Criminal and Quasi-Criminal Law - OCJ

The applicant sought a remedy for alleged violations of her Charter rights, arguing that search warrants for her vehicle and home should be invalidated because they were based partly on information obtained through searches that violated her co-accused's Charter rights.

The applicant alternatively argued she had her own reasonable expectation of privacy in the cell phone and phone number that were the subject of the impugned searches.

The court ruled on the standing issue only, finding that the applicant lacked standing to attack the underlying warrants.

The applicant could not assert her co-accused's Charter rights, and she failed to establish her own reasonable expectation of privacy in the cell phone data.

The accused, Giacomo Fiorillo, brought an application for a stay of proceedings under section 24(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging a violation of his right to be tried within a reasonable time under section 11(b).

The court applied the framework from R. v. Jordan, calculating the total delay from the information being sworn to the application hearing (817 days or 26.9 months).

The court deducted 531 days (17.5 months) as defence delay, including explicit waivers and adjournments clearly requested by the defence or due to the accused's non-attendance.

The net delay was 286 days (9.4 months), which is well below the 18-month presumptive ceiling for the Ontario Court of Justice.

The Crown's request for a COVID-19 related deduction was denied at this stage.

The application for a stay of proceedings was dismissed.

The defendant pleaded guilty to failing to stop after an accident causing death, contrary to section 320.16(3) of the Criminal Code.

The victim was struck and killed, and the defendant subsequently removed her purse from his vehicle and discarded it, delaying her identification and family notification.

The Crown sought a 12-month custodial sentence, while the defence sought a conditional sentence.

The court considered mitigating factors such as the guilty plea and lack of criminal record, and aggravating factors including the disposal of the victim's purse, prior Highway Traffic Act convictions, and the substantial victim impact.

The court found that a conditional sentence would not meet the principles of denunciation and deterrence, imposing a 12-month custodial sentence, followed by 18 months probation, a 10-year section 109 order, a DNA order, and a 5-year driving prohibition.

The accused, Adriel Cyrus, was convicted of two sexual assaults.

The Crown brought a dangerous offender application seeking an indeterminate sentence.

The court found that Cyrus met all three statutory pathways for dangerous offender designation under the Criminal Code, based on his extensive criminal history, escalating violence, intractable psychiatric disorders (antisocial personality disorder, schizophrenia, cannabis use disorder), and poor prognosis for treatment.

The court concluded that an indeterminate sentence was the only adequate measure to protect the public, rejecting the defence's argument for a fixed sentence with a long-term supervision order.

A 19-year-old Canadian citizen with no criminal record was charged with 13 offences including attempt murder, occupying a motor vehicle with a firearm, and related firearms offences arising from a shooting incident in Toronto.

The Crown sought detention on primary, secondary, and tertiary grounds in a reverse onus hearing.

The accused proposed a plan of house arrest with two sureties (his mother and sister).

The court found the Crown's case was circumstantial with significant evidentiary weaknesses regarding the identity of the getaway driver.

The court granted release on strict conditions, finding the accused had met his onus on all three grounds.

The Crown charged two defendants with aggravated assault of a family member who sustained extensive facial bruising, stitches, and two significant fractures to her orbital bone on December 2, 2017.

The complainant gave two irreconcilable accounts: initially reporting a violent attack by both defendants to medical staff and police, then recanting at trial and claiming she had tripped and fallen down the stairs.

The court admitted the complainant's prior police statement under the KGB doctrine and found it more credible than her trial testimony.

However, the court concluded that while the evidence was highly suspicious of guilt and probably showed the assault occurred, the absence of independent corroborating evidence combined with the complainant's demonstrated willingness to fabricate evidence and her motive to do so created a reasonable doubt.

Both defendants were acquitted.

The applicant was charged with public mischief following a private information sworn by her estranged husband.

The charge arose from her report to police of an alleged assault.

The applicant brought a section 11(b) Charter application seeking a stay of proceedings based on delay in trial.

The net delay from the swearing of the information to the anticipated trial date was approximately 14.5 months, below the 18-month presumptive ceiling for provincial court.

