Criminal and Quasi-Criminal Law - OCA

The applicant sought bail pending appeal from a conviction for sexual assault.

The Crown opposed, arguing the applicant failed to satisfy the public interest criterion of the R. v. Oland test, citing the seriousness of the offense, the applicant's criminal record including prior breaches of release conditions, and the perceived weakness of the appeal grounds.

The court granted bail, finding the proposed appeal grounds were not frivolous and that the time already served by the applicant was relevant to public confidence.

The court balanced the enforceability of the judgment against its revisability, concluding that the latter outweighed in this instance.

The appellant appealed her conviction and sentence.

During the hearing, she withdrew her appeal against the conviction.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's admission of the appellant's confession or the finding of guilt.

The court granted leave to appeal the sentence but dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge considered all relevant principles and circumstances, and that the sentence imposed was reasonable.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder after discharging his trial counsel near the end of the Crown's case.

The trial judge refused the appellant's request for a lengthy adjournment to retain his former preliminary inquiry counsel, finding the request was a sham designed to secure a 'mouthpiece' who would follow unethical instructions.

The trial judge then appointed the discharged trial counsel as amicus curiae.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's discretionary decisions, finding no error in the refusal of the adjournment or the appointment of former counsel as amicus curiae.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault and criminal harassment.

He argued the trial judge erred by providing supplementary reasons four days after oral reasons and by improperly assessing the complainant's delayed disclosure of the sexual assault.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the provision of supplementary reasons and holding that it was open to the trial judge to accept the complainant's explanation for her delayed disclosure.

The appellant sought judicial review of the Minister of Justice's order of surrender.

The Court of Appeal applied the narrow scope of review established in U.S.A. v. Lake and found that the Minister had considered all arguments put forward by the appellant.

The court concluded the Minister's decision was not unreasonable and dismissed the application.

The respondents, a father and son, were convicted of arson and fraud after intentionally causing an explosion and fire at their family business to defraud an insurance company of $200,000.

The trial judge imposed conditional sentences of two years less a day.

The Crown appealed the sentences.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that conditional sentences are generally inappropriate for serious arson offences, especially given the planning, use of accelerants, and danger posed to adjoining occupants and firefighters.

The court substituted sentences of 12 months in custody.

The appellants appealed their convictions for three arson-related offences.

They argued they lacked a sufficient evidentiary record and that their trial counsel provided ineffective assistance.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, noting the appellants had consented to their appellate counsel's removal and were responsible for preparing the appeal, and found no evidence to support the ineffective assistance claim.

The Crown appealed a youth court disposition of 12 months' probation for a young person who, with an accomplice, robbed a convenience store using an imitation firearm and a knife.

The Court of Appeal found the sentence unfit as it failed to recognize the seriousness of the offence and hold the young person accountable.

The Court also found the youth court judge erred by failing to make a mandatory DNA order.

Acknowledging the young person's exceptional rehabilitative progress, the Court substituted a sentence of three months' deferred custody followed by 12 months' probation, and ordered a DNA sample.

The appellant appealed a finding by the trial judge that he was unfit to stand trial.

The trial judge's finding was based on the appellant's delusional thinking, which caused him to disavow his legal name and believe he had no role in the proceedings.

The Court of Appeal noted that the appellant understood the nature of court proceedings and indicated he would defend the case if the Information were amended to his preferred name.

However, the Court concluded that amending the Information was a matter for the authorities and found no basis to interfere with the trial judge's finding of unfitness.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his sentence for breaching a recognizance under s. 810 of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal found that the sentencing judge erred in principle by concluding the conduct was in the category of the most serious possible breaches.

While the offender's criminal history must be considered, not every breach mandates the maximum sentence.

The court granted leave to appeal, set aside the original sentence, and imposed a sentence of 18 months' imprisonment (12 months plus 6 months' time served) along with the original probation period.

The appellant was convicted of possession of crack cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.

He appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in instructing the jury that evidence of his demeanour upon arrest had no value in proving guilt or innocence.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding the demeanour evidence was reasonably capable of supporting an inference favourable to the accused and should not have been taken away from the jury.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The Crown appealed a non-custodial sentence imposed on a repeat drinking and driving offender with a lengthy criminal record.

The trial judge had found exceptional circumstances based on the respondent's remarkable rehabilitative strides and four years of sobriety.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in principle in the trial judge's decision not to incarcerate the respondent, though it clarified that general deterrence applies equally to hardened alcoholics and cautioned against automatically equating residential treatment with pre-trial custody.

The Crown appealed the sentences imposed on the respondents by the trial judge.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge gave careful consideration to the competing interests in what was a difficult sentencing problem.

Finding no error in principle, the Court deferred to the trial judge's assessment and dismissed the appeals.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that he did not make an informed waiver of his s. 10(b) Charter rights because he was not told the details of the complainant's allegations.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge's findings of fact supported the conclusion of an informed waiver, and that the appellant was not entitled to know the details of the allegations before waiving his right to counsel.

The court also found no error in the jury charge on consent.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed the sentence imposed by the trial judge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge carefully reviewed all appropriate factors and the sentence was not manifestly unfit nor did it reflect any error in principle.

The court noted that the appellant's rehabilitation efforts were a matter for parole authorities.

The applicant appealed his conviction for assault, which arose from an attack by a group of skinheads on an unidentified black man.

The trial judge convicted the applicant based on a process of elimination, relying on the testimony of an accomplice and independent witnesses to conclude the applicant was the third participant in the chase.

The Court of Appeal found the independent evidence regarding the number of participants was too contradictory and unsatisfactory to form a safe basis for conviction.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction set aside, and an acquittal entered.

The appellant, who was 14 years old at the time, was convicted of sexually assaulting a seven-year-old child while babysitting.

The complainant did not disclose the incident until months later, after her father, who was separated from her mother and harboured animosity toward the appellant, suggestively questioned her.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge misapprehended the defence's theory, which focused on the reliability of the child's account given the father's suggestive questioning, rather than deliberate fabrication.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction quashed, and an acquittal entered, as the father's unreliability made it impossible to properly assess the reliability of the complainant's disclosure.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in the lower court's dismissal of the appellant's application for a stay based on unreasonable delay.

However, the Court allowed the sentence appeal, finding that the sentencing judge erred by fettering his discretion and rejecting the possibility of a conditional sentence for the specific type of offence, contrary to the Supreme Court's guidance in Proulx.

The sentence was varied to a 12-month conditional sentence.

The Crown sought leave to appeal from a summary conviction appeal court order setting aside a sexual assault conviction and directing a new trial.

The Court of Appeal held that the appeal judge erred by conducting a microscopic review of the evidence, reassessing credibility, and effectively retrying the case rather than showing proper deference to the trial judge's findings.

Applying the governing appellate principles on unreasonable verdicts and credibility-based findings, the court concluded the trial verdict was reasonably supported by the complainant's evidence and the rejection of the defence evidence.

Leave to appeal was granted, the appeal was allowed, the trial verdict was restored, and the sentence appeal was remitted for determination on its merits.

This addendum to a criminal appeal judgment clarified that the court did not intend to preclude the respondent from applying for a discharge.

Relying on prior authority indicating that even a conviction would not necessarily bar a discharge, the court nonetheless amended its earlier reasons for absolute clarity.

The acquittal was set aside and replaced with a finding of guilt for common assault, thereby preserving the respondent's ability to seek a discharge.