Peter J. Cavanagh

The defendants were successful on a motion for summary judgment dismissing the plaintiff's action and sought costs on a partial indemnity scale.

The plaintiff opposed the quantum, arguing the evidentiary record on the motion was incomplete and the costs claimed were excessive.

The court rejected the plaintiff's arguments regarding the evidentiary record, noting the plaintiff was represented by counsel and chose not to file responding evidence.

The court found the defendants' claimed costs of $44,644.28 to be reasonable, proportionate, and within the range the plaintiff would reasonably expect to pay.

Costs were fixed in that amount.

The plaintiff and defendant sought costs on a full indemnity scale after the moving party withdrew her motion to intervene and set aside a writ of possession.

The moving party had claimed to be a lawful tenant under a lease, which the plaintiff and defendant alleged was fraudulent.

The court declined to award full indemnity costs, noting that because the motion was withdrawn, it could not make the necessary factual findings of reprehensible conduct.

The court awarded partial indemnity costs, fixing the plaintiff's costs at $68,092.48 and the defendant's costs at $11,959.92, payable by the moving party.

The plaintiff brought a motion to enforce a settlement agreement reached at mediation in a wrongful dismissal action.

The defendant opposed and brought a cross-motion to refuse enforcement, arguing it had mistakenly made a prior payment of $115,465.20 to the plaintiff which it did not know about during mediation.

The court found that the written Minutes of Settlement were clear and unambiguous, and that the defendant's mistake was unilateral.

Because there was no evidence the plaintiff knew of the mistake or engaged in fraud, the court enforced the settlement and ordered the defendant to pay the remaining balance.

The plaintiff brought a medical malpractice action against two physicians following the death of her father.

The plaintiff, acting as her father's substitute decision-maker, had requested that he be treated as 'full code'.

However, the physicians determined that the patient was actively dying and that CPR would almost certainly not benefit him and would only cause harm.

They wrote a 'do not resuscitate' order without the plaintiff's prior consent.

The plaintiff claimed damages under the Family Law Act and for nervous shock.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the action, finding that the physicians met the standard of care, that writing a DNR order is not a 'treatment' requiring consent under the Health Care Consent Act, and that the physicians did not owe a duty of care to the plaintiff that would conflict with their paramount duty to their patient.

The plaintiff, Homelife/Miracle Realty Ltd., brought a motion for summary judgment against the defendant 2503661 Ontario Ltd. for unpaid real estate commission.

The commission was allegedly due following a property sale that converted into a share purchase transaction.

Homelife argued that 250 was bound by the commission agreement, either directly, as a successor, or through a relaxation of the privity of contract rule. 250 denied liability and sought summary judgment dismissing the action.

The court found the evidentiary record insufficient to interpret the commission agreement and resolve the issues, particularly regarding the objective surrounding circumstances and the impact of subsequent conduct.

Consequently, both Homelife's motion for summary judgment and 250's request for summary judgment dismissing the action were denied, necessitating a trial for a fair and just determination.

The plaintiff, a criminal defence lawyer, sued the Halton Regional Police Service and several police officers for negligence after he was shot by a man who was under police surveillance.

The police defendants brought a motion for summary judgment, arguing they did not owe the plaintiff a private law duty of care.

The court granted summary judgment, dismissing the action, finding no special relationship of proximity existed between the police and the plaintiff that would give rise to such a duty.

The court emphasized that police duties are generally owed to the public as a whole, and the circumstances did not establish the plaintiff as part of a "narrow and distinct group of potential victims at risk from a specific threat" before the shooting.

Sky Solar, a solar energy project developer, sued its contractor's insurer (Economical) and insurance broker (FCA) after two fires involving transformers at its solar projects.

Sky Solar was an additional insured under the contractor's commercial general liability (CGL) policy.

After the second fire, Sky Solar settled with the project buyer (Firelight) for remediation costs and lost income, then sought indemnity from Economical.

Economical denied coverage, arguing Sky Solar's liability did not arise from the contractor's operations and that Sky Solar breached a policy condition by settling without consent.

Sky Solar also claimed negligence and bad faith against FCA for issuing certificates of insurance.

The court dismissed Sky Solar's action against both Economical and FCA, finding no coverage under the policy and no breach of duty by the broker.

