Sean Christopher Doyle

The Crown brought a motion to remove defence counsel for the accused McCreath from the record due to an alleged conflict of interest.

The Crown argued that counsel had a prior relationship with the principal Crown witness, Henry, when she acted as duty counsel approximately five years earlier.

The court held a voir dire to determine whether a solicitor-client relationship had existed between counsel and the witness.

The court found that no such relationship arose, as counsel merely acted as a messenger between the witness and his family while serving as duty counsel, without providing legal advice or being engaged in her professional capacity as a lawyer.

The motion was dismissed.

The accused was charged with driving while impaired and driving with a blood alcohol level over 80 mg per 100 ml.

The Crown alleged the accused drove to a liquor store while already intoxicated, purchased vodka, and was observed by LCBO employees exhibiting signs of impairment before nearly causing an accident.

The accused contended he consumed alcohol only after arriving home and before police arrived.

The court rejected the accused's evidence as lacking credibility and not raising reasonable doubt.

The court also dismissed Charter applications regarding alleged violations of section 8 (unreasonable search) and section 10(b) (right to counsel) rights.

The accused was found guilty on both charges.

The appellant appealed a conviction for operating a motor vehicle with blood alcohol exceeding 80 mg, arguing that breath samples were invalid because the breath technician failed to wait 17 minutes after an invalid sample and that the trial judge improperly relied on the statutory presumption of accuracy under s. 258(1)(g) of the Criminal Code when the Crown had also called the technician to testify viva voce.

The appeal court held that the trial judge did not err in accepting the technician’s evidence that a waiting period was unnecessary where the invalid sample resulted from inadequate blowing rather than residual mouth alcohol.

The court further held that the Crown was not barred from relying on the certificate and presumption of accuracy merely because the technician also testified.

In the absence of evidence to the contrary raising doubt about the reliability of the readings, the presumption applied.

The conviction for driving over 80 mg was therefore upheld.

Following a successful summary conviction appeal in which a new trial was ordered due to non‑disclosure of the operating manual for an approved screening device, the appellant sought a stay of proceedings and costs against the Crown under s. 24(1) of the Charter.

The court considered the principles governing stays for abuse of process and the limited residual category under s. 7 of the Charter.

It held that the Crown’s conduct did not render the prosecution unfair or damage the integrity of the justice system so as to justify a stay.

Applying Supreme Court of Canada jurisprudence on costs in criminal matters, the court also found the non‑disclosure did not amount to a marked and unacceptable departure from reasonable prosecutorial standards.

The application for a stay and for costs was dismissed.