Robert F. Goldstein

The applicant, a failed refugee claimant from Sri Lanka, sought an emergency interim injunction in the Superior Court of Justice to stay his removal after the Federal Court dismissed a similar application earlier the same day.

The Superior Court dismissed the application, holding that it should defer to the Federal Court, which has primary jurisdiction over immigration matters and provides an effective remedy.

The court also found that the applicant failed to establish irreparable harm to meet the test for an injunction.

The defendants brought a motion seeking enforcement of an alleged settlement agreement arising from negotiations following a trademark dispute between competing food businesses.

The plaintiffs argued that the correspondence between counsel constituted only ongoing negotiations and not a finalized settlement.

Applying principles of contract formation governing settlements, the court considered whether there was a mutual intention to create a binding agreement and whether all essential terms had been agreed upon.

The court concluded that the correspondence demonstrated continuing negotiations and unresolved essential terms, including timing for the disposal of inventory.

As there was no meeting of the minds on essential terms, no binding settlement contract was formed and there was nothing for the court to enforce.

The plaintiff company, controlled by the defendant's former business partner, voluntarily paid off a bank line of credit owed by their jointly owned business.

The bank had not made a formal demand for payment.

The plaintiff then obtained an assignment of the defendant's personal guarantee from the bank and sued the defendant for his share.

The court dismissed the action, finding that the plaintiff acted as a volunteer and that there was no legal compulsion or reasonable necessity to pay the debt, disentitling the plaintiff from claiming indemnification under the guarantee.

The plaintiff brought a motion to set aside a registrar’s administrative dismissal of a defamation action against an unknown defendant and sought default judgment.

The defendant had posted numerous anonymous defamatory statements about the plaintiff online, continued publishing further statements after the action commenced, refused to identify himself despite a court order, and was noted in default.

The court held that the registrar’s dismissal should be set aside because the plaintiff had received no notice and had not been dilatory.

The court found the statements plainly defamatory and entered judgment in default.

The plaintiff was awarded $100,000 in general damages, $50,000 in aggravated damages, $50,000 in punitive damages, and substantial indemnity costs.

Following the granting of summary judgment dismissing the plaintiffs’ action, the court addressed the issue of costs.

The defendant sought substantial indemnity costs approaching $100,000, arguing that the plaintiffs had advanced unproven allegations of fraud.

The court reaffirmed that substantial indemnity costs may be warranted where serious allegations of fraud or dishonesty are made but not proven.

While agreeing that such elevated costs were justified, the court held the amount claimed was excessive and instead fixed a fair and reasonable amount based on the Rule 57.01 factors.

The court also declined to pierce the corporate veil to impose personal costs liability on a non‑party principal of the plaintiff corporations.

The Law Society of Upper Canada sought an injunction to prevent the respondent from practicing law or holding himself out as a lawyer.

The respondent operated McGuire Law Corporation and provided legal services in estates, divorce, and immigration matters, claiming he was acting as a clergyman assisting his congregants.

The court found the respondent was practicing law for profit and holding himself out as a lawyer, contrary to s. 26.1 of the Law Society Act.

The court granted the statutory injunction and awarded costs to the applicant.

Following the dismissal of a summary judgment motion concerning unpaid invoices and an equitable counterclaim, the court determined the appropriate costs order.

The responding party sought substantial indemnity costs exceeding $36,000.

The court held that substantial indemnity costs under Rule 20.06 of the Rules of Civil Procedure require unreasonable conduct or bad faith, neither of which was established.

Given that the summary judgment motion had merit and was described as a close call, the court ordered that costs be in the cause and fixed them at $12,000 inclusive of HST and disbursements.

Following an earlier decision striking the plaintiff’s statement of claim as disclosing no reasonable cause of action and finding the action frivolous and vexatious, the court addressed the issue of costs.

The defendant sought $10,367.59 on a partial indemnity basis.

