Robert N. Beaudoin

Following a multi‑day civil trial involving contractual disputes and a counterclaim, the successful defendants sought costs relying on multiple settlement offers made under Rule 49 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The plaintiff argued the result was mixed and that each party should bear its own costs, emphasizing that the defendants’ counterclaim was ultimately found to be prescribed.

The court reviewed the governing costs factors under Rule 57 and the jurisprudence concerning settlement offers and proportionality.

The court held the defendants were the successful parties and that a reasonable settlement offer should have been accepted.

Partial indemnity costs were awarded against the plaintiff.

The applicant mother sought sole custody of the parties' four-year-old daughter, while the respondent father sought sole custody or, alternatively, joint custody with equal parenting time.

The parties had a history of communication difficulties and inability to agree on decision-making, despite the involvement of a parenting coordinator.

The court found that the father's proposed parenting plan prioritized his own interests over the child's and that joint custody was inappropriate given the ongoing conflict.

The mother was granted sole custody with final decision-making authority, and the father was granted specified access.

The estate trustees sought the opinion, advice, or direction of the court regarding the application of the rule in Saunders v. Vautier to a testamentary trust created for a beneficiary under a limited property will.

The court addressed whether the trust known as the “Susan Fund” could be terminated with immediate distribution depending on whether the beneficiary exercised a power of appointment by deed or will.

The court held that the rule in Saunders v. Vautier would not apply where no appointment was made, but would apply if the beneficiary appointed another beneficiary or her estate by deed.

The reasons clarified the implications of an earlier decision concerning a related trust and confirmed when the beneficiary could compel termination of the trust.

The plaintiff moved for leave to amend its statement of claim to add its insurance broker as a defendant and to assert negligence and breach of duty claims arising from insurers’ denial of coverage in related litigation.

The proposed claims were contingent on the plaintiff failing to obtain indemnity and defence costs from the insurers.

The court considered Rules 5.04(2) and 26.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure alongside the mandatory two‑year limitation period under the Limitations Act, 2002.

It held that the plaintiff had knowledge of the material facts underlying the broker’s alleged negligence when the insurers denied coverage, more than two years before the motion to amend.

Because the limitation period had expired and no evidence rebutting discoverability was provided, the broker could not be added as a party.

The applicant brought a motion to enforce the terms of a separation agreement after the respondent failed to comply with its obligations, including transferring his interest in the matrimonial home and paying child support and extraordinary expenses.

The respondent also sought an adjournment, which was refused due to prior notice and repeated non‑compliance with earlier court disclosure orders.

The court found the separation agreement constituted a valid family contract under the Family Law Act and had been negotiated with sufficient financial disclosure and opportunity for independent legal advice.

Applying s. 55 of the Family Law Act and Rule 49.09 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court ordered the agreement enforced and made additional orders concerning custody, access, enforcement by police if necessary, and payment of child support arrears and expenses.

The beneficiary of a testamentary trust applied for termination of the trust and immediate distribution of its capital.

The trust provided that the beneficiary would take the capital absolutely 21 years after the testator’s death and granted her a power of appointment by deed or will.

The estate trustees sought the court’s opinion on whether the rule in Saunders v. Vautier applied, arguing that contingent interests and a potential gift-over prevented early termination.

The court held that the beneficiary’s life interest combined with the power of appointment by deed gave her effective dominion over the trust property and that no other person could ultimately benefit from the trust.

Applying the rule in Saunders v. Vautier and relying on Robinson v. Royal Trust Co., the court concluded that the beneficiary was entitled to immediate distribution of the trust assets.

The defendants brought a motion seeking a finding that one of the plaintiffs was in contempt of court for breaching an earlier court order requiring all communications with defence counsel to be in writing and prohibiting telephone or voicemail messages.

Despite the order, the plaintiff left numerous abusive voicemail messages for defence counsel over several days.

The court applied the established three‑part test for civil contempt and found the order was clear, the breach was deliberate and wilful, and the evidence proved contempt beyond a reasonable doubt.

While the contemnor admitted the conduct and apologized, the repeated nature of the breaches and the defiant tone of the messages aggravated the misconduct.

