Criminal and Quasi-Criminal Law - OCA

The Minister of Justice referred the appellant's 1990 second-degree murder conviction to the Court of Appeal after it was discovered that police failed to disclose an audio recording of an interview with an alternate suspect.

The Crown conceded the non-disclosure constituted a miscarriage of justice, requiring the conviction to be quashed.

The appellant sought an acquittal, arguing a police conspiracy to frame him and that his confession was false.

The Court of Appeal declined to enter an acquittal, finding that a properly instructed jury could still convict based on the appellant's voluntary confession and new DNA evidence linking him to the victim's clothing.

The Court ordered a new trial rather than a judicial stay of proceedings.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault, sexual interference, and unlawful confinement against his daughter when she was under 16 years of age.

The sole ground of appeal was that the trial judge provided insufficient reasons for meaningful appellate review.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that while the trial judge's reasons were brief, they were sufficiently clear to demonstrate why the conviction was reached.

The trial judge properly assessed credibility and reliability of witnesses, accepted the complainant's evidence regarding the April 16, 2013 offences, and correctly applied the W.(D.) analysis to reject the appellant's denial and defence evidence.

The applicants, family members of individuals whose deaths were investigated by the Special Investigations Unit (SIU), sought a declaration that police officers involved in SIU investigations are not entitled to legal assistance in preparing their notes.

The application judge dismissed the application on grounds of standing, justiciability, and mootness.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the applicants had public interest standing and the issues were justiciable and not moot.

Exercising its jurisdiction to decide the substantive issues, the Court held that the Police Services Act and the SIU Regulation do not permit police officers to have a lawyer vet or assist in the preparation of their notes, though they may obtain basic legal advice regarding their rights and duties provided it does not delay note completion.

The appellants, former executives of Livent, appealed their convictions and sentences for large-scale commercial frauds involving the falsification of financial statements.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeals, finding that the trial judge's reasons were adequate, the verdicts were reasonable, and the trial judge properly assessed the credibility of unsavoury accomplice witnesses.

However, the Court allowed the sentence appeals, reducing the penitentiary terms because the Crown failed to prove the actual amount of financial loss or that the company's bankruptcy was caused solely by the fraud.

The applicant, whose conviction for first degree murder was set aside and a new trial ordered, sought a review of a decision denying him judicial interim release.

The Court of Appeal found that the application judge erred in denying bail on the secondary and tertiary grounds.

Given the applicant's previous compliance with bail conditions for five and a half years, his age, the weakness of the Crown's case, and the presumption of innocence, the Court concluded that his detention was not necessary for public safety or to maintain confidence in the administration of justice.

The application for release was granted.

The appellant was convicted of three counts of sexual assault involving employees of his business.

He appealed the convictions, arguing the trial judge erred in failing to give a limiting instruction on similar act evidence, misdirected the jury on the exercise of authority vitiating consent under s. 265(3)(d) of the Criminal Code, and that the Crown made improper comments during closing arguments regarding jury selection.

The Court of Appeal agreed with all three grounds, finding the errors prejudicial.

The appeal was allowed, the convictions were set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed his conviction for first degree murder, arguing the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on the common sense inference and intoxication.

The appellant admitted to causing the elderly victim's death and sexually assaulting her but claimed an alcohol-induced blackout negated the requisite intent for murder.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the common sense inference was properly left to the jury and the intoxication instruction did not improperly shift the burden of proof.

The appellant appealed his convictions for dangerous driving and driving with a blood alcohol concentration over 80.

The Court of Appeal found ample evidence to support the dangerous driving conviction, including the appellant's speed and a prior warning from police not to drive.

The court also upheld the over 80 conviction, finding that a voluntary breath sample provided reasonable grounds for a search warrant to seize blood samples at the hospital.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was briefly detained by a police officer for investigative purposes after an accomplice attempted to use a stolen gift certificate.

The officer asked exploratory questions before receiving additional information and arresting the appellant, at which point he was advised of his right to counsel.

The appellant argued his section 10(b) Charter rights were violated because he was not informed of his right to counsel immediately upon the initial detention.

The Court of Appeal held that in the context of a brief investigative detention, the phrase 'without delay' allows for a brief exploratory interlude before the right to counsel must be provided.

The appeal from conviction and sentence was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his committal for extradition to the United States on charges related to a large-scale lottery fraud scheme, and sought judicial review of the Minister of Justice's surrender decision.

The appellant argued that the requirement of double criminality was not met because his alleged conduct predated the relevant Criminal Code amendments, and challenged the admissibility and sufficiency of the evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that under s. 29(4) of the Extradition Act, double criminality is assessed at the date of the Authority to Proceed.

