Administrative Law - SCJ

The plaintiff, Alexander Shaulov, brought a motion to amend his statement of claim to re-add Performance Assessment Group Inc., John Braham, and Michael Williams (the non-LSO defendants) and to plead a new cause of action in negligence against them.

The claims against the non-LSO defendants had been previously struck without leave to amend, and subsequent attempts to keep them as parties or appeal those decisions were unsuccessful.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that re-litigating the issue of adding the non-LSO defendants was an abuse of process, and that the proposed negligence claim was statute-barred as the material facts were known to the plaintiff prior to the initial claim.

J.F. appealed a decision by the Consent and Capacity Board that found him incapable of consenting to anti-psychotic medication.

The core issue was whether J.F. could appreciate the reasonably foreseeable consequences of his treatment decisions, particularly his inability to acknowledge the manifestations of his mental condition.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the Board's determination that J.F. was incapable of consenting to treatment, as he failed to recognize the possibility that he was affected by the manifestations of a mental condition.

The Corporation of the Township of Strong brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiffs' claims for defamation, malicious prosecution, and misfeasance in public office.

The plaintiffs alleged that the Township made defamatory statements to police, initiated a malicious prosecution for public mischief, and engaged in misfeasance in public office, all stemming from a dispute over land ownership.

The court dismissed the Township's motion, finding genuine issues for trial on all three causes of action, particularly regarding the Township's alleged malice and reckless disregard for the truth in its communications with the police.

The court also found that partial summary judgment was inappropriate due to the intertwined factual and legal issues.

The defendant, Executive Director of the Secretariat on Responsible Conduct of Research, brought a motion under Rules 21.01(1)(b) and 25.06 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to strike the plaintiff's statement of claim without leave to amend.

The plaintiff had previously amended the claim twice.

The court found the claim, which alleged unspecified torts related to the plaintiff's troubled relationship with McMaster University and the Secretariat's handling of research misconduct reports, disclosed no reasonable cause of action.

The court determined that the plaintiff failed to plead material facts supporting a private law duty of care or any recognized tort against the defendant, and that the claim consisted of bald, conclusory statements.

Given the repeated failures to cure deficiencies, leave to amend was denied, and the action was dismissed.

This endorsement addresses a motion by the Attorney General of Canada for a further extension of the suspension of a declaration of invalidity concerning sections 3(3)(a) and 3(3)(b) of the Citizenship Act, which were previously found to contravene the Charter.

The court assessed the respondent's updated mechanism for addressing urgent hardship cases and the progress of Bill C-71, intended to remedy the unconstitutional provisions.

The court found the hardship mechanism sufficient and the legislative progress satisfactory, concluding that a further extension would not undermine confidence in the administration of justice.

The extension was granted until December 19, 2024, and the applicants were awarded partial indemnity costs.

The plaintiff, a federally incarcerated offender, brought a motion for state-funded counsel and a cross-motion to dismiss the defendant's motion to strike his claim.

The defendant moved to strike the plaintiff's claim for disclosing no reasonable cause of action and for being frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process.

The court dismissed the plaintiff's motion for counsel, finding no basis under the Rules of Civil Procedure or the Charter.

The court granted the defendant's motion to strike, concluding that the statement of claim failed to disclose a reasonable cause of action and was frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process, given the plaintiff's history of initiating numerous civil actions.

The plaintiff's claim was dismissed in its entirety.

The applicant challenged the City of Mississauga's Nuisance Weed and Tall Grass Control By-law, arguing it was ultra vires and unconstitutional as an infringement of his right to free expression under section 2(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court dismissed the application, finding that while the by-law did infringe on freedom of expression, it was justified under section 1 of the Charter.

The by-law's objectives of public safety, health, and aesthetics were pressing and substantial, and its restrictions were minimally impairing and proportionate.

The court also rejected claims of improper by-law enforcement, lack of qualified inspectors, and insufficient appeal processes.

TruGrp Inc. moved to set aside an ex parte order vacating its construction liens, arguing that the form of letter of credit used as security was uncertain and inconsistent with the Construction Act and the Accountant's statutory role.

