ONTARIO COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN:
HIS MAJESTY THE KING
— AND —
JASON CLAUDE LAMARCHE
Before Justice T. Lipson
Released on February 25, 2026
MS. L. Little counsel for the Crown
Mr. J. Lamarche ............................................................................................ on his own behalf
Lipson J.:
SECTIONS 8 AND 9 CHARTER RULINGS
1Background
2Mr. Lamarche has entered pleas of not guilty to charges of criminal harassment, utter death threats and breach of a section 810 peace bond. The Crown alleges that on June 20 and 21, 2024, Mr. Lamarche sent threatening emails to an Ottawa City Council member, Stephanie Laplante.
3On June 25, 2024, Detective Dakota Bashford of the Ottawa Police Service arrested Mr. Lamarche on the charges before the court at the Ottawa Mission shelter in downtown Ottawa. Detective Bashford testified that he arrested Mr. Lamarche after locating him sitting on a chair in what the officer described as the lobby area of the Mission. Located very near to Mr. Lamarche, a cell phone was plugged into an outlet. Detective Bashford seized the phone incident to arrest.
4Mr. Lamarche, who is acting on his own behalf, has brought a number of Charter applications in this trial. This ruling addresses alleged breaches of Mr. Lamarche’s section 8 and 9 Charter rights.
5Mr. Lamarche submits that he was unlawfully detained and arrested and that the seizure of the phone was unreasonable. Mr. Lamarche seeks that the evidence related to the seizure and subsequent forensic findings related to that device be excluded pursuant to s. 24(2) of the Charter.
6The issues to be determined in this Charter ruling are the following:
1.Was Mr. Lamarche arbitrarily detained or arrested, contrary to section 9?
Did the police conduct an unreasonable search or seizure, contrary to section 8?
If a breach is found, should the evidence nevertheless be admitted under section 24(2)?
7I now turn to an overview of the evidence relating to these Charter issues
8Mr. Ashley Potter is the Manager of Front-Line Services at the Ottawa Mission. He described the Mission as an emergency shelter that is open to the public 24 hours a day. The front doors are unlocked; no fob is required to enter or leave. The front desk is always staffed. The lounge area—where the arrest of Mr. Lamarche occurred—lies just past the front desk. It is a shared, supervised space with a seating capacity for 50-60 people. Individuals often remain there for long periods and, on occasion, overnight. The Mission has extensive video surveillance, approximately 200 cameras in public areas—but none in dorm rooms, offices, or washrooms. Police attend the Mission daily. Staff have no authority to prevent an arrest and have a policy to cooperate with the police when they are on the premises for the purpose of arresting an individual. Sometimes staff will ask the intended arrestee to attend the front desk to meet the arresting officer. Sometimes, if the police are of the view that the person is too dangerous or has a weapon, staff will permit the police to proceed to the dormitory to make the arrest. Dorm rooms are locked in daytime for cleaning and can be mag‑locked from the desk. The common areas are openly accessible and not under any client’s control.
9There is no dispute that there is a small laundry room next to the lounge which anyone, resident or non-resident, can use. There are also laundry facilities on the dorm floors for booked guests from 4 pm to 6 am.
10Detective Bashford testified that he was assigned to the investigation after alleged threatening emails were sent to City Councillor Plante. The emails included language such as ‘death sentence’ and ‘wanted dead or alive’. He verified the email account as belonging to Mr. Lamarche and telephoned the Ottawa Mission, confirming that Mr. Lamarche was staying there. On June 25, 2024, at approximately 5:25 p.m., he entered through the unlocked Waller Street doors, identified himself at the front desk, and located Mr. Lamarche seated in the public lounge roughly 12–15 feet inside. He advised Mr. Lamarche that he was under arrest and handcuffed him. A cell phone was within arm’s reach and plugged in to an outlet. The detective seized it to preserve evidence, relying on his common‑law power to search incident to arrest under section 489 of the Criminal Code. He did not manipulate or search the device at the scene. At the station, the phone was secured in property and later searched under a judicial warrant by forensic digital specialists.
11Mr. Lamarche testified on the Charter voir dire and described his living situation at the Ottawa Mission as well as his perspective on the circumstances surrounding his arrest. He stated that he had been residing at the Mission for over a year, consistently checking in each day to receive a bed and meals. Although he acknowledged that the Mission is intended as temporary accommodation for its residents, he emphasized that for him and many other long‑term residents, the shelter functioned as a dwelling. He explained that he kept his belongings in a small locker, slept in a shared dormitory, and used the common lounge area as his primary living space. According to Mr. Lamarche, this lounge area served as a communal “living room” where residents watched television, socialized, and spent much of their time. He described the room as partially divided by a retaining wall, giving the space a sense of separation from the front desk despite remaining physically accessible. He also noted that he was doing laundry in a nearby laundry room on the day of his arrest—an area he said residents rely on daily, further supporting his claim that this part of the Mission was a shared living room rather than a public lobby.
