Peter J. Cavanagh

The plaintiffs, Andrew and Selena Stronach, sought leave to amend their respective statements of claim in two related actions concerning the management of the Stronach family business and trusts.

The defendants, including Belinda Stronach, opposed the amendments on several grounds, primarily arguing that references to a May 2020 Agreement were barred by settlement privilege.

The court found that the defendants failed to prove the May 2020 Agreement was intended to be kept confidential, and alternatively, that any privilege had been waived or an exception applied.

The court also rejected arguments that the amendments improperly withdrew admissions or were scandalous and vexatious.

Leave to amend the pleadings was granted.

The applicants, former directors of PACE Savings & Credit Union, sought a declaration that CUMIS General Insurance Company had a duty to defend them in an action brought by the Financial Services Regulatory Authority (FSRA) as administrator of PACE.

CUMIS denied coverage based on the 'Insured vs. Insured' exclusion in the Directors' and Officers' Liability Policy.

The court held that while the exclusion applied, the 'derivative action' exception restored coverage because the FSRA, acting as a 'person', brought the claim on behalf of the corporation.

The court also ruled that applicants facing fraud claims were entitled to independent counsel due to a conflict of interest, while those facing only negligence claims were not.

The plaintiffs moved for an interlocutory injunction to prohibit the Independent Electricity System Operator (IESO) from enforcing the deemed terminations of 34 Feed-In Tariff (FIT) contracts and discontinuing payments.

The court found that the motion was an impermissible collateral attack on prior court orders that had deemed the contracts terminated.

Furthermore, the plaintiffs sought a mandatory injunction but failed to establish a strong prima facie case, as the issues of termination had been decided in prior litigation.

The court also found the plaintiffs' evidence of irreparable harm to be speculative.

The motion for an interlocutory injunction was dismissed.

The Crown moved to strike out the plaintiff's Second Amended Claim for misfeasance in public office under Rule 21.01(1)(b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The plaintiff alleged the Crown unlawfully directed Infrastructure Ontario to exclude it from participating in the financing of a public tendering project.

The court found that the Crown was entitled to make decisions adverse to the plaintiff's interests in a public tendering process, and the pleadings did not plausibly support a conclusion that the Crown acted for an improper purpose or in bad faith.

The claim was struck out without leave to amend.

The court also held that, alternatively, the plaintiff would have required leave to proceed under the Crown Liability and Proceedings Act, 2019.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for an interlocutory injunction to prevent the defendants from transferring or encumbering a partnership property without consent or court order.

The dispute arose after the plaintiff was disqualified as a partner for failing to satisfy a cash call, which he alleged was invalid.

The court characterized the requested relief as a mandatory injunction, requiring the plaintiffs to demonstrate a strong prima facie case.

The court found the plaintiffs failed to establish a strong prima facie case regarding the validity of an alleged oral agreement, the invalidity of the cash call, or oppressive conduct.

Furthermore, the plaintiffs failed to show irreparable harm, as damages would be an adequate remedy.

The motion for an injunction was dismissed.

Two 50/50 shareholders of an IT security company brought cross-applications for oppression under s. 241 of the CBCA following a breakdown in their relationship.

The applicant alleged the respondent misappropriated corporate opportunities and improperly dissolved the company, while the respondent alleged the applicant misappropriated funds and improperly terminated his position.

The court dismissed both applications, finding that both parties engaged in a 'war of attrition' and neither established that the other's conduct warranted an oppression remedy or caused compensable damages.

RageOn Inc., an online retailer using Shopify's platform, sought an interim injunction to restore its access to Shopify's services after Shopify terminated their agreement.

Shopify terminated the agreement due to RageOn's repeated violations of its Acceptable Use Policy (AUP), which prohibits hateful content and content associated with terrorist organizations.

RageOn argued the termination was premature, the breaches were not material, and Shopify acted in bad faith.

The court applied the modified RJR-MacDonald test for mandatory interlocutory injunctions, requiring RageOn to demonstrate a strong prima facie case.

The court found RageOn failed to show a strong likelihood of success on the merits, failed to demonstrate irreparable harm, and that the balance of convenience did not favour granting the injunction.

Consequently, RageOn's motion was dismissed.

This motion, brought within a receivership, addressed a dispute between Sluyter Isaac Investments Inc., a secured creditor, and 1902408 Ontario Ltd., the registered owner of the Brockville Property.

Sluyter claimed $600,000 plus interest and costs, asserting a secured interest in fixtures attached to the property, and sought payment from the net proceeds of sale. 1902408 Ontario Ltd. opposed, arguing the claim was statute-barred.

The court held that Sluyter's claim to enforce its security interest in fixtures, arising under the Personal Property Security Act, is an interest in personal property, not real property, and is therefore subject to the two-year limitation period under the Limitations Act, 2002, rather than the ten-year period under the Real Property Limitations Act.

The applicant sought to challenge his deceased father's 2019 Will, which left the entire estate to the applicant's mother.

The respondents moved to dismiss the application for lack of standing, relying on a 1996 Will that also left the entire estate to the mother.

The court found that the applicant failed to present sufficient evidence to challenge the validity of the 1996 Will.

Consequently, even if the 2019 Will were invalid, the applicant would have no financial interest in the estate under the 1996 Will.

The court also rejected the applicant's argument that his separate civil claim for proprietary estoppel gave him independent standing under s. 23 of the Estates Act.