The defendants brought a motion to strike out the statements of claim in four related actions against the defendant Adam Abramson, arguing that the pleadings, even with particulars, failed to disclose a reasonable cause of action.

The court granted the motion, finding that the plaintiffs had not pleaded sufficient material facts to establish specific causes of action (negligence, negligent misrepresentation, breach of fiduciary duty, breach of contract, and conspiracy) against Adam Abramson individually.

The court emphasized that merely grouping defendants together was insufficient to provide Adam Abramson with adequate notice of the case against him.

However, the plaintiffs were granted leave to amend their statements of claim.

This is a costs endorsement following a successful motion for an interlocutory injunction by Product Pro Industrial Supplies Inc. against Sheam Yee Wang and KTS Consulting (the "Wang Defendants").

Product Pro sought costs on a partial indemnity scale, or alternatively, substantial indemnity.

The court found that while Product Pro did not achieve all requested relief, it was substantially successful, warranting costs.

The court rejected the Wang Defendants' arguments against costs, including allegations of fraud and improper conduct by Product Pro's principal, finding these did not disqualify Product Pro from receiving costs.

The court fixed costs at $26,869.20 on a partial indemnity scale, inclusive of fees, disbursements, and HST, to be paid by the Wang Defendants within 30 days.

This is a costs endorsement following a ten-day trial where judgment was granted in favour of the defendants, dismissing the plaintiff's action and allowing the defendant Martha Stirpe's counterclaim.

The court fixed costs on a partial indemnity scale, rejecting the defendants' claim for substantial indemnity costs under Rule 49.10(2) and confirming that "costs in the cause" for a prior summary judgment motion and appeal meant costs were awarded to the successful party in the main action.

The court also found the hourly rates for lead counsel and the inclusion of a law clerk's attendance at trial to be reasonable.

The appellant, Amir Nikbakht, appealed an interlocutory order of Master Wiebe that granted the respondent, Sarfraz Malik, leave to amend his statement of claim to add a claim under s. 61 of the Family Law Act (FLA) after the two-year limitation period had expired.

The Master, relying on Bazkur v. Coore, held that the FLA claim was not a new cause of action but an additional remedy.

The Superior Court judge, exercising coordinate jurisdiction, found that Bazkur was "plainly wrong" and that a s. 61 FLA claim constitutes a new statutory cause of action, distinct from a direct negligence claim.

Consequently, the amendment sought after the limitation period was statute-barred.

The appeal was allowed, and the Master's order was set aside.

The plaintiff, an employment staffing agency, sought an interlocutory injunction against a former Director of Branch Operations and his new employer for alleged breaches of non-solicitation and confidentiality covenants.

The court found the Proprietary Information, Developments Non-Competition and Non-Solicitation Agreement to be valid and binding, rejecting the argument of lack of fresh consideration as the agreement was a condition of employment and presented on the first day.

A strong prima facie case was established for the former employee's solicitation of a major client (Cisco) and misuse of proprietary information (knowledge of a former colleague's value to Cisco).

However, no strong prima facie case was found for solicitation of another client (Bank of Montréal) or employee inducement.

The court determined that the plaintiff would suffer irreparable harm from loss of goodwill and market share, which would be difficult to quantify in damages.

The balance of convenience favored granting the injunction.

This is a costs endorsement following a successful motion by the defendants to strike out the plaintiffs' statement of claim, with leave to amend.

The defendants sought costs on a substantial indemnity scale, arguing the claims were baseless and important to their reputations.

The court denied substantial indemnity costs, finding no reprehensible conduct by the plaintiffs.

Instead, the court awarded costs on a partial indemnity scale to both groups of defendants, fixing specific amounts for fees and disbursements, emphasizing that costs are not a mechanical exercise and must be fair and reasonable for the unsuccessful party.

The plaintiff claimed damages for early termination of a fixed-term employment contract under simplified procedures.

The action settled, with costs remaining in dispute.

The plaintiff sought partial indemnity costs of $24,615.80, while the defendant proposed $5,000 plus disbursements, arguing for restraint in simplified procedure cases and criticizing the plaintiff's conduct and excessive time spent.

The court considered factors under Rule 57.01(1), the simplified procedure context, the amount recovered, and the defendant's reasonable expectations, ultimately fixing the plaintiff's total costs at $14,855.99.

