Peter J. Cavanagh

The applicant, Andrew White, sought a declaration that electronic messages exchanged between himself and the complainant, A.S., and in a group chat with A.S. and her mother, were not "records" under s. 278.92(1) of the Criminal Code.

This determination was crucial to avoid the requirement of an application under s. 278.93 for their use at trial.

The court, following the procedure established in R. v. W.M., reviewed the messages and applied a normative analysis to determine if the complainant had a reasonable expectation of privacy.

Considering the innocuous content, the manner of communication, the nature of the relationship (even with a minor complainant), and policy implications, the court concluded that the messages did not contain personal information for which there was a reasonable expectation of privacy.

Consequently, the application was granted, and the messages were deemed not to be "records" under the Criminal Code.

The applicant sought an order under ss. 462.34(1) and 462.34(4) of the Criminal Code for the return of $99,475 in seized Canadian currency to cover reasonable legal expenses.

The primary issue was whether the applicant was required to apply for Legal Aid funding as a prerequisite.

The court, informed by R. v. Rafilovich, found that requiring a Legal Aid application would conflict with the statutory objectives of providing access to counsel and upholding the presumption of innocence, especially given the applicant's desire for counsel of choice.

The court was satisfied that the applicant had an interest in the seized property and no other available assets or means.

The application for the return of funds for legal expenses was granted, with the reasonableness of the expenses to be determined at a subsequent in camera hearing.

The applicant, George Flowers, sought a stay of proceedings under section 24(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging breaches of his section 11(b) right to a trial and sentencing within a reasonable time.

The charges involved aggravated sexual assault.

The application was based on three grounds: unreasonable pre-verdict delay, unreasonable post-verdict delay exceeding the presumptive ceiling set by R. v. Charley, and unreasonable post-verdict delay even if below the ceiling.

The court found that the net pre-verdict delay was below the Jordan ceiling and the applicant failed to demonstrate unreasonable delay.

For post-verdict delay, the court accepted that dangerous offender proceedings under Part XXIV of the Criminal Code constituted exceptional circumstances, and the net post-verdict delay, after accounting for these circumstances, did not exceed the Charley ceiling.

Consequently, the application for a stay of proceedings was dismissed.

The applicant, charged with attempted murder and other offenses, sought production of records from the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) related to the complainant, Morvin George, and disclosure from the Crown regarding Mr. George and witness Lynecia Blugh.

The application for CBSA records was dismissed as the applicant failed to demonstrate likely relevance under the O'Connor test.

The application for Crown disclosure was allowed in part, with the court ordering the production of three specific missing person occurrence reports related to Ms. Blugh that referenced the applicant, while dismissing the request for other Crown records deemed clearly irrelevant.

The applicant sought a stay of extradition proceedings and a declaration that s. 4 of the Extradition Act was unconstitutional, arguing abuse of process and Charter s. 7 infringement due to a second extradition request after a prior discharge.

The court dismissed the application, finding that s. 4 of the Act explicitly permits further proceedings unless they constitute an abuse of process, and that the current proceedings, based on additional evidence, did not meet the high threshold for abuse of process or violate the principles of fundamental justice under s. 7 of the Charter.

This decision concerns a second extradition request by the United States for Mohamed Abdi Siyad, also known as "Hassan," for alleged human smuggling.

The respondent had been discharged in a previous extradition hearing because the judge was not satisfied on a balance of probabilities that he was the person sought.

In this second hearing, the court found sufficient prima facie evidence of conduct that would justify committal for trial in Canada under section 117(1) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act.

Crucially, new fingerprint evidence, not available in the first hearing, satisfied the court on a balance of probabilities that the respondent was indeed the person sought by the requesting state.

The court ordered the respondent's committal into custody to await surrender.

The accused, Evans Okwara, was charged with possession of heroin for the purpose of trafficking and unlawfully importing heroin into Canada.

The Crown presented evidence including cell phone records showing knowledge of the shipment details and searches related to the delivery address, as well as a storage locker access card found in the accused's wallet, which contained additional heroin.

The accused's testimony denying knowledge and involvement was found to be inconsistent with the evidence.

The court applied the R. v. W.(D.) framework and found the accused guilty on both counts, concluding that the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused knowingly possessed and imported heroin for trafficking.

The defendants brought a joint motion to strike out the amended statement of claim without leave to amend, and for an order dismissing the action, alleging insufficient material facts to support claims of misappropriation and misuse of confidential information.

The court reviewed the amended pleading against its prior decision, which had struck the original statement of claim with leave to amend due to vagueness.

The court found that the amended statement of claim sufficiently particularized the types of confidential information, the products to which they related, and the alleged instances and methods of misappropriation and misuse by each defendant, satisfying the minimum level of material fact disclosure required for such claims.

The motion was dismissed.

Following the dismissal of the defendants' motions to transfer and consolidate four Small Claims Court actions, the self-represented plaintiffs sought costs on a substantial indemnity scale for their time and disbursements.

Applying the principles from Fong v. Chan, the court held that the plaintiffs were not entitled to costs for their time because they failed to demonstrate that they had forgone remunerative activity.

The court awarded the plaintiffs their disbursements only.

The plaintiff electrical contractor sued the defendant property managers for unpaid invoices relating to electrical services and energy-efficient lighting installations.

