Sean Christopher Doyle

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board dated August 23, 2013.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal as moot because a subsequent disposition was issued on February 18, 2014, and the appellant was successfully living in the community in approved housing.

The appellant, a health spa owner, was convicted of unlawful confinement and assault after locking the door and pushing a client who tried to leave without paying.

The trial judge and summary conviction appeal judge rejected her defence of citizen's arrest under s. 494 of the Criminal Code, finding she did not subjectively believe the client had committed a crime.

The appellant sought leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal, arguing a translation error affected her testimony and raising the issue of citizen's arrest for non-payment of services.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application for leave, finding the proposed appeal did not raise a question of law of significance to the administration of justice under s. 839(1) of the Criminal Code.

The appellant appealed a conviction for driving with excess blood alcohol, arguing the trial judge erred by dismissing a s. 11(b) Charter application alleging unreasonable delay and by providing insufficient reasons for that ruling.

The appellate court agreed that the trial judge’s reasons were inadequate to permit appellate review and therefore conducted its own analysis of the delay under the Askov and Morin framework.

The court found the total delay of approximately 14 months and 20 days warranted scrutiny but concluded that only about nine months and three weeks constituted institutional and Crown delay.

Some delay was attributable to defence conduct, including insisting on an adjournment based on a mistaken interpretation of s. 657.3 of the Criminal Code and failing to raise s. 11(b) concerns when a continuation date was set.

Although some prejudice arose from multiple trial dates, the court held the delay was not unreasonable in the circumstances.

The accused was found intoxicated in the driver's seat of a damaged motor vehicle parked in a gas station lot.

He was charged with care or control of a motor vehicle while impaired and excess blood alcohol.

The central issue was whether the Crown proved care or control beyond a reasonable doubt.

The court found that the statutory presumption under section 258(1)(a) of the Criminal Code applied, as the accused occupied the driver's seat while intoxicated.

The accused failed to rebut the presumption on a balance of probabilities.

The court also found that even if the presumption had been rebutted, the Crown proved actual care or control beyond a reasonable doubt based on the realistic risk of danger presented by the accused's conduct and circumstances.

Verdicts of guilty were entered on both counts.

The applicants, charged with offences related to an armoured car robbery, applied for a stay of proceedings under s. 24(1) of the Charter, alleging a violation of their s. 11(b) right to be tried within a reasonable time.

The total delay from the laying of charges to the scheduled trial was approximately 49 months.

The court applied the Morin framework and found that the majority of the delay was attributable to the inherent time requirements of the case and defence actions, particularly during a protracted preliminary inquiry.

The total Crown and institutional delay was calculated at just under 13 months, which fell within the Morin guidelines.

Finding no unreasonable delay and no evidence of actual prejudice, the court dismissed the application.

The appellant appealed a conviction for assault arising from a domestic dispute, arguing that the trial judge demonstrated bias, made unreasonable findings of fact, and misapplied the law relating to defence of property.

The Superior Court of Justice held that the impugned comments by the trial judge were made in the context of explaining the trial process to a self-represented accused and did not give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The court further found that the trial judge’s factual findings were supported by the evidence and were entitled to deference on appeal, and that the correct legal framework for defence of property had been applied.

The appellant also sought costs and compensation for various alleged harms, but the court held that there was no basis for such an award in the absence of prosecutorial misconduct or other exceptional circumstances.

The conviction and conditional discharge were therefore upheld.

The Crown brought a motion to remove defence counsel for the accused McCreath from the record due to an alleged conflict of interest.

The Crown argued that counsel had a prior relationship with the principal Crown witness, Henry, when she acted as duty counsel approximately five years earlier.

The court held a voir dire to determine whether a solicitor-client relationship had existed between counsel and the witness.

The court found that no such relationship arose, as counsel merely acted as a messenger between the witness and his family while serving as duty counsel, without providing legal advice or being engaged in her professional capacity as a lawyer.

The motion was dismissed.