The motion was granted and the application dismissed.

The appellant, a rap artist, appealed his conviction and sentence for uttering a threat to cause bodily harm.

The charge arose from a YouTube music video containing lyrics and images directed at the complainant, a music promoter.

The appellant, who was self-represented at trial, raised 14 grounds of appeal, including issues related to the complainant's credibility, disclosure of a Facebook message, cross-examination on his criminal record, and the trial judge's handling of various procedural matters.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible errors in the trial judge's assessment of the evidence, handling of disclosure, or sentencing.

CIM Bayview filed a Notice of Intention to Make a Proposal under the BIA and sought to disclaim an Amended Option Agreement that granted Bryton Creek the right to purchase a development property.

CIM Bayview argued the option could be disclaimed, vested out, or was void for imposing a criminal rate of interest or violating the Interest Act.

The court dismissed CIM Bayview's motion, finding the option created an immediate interest in land that could not be disclaimed or vested out.

The court also found the option did not constitute a criminal rate of interest or a penalty.

The court lifted the stay of proceedings to allow Bryton Creek to exercise its option.

Following a successful motion by the defendant to strike the plaintiff's statement of claim with leave to amend, the court determined the appropriate costs award.

The moving party sought over $43,000 on a partial and substantial indemnity basis, relying on an offer to settle.

The court found the offer to settle was less favourable than the outcome because it did not contemplate leave to amend, and thus awarded costs on a partial indemnity scale.

Applying the factors under Rule 57.01, the court fixed costs payable by the plaintiff to the moving party at $23,969.22.

The respondents moved to dismiss an oppression application commenced in 2009 for delay, lack of corporate authority, and alternatively sought security for costs.

The court found that the applicants were not principally responsible for the delay, as the respondents had brought a motion in 2009 that they never set down for a hearing.

The court dismissed the assigned claims from a corporate applicant that lacked authority to sue, but allowed the personal claims of the individual applicants to proceed.

The motion for security for costs was dismissed.

The corporate defendant brought a motion to strike the plaintiff's statement of claim against it for disclosing no reasonable cause of action and to dismiss the oppression remedy claims for lack of jurisdiction.

The plaintiff alleged breach of an oral agreement for equity in a visual effects studio, conversion, fraudulent misrepresentation, and oppression.

The court found the plaintiff failed to plead any material facts establishing that the corporate defendant owed obligations under the agreement or engaged in wrongful conduct.

The statement of claim was struck with leave to amend, and the oppression claims were dismissed as the court lacked jurisdiction over the discontinued corporation.

The applicants, charged with firearms offences, brought an application for a stay of proceedings, arguing their right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Charter was infringed.

The total delay exceeded the 30-month presumptive ceiling established in Jordan.

However, the court found several periods of delay were attributable to the defence, including time taken to retain counsel, scheduling conflicts for a joint preliminary hearing, and a late request for disclosure that delayed committal.

After deducting the defence delay, the remaining delay for both applicants fell below the 30-month ceiling.

The application for a stay of proceedings was dismissed.

The offender was found guilty by a jury of possession of a loaded prohibited firearm, possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, and related offences.

The court considered the offender's extensive criminal record, including prior firearms convictions, as well as mitigating factors such as systemic racism and harsh pre-sentence custody conditions exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic.

A global sentence of 9 years was imposed, with 64 months of credit granted for pre-sentence custody and harsh conditions, leaving 44 months to serve.

The accused was convicted by a jury of substantive charges including possession of a firearm and cocaine.

The failure to comply (FTC) charges were severed by a consent order to be tried by judge alone, with the evidence from the jury trial to apply.

At the FTC trial, the Crown argued the judge was bound by the jury's factual findings, while the defence argued the judge could independently assess the evidence.

The court found the severance order was unclear and the parties were not ad idem.

To avoid inconsistent verdicts or unfairness, the court ordered a mistrial of the FTC charges, directing them to be tried before a different judge with new evidence.

This costs endorsement followed the dismissal of the defendants' joint motion to strike the plaintiffs' amended statement of claim.

The plaintiffs, having successfully defended the motion, sought costs on a substantial indemnity scale, arguing the motion was largely duplicative of a prior, successful motion to strike the original statement of claim.

The court determined that while the subject matter overlapped, the motion against the amended pleading did not constitute a "serial attack" justifying substantial indemnity costs.

Instead, costs were awarded on a partial indemnity scale, fixed at $17,404.18 (including fees, HST, and disbursements), payable by the defendants to the plaintiffs within 30 days.

The third party, Gregory Cook, sought costs of a dismissed motion for interim costs brought by the defendant David Lawrence Denomme, as trustee of the estate of Daniel Thomas Denomme.

The court reviewed the third party's costs outline, found the time expended and partial indemnity hourly rates reasonable, and fixed costs to be paid by the estate trustee to the third party.

The accused was tried on charges of sexual assault and sexual interference arising from alleged repeated sexual conduct with the complainant between ages 13 and 17.

Applying the W.(D.) framework, the court assessed the accused's denial in the context of the complainant's evidence and identified material concerns about the complainant's evolving explanations on cross-examination and the plausibility of the alleged encounters within the household circumstances described.

The court accepted the accused's evidence about his daily routine and found that, considered with the complainant's evidence, it raised a reasonable doubt.

The accused was acquitted on both counts.