The court found that while the defence had taken meaningful steps to expedite proceedings, the case had markedly exceeded reasonable time requirements due to systemic failures and Crown complicity in unnecessary delays, particularly during the pre-enquette phase and service of process.

A stay of proceedings was granted.

The Crown sought a dangerous offender designation for the accused following his guilty pleas to three counts of assault, one count of assault with a weapon, and two counts of failing to comply with a recognizance.

The accused had engaged in a pattern of predatory behaviour targeting women in apartment buildings, including physical assaults and an incident involving a pellet gun.

The defence conceded the accused met the criteria for long-term offender designation but opposed the dangerous offender designation.

The court found that while the accused presented a serious clinical challenge with paraphilic coercive disorder and schizophrenia, he did not pose a "tremendous future risk" as required for dangerous offender designation.

The court designated the accused as a long-term offender, imposed a two-year custodial sentence, and ordered a 10-year long-term supervision order.

The accused was charged with care or control while impaired by alcohol, over 80 mg of alcohol in 100 mL of blood, driving while licence suspended, and driving as a novice driver with more than zero blood alcohol content.

The trial addressed Charter violations regarding arrest grounds and right to counsel, the interpretation of truncated breath readings under section 258(1)(c) of the Criminal Code, and the sufficiency of evidence for each charge.

The court found no Charter violations, acquitted on the over 80 and impaired charges, acquitted on the driving while suspended charge due to lack of proof of notice, and convicted on the novice driver zero BAC charge.

An aboriginal first-time offender was sentenced for trafficking in marijuana over 3 kg, possession of marijuana over 3 kg for the purpose of trafficking, and possession of cannabis resin for the purpose of trafficking.

The offender operated a marijuana dispensary and later supplied other dispensaries during a period of uncertain law enforcement.

The court imposed a 45-day intermittent sentence, considering the evolving social attitudes toward marijuana, the offender's benevolent intentions, his aboriginal status and family background, his lack of prior record, and his strong rehabilitation prospects since arrest.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle while impaired and driving with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg per 100 ml of blood following a traffic stop.

The accused challenged the admissibility of breath sample test results, alleging breaches of Charter rights under sections 8 and 10(b), specifically regarding the timing of the roadside screening demand, the timing of breath samples, and the adequacy of rights to counsel advisement in a language he understood.

The court found that the roadside demand was made forthwith, the breath samples were taken as soon as practicable, and the police took reasonable steps to ensure the accused understood his rights to counsel in Mandarin.

The court admitted the evidence and found the accused guilty on both counts, with the impaired driving count stayed pursuant to the Kienapple principle.

The defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle while disqualified from driving contrary to section 259(4) of the Criminal Code.

A police officer observed a vehicle with a disqualified owner enter a dealership parking lot and detained the defendant standing beside the vehicle.

Without informing the defendant of the reason for detention or his right to counsel, the officer obtained admissions that the defendant had no driver's licence and had been driving that day.

The court found that the detention was lawful based on reasonable suspicion of a criminal offence, but the officer breached sections 9 and 10(b) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms by failing to advise the defendant of the reason for detention and his right to counsel before questioning.

The court excluded the defendant's statements under section 24(2) of the Charter, finding that the seriousness of the breaches and their impact on the defendant's rights outweighed society's interest in adjudication on the merits.

With the Crown's essential evidence excluded, the charge was dismissed.

The Crown prosecuted four defendants for violations of the Nutrient Management Act and Ontario Water Resources Act relating to a large hog finishing operation near Newburgh, Ontario.

The defendants failed to comply with specific items in a Director's Order, including providing written confirmation that manure production had ceased and submitting engineering assessments and site characterization studies.

The court found the defendants guilty on five counts, rejecting their defences of due diligence, reasonable mistake of fact, and officially induced error.

The court found that the defendants' belief that filing a Nutrient Management Strategy application obviated their need to comply with the Director's Order was unreasonable and contrary to law.

A conditional stay was entered on one count due to duplication of charges.

