Criminal and Quasi-Criminal Law - SCJ

The offender was found guilty of second-degree murder for stabbing his mother to death.

The Crown sought a 15-year period of parole ineligibility, while the defence sought the minimum 10 years.

The court considered the profound breach of trust in a domestic relationship, the brutal nature of the attack involving multiple weapons, and the offender's criminal record.

The court sentenced the offender to life imprisonment with no eligibility for parole for 15 years.

During a jury trial for sexual assault, defence counsel sought to use Sandro Boticelli's painting 'Calumny of Apelles' as a visual prop during his closing address to illustrate the theme of false accusation.

The trial judge ruled that the painting could not be used, finding that its depiction of women as symbolic representations of slander, ignorance, suspicion, fraud, and conspiracy risked resurrecting offensive myths and stereotypes about female complainants.

The court concluded that the potential for prejudice and distortion of the fact-finding process substantially outweighed any legitimate persuasive impact.

The applicant, charged with first degree murder, brought a pre-trial motion for directions on whether the jury should be instructed on self-defence using the former or newly amended provisions of the Criminal Code.

The alleged offence occurred before the Citizen's Arrest and Self-defence Act came into force.

The court held that the presumption against retrospective application of legislation affecting substantive rights was rebutted.

The new provisions were intended to clarify and simplify the law, providing a benefit to claimants, and therefore apply retrospectively to the applicant's trial.

The appellant appealed his nine-month custodial sentence for break and enter and mischief.

He argued the sentencing judge failed to give sufficient weight to his Aboriginal heritage and erred by not imposing a conditional sentence similar to his co-accused based on the parity principle.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding the sentencing judge properly considered Gladue factors by reducing the sentence from 15 to 9 months, and justified the disparity with the co-accused due to the co-accused's guilty plea and a lack of evidentiary foundation for comparison.

The appellant appealed his conviction for driving 'over 80'.

The central issue was whether an unexplained 18-minute delay at the police station before the arresting officer contacted duty counsel meant the breath samples were not taken 'as soon as practicable' under s. 258(1)(c)(ii) of the Criminal Code.

The summary conviction appeal judge found that the trial judge erred in relying on the officer's general booking duties to explain the delay, as the officer testified those duties only took a couple of minutes.

Because the Crown failed to explain the remaining 18 minutes, it could not rely on the presumption of identity.

The appeal was allowed and an acquittal entered.

The defence applied to exclude evidence of the accused's post-offence conduct, specifically his flight from police nine months after the alleged homicide.

The defence argued the evidence was more prejudicial than probative.

The court dismissed the application, finding the evidence relevant and probative to the issue of whether the accused committed a culpable homicide and did not act in self-defence.

The court held that the jury should be allowed to weigh the evidence with appropriate instructions.

The accused brought a Corbett application seeking to edit his criminal record before testifying before the jury.

He requested that a prior robbery conviction be referred to as a theft and that a conviction for flight from police be excluded.

The court granted the application, finding that admitting the robbery conviction carried a serious risk of impermissible propensity reasoning given the factual matrix of the current charges.

The court also excluded the flight from police conviction, noting it was not a crime of dishonesty and its prejudicial effect outweighed any probative value, particularly since the Crown intended to lead after-the-fact conduct evidence of the accused fleeing police upon arrest.

The United States of America sought the extradition of the respondent for the offence of child luring.

The perpetrator communicated with a 17-year-old female online and coerced her into engaging in sexual activity with her 13-year-old sister over a Skype video call.

The communications were traced to an IP address assigned to the respondent at the relevant time.

The court found that the IP subscriber information provided a sufficient foundation for a reliable inference that the respondent was the perpetrator, satisfying the test for committal under the Extradition Act.

The application for committal was granted.

The accused, on trial for second-degree murder, brought an application to exclude several documents seized by police from an abandoned apartment he formerly occupied.

The documents included a probation order, letters from a girlfriend, drawings depicting a gun, and a driver's licence suspension notice.

The Crown sought to introduce the documents to negate the accused's claim of self-defence and innocent purpose.

The court allowed the application and excluded the documents, finding they lacked relevance and probative value, and that their prejudicial effect far outweighed any potential probative value.

The applicant was convicted of sexual interference and sexual assault but successfully appealed based on ineffective assistance of trial counsel, resulting in an order for a new trial.

The applicant brought an application seeking to return to the pre-election stage to elect a trial by judge and jury and have a preliminary inquiry.

The court granted the application under section 24(1) of the Charter, finding that the lack of adequate legal representation included the initial election process, and denying a re-election would infringe the applicant's rights under sections 7 and 11(f).

The Crown brought a motion seeking to admit evidence of an alleged robbery occurring four days before a fatal shooting as similar fact evidence in a second degree murder trial.

The Crown argued that the earlier incident shared distinctive similarities with the charged offence, including the use of a firearm, hotel-room encounters with sex trade workers, and the use of the same cellphone number to arrange meetings.

The respondent opposed admission, arguing that the similarities were generic and that the evidentiary link between the accused and the earlier robbery was weak and largely hearsay.

The court held that the similarities were not sufficiently distinctive and that the evidence linking the accused to the earlier incident was not cogent.

As the probative value did not outweigh the prejudicial effect, the proposed similar fact evidence was ruled inadmissible.

