Richard A. Lococo

The appellant, who was deemed catastrophically impaired following a motor vehicle accident, appealed a Licence Appeal Tribunal (LAT) decision dismissing his claim for attendant care benefits.

The Divisional Court found that the LAT Vice-Chair erred in law by providing inadequate, conclusory reasons and conflating the test for 'reasonable and necessary' expenses with procedural non-compliance.

The court set aside the LAT decision and remitted the matter for a fresh hearing before a differently constituted tribunal.

The moving party tenant sought to set aside two orders of Charney J. that lifted a stay of an eviction order and granted vacant possession to the landlords, and also sought an extension of time to appeal a Landlord and Tenant Board decision.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion to set aside the orders, finding no error of law, fact, or breach of procedural fairness, and noting the premises had already been re-rented.

The court also denied the extension of time to appeal, citing obvious prejudice to the landlords and the tenant's failure to demonstrate any merit to the appeal.

Costs of $2,000 were awarded to the landlords.

The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal a prior decision.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal without costs.

The moving party sought leave to appeal a decision dated July 30, 2024.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal with costs fixed at $5,000.

Consequently, the responding party's cross-motion was dismissed as moot without costs.

The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal an earlier order.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and ordered the moving party to pay costs of $5,000 all inclusive to the responding party.

The proposed interveners brought a late motion for leave to intervene in an application for judicial review.

The respondent opposed the motion, arguing the interveners lacked a distinct perspective and sought to supplement the evidentiary record.

The Divisional Court granted leave to intervene on strict terms, limiting the interveners to five minutes of oral submissions, prohibiting them from repeating the applicant's submissions, and barring them from supplementing the evidentiary record or taking a position on the ultimate disposition.

During the hearing, the interveners attempted to rely on new evidence, which the court rejected as procedurally unfair.

The tenants appealed an order requiring them to pay $45,397.40 in rent arrears to the landlord.

They argued the Superior Court lacked jurisdiction and the matter should have been heard by the Landlord and Tenant Board, alleging the landlord artificially inflated the arrears by refusing rent to exceed the Board's monetary limit.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the application judge properly exercised jurisdiction under s. 207(2) of the Residential Tenancies Act, 2006, as the claim exceeded the Board's $35,000 limit, and there was no evidence the landlord improperly inflated the arrears.

The moving party, a self-represented tenant, appeared for a motion without having uploaded her materials to Case Center in advance.

She brought a considerable volume of printed material but no copies for the responding parties or the court.

To accommodate the moving party's agent, who had a hearing impairment, and to provide a fair opportunity to present arguments, the Divisional Court converted the oral motion to a hearing in writing and set a peremptory schedule for the delivery of electronic materials and written submissions.

The appellant father appealed a motion judge's order regarding retroactive and ongoing child support and section 7 expenses.

He argued the motion judge erred by refusing to hear his cross-motion for table support, finding one child was not a dependent while taking part-time virtual courses, and awarding costs based on bad faith.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the dependency finding and upholding the motion judge's exercise of discretion regarding the cross-motion.

The court also denied leave to appeal costs, noting the bad faith finding was justified by the father's failure to disclose income increases.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's order finding him in contempt of a final parenting order.

The motion judge had temporarily reduced the appellant's parenting time until he complied with the order, which the appellant argued was an impermissible variation.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the motion judge had jurisdiction to make a temporary variation to facilitate compliance.

The court also upheld the contempt findings regarding unilateral medical decisions and withholding the children, and rejected the appellant's claims of procedural unfairness.

The respondents sought public funding for Jewish day schools in Ontario, arguing that the failure to fund them breached their Charter rights under ss. 2(a) and 15(1).

Ontario brought a motion to strike the application on the basis that the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in Adler definitively decided the issues.

The motion judge dismissed the motion, finding a reasonable prospect of meeting the Bedford/Carter test for revisiting binding precedent.

On appeal, the Divisional Court allowed the appeal and dismissed the application, holding that the motion judge erred in relying on facts and circumstances that were not new and in questioning the force of the majority analysis in Adler.

