Peter J. Cavanagh

The moving party, a director and disputed shareholder of the defendant corporation, sought leave under s. 246 of the Business Corporations Act to defend an action brought by the plaintiff for unpaid project management fees.

The motion was opposed by the plaintiff and other shareholders of the defendant corporation.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the moving party failed to establish that he was acting in good faith or that defending the action was in the best interests of the corporation, given the disproportionate costs of litigation, the risks of an increased claim, and the opposition from other stakeholders.

The Proposal Trustee brought a motion for advice and directions, seeking an order to not undertake the adjudication of a proof of claim filed by Moroccanoil and a cross-motion by the insolvent Company, and instead lift the stay of proceedings to allow the claims to be determined in ongoing U.S. litigation.

The Court dismissed the motion, finding that section 135(1.1) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act unambiguously requires the Proposal Trustee to determine and value the claim, and the Court's inherent jurisdiction does not extend to displacing this mandatory statutory process.

In a bankruptcy proposal proceeding, a creditor (Moroccanoil) moved for an order declaring that no secured indebtedness was owing by the debtor (CHL) to a related company (BEI) and prohibiting a credit bid based on that debt.

The court found that the alleged debt, which consisted of management fees agreed to in 2019 for services rendered in previous years, was based entirely on past consideration.

Applying the rule that past consideration is not good consideration, the court held the agreement unenforceable and granted the order prohibiting the credit bid.

The plaintiff in a proposed class action brought a motion for a declaration that the defendants were contractually precluded from opposing his motion for leave to appeal a decision denying class certification.

The parties had previously entered into a Litigation and Mediation Process Agreement which stated that no party would oppose a motion for leave to appeal an order disposing of all or a portion of the claim.

The court interpreted the agreement and found that the certification decision disposed of a portion of the claim, meaning the defendants were bound by their agreement not to oppose the leave to appeal motion.

The moving party, the Estate Trustee, sought an order for possession of a condominium unit, which was the sole significant asset of the deceased's estate.

The responding party, the deceased's son and sole residual beneficiary, resided in the unit and opposed the motion, seeking a stay pending his application against the Estate Trustee for negligence and misfeasance.

The court declined to stay the motion, finding that the Estate Trustee was acting within his authority to sell the unit to pay estate debts and ongoing expenses.

The court granted the order for possession, adjourning the request for a writ of possession to allow the responding party time to find alternative accommodations.

The applicant, a second mortgagee, sought the appointment of a receiver and manager over the respondent's real property due to a matured and defaulted mortgage loan.

The respondent requested a further adjournment to complete refinancing, which was denied due to a non-binding commitment letter and the respondent's lack of diligence in retaining counsel and pursuing refinancing.

The court found the appointment of a receiver to be just and convenient, particularly as the security documents contractually permitted such an appointment upon default.

The court rejected the respondent's claim of bad faith by the applicant.

The defendant, Dr. Saad, sought a declaratory order that evidence he would provide in support of a renewed motion to stay the action would be inadmissible in a pending contempt proceeding against him, relying on the s. 13 Charter right against self-incrimination.

The Plaintiffs opposed, arguing the evidence was not compelled and the proceedings were not "other proceedings." The court dismissed Dr. Saad's motion, holding that his evidence on the stay motion was not statutorily compelled, and therefore s. 13 of the Charter was not engaged.

The court clarified that the proper time to seek use immunity would be at the contempt hearing itself.

The applicant, Stoja Sekulovski, sought dependant's support from the estate of her late husband, Jim Sekulovski, under the Succession Law Reform Act.

She also sought an order for her step-son, Michael Sekulovski, to return funds he received from Jim's mother's estate, asserting it was an invalid gift, and to discharge Personal Property Security Act (PPSA) registrations he made against the estate and Stoja, along with statutory and punitive damages.

The court found the purported gift to Michael invalid, granted Stoja dependant's support including vesting the matrimonial home in her, and ordered Michael to discharge the PPSA registrations, pay the statutory amount, and punitive damages for his vexatious conduct.

The applicant, Gregory Zentner, sought certification of a class action against GFA World and related entities, alleging fraud and misappropriation of charitable donations.

The defendants brought a cross-motion for summary judgment to dismiss the claim on limitation grounds.

The court dismissed Zentner's motion for certification, finding that the pleadings did not disclose a cause of action because the donations were unencumbered gifts, meaning donors did not suffer a compensable loss recoverable through civil action.

The court also found insufficient factual basis for common issues, particularly regarding reliance and causation.

However, the defendants' summary judgment motion was also dismissed, as there remained a genuine issue requiring a trial concerning when Zentner discovered, or reasonably ought to have discovered, the material facts of his claim for limitation purposes.

The defendants brought a motion to disqualify the plaintiff's counsel, Matthew Valitutti and Jeffrey Radnoff, alleging a conflict of interest based on a prior lawyer-client relationship between Mr. Valitutti and the defendant Giuseppe Prizzi.

Mr. Prizzi claimed Mr. Valitutti had provided ongoing legal advice to Mr. Prizzi on business matters, including those related to the plaintiff, in exchange for landscaping services.

Mr. Valitutti denied any such relationship or providing legal advice.

The court, applying the MacDonald Estate v. Martin test, found that the defendants failed to discharge their onus to prove a prior lawyer-client relationship, citing a lack of objective corroborating evidence for Mr. Prizzi's assertions which were forcefully denied by Mr. Valitutti.

The motion to disqualify counsel was dismissed.

The applicants sought to appoint a receiver over a commercial property due to an alleged default on a third mortgage.

The respondents brought a counter-application arguing the mortgage was void or unenforceable due to material alterations, lack of independent legal advice, and unconscionability.