The defendants claimed set-off and brought a separate action against the plaintiff and its principal for fraudulent or negligent misrepresentation, alleging defective work, failure to secure energy rebates, and uncertified fixtures.

The court found the plaintiff was entitled to $123,339.06 for unpaid invoices.

The defendants' set-off claims were dismissed as they failed to prove the plaintiff breached its contract or caused the alleged damages.

The defendants' separate action was dismissed as statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002, and the court declined to pierce the corporate veil to hold the plaintiff's principal personally liable.

The plaintiff repair shop brought an action to recover amounts paid into court by the defendant vehicle owner under the Repair and Storage Liens Act.

The plaintiff had repaired and stored a Ferrari leased to a third party that later went into receivership.

The court found that the plaintiff had valid non-possessory liens that became charges on the funds paid into court.

The court awarded the plaintiff $30,358.06 for the fair value of the repairs but dismissed the claim for storage charges due to insufficient evidence of fair value.

The plaintiff brought an action against her family members and a Chinese enterprise, claiming a 25% ownership interest in the enterprise and seeking damages for misappropriation of its assets.

The court heard expert evidence on Chinese law, which established that the enterprise was state-owned and could not have private shareholders.

The court rejected the plaintiff's argument that she had a contractual right to profits under a management agreement, finding it was neither pleaded nor proven.

The plaintiff's claim for $599,000 USD allegedly misappropriated from a joint bank account was also dismissed, as the court accepted evidence that the funds were deposited due to a bank error.

The action was dismissed in its entirety.

The Crown and the Municipal Property Assessment Corporation (MPAC) brought motions to transfer four related Small Claims Court actions to the Superior Court of Justice.

The self-represented plaintiffs, former employees affected by a 1998 pension divestment, opposed the transfer.

The court applied the factors from Farlow v. Hospital for Sick Children, balancing the complexity of issues, need for expert evidence, and discovery against access to justice concerns.

The court concluded that the moving parties failed to demonstrate that the claims could not be fairly and justly resolved in the Small Claims Court, and dismissed the motions.

The plaintiff successfully defeated the defendants' anti-SLAPP motion and sought costs on a partial indemnity scale.

The court considered whether to depart from the statutory presumption in section 137.1(8) of the Courts of Justice Act, which provides that a successful responding party is generally not entitled to costs.

Finding that the defendants' motion was not frivolous, ill-conceived, or brought at an unjustifiably late stage in the proceeding, the court declined to exercise its discretion to award costs.

No order as to costs was made.

The plaintiff, a director of a company that contracted with the defendant to host a television festival, sued the defendant for breach of contract, negligence, and breach of fiduciary duty after the defendant cancelled the agreement due to unpaid fees.

The defendant moved for summary judgment.

The court granted the motion, finding that the plaintiff's claim was statute-barred as it was commenced more than two years after the claim was discovered.

Furthermore, the court held that the plaintiff lacked privity of contract to sue personally, and that the defendant owed no duty of care or fiduciary duty to the plaintiff.

The applicant tenant brought an application for a declaration that the respondent landlord unlawfully terminated its commercial lease for a parking lot.

The landlord had posted a Notice of Termination alleging the tenant abandoned the premises.

The court found that the landlord's notice did not comply with s. 19(2) of the Commercial Tenancies Act because it failed to provide the tenant with a reasonable opportunity to remedy the alleged breach or make compensation.

Consequently, the court declared the termination of the lease invalid.

The plaintiff surety brought a motion for summary judgment against the defendant indemnitors for payments made under performance and labour and materials bonds.

The defendants opposed the motion, arguing the plaintiff failed to produce relevant documents requested during cross-examination that were necessary to assess the reasonableness of the payments.

The court found that the plaintiff's blanket refusals to produce the requested documents resulted in an incomplete evidentiary record.

Consequently, the plaintiff failed to discharge its onus of showing there was no genuine issue requiring a trial, and the motion was dismissed.

Following the dismissal of the plaintiff's action for insurance coverage, bad faith, and professional negligence, the successful defendants sought costs.

Economical sought substantial indemnity costs based on unaccepted offers to settle.

The court rejected this, finding no egregious misconduct by the plaintiff, and awarded costs on a partial indemnity scale.

The court fixed the partial indemnity hourly rates at 60% of actual rates and assessed the reasonableness of the time and disbursements claimed, including expert witness fees.

The court awarded $356,452.49 in costs to Economical and $183,979.82 to FCA, emphasizing the objective of fixing an amount that is fair and reasonable for the unsuccessful party to pay.

The applicant, a residential tenant living above an unlicensed cannabis retail store, brought an application under section 18(4) of the Cannabis Control Act to lift an interim closure order that barred entry to the entire premises.

The premises had been repeatedly closed by law enforcement due to illegal cannabis sales, but the operators continually breached the closures.

The court dismissed the application, finding the applicant failed to satisfy the burden of proving that, if access were granted, the premises would not continue to be used for illegal cannabis sales with the landlord's permission.

The plaintiff, a retired music teacher, brought a defamation action against the school board and its superintendent regarding letters sent to parents about hidden cameras discovered in music rooms.

The defendants moved to dismiss the action under the anti-SLAPP provisions of the Courts of Justice Act.

The court found that while the letters related to a matter of public interest, the plaintiff established that the claim had substantial merit, there were grounds to believe no valid defence existed, and the harm suffered outweighed the public interest in protecting the expression.

The motion to dismiss was denied.