Applying s. 131(1) of the Courts of Justice Act and the factors under Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court held that a successful party is generally entitled to costs unless strong reasons exist otherwise.

Although the plaintiff asserted an inability to pay, the court found that the defendant had incurred additional unnecessary expense due to the plaintiff’s conduct and that the motion’s outcome was reasonably predictable in light of related prior litigation.

The court fixed costs at $7,500 as a fair and reasonable amount.

Following an application in which the applicant obtained a declaration as its primary relief but was denied other remedies, the court addressed the issue of costs.

The applicant sought substantial indemnity costs, alleging bad faith conduct and reliance on an offer to settle under Rule 49.10(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court rejected these arguments, finding no bad faith and holding the offer to settle did not meet the rule’s requirement of being made at least seven days before the hearing.

Applying the discretionary factors under Rule 57.01 and s. 131 of the Courts of Justice Act, and considering the partial success achieved, the court fixed costs on a partial indemnity basis.

Costs were awarded in the amount of $40,000 inclusive of HST and disbursements.

Following the dismissal of an application for relief from forfeiture, the court addressed the issue of costs.

Both parties agreed that the respondent, as the successful party, should receive costs, but disagreed on the appropriate quantum.

Applying the principles under s. 131(1) of the Courts of Justice Act and Rule 57.01(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court considered fairness and reasonableness in light of the matter’s limited complexity and the involvement of junior counsel for the respondent.

The court declined to award substantial indemnity costs and instead fixed partial indemnity costs at an amount between the parties’ proposed figures.

Costs of $3,200 inclusive were awarded to the respondent, payable within 30 days.

The plaintiff sued the defendant for breach of contract and misrepresentation arising from a franchise agreement.

The defendant brought a motion for summary judgment dismissing the action as statute-barred.

Before discoveries took place, the plaintiff moved to strike the summary judgment motion on the grounds of prematurity.

The court dismissed the motion to strike, applying the test that such a motion should only be granted in the clearest of cases.

The court found that the summary judgment motion had a reasonable chance of success and the matter was not overly complicated.

The applicant sought a declaration that a judgment debt arising from the respondent’s misappropriation of corporate funds while acting in a fiduciary capacity would survive bankruptcy under s. 178(1)(d) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

The respondent conceded the debt fell within the statutory category but argued that the application was hypothetical because no bankruptcy had yet occurred.

The court rejected that argument, holding that a declaration could properly be issued in advance of a bankruptcy where the debtor’s financial circumstances and the existence of an unsatisfied judgment made the issue practical and not merely theoretical.

Following earlier reasoning on the same factual background, the court declared that the debt would survive bankruptcy and awarded substantial indemnity costs.

The defendants moved to set aside a default judgment and noting in default arising from a trailer lease dispute after several years of procedural delay.

The plaintiff opposed the motion, arguing prejudice and reliance on the longstanding judgment and invoking the doctrine of laches.

Applying the flexible test for setting aside default judgments articulated in appellate jurisprudence, the court considered delay, explanation for the default, and whether the defendants had an arguable defence.

Although the litigation history involved significant delay attributable to financial difficulties and prior counsel, the court found the individual defendant had a potentially meritorious defence and that fairness favoured permitting the matter to be defended.

The court set aside the default judgment and noting in default, subject to the plaintiff’s ability to amend its statement of claim.

Prospective purchasers and current tenants brought a motion to discharge a certificate of pending litigation registered by a former tenant who claimed an interest in the property based on an alleged agreement of purchase and sale.

The court held that the moving parties had standing to seek discharge despite the withdrawal of the counterclaim against them, as they were innocent third‑party purchasers in possession who had paid deposits toward the purchase.

The respondent failed to demonstrate a reasonable claim to an interest in land, relying only on an unexecuted agreement with a non‑owner and unsupported assertions of readiness to close.

