Bernd Michael Richardt

The City of Kenora brought an application for a closure order and injunctive relief against the owners of an illegal boarding house that had become a public nuisance due to extensive criminal activity, fire hazards, and property standards violations.

The owners did not oppose the application, but an intervening legal clinic argued that the Residential Tenancies Act (RTA) gave the Landlord and Tenant Board exclusive jurisdiction to terminate tenancies, thereby ousting the court's jurisdiction to issue a closure order.

The Superior Court held that the RTA regulates landlord-tenant relationships, whereas the Municipal Act empowers the municipality to protect the broader public interest.

The court concluded that a closure order under the Municipal Act is not a termination order under the RTA, and granted the closure order effective April 1, 2019.

The court dismissed both the plaintiff's claim for approximately $14,000 and the defendants' counterclaim for about $100,000.

The plaintiff sought partial indemnity costs of approximately $27,000 for a 3.5-day trial.

The court, exercising its discretion under s. 131(1) of the Courts of Justice Act, ordered Wayne Nicholas Degagne and Degagne Multi-Electric to pay the plaintiff $10,000 plus GST in costs.

The court found the defendants to be the "biggest loser" due to the substantial counterclaim's dismissal, while Lea Macalino Degagne and 2225171 Ontario Corporation were deemed not proper parties for costs.

The plaintiff, Kenora Flooring Centre Inc. (KF), sued for an unpaid balance on a flooring contract.

The defendants, Degagne Multi-Electric (DME) and others, counterclaimed for the cost of replacing all vinyl flooring due to alleged deficiencies.

The court found some deficiencies existed but dismissed the counterclaim because the defendants failed to provide sufficient evidence of specific damages and sought an excessive remedy (wholesale replacement).

The plaintiff's claim for the unpaid balance was also dismissed as the court found the contract had not been fully fulfilled, and KF similarly failed to provide evidence of the costs to complete the outstanding work.

Two police officers appealed a finding of misconduct for making an unlawful or unnecessary arrest without good and sufficient cause.

The officers had arrested a driver leaving a laneway near a suspected drug dealer's residence without observing any drug transaction or confirming the driver's identity.

The Ontario Civilian Police Commission dismissed the appeal, finding that the Hearing Officer's reasons were adequate in the administrative law context and that the officers lacked objective reasonable and probable grounds to make the arrest.

The applicant, acting through the Public Guardian and Trustee, filed a human rights application alleging discrimination on the basis of disability and age.

The applicant sought retroactive benefits from the respondent Board to the date of her original 2001 application, which had been closed due to non-attendance at a medical appointment.

The respondent argued the application should be dismissed based on judicial immunity, as it challenged a statutory decision.

The Tribunal held it was not plain and obvious that the administrative requirement to file a second application was an adjudicative decision protected by judicial immunity, and allowed the application to proceed.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their claim for specific performance of a contract for the sale of a cottage property.

The trial judge had found that a 1964 letter agreement was not an enforceable contract due to uncertainty in the property description, as part of the land described was on an adjoining Crown reserve.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the purchasers were entitled to specific performance for the portion of the land the vendor was able to convey.

The Court also found the trial judge erred in applying the Limitations Act, as the limitation period did not begin until a demand to convey was made.

Following the dismissal of the wife's application for leave to appeal a summary judgment decision regarding the partition and sale of a jointly owned family cottage, the court determined the quantum of costs payable to the successful husband.

The court applied the principles of proportionality and reasonableness, noting that the husband's claimed costs of over $16,000 for a leave to appeal motion were excessive.

Costs were fixed on a partial indemnity scale at $8,487.09.

The applicant wife sought leave to appeal a costs order of $32,107.82 made against her following an unsuccessful motion for partition and sale of a family cottage.

The court reviewed the test for granting leave to appeal an interlocutory order under Rule 62.02(4) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court found that the motions judge had correctly applied the proper principles in awarding costs and that the wife failed to demonstrate conflicting decisions or good reason to doubt the correctness of the order.

The motion for leave to appeal was dismissed.

The Attorney General of Ontario applied for judicial review of a decision by the Health Services Appeal and Review Board.

The Board had rescinded orders made by a local Medical Officer of Health that prohibited smoking in several hospitality businesses.

The Board found that the Medical Officer of Health exceeded his statutory authority under section 13 of the Health Protection and Promotion Act by issuing blanket, unit-wide orders rather than site-specific ones.

The Divisional Court applied a correctness standard of review and upheld the Board's decision, dismissing the application for judicial review and awarding costs to the respondent businesses.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment enforcing a written agreement.

The appellant argued that a contemporaneous oral agreement altered its payment obligations.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the written agreement was clear and unambiguous, and evidence of an oral agreement cannot be admitted to contradict its terms.

The Court also noted that even if the dispute was subject to an arbitration clause, summary judgment was appropriate under s. 7(2), para. 5 of the Arbitration Act, 1991.