Sarah E. Pepall

The appellant was convicted of three burglaries based primarily on the testimony of his accomplice.

On appeal, the appellant argued that the trial judge improperly used similar fact reasoning to bolster the accomplice's credibility, despite dismissing the Crown's similar fact application.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge appropriately considered circumstantial evidence, such as the appellant's possession of a screwdriver, and the totality of the evidence without engaging in propensity reasoning.

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board under Part XX.1 of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the Board's decision was reasonably supported by the evidence.

The applicant sought judicial review of the Minister of Justice's surrender order under the Extradition Act.

The applicant conceded that the Minister applied the correct principles regarding sections 7 and 6(1) of the Charter and section 44 of the Extradition Act.

The Court of Appeal found that the Minister's surrender decision was not unreasonable and dismissed the application.

The appellant appealed his sentence, arguing the trial judge erred in principle by failing to consider that this was his first period of incarceration and by miscalculating pre-sentence custody.

The Court of Appeal agreed, applying the Supreme Court's decision in Summers to grant 115 days of pre-sentence credit.

The appeal was allowed, the sentence was reduced to 12 months' imprisonment, and specific probation conditions were varied.

The appellant sought leave to appeal his sentence for robbery with an imitation firearm, arguing he should receive enhanced credit for his 15 months of pre-trial custody.

Following the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in R. v. Summers, the Court of Appeal granted leave and allowed the appeal, awarding enhanced credit on a 1.5 to 1 basis, reducing the remaining sentence.

The Crown appealed a conditional sentence imposed on the respondent for impaired driving causing bodily harm.

The respondent conceded the sentence was illegal, as the offence is a 'serious personal injury offence' under s. 752 of the Criminal Code, precluding a conditional sentence.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and substituted an 18-month custodial sentence.

The Court granted one-for-one credit for the five months and ten days the respondent had already served under house arrest, resulting in a net sentence of 12 months.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that the trial judge's finding that he threw a flaming object onto a shopping mall roof was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that there was an ample basis for the trial judge's conclusion and no reason to re-weigh the evidence.

The Crown appealed the conditional sentence imposed on the respondent.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, set aside the conditional sentence, and substituted a sentence of 12 months' incarceration followed by two years of probation.

The Crown appealed a summary conviction appeal court decision that had overturned the respondent's conviction by applying the necessity defence.

The Court of Appeal granted leave and allowed the appeal, finding that the trial judge had correctly applied the test for necessity and made factual findings that the defence was not made out.

The summary conviction appeal court judge erred in law by failing to defer to those factual findings and effectively retrying the case.

The convictions were restored.

The appellant insurer appealed a Superior Court judgment ordering it to indemnify the respondent for costs incurred in defending a slip and fall lawsuit.

The appellant argued the application judge erred in finding that issue estoppel did not bar the claim and that the underlying lawsuit triggered a duty to defend.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the application judge's conclusions and dismissed the appeal, awarding costs to the respondent.

The plaintiffs sued the quarry owner (Miller Group) and the blasting operator (Sernoskies) for damages caused by a fly rock incident.

The plaintiffs and the operator entered into a Pierringer settlement agreement, releasing the operator and restricting claims against the owner to several liability.

The owner cross-claimed against the operator, alleging an implied indemnity agreement.

The motion judge dismissed the owner's cross-claim and its motion for summary judgment against the plaintiffs.

The Court of Appeal allowed the owner's appeal, finding the motion judge erred by failing to address the threshold issue of whether an implied indemnity agreement existed, which could eliminate the owner's liability entirely.

The matter was remitted to the Superior Court for determination.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of its action against the respondents.

The Court of Appeal found ample evidence that an Easement and Lake Water Supply Agreement had been conveyed to the appellant through an Assignment and Assumption of Contracts Agreement and a vesting order.

The motion judge erred in dismissing the action on the basis that the agreement had not been transferred.

The appeal was allowed, the order set aside, and partial summary judgment granted declaring the agreement was conveyed to the appellant.

The respondent invested $57,000 in a fraudulent investment scheme through the appellant and a third party.

The trial judge found the appellant liable for the loss based on a breach of constructive trust as a trustee de son tort.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the trial judge erred by deciding liability on a theory that was not pleaded.

Furthermore, the Court found no evidentiary basis for a breach of trust, as the appellant did not guarantee the investment or participate in any wrongdoing.

The appellant appealed an order granting in part the respondents' motion for summary judgment, which struck out several paragraphs of his Statement of Defence.

The appellant argued the motion judge erred in striking his defence of truth, which the motion judge found to be a collateral attack on previous factual findings.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing there was no genuine issue requiring a trial.

The Court also dismissed the appellant's requests for other relief, including a declaration of bias and a transfer of the matter to Florida.

The appellant partnership appealed a trial judgment dismissing its action and awarding the respondent former partner damages on his counterclaim.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's calculation of goodwill attributable to the respondent's capital account, his conclusion regarding the equity of subsidiaries, or his calculation of goodwill for retained clients.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his action by the motion judge.

The motion judge had dismissed the action because the appellant failed to pay security for costs into court as required by a previous order.

The Court of Appeal found a proper basis for the motion judge's conclusion and dismissed the appeal, awarding costs to the respondent due to unfounded public allegations against respondent's counsel.

The appellant appealed his conviction for a drug-related offence.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge failed to adequately apply the W.(D.) framework to assess the appellant's credibility regarding his knowledge of the presence of cocaine.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction was set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant filed a Notice of Abandonment for the appeal.

The Court of Appeal ordered costs of the abandoned appeal to the respondent, fixed at $7,500 inclusive of disbursements and taxes.

Following an appeal and cross-appeal, the court determined the quantum of trial costs payable to the cross-appellant, a lawyer who represented himself at trial.

The cross-appellant sought substantial indemnity costs of approximately $49,600, while the respondent suggested $1,000.

Applying the principle that self-represented lawyers are entitled to costs for work ordinarily done by retained counsel that results in an opportunity cost, the court fixed the cross-appellant's trial costs at $15,000 inclusive of HST and disbursements.

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board ordering his continued detention at a psychiatric hospital with privileges to live in approved community accommodation.

He argued the Board erred by refusing disclosure of materials from his original NCR hearing and by failing to order an absolute or conditional discharge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the Board had no jurisdiction to review the NCR hearing's procedural fairness.

The Court also held the Board's refusal to grant a discharge was reasonable, as evidence supported the finding that the appellant continued to pose a significant risk to the community and required hospital boundaries to maintain stability.