Applying the principles under s. 103(6) of the Courts of Justice Act and the factors governing CPL discharge, the court found that damages would be an adequate remedy and that the prejudice to the purchasers outweighed any prejudice to the respondent.

The certificate of pending litigation was therefore discharged.

Appeal from a Master's order compelling production of communications and answers on discovery despite a claim of litigation privilege.

The appellant argued that emails and a meeting with its insurance broker were created for the dominant purpose of anticipated litigation following denial of insurance coverage for an aircraft crash.

The court held that the appellant failed to establish an evidentiary basis that the dominant purpose of the communications was litigation, noting that the available evidence suggested the discussions focused on advancing the insurance claim rather than preparing for litigation.

The court further held that any common interest litigation privilege between the insured and the broker would have been dissolved once the insured commenced an action against the broker.

The Master's order compelling disclosure was upheld.

The defendants brought a motion to strike a paragraph of the plaintiff’s statement of claim seeking an interlocutory injunction restraining the Canada Revenue Agency from collecting outstanding tax liabilities.

The underlying action alleged torts including misrepresentation, breach of contract, misfeasance in public office, and intentional interference with economic relations arising from the handling of a taxpayer relief application.

The court held that s. 18 of the Federal Courts Act grants exclusive jurisdiction to the Federal Court to issue injunctions against federal boards, commissions, or tribunals, including the CRA when exercising tax collection powers.

Although superior courts retain jurisdiction over damages claims against the Crown grounded in tort or contract, they cannot grant injunctive relief against such federal entities.

The impugned paragraph seeking injunctive relief was therefore struck without leave to amend.

The moving party brought a motion to stay an employer’s application seeking declaratory relief that an employee’s termination following maternity leave occurred for valid business reasons.

The employee had already filed a human rights complaint alleging discrimination based on sex and pregnancy arising from the same termination.

The court held that the employer’s Rule 14 application constituted a pre‑emptive collateral attack and an abuse of process because it forced the employee to litigate identical issues in parallel proceedings and effectively attempted to circumvent the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario process.

The court emphasized that the tribunal had jurisdiction and expertise to determine whether the termination violated the Human Rights Code and that permitting the court application would encourage forum shopping and inconsistent results.

The application was permanently stayed.

The defendants appealed a master's order compelling answers and document production arising from an examination for discovery in a commercial dispute involving alleged misuse of confidential information and solicitation of a former employer’s client.

The defendants argued the production order was based on unsubstantiated pleadings, speculation regarding misuse of confidential information, and the discredited doctrine of inevitable disclosure.

The court held that relevance for discovery is determined by the pleadings and that the allegations in the statement of claim sufficiently grounded the requested discovery.

The master properly exercised discretion in balancing proportionality and determining that the information sought was relevant.

The appeal was dismissed.

The plaintiff by counterclaim alleged that his brokerage and stockbroker made unauthorized trades in his margin account involving highly risky derivative securities during a period of extreme market volatility, causing substantial losses and forcing him to sign a promissory note.

The court examined the relationship between a broker and client and whether a fiduciary duty arose.

The evidence showed the account was non‑discretionary, the investor was knowledgeable, and the trades were executed on the client’s instructions.

The court found the investor’s testimony not credible and concluded that the losses resulted from authorized trading decisions during volatile market conditions.

The brokerage and broker breached no contractual, fiduciary, or regulatory duties.

The applicant sought declarations and mandatory relief arising from a cooperation agreement relating to a solar power rooftop project and associated FIT contracts.

The respondents refused to execute transaction documents required to complete a sale of project assets, citing a disputed right of first offer held by a related entity.

The court held that the cooperation agreement clearly required the corporate respondent to use commercially reasonable efforts to facilitate any transaction relating to the project, including asset or share sales.

A declaration was granted confirming that the respondent corporation was obligated to sign the documents, but the court declined to grant a mandatory order or injunction because the applicant failed to establish irreparable harm under the RJR‑MacDonald test.