Robert N. Beaudoin

The applicants, charged with manslaughter, brought an O'Connor application seeking the production of mental health and medical records of a key Crown eyewitness.

The witness suffered from cognitive deficiencies and mental illnesses, which the applicants argued affected her reliability and credibility.

The court found that the applicants met the 'likely relevance' threshold at the first stage of the O'Connor regime, relying on evidence from the preliminary inquiry regarding the witness's mental health challenges.

The court ordered the production of specific medical and psychiatric records to the court for review.

The applicants, owners of a townhouse unit in a co-tenancy development, sought declarations regarding a Co-Tenancy Agreement, specifically whether a perimeter fence and retaining wall were 'Shared Property' and whether the Co-Tenancy Committee acted in bad faith.

The court found that the Co-Tenancy Agreement was ambiguous but, based on the factual matrix and subsequent conduct of the parties, the fence and retaining wall were intended to be Shared Property.

The court also dismissed the applicants' allegations of bad faith against the committee members, finding that the committee acted in good faith and consistently sought legal advice.

The defendants submitted written requests to dismiss the plaintiff's action under Rule 2.1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court issued notices to the plaintiff that it was considering dismissing the action against the defendant judges and Jeff C. Hopkins.

The plaintiff's written submissions failed to provide material facts supporting the claims or address the absolute immunity of the defendant judges.

The court found the attenuated procedure under Rule 2.1 appropriate and dismissed the plaintiff's claim.

The applicants, several humane societies, challenged the governance model of the respondent provincial animal welfare society.

After the respondent successfully resisted the application following a membership vote, the parties sought costs.

The applicants argued they should be shielded from costs as public interest litigants.

The court rejected this argument, finding the dispute was primarily about internal governance and control rather than a matter of public importance.

The court apportioned costs based on the stages of litigation and ordered the applicants (excluding one that withdrew) to pay $100,000 in costs to the respondent.

The accused was convicted of attempt murder, robbery with violence, forcible confinement, and weapons offences following a home invasion of a 101-year-old victim.

The accused bound the victim, placed a plastic bag over his head, and left him to suffocate.

The court found the accused's actions were part of a pattern of violent behaviour, noting his prior convictions for three similar suffocation murders.

Emphasizing the paramount need to protect the public, the court imposed a life sentence for the attempt murder and robbery charges, with a 10-year period of parole ineligibility.

The defendants sought costs of a motion to dismiss or stay the action, which had been adjourned to allow the plaintiff to deliver a Fresh as Amended Statement of Claim.

The defendants argued they were forced to bring the motion because the original claim was overly broad and overlapped with a Solicitors Act assessment.

The court found that the defendants obtained the substantive relief they sought by forcing the amendment, and awarded them costs fixed at $2,500.

During a trial for robbery, forcible confinement, and attempted murder, the Crown brought an application to cross-examine the accused on the underlying facts of his prior convictions for three suffocation murders.

The court had previously dismissed a similar fact application to admit this evidence.

However, after the accused indicated he would testify that he did not understand the deadliness of a plastic bag fastened over someone's head, the Crown sought to revisit the ruling.

The court granted the application, finding that the accused's anticipated testimony constituted a material change in circumstances and that the defence could not use the prior exclusionary ruling as a sword to mislead the jury.

The applicant, Ian Bush, sought a stay of proceedings due to an alleged breach of his right to a timely trial under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The court considered the total delay, defence delay, and exceptional circumstances, including the agreement to switch trial dates for a triple murder trial and an attempt murder trial to avoid prejudice from pre-trial publicity.

The court found the switch in trial dates constituted an exceptional circumstance and that the total delay was within the presumptive ceiling or justified by transitional exceptions.

The application was dismissed.

The accused, charged with robbery, forcible confinement, and attempted murder of an elderly victim, brought a Corbett application to prevent the Crown from cross-examining him on his prior convictions for a triple murder.

The accused argued the evidence was highly prejudicial.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the accused's credibility regarding his intent was the central issue in the trial, and the probative value of the prior convictions outweighed the potential prejudice, which could be addressed through a proper jury instruction.

The court issued a notice to the plaintiff under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, indicating it was considering dismissing the action.

The plaintiff failed to provide written submissions within the prescribed 15-day period.

Consequently, the court dismissed the action as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process.

The defendants submitted a written request under Rule 2.1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to have the plaintiff's action dismissed as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process.

The plaintiff alleged that the defendants and their counsel conspired to defraud him during a previous trial.

The court found that while the defendants' limitation period and abuse of process defences might have merit, the claim could not be determined to be frivolous or vexatious simply on the face of the pleadings.