The appellants appealed two decisions of the Capital Markets Tribunal finding they committed breaches of Ontario securities law, including securities fraud, illegal distribution, and unregistered trading, and imposing sanctions including disgorgement and administrative penalties.

The appellants argued the Tribunal made palpable and overriding errors of fact and erred in law in its interpretation of the disgorgement remedy.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the Tribunal's factual findings were amply supported by the evidence and its interpretation of the disgorgement remedy was correct and within its broad public interest discretion.

The self-represented applicant sought judicial review of an Ontario Labour Relations Board (OLRB) decision dismissing his reprisal complaints against his employer, a school board.

The applicant alleged the employer unlawfully retaliated against him under the Occupational Health and Safety Act by denying him a specific teaching position after he raised safety concerns.

The OLRB found the employer's decision was based solely on its inability to accommodate the applicant's medical restrictions, not retaliation.

The Divisional Court applied the reasonableness standard of review, found the OLRB's decision was reasonable and procedurally fair, and dismissed the application for judicial review.

The applicants, a licensed mortgage brokerage and its principal broker, sought to vary a motion judge's decision quashing their application for judicial review of a Notice of Proposal issued by the Financial Services Regulatory Authority (FSRA).

They also sought judicial review of FSRA's decisions to publish the Notice of Proposal on its website pursuant to its Transparency Guidance and to refuse to publish the applicants' Request for Hearing.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion to vary, finding no error in the motion judge's conclusion that the application was premature.

The Court also dismissed the remaining judicial review application, holding that FSRA's publication decisions did not affect the applicants' legal rights and were not amenable to judicial review.

In any event, the Court found the decisions to be reasonable and consistent with FSRA's statutory objects.

The applicants, parents of an Indigenous child, sought judicial review of a decision by the Health Professions Appeal and Review Board upholding the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario's Inquiries, Complaints, and Reports Committee's disposition of their complaint against a physician.

The complaint alleged the physician conducted a non-consensual genital examination on the child.

The Divisional Court found the Board's decision unreasonable because it failed to adequately address the ICRC's unresponsive treatment of the consent issue, noting that clinical indication does not equate to consent and implied consent cannot override express refusal.

However, given the passage of time and the physician's remedial actions, the court declined to remit the matter for further consideration.

The appellants appealed an interlocutory order requiring them to produce their former lawyers' file based on a deemed waiver of solicitor-client privilege.

The motion judge had found that the appellants waived privilege by pleading they signed a lease extension 'without legal advice', and that they could not 'unwaive' this privilege by subsequently amending their pleadings to remove that assertion.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, holding that the motion judge erred in law by failing to apply the test for deemed waiver to the amended pleadings, which no longer made the absence of legal advice a material issue.

The applicant, a psychologist, sought judicial review of a decision by the Health Professions Appeal and Review Board (HPARB) confirming an Inquiries, Complaints and Reports Committee (ICRC) order requiring him to complete a specified continuing education and remediation program.

The applicant argued the HPARB decision was unreasonable because the ICRC failed to address his submissions regarding a significant delay in the investigation.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that while the ICRC should have addressed the delay, the HPARB reasonably considered the issue and concluded the delay did not result in an inadequate investigation or a denial of procedural fairness.

The applicant City sought judicial review of an arbitration award declaring September 19, 2022 (the day of mourning for Queen Elizabeth II) a paid holiday under the collective agreement.

The Divisional Court found the arbitrator's decision unreasonable because he failed to consider evidence of historical collective agreements and proclamations relevant to the City's estoppel argument.

However, the arbitrator's interpretation of the bilingual statutory instruments was reasonable.

The matter of estoppel was remitted to the same arbitrator for reconsideration.

The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal an earlier order.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and awarded costs to the responding party in the amount of $5,000.

The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal an earlier order.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and awarded costs of $5,000 to the responding party.

The court also directed the responding party to bring this endorsement and a prior case management direction to the attention of the judge hearing the upcoming application for directions.