Nancy J. Spies

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his action for damages for assault, negligence, and Charter breaches against the police.

The appellant argued the officer, who was driving an unmarked vehicle, was not readily identifiable and lacked reasonable grounds to arrest him for failing to stop.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's credibility assessments or factual findings that the officer was identifiable and had reasonable grounds to arrest under the Criminal Code.

The appellant appealed an order dismissing its motion to restore a construction lien action to the trial list and denying it the right to deliver a defence to the respondents' counterclaim.

The Divisional Court admitted fresh evidence explaining the delay, which was largely due to the parties focusing on a companion action and the respondents' own delays in fulfilling undertakings.

The Court found the appellant met both the 'ready for trial' test and the test for explaining delay without causing non-compensable prejudice.

The appeal was allowed, the action was restored to the trial list, and the appellant was permitted to file a defence to the counterclaim.

The appellant brought a motion to admit fresh evidence on appeal.

The respondents opposed the motion on the basis that the appellant could not meet the due diligence criterion of the Palmer test.

The Divisional Court allowed the motion, finding that the interests of justice favoured admitting the evidence despite the lack of due diligence, given the uncertainty in the law, the nature of the evidence (procedural history), and the potential serious effect of denying admission.

The appellant appealed a trial judge's decision regarding the quantum and duration of spousal support, as well as the costs award.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred by failing to impute a higher income to the respondent based on her part-time earnings with tips and commissions, and by ordering support for five years without a reduction over time.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding errors of fact or errors of law, as the trial judge's conclusions were supported by the evidence and consistent with the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines.

The appellant sought to appeal several interlocutory orders made by an Acting Referee under the Drainage Act, including an order dismissing a recusal motion.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal on multiple grounds.

First, the appellant lacked standing as he was not the registered owner of the property.

Second, the orders appealed from were interlocutory and therefore final and not subject to appeal under section 106(3) of the Drainage Act.

Finally, the court found no unfairness in the Acting Referee hearing his own recusal motion, as this accords with usual practice.

The accused was tried before a judge alone on charges of sexual assault and sexual interference arising from allegations made by a child complainant concerning events said to have occurred when she was seven years old.

The Crown relied principally on the complainant’s videotaped statement and testimony, while the defence raised concerns arising from a missing second police video statement, third party records, inconsistencies in the complainant’s accounts, and evidence suggesting influence from counselling in the context of ongoing family custody litigation.

Applying the W.(D.) framework and the jurisprudence governing the assessment of child witness testimony, the court found that the complainant’s evidence about the most serious allegation, and her evidence overall, did not satisfy the Crown’s burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

The accused was acquitted on all charges, and the lost evidence application was therefore moot.

V.J. was convicted of eight offences, including assault, assault with a weapon, uttering death threats, sexual assault, and unlawful confinement, against his wife, A.J., over a two-year period.

The court considered aggravating factors such as domestic violence in the home, escalation of violence, and the victim's vulnerability, alongside mitigating factors like the offender's lack of criminal record and strong work ethic.

Applying sentencing principles of denunciation and deterrence, and following the approach of assigning fit sentences for each offence before considering totality, the court imposed a total penitentiary sentence of 35 months, along with a mandatory weapons prohibition, DNA order, Sex Offender Registry order, and a no-contact order.

The Attorney General of Canada, on behalf of the United States, sought an order for the committal for extradition of Jhoan Manuel Ciprian-Guzman for the Canadian offence of possession of child pornography.

Guzman opposed the application and brought a cross-application for a stay of proceedings, arguing that the anticipated prison conditions in Florida would violate his Charter rights.

The court found that the test for committal was met and dismissed Guzman's cross-application, holding that the extradition judge's jurisdiction to consider Charter issues is limited to the fairness and integrity of the committal hearing itself, not the potential future treatment or punishment in the requesting state, which falls under the Minister of Justice's purview.

The defendants, Ludovico Minicucci and 2181860 Ontario Limited, brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss an action by Windrock Associates Ltd. for a success fee of $97,350.

Windrock claimed the fee was owed under an agreement for advisory services related to the purchase of a one-half interest in real property, or alternatively, under quantum meruit and unjust enrichment.

The defendants argued that the agreement contravened the Real Estate and Business Brokers Act, 2002 (REBBA) because Windrock was not registered under the Act, and therefore, the claim for remuneration was barred.

The court found that Windrock's services were "in connection with a trade in real estate" and that the success fee, calculated as a percentage of the sale price and conditional on the transaction closing, gave Windrock a direct pecuniary interest in the sale.

Consequently, the court held that Windrock's claims under the agreement, quantum meruit, and unjust enrichment were all barred by section 9 of REBBA.