The request to dismiss the action under Rule 2.1 was denied.

The court-appointed liquidator of a partnership sought approval of its fees and disbursements, including legal fees, and directions for the distribution of the net proceeds.

The liquidation involved significant complications, including the need to recognize a Quebec judgment in Ontario and deal with multiple creditors.

The court approved the liquidator's fees, finding them fair and reasonable despite exceeding a 2:1 ratio of net receivables, due to the disproportionate difficulties encountered.

The court also interpreted the underlying Quebec judgment, concluding that a specific sum awarded to one partner was a damages award, not a priority claim on the liquidated assets, and directed the remaining proceeds to be distributed pro rata among the other partner's creditors.

The accused, charged with attempted murder, robbery, forcible confinement, and weapons offences, brought pre-trial motions to sit at the counsel table and to sever the firearms charges.

The court dismissed the seating application, finding the accused posed a security risk and that his presence in the prisoner's box would not cause undue prejudice.

The court also dismissed the severance application, concluding that the evidence was not complex, the counts were factually connected, and a separate trial would cause further delay and consume additional resources.

The Crown applied to introduce similar fact evidence of three murders (the "Garon murders") committed by the accused, Ian Bush, in 2007, at his trial for the attempted murder of Ernest Côté in 2014.

The Crown sought to use this evidence to prove intent, arguing striking similarities between the acts.

The defence conceded the probative value but argued overwhelming prejudice.

The court, applying the balancing test of probative value versus prejudicial effect, denied the Crown's application, finding that the highly inflammatory nature and gravity of the triple murders would overwhelmingly prejudice the jury, outweighing the probative value, and that a limiting instruction would be ineffective.

The plaintiff contractor brought a motion for summary judgment against the defendant restaurant for unpaid HST amounts totaling $83,261.60 relating to emergency repair and restoration services following a fire.

The defendant opposed the motion, claiming equitable set-off for $81,711.10 in expenses it incurred to complete work abandoned by the plaintiff's subcontractor.

The court dismissed the motion, finding a genuine issue requiring a trial regarding the defendant's entitlement to equitable set-off, as the claims were closely connected and it would be unjust to grant judgment without determining the counterclaim.

The applicant, who was not the biological father of the child, brought a motion for interim access.

The parties cohabited for six months and the applicant had not seen the child for 20 months.

The respondent mother opposed access, arguing it negatively impacted the child's behaviour and that the child had no memory of the applicant.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the applicant failed to demonstrate that resuming contact would be in the child's best interests, noting the potential for disruption to the child's current family unit.

The Estate Trustee During Litigation brought a motion for directions regarding the final distribution of the estate.

The sole issue was whether a beneficiary was entitled to reimbursement of $40,000 in legal fees incurred after the trustee's appointment.

The fees were incurred in relation to defending the estate against fraudulent claims by another beneficiary, who was criminally convicted.

The court found that while costs awards to beneficiaries are not the ordinary course, the beneficiary's participation was partially necessary and benefited the estate.

The court awarded the beneficiary $25,000 in costs, to be paid first from the fraudulent beneficiary's share of the estate, and the balance from the estate itself.

The applicant sought costs on a full recovery basis totaling $55,927.42 for a case conference and two motions, alleging bad faith and unreasonable conduct by the respondent regarding jurisdiction and financial disclosure.

The court declined to make a finding of bad faith but awarded substantial indemnity costs for a motion where the respondent needlessly revived a jurisdiction issue.

Recognizing divided success on other issues, including retroactive support and parenting, the court fixed total costs payable by the respondent to the applicant at $24,712.05 for fees and $6,261.53 for disbursements, which included the reasonable expense of retaining an accounting expert.

The defendants brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's slip and fall action.

The plaintiff failed to serve a responding affidavit until after cross-examining the defendants' affiants, contrary to the Rules of Civil Procedure, and failed to serve a Reply that materially changed the alleged facts.

The defendants subsequently abandoned their motion and sought costs.

The court found the plaintiff's litigation tactics unjustified and awarded the defendants $15,000 in costs in any event of the cause.

This costs endorsement concerned an adjourned application hearing where the moving parties sought a second adjournment because of counsel's health issue.

The court held that even absent fault, a party responsible for an adjournment may still be ordered to pay costs thrown away, and declined to follow authority suggesting unforeseen illness falls into a no-costs category.

Applying the established framework for adjournment costs, the court accepted that substantial preparation would need to be repeated given the extensive record and multiple affidavits.

The court awarded thrown-away costs to both the responding parties and the intervener.