12Mr. Lamarche described his arrest as sudden and heavy‑handed. He testified that he had been sitting in a chair in the lounge when Detective Bashford approached him without presenting identification or explaining his authority. According to Mr. Lamarche, the officer did not display a badge, did not show a warrant, and made no effort to confirm whether Lamarche understood who he was or why he was being detained. Instead, Detective Bashford allegedly handcuffed him within seconds, advised him of his rights, and seized the device, which had been lying within arm’s reach on the floor.
13Mr. Lamarche maintained that the arrest was conducted without legal justification because, in his view, the lounge he was sitting in was part of his home for the purposes of constitutional protections. In his testimony, Mr. Lamarche was of the belief that the police were required to obtain a Feeney warrant before entering what he considered his dwelling place in order to arrest him. He further testified that the arrest amounted to an ambush: police had contacted the Mission to confirm his presence before arriving, instead of simply having staff notify him that he should present himself at the front desk to meet the officer, as was a common procedure he had observed at the mission
14In his testimony as well as his submissions, Mr Lamarche tied his own situation to broader systemic issues. He argued that his arrest and the way police executed it were part of a trend of expanding state power, particularly against vulnerable individuals such as those residing in shelters. He contended that his case was being used as a test of police authority within this kind of setting and suggested that the allegations themselves were secondary to the larger constitutional context. Mr. Lamarche also described himself as an individual who is not only educated but once had meaningful employment, particularly in the banking industry. He was born and grew up in Ottawa but also lived in Vancouver for approximately 20 years where he engaged in high level political activity, including running for mayor of that city. Mr. Lamarche explained that his current circumstances of extended living in the Ottawa Mission has been the result of financial difficulty. He has been unable to find employment at any level and attributes his situation to a negative article once written about him that survives on the internet. Mr. Lamarche is an articulate self-represented defendant who stated his position clearly and with sincerity.
15During cross‑examination, Crown counsel challenged Mr. Lamarche’s characterization of the lounge as his “living room”, highlighting its open accessibility, lack of doors, and the ability of non‑residents to walk through it. Mr. Lamarche acknowledged that he did not spend a great deal of time in the lounge or as he called it, the “living room” but on occasion did so. He maintained that while using it whether to watch television or do his laundry, he had a reasonable expectation of privacy. When questioned about the laundry room, Mr. Lamarche admitted that he did not tell police at the time that he was washing his clothes only because he chose to exercise his right to silence. He also conceded that he could not say whether non‑residents ever used the machines. He didn’t retrieve his laundry after his release from custody because it only involved a few pairs of socks and underwear. Mr. Lamarche asserted throughout his testimony that he considered the Mission to be his dwelling and his home not only in terms of his own reality but also that his constitutionally protected privacy interests at the time of his arrest were violated when he was arrested in the lounge area. He asserted that the police acted improperly, and that a “Feeney” warrant should have been required for his arrest.
16Mr. Lamarche submits that police required a warrant to enter the Mission and arrest him because, in his view, the Mission functioned as his temporary home. He argues the arrest was an unjustified ambush and therefore arbitrary; that the seizure of the phone without a Feeney warrant violated his section 8 right to be free of unreasonable search and seizure; and that police overreacted because the alleged victim was an elected official.
Analysis
Was there a breach of section 9 of the Charter?
17Mr. Lamarche testified that the Ottawa Mission functioned as his home and that he regarded the lounge as his ‘living room.’ Mr. Lamarche did and continues to believe that in his personal circumstances, there is a reasonable expectation of privacy which attaches to the Mission because that is where he has been residing for an extended period. He feels that the Mission is his residence.
18The law, however, draws a clear distinction between what an individual “feels” about a place and what the Charter “protects”. The Supreme Court has long held that a subjective expectation of privacy, standing alone, is insufficient to trigger section 8 Charter protection. It is only the starting point of the analysis, not the conclusion. The core of the inquiry is whether the expectation is one that society is prepared to recognize as objectively reasonable: R v Tessling, 2004 SCC 67 at paras 18–25; R v Patrick, 2009 SCC 17 at paras 26–27).
