Robert N. Beaudoin

The Applicant brought a motion seeking interim access, sole custodial decision-making, police enforcement for access, adherence to children's diet, child support arrears, ongoing child support, security for costs, and questioning.

The Respondent brought a cross-motion for joint custody, a specific care schedule, no school changes without consent, free communication with children, validation of their Separation Agreement, and legal costs.

The court found the Separation Agreement ambiguous regarding child support calculations for high-income earners, dismissing the Applicant's claim for arrears and security for costs, noting these issues required further evidence.

The court granted sole custody to the Applicant, finding joint decision-making impractical due to high parental conflict, and established an interim access schedule for the Respondent.

The request for the Respondent to adhere to the children's specific dietary regime was denied due to insufficient medical evidence.

Questioning was ordered to proceed.

The applicants brought a motion to extend an interim receivership, replace the interim receiver (Raymond Chabot Inc. - RCI) with another firm (Doyle Salewski Inc. - DSI), and later amended their motion to appoint a sales agent (MBG Finance Limited - MBG) and adjourn the appointment of a full receiver.

The respondent Caisse Populaire Rideau-Vision D’Ottawa Inc. and RCI opposed, advocating for RCI to be confirmed as the full receiver.

The court dismissed the applicants' requests, finding no evidence to support removing RCI or appointing MBG as a sales agent, and confirmed RCI as the receiver to provide certainty for the business and facilitate a sales process.

The defendant, F.E., was charged with sexual assault and sexual exploitation of C.K., a person with a mental disability in a relationship of dependency.

The Crown presented evidence including C.K.'s videotaped statements, medical findings of sexual activity and a sexually transmitted disease, and DNA evidence of F.E.'s semen and C.K.'s DNA on a towel.

The defence argued inconsistencies in C.K.'s statements and presented testimony from F.E.'s wife (A.C.) and son (L.C.) denying the incidents.

The court found C.K.'s testimony credible, explaining inconsistencies due to fear and dependency, and found the DNA evidence to be powerful corroboration.

The court rejected the defence witnesses' credibility, finding them motivated by shame and a desire to protect F.E. F.E. was found guilty on both counts.

The plaintiff, Dias, brought a motion to amend her statement of claim to substitute David Kealey for "John Doe" and to plead particulars of negligence.

Kealey opposed, arguing the proposed amendments introduced a new, time-barred cause of action and that the original pleading failed to disclose a reasonable cause of action against him.

The court applied the "plain and obvious" test for striking pleadings, finding that the original statement of claim, read generously, contained a sufficient factual matrix to support a negligence claim against Kealey, particularly given allegations of his intoxication leading to injury.

The court dismissed Kealey's motion to strike and granted Dias's motion to amend.

Following a summary judgment granting the plaintiffs $6,000 in damages for defamation, the plaintiffs sought partial indemnity costs of $43,356.82.

The court considered the defendant's financial situation and the principle of proportionality, ultimately fixing costs at $10,000.

This decision addresses costs following an application concerning a Co-Tenancy Agreement.

The Applicants sought declarations regarding 'Shared Property' and alleged bad faith by the Co-Tenancy Committee.

The court previously ruled against the Applicants on both issues.

The Respondents sought substantial indemnity costs, while the Applicants and Intervenor argued for reduced or no costs, citing an early offer to settle and proportionality.

The court fixed the Respondents' total costs at $145,000, apportioning $28,000 to the Intervenor and $117,000 to the Applicants, based on partial indemnity for the interpretation issue and substantial indemnity for the bad faith claim due to the Applicants' conduct.

The defendant requested a dismissal of the plaintiff's statement of claim under Rule 2.1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The plaintiff's claim sought $75 million in damages, alleging a vast conspiracy involving his employer, law firms, the government, and the police to silence him regarding corruption and murder.

The court found the allegations to be outrageous, with no chance of success, and indicative of significant mental health problems.

Relying on the mechanism to weed out clear cases of abuse, the court dismissed the action as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process without seeking written submissions.

The plaintiff sought $5 million from the City of Ottawa for its alleged failure to prevent an unnamed person from posting defamatory accusations against him on telephone poles.

The court, acting on a requisition from the Registrar's Office following a request from the defendant, reviewed the statement of claim under Rule 2.1.01(6) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court found no tenable allegations against the City of Ottawa, nor any basis for its responsibility for the actions of others.

Despite the plaintiff's submissions arguing the City's duty to protect citizens and prevent crime, the action was dismissed as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process for failing to disclose a reasonable cause of action.

The applicants, L’association pour l’intégration sociale d’Ottawa (AISO), Annik Méthot, and Marc Richer, brought a motion for summary judgment seeking damages for defamation, punitive damages, and permanent injunctions against the respondent, Marlène Casimir.

Casimir, a former employee of AISO, was dismissed in 2015 and subsequently engaged in a sustained campaign of defamatory statements through public protests, flyers, emails, and Twitter, accusing the applicants of injustice, racism, harassment, and dishonesty.

The court found that Casimir's statements were defamatory and that her defense of justification lacked evidentiary support.

Summary judgment was granted in favour of the applicants, awarding general and punitive damages, and a permanent injunction was issued to prevent further dissemination of defamatory content.

The Applicant sought to admit extrinsic similar fact evidence against the Respondent, who was charged with sexual assault and sexual interference.

The evidence involved five non-charged witnesses who described the Respondent, a mathematics teacher, engaging in inappropriate physical contact with female students.

