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, noting the appellant's five prior convictions for harassing the same victim and finding the sentence was necessary to impress upon him that his conduct must stop.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their application for a declaration that sections 7(3)(d)(i) and 7(3)(h.2) of the Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act (PIPEDA) violate section 8 of the Charter.

The Royal Bank of Canada had obtained information from the Toronto Dominion Bank regarding fraudulent mortgage transactions involving the appellants' trust accounts, which it used to obtain a Mareva injunction.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that PIPEDA regulates private organizations and does not transform them into state agents, thus section 8 of the Charter was not engaged.

Furthermore, the appellants lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in the records.

The respondents pleaded guilty to dangerous driving causing death after driving at excessive speeds and colliding with a taxi, killing the driver.

At a pre-trial conference, the Crown undertook not to appeal if conditional sentences were imposed.

The trial judge imposed conditional sentences of two years less a day with house arrest for the first year, plus a four-year driving prohibition.

The Attorney General appealed the sentences.

The Court of Appeal held that the Crown's undertaking did not bar the Attorney General's statutory right to appeal and did not constitute an abuse of process.

While the trial judge did not err in principle in imposing conditional sentences, the sentences were demonstrably unfit as they lacked sufficient punitive conditions to address denunciation and general deterrence.

The Court allowed the appeal, extending the house arrest to the full term of the sentences and increasing the driving prohibitions to seven years.

The cross-appellant lawyer appealed a 12-month suspension imposed by the Law Society Appeal Panel for professional misconduct involving sexual harassment.

He also sought to introduce fresh evidence regarding the impact of the proceedings on his life.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion to introduce fresh evidence, finding it of limited value.

However, the Court allowed the cross-appeal on penalty, finding the 12-month suspension unreasonable given the historical context of the misconduct (1988-1993), comparable cases, and mitigating factors.

The penalty was reduced to a three-month suspension.

The appellant appealed an order quashing his discharge on a charge of first degree murder following a preliminary inquiry.

The preliminary hearing judge had found that the pathologist's evidence of force applied to the deceased's wrists could not support an inference of forcible confinement, weighing it against other evidence.

The Court of Appeal held that the preliminary hearing judge committed jurisdictional error by improperly weighing competing inferences.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed her conviction and sentence for accepting a secret benefit under s. 426(1) of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding that the offence is established by proof that an agent accepted a secret benefit and placed themselves in a conflict of interest without alerting their principal, regardless of whether the benefit actually influenced their conduct.

However, the Court allowed the sentence appeal, finding that the trial judge erred in characterizing the offence as a well-planned fraud upon the public purse.

The Court set aside the term of imprisonment and imposed an 18-month conditional sentence, noting the appellant's lack of prior record, full restitution, loss of career, junior role, and cooperation with authorities.

At a pre-hearing conference regarding a Notice of Proposal to suspend a liquor licence, the Board of the Alcohol and Gaming Commission of Ontario ordered the licensee and the Registrar to exchange witness lists, evidence summaries, and further disclosure ten days prior to the scheduled hearing date.

The applicant appealed a committal order.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal because the appellant failed to surrender.

The appellant was acquitted at trial of failing to comply with a breath demand.

The Crown successfully appealed to the Summary Conviction Appeal Court, which ordered a new trial on the basis that the trial judge found the appellant had feigned compliance, which is tantamount to a refusal.

The appellant sought leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal.

The Court of Appeal agreed that the trial judge's findings amounted to a feigned attempt to blow and denied leave to appeal.

The Law Society appealed a decision of its Appeal Panel, which had set aside a Hearing Panel's finding that the respondent lawyer committed professional misconduct through sexual harassment.

The Appeal Panel had ordered a new hearing, finding the Hearing Panel erred by failing to strictly apply the credibility assessment test from R. v. W. (D.).

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal in part, holding that strict application of W. (D.) is not required in administrative disciplinary proceedings provided the correct civil standard of proof is applied.

The court restored the finding of professional misconduct but upheld the Appeal Panel's conclusion that the penalty of disbarment was unreasonable, substituting a 12-month suspension.

The appellant appealed an extradition committal order and sought judicial review of the Minister of Justice's surrender order to the United States for charges including fraud and theft.

The appellant argued the extradition judge erred by not staying the proceedings due to the requesting state's non-disclosure regarding a witness interview, and by applying the wrong test for committal under the Extradition Act.

The Court of Appeal held that the extradition judge properly excised the tainted witness evidence rather than staying the proceedings.

Furthermore, applying the Supreme Court's decision in Ferras, the Court confirmed that an extradition judge cannot refuse committal merely because the case is weak, provided there is some available and reliable evidence on each element of the offence.

The appeal and application for judicial review were dismissed.

The Crown appealed the sentence imposed on the respondent.

Due to recent developments, the appeal became moot.

The Crown abandoned the appeal, and it was dismissed as abandoned.