Robert Sheppard

The appellant was convicted of having care and control of a motor vehicle while his blood alcohol level exceeded the legal limit.

He appealed to the summary conviction appeal court, which dismissed his appeal.

He then sought leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge correctly applied the presumption of care and control under s. 258(1)(a) of the Criminal Code, noting that although the appellant initially had no intention to drive, he was found in the driver's seat with the keys in the ignition, and his intention had changed.

Leave to appeal was granted, but the appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for robbery, arguing the trial judge failed to exercise sufficient caution when assessing the evidence of an unsavoury co-accused.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly cautioned himself and reasonably relied on numerous pieces of confirmatory evidence, including DNA and witness testimony, to find the co-accused credible.

The appellant appealed the sentence imposed by the Superior Court of Justice.

The sentencing judge had departed from the norm of 2 for 1 credit for pre-sentence custody, granting only 1 for 1 credit based on remission and education points.

The Court of Appeal found the sentencing judge's reasons unpersuasive, particularly because the sentence imposed was at the top end of the Crown's proposed range.

The appeal was allowed, and the sentence was varied to include 2 for 1 credit for pre-sentence custody, resulting in a sentence of time served.

The appellant, a youthful first offender, appealed his sentence.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge failed to consider the appellant's pre-sentence house arrest and efforts to obtain professional counselling.

The appeal was allowed, the custodial sentence was reduced to time served (just over six months), and the probation period was increased to three years.

The applicant applied for an enhanced A-Z driver's licence and submitted a medical report that was equivocal regarding his alcohol use.

The Registrar demanded further medical information, which the applicant refused to provide, resulting in the suspension of his existing 'G' licence.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the Registrar's requirement for additional information and subsequent licence suspension were not unreasonable.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for a convenience store robbery, arguing the trial judge erred in finding the object used was a handgun.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no basis to interfere with the trial judge's conclusion, which was supported by witness testimony and video surveillance.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed as the appellant received the statutory minimum sentence.

The Crown applied for a review of a Superior Court order granting bail to the respondent, who was charged with the first-degree murder of his estranged wife.

The bail judge had released the respondent on the basis that public concern could be met through conditions and that denying bail would mean no one charged with first-degree murder facing a strong Crown case could get bail.

The Court of Appeal found the bail judge erred by equating public concern with public confidence and by placing insufficient weight on the four statutory factors under s. 515(10)(c) of the Criminal Code.

Given the gravity of the offence, the overwhelming strength of the Crown's case, the potential for a life sentence, and the brutal domestic nature of the murder, the Court of Appeal concluded that detention was necessary to maintain public confidence in the administration of justice.

The bail order was set aside and the respondent was ordered returned to custody.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault and sexual touching of his stepdaughter.

The complainant had given birth to a child, and DNA evidence established the appellant as the father.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred by failing to give an adequate caution regarding evidence of an earlier incident of sexual touching and by failing to adequately answer a jury question about the credibility of the complainant's account.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no material error in the jury charge or the trial judge's response to the jury's questions.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual interference, invitation to sexual touching, and sexual assault against his stepson.

He argued that the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on the burden of proof and that his acquittal on one charge was inconsistent with the guilty verdicts.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the jury was properly instructed in accordance with W.(D). and Lifchus, and that there was a rational basis to reconcile the verdicts.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual offences against a minor, arguing the trial judge erred in his jury charge regarding inconsistencies in the child complainant's testimony and that the verdict was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge's charge was fair and adequately addressed the assessment of child testimony and inconsistencies.

The Court also held the verdict was not unreasonable, as there was ample evidence to support it and the inconsistency did not relate to an essential element of the offences.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for sexual assault against a nine-year-old complainant.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge's reasons for both conviction and sentence to be inadequate.

However, the conviction was upheld because the appellant's own testimony admitted to an act of fellatio, and his explanation that the child initiated it while he slept was rejected as incapable of belief.

Because the trial judge's factual findings regarding other sexual acts were unclear, the Court of Appeal proceeded on the basis of a single act of fellatio.

The appeal from sentence was allowed, and the sentence was reduced from four years and seven months to 15 months, taking into account seven months of pre-sentence custody.

The appellant was convicted of possession and distribution of child pornography and sentenced to one year concurrent on each charge, plus two years' probation.

He appealed the sentence, arguing the sentencing judge erred by imposing a custodial sentence rather than a conditional sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in principle and holding that the objectives of denunciation and deterrence could not be adequately addressed by a conditional sentence given the overwhelming volume and horrific nature of the materials.

The appellant appealed his convictions, arguing the verdicts were unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal found sufficient evidence for most convictions but noted a serious discrepancy regarding the prostitution charge involving a newspaper ad that the trial judge failed to address.

The appeal was allowed in part, with a new trial ordered for the prostitution charge, while the remaining convictions were upheld.

The sentence appeal was abandoned.

The appellant appealed an order quashing a costs order made by a justice of the peace.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the reviewing judge that the justice of the peace erred by making the costs determination without providing the Crown an opportunity to respond.

The matter was remitted to a different justice of the peace.

The appellant appealed a summary conviction appeal court decision regarding an impaired driving charge.

At trial, the defence expressly conceded there were no Charter issues and did not object to the admissibility of evidence.

On appeal, the appellant attempted to argue that the officer lacked reasonable grounds for the breath demand under s. 254(3) of the Criminal Code, affecting the presumption in s. 258(1)(c).

The Court of Appeal held that this Charter argument was not open to the defence given their position at trial, and the non-Charter argument was answered by the Supreme Court's decision in R. v. Rilling.

Leave to appeal was granted, but the appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his sentence of two years less a day, arguing it should be reduced to time served (13 months) so his probation period would commence immediately.

He also argued that the one-year conditional sentence imposed on his co-accused created an unjustified disparity.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the sentence was fit when imposed and the disparity was justified by differences in the relevant circumstances of the two cases.

The Crown appealed a Summary Conviction Appeal Court decision that quashed the respondent's conviction.

The respondent had confronted intruders on his rural farm at 4:00 a.m. and removed the keys from their vehicle, leading him to fear for his safety as the intruders could not leave without retrieving the keys.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the summary conviction appeal judge that the trial judge erred in finding the respondent lacked reasonable grounds to apprehend imminent danger, as his belief was based on objectively verifiable facts.

The Crown's appeal was dismissed.

The appellant pleaded guilty to assault causing bodily harm and choking to facilitate the assault.

The trial judge imposed a sentence of two years less a day, taking into account pre-trial custody.

The appellant appealed the sentence, arguing the judge exceeded the range submitted by counsel.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no joint submission existed and the sentence was fit given the circumstances and the appellant's substantial criminal record.

The Crown appealed a sentence of six months' imprisonment and one year of probation imposed on the respondent for the sexual assault of a young complainant.

The Court of Appeal found the sentence woefully inadequate given the circumstances, including the respondent's persistence despite the complainant's resistance and vulnerability.

The court granted leave to appeal and increased the sentence to two years less a day, followed by one year of probation.

The appellant appealed the sentence imposed by Justice K. Ross.

The Court of Appeal found no error in principle in the sentencing and held that the sentence was fit.

Leave to appeal the sentence was granted, but the appeal was dismissed.