Peter J. Cavanagh

The plaintiffs, Evertz Technologies Limited and Evertz Microsystems Limited, brought an action alleging theft of confidential information by former employees and competing businesses.

The defendants moved to strike the statement of claim in its entirety, arguing that the plaintiffs failed to provide sufficient particulars regarding the alleged confidential information, its misuse, and its incorporation into the defendants' products.

The court found that the statement of claim, even with supplemental particulars, did not meet the minimum level of material fact disclosure required for claims of misappropriation and misuse of confidential information.

Consequently, the statement of claim was struck out, but the plaintiffs were granted leave to serve an amended statement of claim within 30 days.

The applicants sought a declaration that a binding settlement agreement had been reached with the respondents regarding rent disputes under four leases.

The respondents argued that no agreement was formed as formal execution and delivery of post-dated cheques were conditions precedent.

Applying an objective test, the court found that the respondents' lawyer had apparent authority to make a binding offer via email, which the applicants accepted by returning executed drafts.

The court declared a binding agreement existed and awarded damages for breach of contract.

The moving defendants, a law firm and one of its lawyers, brought a motion to strike the plaintiff's amended statement of claim.

The plaintiff had sued the lawyers who represented the opposing party in a previous proceeding, seeking to recover costs awarded against him in that proceeding.

The court found that the claim disclosed no reasonable cause of action, as the lawyers owed no duty of care to the plaintiff and the claim was a collateral attack on previous costs orders.

The motion was granted, the claim was struck without leave to amend, and the action was dismissed as an abuse of process.

The applicant sought an interim injunction to restrain the Toronto Police Services Board from conducting further business, alleging failures in its statutory duties and a loss of public confidence.

The Board cross-moved to strike the application as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process.

The court heard the applicant's interim injunction motion and dismissed it, finding that the relief sought was not justiciable as it would improperly intrude on the supervisory responsibilities of the legislature and other bodies.

The court also determined that the applicant failed to demonstrate irreparable harm and that the balance of convenience favoured the Board continuing its statutory functions due to the compelling public interest in the provision of adequate police services.

Costs of $500 were awarded to the Board.

The plaintiff subcontractor moved for summary judgment against the defendant surety on a labour and materials payment bond after the general contractor defaulted and failed to pay the plaintiff's invoices.

The surety argued that the plaintiff had fully mitigated its damages by entering into a replacement subcontract with the new general contractor for a higher amount than the remaining value of the original subcontract.

The court held that the plaintiff's opportunity to profit from the replacement subcontract was separate from and collateral to the general contractor's failure to pay the invoices.

The motion for summary judgment was granted.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for summary judgment in an action for damages arising from the defendants' failure to close a residential real estate transaction.

The defendants argued the agreement was void due to issues with a power of attorney, misrepresentation of square footage, and failure to provide a survey.

The court found no genuine issue requiring a trial on liability or mitigation of damages.

Summary judgment was granted in favour of the plaintiffs for forfeiture of the deposit and damages for the loss in property value and increased commission fees upon resale.

The defendants moved for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's claims for breach of an independent contractor agreement and interference with business opportunities.

Alternatively, the defendants sought an order holding themselves liable but assessing damages based on the motion record.

The court dismissed the motion, finding genuine issues requiring a trial regarding whether the termination of the agreement was justified.

The court also rejected the defendants' alternative request, noting that Rule 20.01(3) does not contemplate a defendant moving for summary judgment in favour of the plaintiff to assess damages, and that partial summary judgment was inappropriate as the issues could not be readily bifurcated.

The plaintiff was successful on the defendants’ motions to set aside default judgment and noting in default, and on its own motion for default judgment against Peter Duric.

The plaintiff sought costs on a substantial indemnity scale, alleging Mr. Duric was not transparent.

The court awarded costs on a partial indemnity scale, finding that while Mr. Duric materially changed his evidence, his conduct did not meet the threshold for reprehensible conduct required for substantial indemnity costs.

The court adjusted the plaintiff's claimed costs, reducing the amount against Leeds due to prior awards, but largely accepting the time claimed for other services.

Following the dismissal of the plaintiff's action on a summary judgment motion, the successful defendants sought costs of the action on a substantial indemnity scale, citing the plaintiff's conduct and unaccepted settlement offers.

The court found the plaintiff's conduct was not reprehensible and the settlement offers did not warrant an elevated scale.

Applying the factors in Rule 57.01 and the principle that costs must be fair and reasonable, the court awarded the defendants costs on a partial indemnity scale fixed at $40,000 inclusive of fees, disbursements, and HST.

The Applicant, Faith Bazos, sought to avoid paying costs to the Respondent, Bell Media Inc., after her application challenging Bell Media's refusal to run her political advertisements was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

Bazos argued she was a public interest litigant and should be exempt from costs or pay reduced costs.

The court found that the jurisdictional issue was not novel and did not qualify her as a public interest litigant for the purpose of costs.

The court also found that it was not necessary for her to invoke the Superior Court's jurisdiction instead of the CRTC.

Consequently, the Respondent, as the successful party on the jurisdictional issue, was entitled to partial indemnity costs.

The court fixed costs at $43,117.90, inclusive of fees, disbursements, and HST, finding the amount reasonable given the urgency and complexity of the jurisdictional hearing.

The applicant brought an application to remove an exhaust vent encroaching on her property.

The respondents removed the encroachment before the hearing, leaving only the issue of costs.

To determine costs, the court assessed whether the applicant would have succeeded on the merits.

