R. Cary Boswell

The plaintiff sued multiple defendants for damages arising from the termination of a commercial sublease for a race shop.

Two defendants, who managed the plaintiff's race car under a separate services agreement, moved for summary judgment to dismiss the claims against them.

The court found that the moving parties were not parties to the sublease and had no obligation under the services agreement to obtain an occupancy permit for the premises.

The court also dismissed the claims for negligent misrepresentation, intentional interference with economic relations, and trespass due to a lack of evidence.

The motion for summary judgment was granted, and the action against the moving parties was dismissed.

Andre Evans, an adult offender, sought orders of prohibition and certiorari to prevent the Crown from using his youth records as an aggravating factor in his sentencing hearing.

The Crown had previously obtained an order from a youth court justice under s. 123 of the Youth Criminal Justice Act to access these records after the prescribed access period expired.

Evans argued that the youth court justice exceeded jurisdiction by granting access and that using the records would compromise his right to a fair trial due to principles of privacy and rehabilitation for young persons.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the youth court justice acted within jurisdiction and that society's interest in truth-seeking and public safety outweighed Evans' privacy interest, which could be protected by a publication ban.

The appellant, the operator of a contracting company, appealed a Small Claims Court judgment holding him personally liable, jointly and severally with his company, for $25,000 in damages arising from an incomplete pool and landscaping project.

The respondents had provided a $25,000 cheque to the company, which they alleged was held in trust for future work, while the appellant claimed it was for past work.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's reasons were inadequate because they failed to explain the basis for imposing personal liability on the appellant, such as piercing the corporate veil or finding a breach of trust.

A new trial was ordered on the narrow issues of whether the funds were impressed with a trust and whether the appellant misappropriated them.

The plaintiffs sold their fitness club franchise to the corporate defendant via an Asset Purchase Agreement (APA) without legal representation.

The corporate defendant took possession but failed to pay the purchase price, which involved assuming two small business loans, and failed to pay rent, causing the plaintiffs to default on their lease and incur a claw-back of deferred rent.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for summary judgment for the amounts owed and sought to pierce the corporate veil to hold the personal defendants liable.

The court granted summary judgment against the corporate defendant for the loan amounts and the foreseeable deferred rent claw-back, totaling $85,637.97.

However, the court ordered a mini-trial to determine liability for three months of rent and dismissed the claims against the personal defendants because the tort of conversion and breach of good faith were not pleaded, though leave to amend was granted.

During pre-trial motions for a murder trial, the accused sought an order to have his leg shackles removed while in the courtroom.

The Crown opposed the request for security reasons, citing alleged gang affiliation, a prior incident in the cells, and staffing pressures.

The court found insufficient evidence that the accused posed a flight or safety risk to justify the continued use of shackles, emphasizing the presumption of innocence.

The court ordered the shackles removed.

The third party plaintiffs, who installed septic systems in a residential subdivision, were sued by the builder after 35 systems failed and had to be replaced due to non-compliant filter sand.

After settling the main action, the installers brought a third party claim against the aggregate supplier who provided the filter sand, alleging breach of contract and negligence.

The court found the supplier breached an implied warranty of fitness under section 15 of the Sale of Goods Act because the sand did not meet Ontario Building Code specifications.

The court awarded the installers their settlement costs and legal fees as damages, but apportioned fault, reducing the damages by 16.5% to account for the installers' own design and installation errors.

The negligence claim was dismissed due to a lack of expert evidence establishing the standard of care for manufacturing filter sand.

The offender pleaded guilty to trafficking in cocaine and possession of the proceeds of crime.

The Crown sought a sentence of one year, while the defence sought a 90-day intermittent sentence.

The court noted the offender's significant rehabilitative efforts, including overcoming addiction, securing employment, and caring for her children and ailing mother.

Finding this to be an exceptional case where a lengthy custodial sentence would impair rehabilitation, the court imposed a 90-day intermittent sentence followed by two years of probation.

The accused was tried on historical sexual offence allegations arising from conduct at a group home in 1984 involving three former child residents.

Applying the W.(D.) framework, the court rejected the accused's denials, accepted the complainants' evidence as credible and reliable, and found that delayed disclosure, criminal antecedents, and alleged collusion did not undermine proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

The court also admitted count-to-count similar act evidence under the Handy framework, finding strong similarities in the bedtime assaults, significant probative value, and minimal prejudice in a judge-alone trial.

The accused was convicted on three counts of gross indecency and three counts of sexual assault, with the gross indecency convictions conditionally stayed under Kineapple.

The applicant lawyer successfully moved to oppose confirmation of an Assessment Officer's ruling regarding unpaid legal accounts, while the respondents' motion to oppose was dismissed.

The applicant sought costs of $21,109.76 for the two motions, including a portion on a substantial indemnity basis due to the respondents' late adjournment request.

The court found no conduct justifying an elevated scale of costs and awarded partial indemnity costs.

Emphasizing proportionality, the court fixed the costs payable by the respondents to the applicant at $15,448.46 inclusive of disbursements and HST.

The accused was charged with aggravated assault, assault causing bodily harm, assault with a weapon, and weapons dangerous following a late-night altercation outside a nightclub.

The victims, who were highly intoxicated, instigated the confrontation and chased the accused and his friend when they attempted to flee.

The accused, fearing for his life, used a pocket knife to stab at least one of the pursuers.

The court found the accused acted in lawful self-defence and that his possession of the knife was not for a purpose dangerous to the public peace.

The accused was acquitted of all charges.