The accused applied under ss. 8, 9, and 24(2) of the Charter to exclude drugs found in the trunk of a vehicle following his arrest for multiple counts of possession for the purpose of trafficking.

The defence alleged the police lacked reasonable and probable grounds and argued that officers fabricated surveillance observations and notes after the arrest.

The court rejected the defence theory, finding that key allegations of fabrication were never put to the officers in cross‑examination contrary to the rule in Browne v. Dunn.

After reviewing the surveillance evidence, confidential informant information, and officer testimony, the court concluded that the police had reasonable and probable grounds to arrest and that the search of the vehicle was lawful as incidental to arrest.

The evidence of the accused and a co‑accused was rejected as improbable and inconsistent with the credible testimony of the officers.

The accused was charged with fraud over $5,000 and knowingly using a forged document after depositing a series of cheques into his criminal defence lawyer’s trust account to pay a $34,000 retainer for a preliminary hearing.

Evidence showed the first cheque was forged and the remaining cheques were not backed by funds, yet the accused confirmed the deposits and represented them as genuine while the lawyer performed extensive legal work.

Surveillance footage linked the accused to the deposit of the forged cheque, and surrounding circumstances supported the inference that he knew the cheques were fraudulent and intended to delay detection until after the preliminary hearing commenced.

Applying the principles from Théroux and Zlatic on fraud and Valois on forged documents, the court found both the actus reus and mens rea of the offences proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

The lawyer suffered financial deprivation after performing over 100 hours of work without payment and faced a potential bank investigation into his trust account.

The accused was convicted on both counts.

The Crown applied for leave to provide a prosecution witness with transcripts of her earlier testimony to refresh her memory before resuming cross‑examination following a five‑month interruption in proceedings.

The defence opposed the request, arguing it would breach professional conduct rules and permit the witness to rehearse prior answers where credibility was a central issue.

The court held that while it had discretion to permit such access, the request was speculative and not sufficiently necessary given the witness’s extensive notes and documentary record.

The court determined the safer course was to maintain the status quo and allow the witness to refresh her memory from transcripts only if a lack of recall arose during testimony.

The application was dismissed.

During a criminal trial involving allegations that the accused pointed a firearm and uttered threats at a children's birthday party, the Crown sought to admit prior inconsistent statements made by four witnesses as substantive evidence under the principled exception to the hearsay rule.

The witnesses recanted their earlier police statements at trial and denied seeing a firearm.

The court considered whether the prior statements met the necessity and threshold reliability requirements under the principled approach to hearsay.

Finding that the witnesses were available for cross-examination, that accurate records of their statements existed, and that the surrounding circumstances provided sufficient indicia of reliability, the court admitted the prior statements for the truth of their contents.

The court also admitted certain spontaneous utterances made during the incident under the res gestae exception to the hearsay rule.

The accused was convicted after trial of indecent assault of a female and gross indecency for sexually abusing a child over a four‑year period while acting in a parental role.

The court considered aggravating factors including breach of parental trust, the complainant’s young age, and the persistent and degrading nature of the abuse.

Mitigating considerations included the offender’s advanced age, poor health, otherwise good character, and the long passage of time without further offending.

The court held that denunciation and general deterrence were paramount and that a conditional sentence would not meet the objectives of sentencing under the Criminal Code.

A custodial sentence was therefore imposed.

The offender was convicted by a jury of possession of 72 methadone pills contrary to s. 4 of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act after bringing the pills into Canada without a valid Canadian prescription.

The offender was a 41‑year‑old first offender who claimed the medication had been obtained in Iran to address an opium addiction and argued that an absolute discharge was necessary to avoid losing his employment.

The Crown sought a suspended sentence with probation, emphasizing general deterrence and the deliberate importation of controlled drugs into Canada.

The court found that an absolute discharge would undermine general deterrence but that a suspended sentence was excessive given the offender’s lack of record and addiction‑related motivation.

A conditional discharge with probationary conditions was imposed.

The accused was charged with criminal negligence causing death, dangerous driving causing death, impaired driving causing death, and driving with a blood alcohol concentration over 80 mg causing death following a single motor vehicle rollover.

The sole issue at trial was the identity of the driver.

The court heard evidence from civilian witnesses, police, and expert witnesses on collision reconstruction and occupant kinematics.

The court rejected the defence expert's opinion that the deceased was the driver and accepted the Crown's expert evidence, along with civilian testimony and physical evidence, concluding beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused was the driver.

The accused was found guilty on all counts.

The accused, charged with robbery, brought applications for a stay of proceedings due to unreasonable delay under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The total delay from the date of arrest to the anticipated end of trial was 25 months.

The court attributed significant portions of the delay to the Crown, including late disclosure of a 9-1-1 audio recording and failure to expedite scheduling.

Finding that the delay was unreasonable and that the accused suffered real prejudice from restrictive bail conditions, the court granted the applications and stayed the charges.

The accused pleaded guilty to multiple drug trafficking charges, including the sale of a half kilogram of heroin to an undercover police officer.

He subsequently brought an application to stay the proceedings on the basis of entrapment, arguing that a police agent induced him to sell the drugs in exchange for documents related to a civil lawsuit.

The court rejected the accused's evidence, finding that he had a personal financial stake in the transactions and was not induced by the offer of documents.

The entrapment application was dismissed.