19The objective component of the test focuses on the nature of the space in question, not the personal circumstances of the accused. The evidence shows that the Mission lounge is an open, shared environment: the front doors remain unlocked; staff, residents, and visitors move freely through it; the area is continually supervised; and security cameras record activity. No resident—including Mr. Lamarche—can exclude others, control access, or otherwise treat the lounge as a private domain. Appellate courts have repeatedly held that common areas of multi‑unit buildings do not attract a reasonable expectation of privacy: R v Drakes, 2009 ONCA 560 at para 18; R v Yu, 2019 ONCA 942 at paras 67–69).
20This principle reflects a broader constitutional distinction: privacy under the Charter is normative, not personal. It protects what Canadians, acting through the courts, are prepared to treat as private—not whatever an individual subjectively believes is private. The Supreme Court has emphasized this repeatedly, noting that section 8 is aimed at protecting societal expectations of privacy that are reasonable in context: see R v Edwards, 1996 CanLII 255 (SCC), [1996] 1 SCR 128). While Mr. Lamarche’s feelings about the lounge are entirely understandable given his living circumstances, the normative standard cannot transform a shared, fully accessible space into a constitutionally protected private zone.
21While I can accept that Mr. Lamarche genuinely saw the lounge as part of his home, the Charter does not attach privacy protection to subjective impressions regarding common areas. The objective features of the space—and the consistent body of appellate jurisprudence on common‑area privacy—lead to the conclusion that section 8 was not engaged by police presence or by the location of the arrest.
22Section 9 prohibits arbitrary detention or arrest. The Criminal Code permits a warrantless arrest where an officer has reasonable grounds to believe a person has committed an indictable offence and prompt action is in the public interest. On this record, Detective Bashford had such grounds. The emails were explicit and escalatory, referring to a ‘death sentence’ and ‘wanted dead or alive.’ The complainant’s status as an elected official reasonably heightened safety concerns. The detective verified Mr. Lamarche’s identity and location before attending.
23The location of the arrest does not render it arbitrary. The lounge at the Ottawa Mission is not a dwelling. It is a public, supervised space with unlocked access, constant staff presence, and frequent police attendance. Clients do not control who enters and cannot exclude others. Entering such a space to arrest a suspect whom police have reasonable grounds to arrest is not arbitrary. I find no breach of section 9.
Was there a breach of section 8 of the Charter?
24Section 8 protects against unreasonable search or seizure. Police entry into the Mission’s lounge did not engage a reasonable expectation of privacy. As Mr. Potter explained, the lounge is open to the public at all times, monitored, and supervised. It is comparable to a lobby or community drop‑in space, not a private residence.
25The seizure of the phone was a valid search incident to a lawful arrest. The device was within arm’s reach of Mr. Lamarche at the time of arrest and was reasonably believed to contain evidence of the very offences under investigation. The detective acted with restraint: he did not examine the contents until a judicial warrant issued. That sequence respects section 8. I find no breach
If there was a breach or breaches occurred, should the evidence still be admitted under s. 24(2)?
26I find that sections 8 and 9 of the Charter were not breached. The arrest of Mr. Lamarche at the Ottawa Mission was lawful. The seizure of the phone was a proper search incident to arrest, followed by a judicially authorized digital search.
The section 24(2) Grant analysis
27If I am wrong on either section 8 or 9, I would admit the evidence under section 24(2).
28The Grant framework requires the Court to consider three factors: the seriousness of the state conduct, the impact on Mr. Lamarche’s Charter-protected interests, and society’s interest in an adjudication on the merits. Even if a breach were assumed, these factors strongly support admitting the evidence.
- Seriousness of the State Conduct
Detective Bashford acted in a careful and measured manner. He verified the emails, confirmed Mr. Lamarche’s location, entered an open and public facility, and did not search the phone until receiving a judicial warrant. Nothing in the evidence of Mr. Potter or Detective Bashford, whose evidence I accept, suggests bad faith, recklessness, or disregard for the Charter. Any breach would be at the very low end of seriousness.
Impact on Charter-Protected Interests: The public lounge of the Ottawa Mission does not provide a strong expectation of privacy. Mr. Potter testified it is open, monitored, supervised, and accessible to anyone at any time. The seizure of the phone minimally impacted privacy because no search occurred until a warrant issued. There was no bodily harm, coercion, or degrading treatment. Any Charter impact was modest.
Society’s Interest in Adjudication on the Merits: The digital evidence from the phone is reliable, essential, and central to the case. Excluding it would prevent the Court from evaluating the core allegations. Threatening communications directed at an elected official raise significant public safety concerns. Society’s interest strongly favours admission.
29Taken together, even if a technical breach had occurred, a fully informed member of the public would expect the evidence to be admitted.
Released: February 25, 2026
Justice T. Lipson