The Respondent argued the evidence lacked probative value as it did not amount to sexual assault and was tainted by potential collusion due to media publicity.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the prejudicial effect of the proposed extrinsic evidence outweighed its probative value, as it did not support the inference of sexual purpose and the Applicant could achieve the same objective with less prejudicial count-to-count similar fact evidence.

The applicant, Naoum Abi-Samra, sought an order to sever count one (sexual assault of a fellow teacher in 2009) from counts two through seven (sexual assault and sexual interference of students in 2013-2016).

The court considered the risk of prejudice to the applicant, the factual and legal nexus between counts, the applicant's intention to testify on one count but not others, the possibility of inconsistent verdicts, multiplicity of proceedings, similar fact evidence, and the right to be tried within a reasonable time.

The court found significant differences between count one and the other counts, particularly regarding the complainant's status (adult teacher vs. underage students) and the context of the incidents.

The applicant's objective intention to testify on count one due to a prior mediation, but not necessarily on the others, was a strong factor.

The court was not satisfied that the charges were sufficiently similar to support a similar fact evidence application.

Ultimately, the court concluded that the significant risk of prejudice to the applicant outweighed the benefits of a joint trial, and severance was required in the interests of justice.

John McRae was found guilty of second-degree murder of his son, Michael McRae.

The court determined the period of parole ineligibility, considering the character of the offender, the nature and circumstances of the offence, and the jury's recommendation.

Aggravating factors included the abuse of a position of trust and the brutal nature of the murder.

Mitigating factors included the offender's age and health.

The court imposed a life sentence with parole ineligibility set at 12 years, balancing deterrence, denunciation, and the specific circumstances.

The court considered dismissing the plaintiff's action under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, following requisitions from the defendants, on the grounds that the claim appeared frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process.

The claim against one defendant was time-barred, and claims against two other defendants (Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario and Ontario Ministry of Labour, sued for an OLRB decision) were against entities lacking legal status to be sued.

Despite the plaintiff's written submissions, which included unsubstantiated allegations and a misunderstanding of civil limitation periods, the court found the abusive nature of the claim clear on its face and dismissed the entire action.

The applicant, accused of fatally stabbing his son, brought a Corbett application to exclude his criminal record from being adduced at trial.

He argued the dated record would cause undue prejudice and lead to improper propensity reasoning by the jury.

The Crown opposed, noting the applicant's credibility was central and he had already introduced parts of his record and attacked the victim's character.

The court dismissed the application, finding the applicant's credibility was crucial and a properly instructed jury could use the criminal record for its limited purpose.

The applicant, charged with the second degree murder of his son, brought a mid-trial Scopelliti application to admit evidence of the deceased's propensity for violence.

The applicant sought to introduce evidence of prior violent acts by the deceased, including incidents unknown to the applicant, to support a claim of self-defence.

The court held that evidence of the deceased's disposition for violence unknown to the accused is only admissible if there is some other appreciable evidence that the deceased was the aggressor on the occasion in question.

Finding no such appreciable evidence at the time of the stabbing, the court limited the admissible evidence to incidents known to the applicant and observations of their relationship by specific witnesses, while excluding the deceased's entire criminal record and incidents unknown to the applicant.

The accused, charged with the second-degree murder of his son, brought an application to have the defence of self-defence put to the jury.

The accused testified that his son threatened to kill him, prompting the accused to stab him.

The court applied the air of reality test to the new self-defence provisions under section 34 of the Criminal Code.

The court found there was an evidential foundation for the accused's reasonable belief of a threat and defensive purpose, and concluded that the reasonableness of the act must be left to the jury.

The accused, charged with the second-degree murder of his son, sought to introduce expert psychiatric evidence to support a claim of self-defence analogous to battered spouse syndrome.

The proposed expert opined that the accused's actions fit the idea of a pre-emptive homicide as self-defence.

The court excluded this portion of the expert's opinion, finding it unnecessary, beyond the expert's qualifications, and liable to usurp the jury's function in assessing the accused's state of mind and the reasonableness of his actions under section 34(2) of the Criminal Code.

During a jury trial, the Crown brought an application under section 9(2) of the Canada Evidence Act to cross-examine its own witness on a prior inconsistent statement.

The witness claimed to have no memory of conversations and events that he had previously detailed in a police statement.

The court found the witness's claim of memory loss was not credible, noting he could recall other significant details from the same day.

The court granted the application, permitting the Crown to cross-examine the witness on the prior statement.

The defendants submitted written requests for a requisition under Rule 2.1.01 to dismiss the plaintiff's action as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process.

The plaintiff's claim against his former employer appeared out of time and had previously been withdrawn to be heard by the Human Rights Tribunal.

The claims against the Human Rights Tribunal and the Ministry of Labour were improper as they lack the legal capacity to be sued for their quasi-judicial functions.

The court directed the Registrar to issue a notice to the plaintiff that it is considering dismissing the action and stayed the proceeding pending the outcome of the written hearing.

The applicants, charged with manslaughter, brought an O'Connor application seeking the production of mental health and medical records of a key Crown eyewitness.

The witness suffered from cognitive deficiencies and mental illnesses, which the applicants argued affected her reliability and credibility.

The court found that the applicants met the 'likely relevance' threshold at the first stage of the O'Connor regime, relying on evidence from the preliminary inquiry regarding the witness's mental health challenges.

The court ordered the production of specific medical and psychiatric records to the court for review.