The accused was charged with driving while impaired and driving with a blood alcohol level over 80 mg per 100 ml.

The Crown alleged the accused drove to a liquor store while already intoxicated, purchased vodka, and was observed by LCBO employees exhibiting signs of impairment before nearly causing an accident.

The accused contended he consumed alcohol only after arriving home and before police arrived.

The court rejected the accused's evidence as lacking credibility and not raising reasonable doubt.

The court also dismissed Charter applications regarding alleged violations of section 8 (unreasonable search) and section 10(b) (right to counsel) rights.

The accused was found guilty on both charges.

The appellant appealed a conviction for operating a motor vehicle with blood alcohol exceeding 80 mg, arguing that breath samples were invalid because the breath technician failed to wait 17 minutes after an invalid sample and that the trial judge improperly relied on the statutory presumption of accuracy under s. 258(1)(g) of the Criminal Code when the Crown had also called the technician to testify viva voce.

The appeal court held that the trial judge did not err in accepting the technician’s evidence that a waiting period was unnecessary where the invalid sample resulted from inadequate blowing rather than residual mouth alcohol.

The court further held that the Crown was not barred from relying on the certificate and presumption of accuracy merely because the technician also testified.

In the absence of evidence to the contrary raising doubt about the reliability of the readings, the presumption applied.

The conviction for driving over 80 mg was therefore upheld.

Following a successful summary conviction appeal in which a new trial was ordered due to non‑disclosure of the operating manual for an approved screening device, the appellant sought a stay of proceedings and costs against the Crown under s. 24(1) of the Charter.

The court considered the principles governing stays for abuse of process and the limited residual category under s. 7 of the Charter.

It held that the Crown’s conduct did not render the prosecution unfair or damage the integrity of the justice system so as to justify a stay.

Applying Supreme Court of Canada jurisprudence on costs in criminal matters, the court also found the non‑disclosure did not amount to a marked and unacceptable departure from reasonable prosecutorial standards.

The application for a stay and for costs was dismissed.

The Crown appealed the sentences imposed on two repeat drinking and driving offenders.

In both cases, the trial judges had set aside the Crown's s. 727(1) notices of intention to seek an increased penalty, finding that the prosecutors had exercised their discretion unreasonably.

One of the offenders also appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in proceeding with the trial in his absence.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in proceeding where counsel was present and prepared.

The Court allowed the Crown's sentence appeals, holding that the decision to file a s. 727(1) notice falls within the core elements of prosecutorial discretion and is reviewable only for abuse of process, not on a standard of reasonableness.

However, at the Crown's request, the existing sentences were not varied.

The parties made written submissions on costs following an appeal where success was substantially divided.

The appellants succeeded on the issues of the base period of reasonable notice and prejudgment interest, while the respondent succeeded on Wallace damages and bonus compensation.

The Court of Appeal held that the divided success did not warrant a departure from the general rule that no costs should be awarded.

The court also considered the respondent's settlement offer but found it did not propose a sufficiently meaningful compromise.

No costs of the appeal were awarded.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment awarding the respondent 34 months' notice (30 months base plus 4 months Wallace damages) for wrongful dismissal.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in awarding a base notice period in excess of 24 months without exceptional circumstances, reducing the base period to 24 months.

The court upheld the 4-month Wallace extension due to the appellants' bad faith conduct during the dismissal.

The court also varied the prejudgment interest award, holding that interest should be calculated on an installment basis rather than a lump sum basis for the period during which salary continuance payments were made.

The appellant limited partnership appealed the dismissal of its application for declaratory and mandatory relief regarding a Sale and Dissolution Agreement.

The dispute centered on whether a conditional offer to purchase real estate satisfied the agreement's requirement that the property be 'sold' before the listing period expired.

The Court of Appeal held that in the commercial context of the agreement, which aimed to provide a clear end to the listing period and trigger a standstill obligation, the word 'sold' meant an unconditional sale.

The appeal was dismissed.