The court interpreted a prior Resolution Agreement between the parties and found it did not grant an easement for the encroachment.

Concluding the applicant would have been successful, the court awarded her costs of $8,000 on a partial indemnity scale.

The plaintiff obtained default judgment against Leeds Contracting Restoration Inc. and moved for default judgment against Peter Duric.

The defendants cross-moved to set aside the default judgment against Leeds and the noting in default against both defendants.

The court dismissed the defendants' cross-motion, finding that Peter Duric failed to prove he did not receive notice of the statement of claim and failed to demonstrate an arguable defence with supporting evidence.

The court also validated service on Leeds through Peter Duric.

Consequently, the plaintiff's motion for default judgment against Peter Duric for breach of trust under the Construction Lien Act was granted.

The plaintiff, a union member, commenced an action against his union for damages for breach of contract and an order to expunge a six-month disciplinary suspension.

The plaintiff alleged procedural unfairness and bias in the union's disciplinary proceedings, including breaches of the union's constitution.

The defendant union moved for summary judgment to dismiss the action, arguing that the court should not interfere with a voluntary tribunal's decision unless it exceeded jurisdiction, failed to conduct proceedings fairly, or acted in bad faith.

The court found that while there were minor breaches of the union's constitution, these did not amount to a deprivation of procedural fairness.

The court also found no evidence of actual bias or a real likelihood of bias on the part of the adjudicators.

Consequently, the union's motion for summary judgment was granted, and the plaintiff's action was dismissed with costs.

The defendants moved for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff Liliana Siggillino's action as statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The action concerned a dispute over the 2008 transfer of a family farm, where Liliana alleged misrepresentation regarding its value.

The central issue was when Liliana discovered her claim, specifically when she first read a 2008 property valuation report.

The court found Liliana's evidence regarding the discovery date to be contradictory and not credible, preferring her earlier statements and a 2013 letter indicating she read the report in 2008.

The court also found that a reasonable person in her circumstances ought to have known of the claim by July 30, 2008, through reasonable diligence.

Consequently, Liliana's action was dismissed as statute-barred.

Cronnox Inc. sought declaratory relief for defence and indemnity coverage under an expired "claims-made-and-reported" professional liability policy issued by Lloyd's Underwriters.

Cronnox also claimed damages for breach of good faith.

Lloyd's Underwriters and International Programs Group (IPG) brought a cross-application for a declaration of no coverage.

The court found no legal relationship between Cronnox and Lloyd's at the time the claim was reported, as the policy had expired and the reporting period had passed.

Consequently, the doctrines of estoppel and waiver did not apply to create coverage or a new contract of insurance.

The court also found no breach of Lloyd's duties of fair dealing and good faith.

Cronnox's application was dismissed, and Lloyd's application for a declaration of no coverage was granted.

The Court of Appeal remitted an application to the Superior Court to determine damages and costs after finding the purchaser breached an agreement of purchase and sale.

The sellers claimed damages for the difference in resale price and carrying costs, and sought costs on a substantial indemnity scale.

The court found the purchaser failed to prove the sellers did not mitigate damages.

Damages were awarded for the price difference and most carrying costs, less the deposit.

Costs were awarded to the sellers on a partial indemnity scale until their offer to settle, and substantial indemnity thereafter, with a reduction for counsel's conduct during cross-examination.

The applicant, a municipal election candidate, sought a declaration and mandatory order from the Superior Court of Justice to compel the respondent broadcaster to run her political advertisements, relying on CRTC regulations and the Charter.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the CRTC had exclusive jurisdiction over the interpretation and enforcement of its regulations.

While the court had concurrent jurisdiction for Charter claims, it declined to exercise it, determining that the entire application should be heard by the specialized tribunal.

The applicants, who held a Small Claims Court judgment against the respondents, brought an application to annul the respondents' bankruptcy filings.

They contended that the respondents' property was significantly undervalued in their Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (BIA) filings, suggesting that the respondents were not insolvent or had abused the court process.

The court accepted the applicants' expert appraisal, which valued the property substantially higher than declared by the respondents.

However, the application was dismissed.

The court found that the applicants failed to demonstrate that Mrs. Fast was not an insolvent person or had abused the process, and that Mr. Fast was eligible to make his consumer proposal as he was already bankrupt at the time of filing.

The defendants moved for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's action for unpaid wages, equity interest, and intellectual property ownership, arguing the claims were statute-barred by the Limitations Act, 2002.

The court found that the plaintiff had discovered the material facts giving rise to his claims by December 2009 at the latest, well outside the two-year limitation period for the action commenced in January 2012.

The court rejected arguments that the unpaid wages constituted a "demand obligation" and that declaratory relief without consequential relief was exempt from limitation periods, as the plaintiff sought mandatory relief.

Consequently, the defendants' motion for summary judgment was granted, and the plaintiff's action was dismissed.

The applicant sought an order to transfer six separate Small Claims Court actions to the Superior Court of Justice and consolidate them into a single action, arguing they were improperly brought or that the court should exercise its inherent jurisdiction.

The court found that the actions were properly brought in Small Claims Court as each was founded upon a separate cause of action, not a division of a single cause.

The court declined to exercise its inherent jurisdiction to transfer, emphasizing that such discretion should be rarely exercised.

It determined that the actions were not complex, did not require expert evidence, and were ready for trial in Small Claims Court, and that transferring them would increase costs and delay, negatively impacting access to justice.

The application was dismissed.