Criminal and Quasi-Criminal Law - OCA

The moving party sought leave to appeal the dismissal of his application for an extension of time to appeal a speeding conviction under Part I of the Provincial Offences Act.

He had been convicted in absentia after failing to attend his trial due to illness and his paralegal's failure to appear.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, holding that it lacked jurisdiction to hear an appeal from a denial of an extension of time to appeal in proceedings under Parts I and II of the Act, as established by binding precedent.

The appellant appealed his sentence, arguing the trial judge failed to expressly address the application of the Gladue principles.

The Court of Appeal agreed that the trial judge should have addressed them, citing R. v. Kakekagamick.

However, because the custodial portion of the sentence had already been served and the appellant was doing well with a proposed parole plan, the court declined to interfere and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant appealed the sentence imposed by the trial judge, arguing there was a misunderstanding over the view expressed by the pre-trial judge as to the appropriate sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, noting it could not resolve the conflict in the affidavits and reminding the bar to place the essence of pre-trial plea discussions on the record.

The term of imprisonment and probation were found to be appropriate.

The accused was charged with concealing the dead body of a child.

The trial judge found that the words 'died before . . . birth' in the Criminal Code were unconstitutionally vague and severed the word 'before', leading to the accused's acquittal.

The Crown appealed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the provision is not unconstitutionally vague when interpreted using the common law 'chance of life' standard, which provides fair notice and limits law enforcement discretion.

A new trial was ordered.

The appellant was convicted of attempted murder and break and enter after attacking his former partner and her new partner.

He was designated a dangerous offender and sentenced to an indeterminate penitentiary term.

On appeal, he argued the sentencing judge erred by relying on statements he made during a pre-trial fitness assessment, claiming they were protected under s. 672.21 of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, applying R. v. Jones to hold that such statements are admissible at the sentencing stage to accurately evaluate the danger posed by the offender.

The Court also found the appellant had consented to the admission of the psychiatric evidence.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that the trial judge erred in assessing the credibility of the complainant and the appellant by relying on irrelevant factors and drawing inferences unsupported by the evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge provided a detailed and fair explanation for her findings and that it was not the appellate court's role to retry the case.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for an assault involving stomping on an unconscious complainant's face.

The trial judge had found that an independent witness's testimony regarding the stomping was uncontradicted.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge materially misapprehended the evidence by failing to consider the contradictory testimony of the appellant's brother.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction was set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed his conviction.

At trial, the judge placed considerable emphasis on the complainant's emotional display during testimony, which related to an alleged threat against his mother.

However, the trial judge had previously precluded evidence on this issue, deeming it unnecessary.

The Court of Appeal held that relying on this emotional display after precluding evidence on the issue was unfair and deprived the appellant of the opportunity to make full answer and defence.

The conviction appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The Crown appealed an acquittal entered after the trial judge refused an adjournment.

A subpoenaed witness had left the courthouse.

The Court of Appeal held that the refusal to allow the adjournment was arbitrary and calculated to bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The appeal was allowed, the acquittal set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his conviction for second-degree murder, arguing that a statement he made to police should have been excluded at trial.

Although the statement was made after the appellant had consulted with counsel, it followed a 14-hour interrogation process during which his s. 10(b) Charter rights were repeatedly breached.

The Court of Appeal found that the statement was temporally and contextually connected to the prior breaches, and was therefore obtained in a manner that infringed the Charter.

Concluding that the admission of this conscriptive evidence would render the trial unfair and bring the administration of justice into disrepute, the Court allowed the appeal, quashed the conviction, and ordered a new trial.

The appellant was arrested in Nova Scotia and transported to Ontario, where he appeared before a justice of the peace.

The Crown conceded he should have been taken before a justice in Nova Scotia under s. 503(3) of the Criminal Code.

The appellant sought release via habeas corpus.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that while the arrest may have been illegal, subsequent valid proceedings justified his current detention, precluding release under habeas corpus.

The appellant appealed his sentence, arguing that the trial judge failed to address the totality principle given the remnant of a prior sentence, and sought to introduce fresh evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in principle, that the sentence was not demonstrably unfit, and that the fresh evidence did not warrant interference.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittal on a charge of trafficking in cocaine.

The respondent had been targeted in a 'reverse sting' operation where undercover RCMP officers offered to sell him 18 kilograms of cocaine.

The trial judge found that the police conduct was illegal because it contravened internal RCMP policy requiring approval from national headquarters, and concluded this amounted to an abuse of process, excluding all evidence.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal, holding that the officers' offer to sell was exempt from the CDSA trafficking prohibition under s. 15 of the regulations, as they were acting in the course of their responsibilities despite breaching internal policy.

Finding no illegality, the Court of Appeal set aside the acquittal and ordered a new trial.

The appellant appealed his sentence of one year imprisonment, 18 months probation, and a three-year driving prohibition for driving while disqualified.

He argued the sentencing judge failed to give pre-trial custody credit, improperly imposed probation for a withdrawn threatening charge, and imposed a harsh sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that pre-trial custody was credited, the sentence was fit, and the consideration of the withdrawn charge complied with the principles in Garcia v. Silva and s. 725(1)(b.1) of the Criminal Code.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder after shooting a 16-year-old girl with a sawed-off shotgun during a home invasion robbery.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred in instructions regarding planning and deliberation, forcible confinement, re-examination of a Crown witness, and the limited use of a defence witness's preliminary inquiry testimony.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible errors in the first three grounds.

While the trial judge erred in failing to give a limiting instruction on the preliminary inquiry testimony, the Court applied the curative proviso under s. 686(1)(b)(iii) of the Criminal Code, concluding the error caused no substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice.

The appellant appealed his conviction and six-month custodial sentence for an offence involving a young teenager.

He argued the trial judge erred in admitting similar fact evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge properly weighed the probative value against the unfair prejudice.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the trial judge made no error in principle given the breach of trust involved.

The appellant, a police officer, was convicted of forgery, attempt to obstruct justice, and breach of trust for issuing false traffic tickets.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred in his reasons, improperly admitted reply evidence, and that the offence of breach of trust required proof of personal benefit.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's reasons or admission of reply evidence.

The Court declined to resolve whether personal benefit is required for breach of trust, instead lifting the stay on the forgery convictions and staying the breach of trust conviction.

The appellant was convicted by a jury of importing cocaine and hashish and sentenced to seven years' imprisonment.

He appealed both his conviction and sentence.

On the conviction appeal, he argued the trial judge misapprehended the evidence, improperly turned the trial into a credibility contest, and failed to properly answer a jury question regarding reasonable doubt.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no errors in the jury charge or the recharge on reasonable doubt.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the seven-year sentence for importing 2.13 kilograms of cocaine and 1 kilogram of hashish was not demonstrably unfit.

The Crown appealed an Ontario Review Board disposition granting the respondent an absolute discharge.

The respondent had previously been found not criminally responsible for offences related to harassing a former girlfriend.

The Crown argued the Board failed to obtain evidence from a staff psychiatrist and misapplied the test for determining if the respondent posed a significant threat to public safety.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the Board had sufficient evidence to conclude the respondent did not pose a significant threat and that its decision was reasonable.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault, assault, and uttering threats, as well as his sentences.

He argued the trial judge committed a Coutts error, improperly relied on battered wife syndrome to explain delayed disclosure, and improperly used nurses' notes as corroboration.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeals, finding no errors in the trial judge's credibility assessments or use of evidence.

However, the Court allowed the sentence appeal in part, reducing the sentence for sexual assault to three years due to an ambiguity in the trial judge's sentencing reasons.