The applicant was charged with luring a child by means of a computer contrary to section 172.1(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The applicant brought a Charter application challenging the lawfulness of the police obtaining his cell phone subscriber information from a telecommunications provider without a warrant.

The applicant argued that the disclosure of cell phone subscriber information was analogous to internet subscriber information and should require judicial authorization under the principles established in R v. Spencer.

The court rejected this argument, finding that cell phone subscriber information does not attract the same reasonable expectation of privacy as internet subscriber information, and therefore no breach of section 8 Charter rights occurred.

The Crown brought an application under section 672.11(b) of the Criminal Code seeking an assessment order to determine whether the accused was suffering from a mental disorder at the time of committing the offences so as to be exempt from criminal responsibility.

The accused had pleaded guilty to public mischief and failing to comply with a recognizance.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the evidence did not establish reasonable grounds to believe an assessment was necessary.

The evidence consisted of observations of odd behaviour and a statement by the accused that he was schizophrenic and receiving treatment, which was insufficient to meet the threshold for ordering an assessment.

The defendant was charged with refusing to comply with a demand to provide breath samples suitable for analysis under s. 254(3) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown alleged that the defendant failed to provide suitable samples during ten attempts at an OPP detachment on April 1, 2012.

The defence challenged both the actus reus and mens rea of the offence, arguing that the breath technician's rejection of the samples was unreasonable and that instrument malfunction could not be ruled out.

The court found that the breath technician properly exercised his discretion in rejecting the samples as unsuitable, that the defendant manifested no signs of distress, and that the Crown adequately proved the instrument was functioning properly.

The defendant was found guilty.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with alcohol in her body contrary to section 253(b) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown proceeded summarily.

The defence brought a Charter application alleging breaches of sections 8, 9, and 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, specifically challenging the timing of the approved screening device demand and the delay in providing the right to counsel.

The court found no breach of Charter rights, holding that the officer's investigative steps were reasonable and compliant with the immediacy requirements of section 254(2) of the Criminal Code.

The trial proceeded on the merits following dismissal of the Charter application.

The accused, a personal care attendant at a long-term care facility, was charged with sexual assault and sexual exploitation of two elderly female residents with advanced dementia.

The Crown proceeded by indictment on four counts arising from two separate incidents in December 2011.

The accused was acquitted on three counts but convicted on one count of sexual assault.

The court found that while the Crown failed to prove direct penile contact as required for the sexual exploitation charge, the conduct constituting the sexual assault—allowing himself to be undressed while caring for a naked resident with his genitals in close proximity to her face—violated the resident's sexual integrity and constituted sexual assault under the objective test established in R. v. Chase.

The applicants brought a motion for a stay of proceedings pursuant to s. 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, alleging that their rights to trial within a reasonable time had been violated by delay exceeding 20 months between accusation and trial.

The applicants argued that Crown delay of approximately 7 months and institutional delay of approximately 8.5 months, combined with inherent and actual prejudice, rendered a fair trial impossible.

The Crown countered that much of the delay was neutral, resulting from mutual agreement of all counsel to delay trial pending exhaustive negotiations on resolution.

The court found that the bulk of the delay resulted from a mutual understanding among all counsel to postpone setting an early trial date to permit further investigation and reconsideration of reasonable prospect of conviction, particularly regarding identification evidence.

The court concluded that s. 11(b) was not breached, as the delay fell within Morin guidelines for a serious multi-accused prosecution, and any actual prejudice was attributable to the fact of the charges rather than the delay itself.

The accused was charged with sexual assault and sexual interference against a minor complainant.

The Crown sought to introduce similar fact evidence from two additional witnesses (sisters of the complainant) alleging similar sexual misconduct by the accused.

The trial judge conducted a voir dire to determine the admissibility of the similar fact evidence under the established legal framework.

The court found that while there were similarities in the conduct alleged by all three witnesses, the potential for collusion, combined with material inconsistencies in the evidence and credibility concerns, meant that the probative value of the similar fact evidence did not outweigh its prejudicial effect.

The similar fact evidence was therefore excluded from trial.