The court found the mortgage valid and enforceable, rejecting the respondents' arguments.

However, the court disallowed several fees claimed by the applicants, determining the actual amount secured by the mortgage.

Finding sufficient equity in the property to satisfy the debt, the court dismissed the application to appoint a receiver, without prejudice to future applications if the debt remains unpaid.

The moving parties (Sprott Parties) sought to stay the responding parties' (Penfound Parties) claims as an abuse of process after discovering the responding parties had unauthorized access to and reviewed privileged emails and documents belonging to the moving parties.

The court found that the responding parties obtained access to confidential and privileged information and failed to rebut the presumption of prejudice.

Concluding that allowing the action to proceed would be manifestly unfair and bring the administration of justice into disrepute, the court permanently stayed the responding parties' claims.

The plaintiff Receiver sued the defendant purchaser for damages after the purchaser failed to close a $12.2 million agreement of purchase and sale for a luxury residential property.

The purchaser argued he was entitled to terminate the agreement and receive his deposit back because the property suffered substantial water and mould damage prior to closing, and that the Receiver anticipatorily breached the agreement by refusing to extend the closing date.

The court found that the damage was not substantial, the Receiver did not repudiate the agreement, and the purchaser breached the contract by failing to close.

The Receiver was awarded over $5.3 million in damages, including the deficiency in the resale price, auction fees, and holding costs.

The Crown and the Madan Defendants brought competing motions regarding the use of funds frozen under a Mareva injunction for legal and living expenses.

Following the disposition of the motions, the Madan Defendants sought costs on a substantial indemnity scale, arguing the Crown's conduct was calculated to undermine their solicitor-client relationship.

The court found the Crown did not act improperly and awarded costs to the Madan Defendants on a partial indemnity scale, fixed at $150,000, reflecting their overall success on the motions.

The Globe and Mail brought a motion to set aside a sealing order granted by Conway J. that sealed a supplementary affidavit and excerpts of surreptitiously recorded transcripts in a corporate winding-up application.

The responding party opposed the motion, arguing that unsealing the materials would harm his privacy and dignity interests.

Applying the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in Sherman Estate, the court found that the responding party failed to establish that unsealing the court file posed a serious risk to an important public interest that would justify rebutting the strong presumption in favour of open courts.

The motion was granted and the sealing order was set aside.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for contempt against the defendants, alleging they breached a Mareva injunction by using frozen assets to pay for living and legal expenses.

In response, the defendants brought several procedural motions.

Dr. Saad moved to strike compelled evidence from the plaintiffs' contempt motion record, arguing it violated his Charter rights against self-incrimination.

The court dismissed this motion, finding that a contempt motion is not 'other proceedings' under s. 13 and that ss. 7 and 11(c) did not apply to previously compelled evidence.

Dr. Saad also moved under Rule 21 to exclude prior judicial rulings made in the civil action from the contempt motion.

The court granted this motion, holding that findings made on a civil standard are inadmissible in a quasi-criminal contempt proceeding.

The plaintiffs moved to compel the defendants to answer undertakings and produce documents.

The court ordered Dr. Saad to answer undertakings but ruled the answers could not be used in the contempt motion, and declined to order further document production that would conscript the defendants to assist in their own prosecution.

The court also limited the plaintiffs' disclosure obligations to the alleged breach, refusing broad discovery on the underlying fraud.

Finally, the court dismissed Mohammed's motion to stay the contempt proceedings pending his appeal on jurisdiction.

The proposed intervener, a shareholder of the respondent corporation and leader of an investor group, brought a motion for leave to intervene as an added party in an application concerning the extension of an outside date for a recapitalization transaction.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the proposed intervener's financial interest in the outcome did not constitute a direct interest in the subject matter of the private commercial dispute.

Furthermore, the court held that the proposed intervener's intended evidence regarding foreign regulatory law would not make a useful contribution to the resolution of the proceeding.

The plaintiffs, Andrew and Selena Stronach, brought motions to strike out portions of the defendants' Fresh as Amended Statements of Defence under Rule 25.11 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The plaintiffs argued that the impugned pleadings improperly referenced documents and communications that were subject to settlement privilege arising from a confidential judicial mediation.

The defendants argued that the plaintiffs had waived privilege or that an exception applied based on the justice of the case.

The court found that the mediation was subject to settlement privilege, the plaintiffs had not waived the privilege, and no exception applied.

The court granted the motions to strike the pleadings relating to the mediation.

The court also struck out portions of one defendant's pleading as scandalous, but dismissed a motion to require another defendant to reinstate a withdrawn admission.

Centurion Mortgage Capital Corporation brought a motion for determination of a mortgage priority dispute with The Guarantee Company of North America (GCNA) regarding a condominium development project.

The court found that counsel for both parties had agreed in May 2016 that Centurion's mortgage would have priority over GCNA's mortgage, except with respect to purchasers' deposits.

The court also held that GCNA was precluded by proprietary estoppel from relying on a registered postponement acknowledgment to assert priority over Centurion's mortgage.

The court declared Centurion's mortgage subordinate only with respect to deposits and ordered the deletion of the postponement acknowledgment from title.

The appellants, the publisher and editor of Your Ward News, appealed their convictions and sentences for wilfully promoting hatred against Jews and women.

They argued the trial judge provided insufficient reasons, misapprehended the evidence, and erred in imposing consecutive six-month sentences.

One appellant also alleged ineffective assistance of counsel at trial.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeals, finding the trial judge's reasons were sufficient, the verdicts were reasonable based on the overwhelming message of hatred in the publication, trial counsel was competent, and the consecutive maximum sentences were fit given the separate legally protected interests of the two targeted groups.