The court imposed a monetary sanction rather than imprisonment but warned that future breaches could attract more severe penalties.

The defendants brought a motion under Rules 21.01(3)(d) and 25.11 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to dismiss an action brought by a physician and university faculty member challenging internal academic decisions concerning sexual harassment findings and denial of academic promotion.

The plaintiff sought declarations overturning internal university decisions and substantial damages based on various tort and Charter claims.

The court held that the action constituted an abuse of process because it attempted to re‑litigate matters that were properly the subject of university procedures and judicial review of academic decisions.

The court further found that the statement of claim disclosed no reasonable cause of action, including because university officers were acting within their institutional roles, complainants in quasi‑judicial proceedings enjoy absolute privilege, and universities are generally not subject to Charter claims absent implementation of government policy.

The entire statement of claim was struck without leave to amend.

During a jury trial concerning an alleged agreement to share proceeds of a winning Lotto 6/49 ticket, the defendant moved for a non-suit after the plaintiff closed her case.

The court considered whether the plaintiff’s evidence could support a breach of contract claim for a one-third share of lottery winnings based on an alleged oral agreement involving the defendant and a third party.

The court held there was no evidence of a “meeting of the minds” with the third party and no agency relationship allowing the defendant to bind that party to a contract.

As a result, no reasonable jury could find a valid contract existed.

The non-suit motion on the breach of contract claim was granted, the jury was dismissed, and the remaining equitable trust claims were left to be determined by the judge.

The applicant sought judicial review of a tribunal decision denying accreditation as an accredited farm organization under the Farm Registration and Farm Organizations Funding Act, 1993.

The tribunal had concluded the applicant lacked standing because it did not actively represent farmers in Ontario and failed certain accreditation criteria under O. Reg. 723/93.

The court held the tribunal’s interpretation of the standing provision in s. 4(1) of the Act was unreasonable and improperly introduced additional criteria not prescribed in the legislation or regulation.

The tribunal’s focus on the applicant’s affiliation with a national organization and organizational structure was inconsistent with the statutory scheme.

The court concluded the applicant met the prescribed criteria and that the tribunal had no discretion to deny accreditation once those criteria were satisfied.

Following settlement of family law issues prior to a settlement conference, the court was asked to determine entitlement to costs.

The applicant argued the respondent negotiated unreasonably throughout the litigation, causing delays and unnecessary legal expenses, while the respondent contended that the applicant prolonged the matter and rejected reasonable settlement offers.

Applying rule 24 of the Family Law Rules, the court examined the conduct of the parties, the reasonableness of settlement positions, and the progression of mediation and negotiations.

The court found the applicant consistently attempted to resolve the dispute reasonably and that the respondent could have avoided litigation by accepting earlier proposals.

Costs were therefore awarded to the applicant.

A financial advisor sued his former business associate and the associate’s corporation for breach of contract following termination of their business arrangement.

The defendants alleged that the advisor breached an exclusivity clause by selling investment products of a competing financial institution outside the agreed distribution structure and brought a counterclaim for damages.

The court found that the advisor had violated the contractual clause prohibiting the transfer of business outside the firm and had also breached fiduciary obligations.

The defendants were therefore entitled to terminate the contract.

However, the counterclaim was dismissed as statute‑barred under the Limitations Act, 2002 because it was commenced outside the applicable limitation period.

The appellant appealed a summary conviction for care or control of a motor vehicle while impaired by a drug under the Criminal Code.

The trial judge had acquitted the accused of impaired driving but convicted him of the included offence of care or control.

On appeal, the court held that the trial judge failed to properly apply the legal test requiring proof of conduct creating a realistic risk of danger associated with the vehicle.

The evidence showed the accused had collapsed inside a convenience store, had surrendered his keys to police, and had requested an ambulance.

As there was no evidence of conduct creating a risk of danger that the vehicle would be set in motion, the conviction lacked an evidentiary foundation and involved an error in law.

GSI Environnement Inc. sued the City of Ottawa for unpaid invoices related to a biosolids disposal contract.

The City counterclaimed for breach of contract, alleging GSI wrongfully repudiated the agreement.