The Court also found the evidence admissible and sufficient to justify committal, and upheld the Minister's surrender decision as reasonable.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in finding he intended to mislead the court at his bail hearing.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge's finding that the appellant presented evidence he knew was dishonest to advance his position was supported by the evidence, and that the evidence did not need to be on a material point.

The appellant appealed his convictions for rape and indecent assault, seeking to introduce fresh evidence of a letter authored by the complainant which she denied writing at trial.

The Court of Appeal admitted the evidence, finding that trial counsel exercised due diligence and the interests of justice compelled its admission.

The court held the evidence could have affected the verdict on all counts by impacting the complainant's credibility.

The court also noted the trial judge failed to provide an adequate limiting instruction regarding moral prejudice reasoning between the counts.

The appeal was allowed, convictions quashed, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant was convicted of second-degree murder following a shooting at a nightclub and sentenced to life imprisonment with no parole eligibility for 18 years.

He appealed the conviction on multiple grounds, including improper judicial intervention during cross-examination, erroneous evidentiary rulings, and misdirections in the jury charge regarding eyewitness identification, gunshot residue evidence, and the burden of proof.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no reversible errors.

However, the court allowed the sentence appeal, finding the trial judge erred in characterizing the youthful offender as an 'armed, dangerous drug dealer' without sufficient evidence, and reduced the parole ineligibility period from 18 to 15 years.

The appellant appealed his convictions on four counts of break and enter.

The Court of Appeal upheld the convictions on counts one and four, finding it was open to the trial judge to apply the doctrine of recent possession given the unique combination of stolen items (a marked two-dollar bill and 88-cent stamps) found on the appellant.

However, the Court allowed the appeal on counts two and three, setting aside the convictions and entering acquittals, as there was no evidence linking the appellant to those specific break-ins other than proximity, and there was exculpatory evidence regarding the intruder's shoes.

The appellant was arrested for impaired driving and detained in a police cell for 11 hours with virtually no contact with police officers.

He sought a stay of proceedings, arguing his s. 9 Charter right against arbitrary detention was breached.

The trial judge and summary conviction appeal court judge dismissed the application.

The Court of Appeal found that the 11-hour detention was indeed arbitrary and breached s. 9 of the Charter.

However, the Court concluded that a stay of proceedings was not the appropriate remedy, as the breach occurred post-offence and did not impact trial fairness or the gathering of evidence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants were charged with cruelty to animals after a search of their property under the Ontario Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act (OSPCAA) resulted in the seizure of numerous animals.

The trial judge acquitted the appellants, finding the search warrant invalid because it authorized multiple officers to enter, which she held violated the OSPCAA.

On appeal, the Summary Conviction Appeal Court applied the Interpretation Act to find that the singular wording in the OSPCAA included the plural, validating the warrant and ordering a new trial.

The Court of Appeal upheld this decision, confirming that the Interpretation Act applied, the search was reasonable, and the presence of police officers to keep the peace did not violate the appellants' Charter rights.

The appellant was convicted of fraud over $5,000 relating to a mortgage scheme.

He appealed his conviction on the grounds of an unreasonable verdict and a reasonable apprehension of bias by the trial judge.

The Court of Appeal found that while there was sufficient evidence to support the conviction, the trial judge's active role in eliciting evidence and making adverse comments about the credibility of Crown witnesses during their testimony created a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed a summary conviction appeal judge's decision that overturned her acquittal at trial.

The Court of Appeal found that the summary conviction appeal judge erred by applying a correctness standard to the trial judge's finding that the officer lacked the requisite grounds to make a breath demand under s. 254(3) of the Criminal Code.

The trial judge's finding was not unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal granted leave to appeal, allowed the appeal, and restored the acquittal.

The appellant appealed his 38-month sentence for break and enter, arguing disparity with his co-accused's 23-month sentence, improper discounting of his guilty plea, and disproportionality.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the disparity justified by the appellant's worse record and additional charges.

The court also held the trial judge properly considered the timing of the guilty plea and that the sentence was not manifestly excessive given the need for denunciation and deterrence.

The appellant appealed his conviction for robbery and assault.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in admitting a witness's videotaped statement for the truth of its contents, as the witness claimed no memory at trial and the judge improperly assessed the statement's reliability.

However, the Court applied the curative proviso and dismissed the appeal, concluding that the remaining evidence against the appellant, including eyewitness testimony and the victim's blood on his shoe, was overwhelming.