Karmina Holdings Inc. opposed, arguing the motion was meritless and that the letter of credit form was standard.

The court dismissed Karmina's procedural challenges but adjourned the motion to allow the Accountant of the Superior Court of Justice and the Bank of Montreal to make submissions on the core dispute regarding the sufficiency and statutory compliance of the letter of credit.

The Attorney General for Ontario brought a motion on behalf of Monte McNaughton (former Minister of Labour) and Margaret Townsend (Director of the Office of the Worker Advisors) to quash two summonses to witness issued by self-represented plaintiffs in a proposed class action.

The plaintiffs sought to compel testimony regarding the Office of the Worker Advisors' (OWA) obligation to provide legal representation.

The court quashed the summonses, finding the evidence sought irrelevant to the pending Rule 15 motion (which addresses the requirement for class action representatives to be represented by counsel) and that the plaintiffs failed to establish the non-parties likely possessed relevant evidence.

The court also determined the examination constituted an abuse of process, as much of the information was already available or obtainable through other means, and that Townsend, as OWA Director, was immune from being summonsed under the Workplace Safety and Insurance Act.

The plaintiffs, Yves Chevalier and George Basmadji, brought an action against the Office of the Public Guardian and Trustee, alleging unconstitutional and criminal conduct, unjust enrichment, breach of duty of care, and abuse of public trust, seeking substantial damages.

The defendant requisitioned a Rule 2.1 order to dismiss the action as frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process.

The court found Basmadji was subject to a vexatious litigant order and had not obtained leave to commence the action.

Chevalier's claim was found to be frivolous and an abuse of process, particularly given a prior stay.

The court dismissed both plaintiffs' claims under Rule 2.1.03(1) and Rule 2.1.01, respectively, with no order as to costs.

The applicant sought a declaration that Rule 15.01(1) of the Law Society of Ontario's Rules of Practice and Procedure, concerning the awarding of costs against the Law Society, was ultra vires or null and void.

The Law Society brought a cross-motion to dismiss the application for disclosing no reasonable cause of action or being an abuse of process.

The court dismissed the applicant's request for a declaration, finding that the Law Society's rule on costs was within its statutory authority and that costs are procedural in nature.

The Law Society's motion to dismiss was granted, and costs were awarded to the Law Society.

This decision, Part 9 of a series in a multi-jurisdictional class action, addresses bitterly contested motions by both the Attorney General of Canada and Class Counsel to revise the Distribution and Individual Issues Protocol (DIIP).

The dispute centered on the scope of reply position statements for Track 2 claims.

Canada sought to limit replies strictly to mitigating factors and causation rebuttal, while Class Counsel argued for broader replies to new issues raised by Canada.

The court denied both parties' specific requests, instead directing a revision to allow Canada a right of sur-reply if a claimant files a reply, and imposing an increased payment to the Manager/Expert in such instances.

The ruling aims to ensure fair, efficient, and proportionate litigation while discouraging procedural abuses by either party.

The Chief Building Official of the City of Cambridge issued an emergency order for the immediate demolition of the designated heritage Preston Springs Hotel due to its unsafe structural condition and persistent trespassing.

The CBO applied to the court to confirm the reasonableness of this order and to recover demolition costs from the owner, Haastown Holdings (Preston) Inc., who consented to both orders.

The Architectural Conservancy of Ontario (ACO) intervened, challenging the reasonableness of the demolition order, arguing that the CBO failed to consider relevant factors (heritage status, appeal to CRB, alternative remediation options) and considered irrelevant factors (cost of remediation).

The court applied a reasonableness standard of review, finding that the CBO's decision was well-informed by expert reports and his own inspections, and that the building posed an immediate danger that necessitated demolition.

The court confirmed the emergency order and the recoverability of demolition costs from the owner, dismissing the ACO's challenge and alternate relief requests as moot or unsupported.

