Walter Yoo

Following a decision permanently staying the plaintiffs' second action for abuse of process, the successful defendants sought costs on a substantial indemnity basis.

The court rejected the request for substantial indemnity, finding that the defendants' Rule 49 offer was not beaten and the plaintiffs' fraud claim was never adjudicated.

The court awarded costs on a partial indemnity basis, reducing the requested amounts by 25% to account for issues that were deferred to a potential future motion.

Costs were fixed at $34,608 for the main group of defendants and $13,722 for Dr. Kajdehi.

The plaintiff commenced a wrongful dismissal action in 2015 against his former employer, which was stayed when the employer declared bankruptcy.

In 2019, the plaintiff commenced a second action against the bankrupt employer and several new defendants, alleging oppression, common employer, and improper transfer of assets.

The newly added defendants moved to strike or stay the second action.

The court permanently stayed the second action as an abuse of process, finding that it improperly circumvented the comprehensive regime of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act for challenging asset transfers, as well as the Rules of Civil Procedure regarding the addition of parties to an existing action.

The appellant appealed a Small Claims Court decision regarding her termination.

After her position became redundant, the parties agreed to ten weeks of working notice.

The employer breached this agreement after five weeks, alleging job abandonment, and the trial judge awarded the appellant the remaining five weeks' pay.

On appeal, the appellant argued the agreement lacked consideration and its breach constituted rescission entitling her to common law notice.

The Superior Court dismissed the appeal, finding the agreement valid and the breach a repudiation rather than rescission, as the appellant had already received half the benefit of the contract.

The appellant, Amir Nikbakht, appealed an interlocutory order of Master Wiebe that granted the respondent, Sarfraz Malik, leave to amend his statement of claim to add a claim under s. 61 of the Family Law Act (FLA) after the two-year limitation period had expired.

The Master, relying on Bazkur v. Coore, held that the FLA claim was not a new cause of action but an additional remedy.

The Superior Court judge, exercising coordinate jurisdiction, found that Bazkur was "plainly wrong" and that a s. 61 FLA claim constitutes a new statutory cause of action, distinct from a direct negligence claim.

Consequently, the amendment sought after the limitation period was statute-barred.

The appeal was allowed, and the Master's order was set aside.