GSI argued the City breached the contract first by supplying non-conforming biosolids due to Quebec regulatory changes.

The court found that a 2007 amendment to the contract addressed the non-conforming biosolids issue by adjusting the pricing structure, and alternatively, any breach by the City was not fundamental.

Although the City's counterclaim was statute-barred, the court allowed an equitable set-off, effectively denying GSI's claim.

The City was awarded judgment against EnGlobe Corp. for unpaid disposal costs.

The defendant sought leave to appeal to the Divisional Court from an order dismissing its motion for summary judgment in a personal injury action arising from a bicycle accident on a recreational trail.

The motion judge had questioned the applicability of section 4 of the Occupiers Liability Act and suggested the statutory assumption of risk for recreational trails created a rebuttable presumption.

The court found this reasoning conflicted with appellate authority holding that recreational trail users are deemed to have willingly assumed risks unless the occupier acts with reckless disregard.

The decision also raised concerns about an unduly restrictive approach to summary judgment in simplified procedure actions.

Leave to appeal was granted because there was good reason to doubt the correctness of the order and the issues were of broader importance.

In estate litigation concerning the estate of a deceased testator, the objector brought motions seeking an order requiring the estate to pay transcript costs for an appeal, an extension of time to file a notice of appeal, and a stay of a master’s summary judgment decision validating the will and dismissing the objection.

The court held that the moving party failed to provide sufficient financial evidence to justify shifting transcript costs to the estate and dismissed that request.

While an extension of time to pursue the appeal was granted due to procedural confusion and personal difficulties, the court refused a stay, finding no serious question on appeal, no irreparable harm, and that the balance of convenience favoured allowing the estate administration to proceed.

On the respondents’ cross‑motion, a notice of objection filed by another beneficiary after the judgment validating the will was declared out of time and an abuse of process and was removed.

Decision on costs following a prior ruling that counsel for a closely held corporation must withdraw due to a conflict of interest in related family litigation between the corporation’s shareholders.

The moving party sought full indemnity costs and requested that opposing counsel personally bear responsibility for the costs arising from the conflict.

The court found that the majority shareholder abused his authority in directing the corporation’s actions and that the conflict issue had been raised earlier but ignored.

Although the court declined to award the full amount claimed, it held the majority shareholder personally responsible for the moving party’s costs.

The court also ordered the lawyer and law firm not to bill the corporation for work performed after the conflict was identified.

Following a wrongful dismissal trial in which the plaintiff recovered modest damages equivalent to three months’ salary, the court addressed costs.

The action had been brought in the Superior Court although the recovery fell within Small Claims Court jurisdiction.

The court found that the plaintiff had expanded a simple wrongful dismissal claim with unfounded allegations of conspiracy and inducement, unnecessarily increasing complexity and cost.

Concluding that the proceeding should have been brought in Small Claims Court and that the defendants had been put to unnecessary expense, the court denied the successful plaintiff any costs and ordered the plaintiff to pay costs to the defendants.

The applicant sought declarations that operational policies adopted under the Workplace Safety and Insurance Act were unconstitutional and contrary to s. 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The issue before the court was whether the Superior Court had jurisdiction to determine the matter by application or whether it had to proceed as a judicial review before the Divisional Court.

The court held that the impugned policies constituted the exercise of statutory power under the Judicial Review Procedure Act.

Because the applicant sought only declarations regarding the legality of those policies and no civil action was pending, the matter properly fell within the jurisdiction of the Divisional Court by way of judicial review.

Following a motion to change concerning child support in a hybrid parenting arrangement—where one child resided primarily with one parent and another child shared residence—the parties resolved the substantive support issues but disputed costs.

The court had previously accepted the respondent’s proposed hybrid set-off approach to calculating child support and ordered retroactive support along with reduced section 7 expenses.

In determining costs under Rule 24, the court considered the closeness of the respondent’s settlement offer to the ultimate result and the reasonableness of both parties’ litigation conduct.

Although the applicant argued that the respondent’s earlier refusal to address arrears and alternative dispute resolution increased litigation costs, the court found the respondent was the successful party.

Costs of $5,000 were awarded to the respondent.