The defendants moved to set aside an ex parte order that extended the deadline for service of the Statement of Claim, alleging the plaintiff failed to make full and fair disclosure of material facts and caused prejudice.

The plaintiff cross-moved to validate service.

The court found that the plaintiff's affidavit on the ex parte motion was inadequate, failing to disclose that defendants' counsel had offered to accept service and that the MFDA was also investigating the defendants for the same conduct.

The court determined that the defendants suffered prejudice because they entered into a settlement agreement with the MFDA, making admissions that would impair their defence in this action, under the belief that the litigation was not proceeding.

The defendants' motion was granted, and the ex parte order was set aside.

The plaintiff's cross-motion was dismissed.

The plaintiff sought to amend his 13-year-old Statement of Claim to add a claim under section 15 of the Charter and to include Department of Justice (DOJ) employees as impugned actors.

The defendants opposed, citing prejudice due to delay and arguing the DOJ claim was not legally recognizable.

The court granted leave to add the section 15 Charter claim, finding it was not a new cause of action or that any limitation period was not plain and obvious.

However, the court dismissed the request to add DOJ employees, holding that lawyers acting in their professional capacity for the Crown are generally not personally liable for Charter breaches, distinguishing this from the role of Crown prosecutors in criminal cases.

The defendant, His Majesty the King in Right of Ontario, brought a motion to strike the plaintiff's, Scott McAnsh's, proposed class action claim.

The plaintiff, a former adjudicator with a fixed-term appointment to the Assessment Review Board, sued for breach of contract, alleging that the government's failure to reappoint him after his term expired constituted a termination of employment and violated a promise of extended tenure.

The court dismissed the action, holding that statutory appointments to administrative tribunals are not employment contracts, and there is no legal obligation or right to reappointment after a fixed term expires.

The court affirmed that the decision to reappoint rests solely with Cabinet's discretion, which cannot be fettered by alleged promises or political considerations, and that fixed-term appointments are consistent with adjudicative independence.

The defendant brought a motion to dismiss the plaintiff's action, which sought damages under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms for alleged discrimination and obstruction of justice by court staff due to her whistleblower status.

The court, applying Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, found the Statement of Claim unintelligible, an attempt to relitigate past proceedings, and that court staff are statutorily immune from such claims.

The action was dismissed as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process.

The Muslim Association of Canada (MAC) brought a motion for a sealing order concerning an Administrative Fairness Letter (AFL) and its responses, central to its application alleging systemic bias and Islamophobia in a Canada Revenue Agency (CRA) audit.

The Attorney General of Canada opposed the sealing order, proposing a more tailored redaction approach.

The court, applying the Sherman Estate test, declined the full sealing order.

While acknowledging a serious risk to the physical safety and dignity of minors and peripherally involved MAC members due to personal information, the court found that a full sealing order was not necessary.

Instead, it ordered specific redactions of names of minors and peripherally involved members, personal contact information, and financial details, emphasizing the paramount importance of open courts for public debate on government conduct, especially concerning allegations of constitutional violations.

The applicant, Daniel Goguen, initiated an action against the Ontario Landlord and Tenant Board (LTB) and other defendants, seeking damages and injunctive relief.

The LTB requested dismissal of the action against it under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, arguing it cannot be sued and the action is an indirect challenge to an LTB order.

The court found the applicant's statement of claim largely incomprehensible and without a valid cause of action against the LTB, confirming that the LTB is not a suable entity in a civil action.

The court dismissed the action against the LTB as frivolous and abusive.

The defendants brought a motion to dismiss or strike the plaintiff's Statement of Claim, arguing that the "City of Thunder Bay" and "Thunder Bay Police" were not proper parties, that the action disclosed no reasonable cause of action, and that it was scandalous, frivolous, or vexatious due to a lack of material facts.

The plaintiff, self-represented, acknowledged deficiencies but sought leave to amend.

The court granted the defendants' motion, striking the Statement of Claim with leave for the plaintiff to file a fresh claim against the proper party, the Thunder Bay Police Services Board, within 30 days, emphasizing the need for material facts and proper pleading.