The accused was tried for sexual assault and unlawful confinement of a young employee following a work-related meeting at the accused's home.

The employee became highly intoxicated and passed out, later waking up to find the accused sexually touching him.

The court applied the W.(D.) framework to assess credibility, rejecting the accused's denials and relying on the complainant's testimony, which was supported by circumstantial DNA evidence.

The accused was found guilty of sexual assault but acquitted of unlawful confinement due to reasonable doubt regarding physical restraint.

The applicant lawyer and respondent clients both brought motions to oppose the confirmation of an Assessment Officer's decision regarding unpaid legal accounts.

The clients argued the Assessment Officer made numerous errors, including reversing the onus of proof, misapprehending evidence, and improperly relying on business records for a law clerk who did not testify.

The court dismissed the clients' motion, finding that the Assessment Officer properly applied the burden of proof, made no palpable and overriding factual errors, and correctly admitted the dockets as business records.

The lawyer's motion was granted solely to remit the issue of costs back to the Assessment Officer, as the parties had not been given an opportunity to make submissions regarding a Rule 49 offer to settle.

The applicant, an incorporated association managing a recreational park, applied to vacate a 1997 court order that established a two-manager governance system.

Three respondent members brought a counter-application challenging the applicant's corporate standing and seeking an external financial audit.

The court found that the applicant lacked standing because the park's constitution was never properly amended to authorize incorporation.

The court partially vacated the 1997 order, removing provisions related to the defunct two-manager system but leaving other substantive provisions intact.

The request for an external audit was dismissed for failing to meet the statutory threshold under the Corporations Act and lacking majority member support.

The applicants, owners of non-waterfront lots, sought declarations that they held valid deeded rights-of-way over the respondents' waterfront lot to access Sturgeon Lake.

The court reviewed the chain of title and applied the prerequisites for creating an easement by express grant.

The court found that only one applicant possessed a valid right-of-way, as the original grants for the other applicants were defective, primarily because they were not executed by all co-owners of the servient tenement at the time of the grant.

The successful applicant was granted a declaration that her right-of-way extended to the water's edge.

The parties, who separated in 2015 but continued to live in the same home, brought omnibus motions regarding child care, exclusive possession, and financial issues.

The court found the high-conflict living situation was causing severe emotional harm to the children, including a suicide attempt by one child.

To protect the children, the court awarded temporary custody and exclusive possession of the matrimonial home to the applicant, ordering the respondent to vacate.

The court also ordered the immediate sale of the home, an interim disbursement of $100,000 from the sale proceeds for a business valuation, and fixed temporary child support based on previously imputed income.

The plaintiff, Trisan Construction, brought a second motion for summary judgment against its former lawyer, Mark A. Epstein, to quantify damages arising from Epstein's admitted negligence.

Epstein had failed to advise Trisan of their ability to bring a breach of trust claim against the directors of Bianchi Contracting (2004) Inc. (BCI) under the Construction Lien Act.

The court found that Epstein's negligence caused Trisan to suffer damages and, after considering Mr. Bianchi's identified assets and various contingencies inherent in debt collection, fixed the damages at $50,000.

The court declined to include potential recovery from a tracing action against RBC, as that was not part of the initial negligence finding.

The appellant, a police officer, appealed his sexual assault conviction, alleging two legal errors in the trial judge's credibility assessment: an improper leap from disbelief to fabrication regarding his dash camera practice, and impermissible propensity reasoning.

The court found no error in the first ground, affirming that rejecting an explanation as unbelievable is distinct from finding fabrication.

However, the court found the trial judge erred in engaging in propensity reasoning by mischaracterizing the "brazen act defence" as an assertion about the appellant's disposition for risky behavior.

Despite this error, the court concluded it did not significantly impact the overall credibility findings, which were amply supported by other evidence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The defendant, Andre Evans, was charged with 15 counts including procurement, human trafficking, assault, criminal harassment, drug trafficking, and various firearms offences involving two complainants, KJ and AB.

The court acquitted Evans on the procurement charges (counts 1 and 13) for both complainants, finding insufficient evidence of inducement.

However, Evans was found guilty of human trafficking (counts 2 and 12) for both complainants, as the court determined he exercised control and influence over their movements for exploitation, creating a culture of dependence and fear.

He was also found guilty of assault (counts 3 and 14) against both complainants, criminal harassment (count 4) against KJ, breach of a non-communication order (count 15), possession of marijuana and cocaine for trafficking (counts 5 and 6), and all five firearms offences (counts 7-11).

Kenneth Johnson was convicted of manslaughter after being acquitted of second-degree murder.

The sentencing decision addresses the circumstances of the assault on his roommate, Richard Skupien, which resulted in Skupien's death from a ruptured spleen and rib fractures.

The court considered aggravating factors, including the violent nature of the attack on a vulnerable individual in his home, and the offender's lengthy criminal record.

Mitigating factors included the offender's remorse, strong family support, and particularly harsh pre-trial custody conditions due to frequent lockdowns at the Central East Correctional Centre.

The court imposed an eight-year sentence, reduced to two years and four months after applying credit for pre-trial custody and the onerous conditions.

The Crown applied under s. 486.2(2) of the Criminal Code for an order permitting a complainant in a human trafficking and procuring case to testify via closed-circuit television.

The complainant expressed significant anxiety about testifying in the presence of the accused due to past trauma.

The defence opposed the application, arguing it would infringe the accused's right to face his accuser and impede cross-examination.

The court granted the application, finding that the use of a testimonial aid would facilitate a full and candid account from the witness and enhance the truth-seeking function of the trial.