The plaintiff, Product Pro Industrial Supplies Inc., moved for an interlocutory injunction against the defendants, Sheam Yee Wang and KTS Consulting, alleging breaches of fiduciary duties and unfair competition.

The court found a strong prima facie case that Wang owed fiduciary duties to Product Pro, noting his role as "Director of Operations" and contractual obligations.

Irreparable harm in the form of loss of goodwill and market share was established.

The court also found the balance of convenience favored granting the injunction, rejecting the "unclean hands" defense.

An interlocutory injunction was granted for 12 months, restraining the Wang Defendants from soliciting Product Pro's customers or potential customers contacted before March 21, 2019.

This is a costs endorsement following the dismissal of an application and an appeal related to provincial offence convictions.

The Lake Simcoe Region Conservation Authority and the Ministry of the Attorney General, Ontario, sought costs.

The Authority requested substantial indemnity costs, citing unsubstantiated allegations of fraud and procedural abuses by the applicants/appellants.

The court declined to award substantial indemnity costs, finding that the conduct, while improper, did not rise to the level of reprehensible conduct.

Instead, the court awarded partial indemnity costs to both respondents, considering factors such as responding to improperly brought proceedings and non-compliance with procedural rules.

The plaintiffs, having succeeded on a summary judgment motion in a real estate transaction dispute, sought costs.

The court determined the application of Rule 49.10(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, which dictates costs consequences for unaccepted offers to settle.

The defendants argued that a non-disparagement clause in the plaintiffs' offer to settle rendered it invalid for Rule 49.10 purposes.

The court found the non-disparagement provision to be clear and not unreasonable, distinguishing it from cases where an offer's terms were vague or uncertain.

As the judgment obtained by the plaintiffs was more favourable than their offer, they were awarded partial indemnity costs to the date of the offer and substantial indemnity costs thereafter.

The court fixed costs at $33,039.76, considering the factors under Rule 57.01(1) and the principle of fairness and reasonableness.

Following the dismissal of the defendants' motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff sought substantial indemnity costs under Rule 20.06 or, alternatively, partial indemnity costs.

The court found that the defendants' conduct in bringing the summary judgment motion, though unsuccessful, did not meet the threshold of "unreasonable" or "bad faith" required for substantial indemnity costs under Rule 20.06.

The court emphasized that Rule 20.06 applies in "exceptional circumstances" involving improper conduct, not merely an arguable but unsuccessful motion.

Consequently, substantial indemnity costs were denied.

The plaintiff was awarded partial indemnity costs, fixed at $85,000, inclusive of fees, disbursements, and HST, after considering the complexity and importance of the motion, and the limited benefit of the work product for the remainder of the action.

The applicants/appellants brought an application and an appeal to the Superior Court of Justice challenging provincial offense convictions and sentence against Murray Brown.

The respondents, Lake Simcoe Region Conservation Authority and Ministry of the Attorney General, Ontario, brought motions to strike out both proceedings.

The court found that the applicants/appellants lacked standing to challenge Mr. Brown's convictions and sentence, and that the appeal was brought to the wrong court (it should have been to the Ontario Court of Justice).

The court also determined that the application constituted an impermissible collateral attack on the Provincial Offenses Court decisions.

Consequently, both the amended application and the appeal, along with the appellants' motion for interim relief, were struck out and dismissed.

The plaintiff, Michel Drakoulakos, sued his daughter, Martha Stirpe, her husband, Mark Stirpe, and their company, 1166504 Ontario Limited, claiming beneficial ownership of a company share and its assets (taxis and investments) registered in his daughter's name, asserting a resulting trust.

He also sought alternative relief based on unjust enrichment and constructive trust.

The defendants counterclaimed for $49,000 withdrawn by the plaintiff from the daughter's credit cards.

The court dismissed the plaintiff's action, finding that the transfer of the company share and its initial asset (a taxi) was a gratuitous gift from the parents to the daughter, rebutting the presumption of resulting trust.

The court accepted the defendants' evidence that promissory notes signed by the daughter were for protection in case of divorce, not to create a debt.

The plaintiff's alternative claims were dismissed as unpleaded and unsupported by evidence.

The court allowed the daughter's counterclaim for $49,000, which the plaintiff conceded.