The motion for summary judgment was granted, and the action was dismissed.

This is a costs endorsement following the dismissal of the Applicant's request for leave to commence an action against the Respondents.

The court assessed the costs payable by the Applicant to the successful Respondents on a partial indemnity basis.

The court considered the reasonableness of two separate sets of costs, duplication of legal work by multiple lawyers of similar call years, and the hourly rates and disbursements claimed.

The court reduced the costs sought by Centennial College and the individual Respondents due to concerns about duplication and excessive disbursements, while approving the costs sought by the Toronto Police Services Board.

The Applicant, a vexatious litigant, was ordered to pay costs, and his approval of the costs order's form and content was waived.

The applicant, The Scoular Company, sought to enforce Letters Rogatory from a U.S. District Court against the respondents, who were former employees and associated entities of a third party in the U.S. litigation.

The primary issues were whether the respondents' costs for complying with the discovery requests should be capped at $20,000 and whether they should receive costs for responding to the enforcement application.

The court found that the respondents were not "strangers to the litigation" due to their indemnification agreements with a party in the foreign action and their cooperation.

Consequently, the court imposed a $20,000 cap on the costs for complying with the Letters Rogatory and denied the respondents their costs for the enforcement application, as the applicant was wholly successful.

The plaintiff brought a motion seeking to invalidate Full and Final Releases she signed and a Notice of Discontinuance against two former lawyers, alleging they acted contrary to her instructions or mistakenly.

The court found that a settlement agreement existed, and the lawyers had ostensible authority to effect it.

Considering factors for setting aside a settlement, including the significant delay by the plaintiff in challenging the settlement and the public policy favoring enforcement of settlements, the court dismissed the motion.

The applicant, a declared vexatious litigant, sought leave under s. 140(3) of the Courts of Justice Act to commence an action against a college, its employees, the police, and the Attorney General.

The proposed action related to his expulsion from a paralegal program and subsequent arrest for uttering threats.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the proposed pleading was defective, lacked an evidentiary basis, and constituted an abuse of process as an attempt to re-litigate a final college decision.

The court noted the applicant's history of bringing meritless proceedings and his failure to pay over $73,000 in outstanding costs orders.

The offender was found guilty by a jury of assault with a weapon and aggravated assault after pouring hot oil on a teenager who was fighting her son.

The Crown sought a penitentiary sentence of 2.5 to 3 years, while the defence sought a 90-day intermittent sentence.

The court found that the offender's actions were a spontaneous overreaction to protect her son, rather than a premeditated attack.

Considering the offender's status as a first-time offender and the sole caregiver for four children, the court applied the principle of restraint and sentenced her to 90 days in jail to be served intermittently, followed by 24 months of probation.

The accused was charged with possession of methamphetamine for the purpose of trafficking after police found 31.58 grams of crystal meth in his possession.

He pleaded guilty to simple possession but contested the trafficking charge.

The Crown relied heavily on expert evidence from a police detective regarding typical consumption and trafficking patterns to argue the quantity was too large for personal use.

The court excluded portions of the expert's evidence that touched on the ultimate issue or lacked a reliable foundation.

Ultimately, the court found that while the quantity was large, it was not impossible for it to be for personal use, and the absence of other trafficking indicia left a reasonable doubt.

The accused was acquitted of trafficking but convicted of simple possession.

The offender was convicted by a jury of two counts of dangerous driving causing bodily harm and two counts of failure to remain at the scene of an accident after rear-ending a motorcycle at high speed and fleeing.

The collision caused severe, life-altering injuries to the two victims.

The court considered the offender's difficult background, lack of alcohol involvement, and the automatic deportation consequence he faced.

The court sentenced the offender to 12 months for dangerous driving and 6 months consecutive for failing to remain, totaling 18 months in custody, along with a 5-year driving prohibition.

The offender was found guilty of possession of crack cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.

The Crown sought a sentence of two and a half years' incarceration, while the defence sought a conditional sentence.

The court considered the offender's mental illness, lack of prior drug record, and the delay in bringing the matter to trial.

The court imposed a conditional sentence of two years less a day, followed by one year of probation, along with a ten-year weapons prohibition.

The offender was convicted of conspiracy and attempting to import approximately 356 grams of cocaine from Costa Rica.

The Crown sought a three-year sentence, while the defence sought two years, noting the offender's impending deportation.

The court found the offender was a key participant in the scheme and had a prior record for drug trafficking.

The court determined a fit sentence was 35 months, but reduced it to two years less a day after applying credit for pre-sentence custody, strict house arrest, and the collateral consequence of certain deportation.

The applicant, facing two sets of charges for trafficking crystal methamphetamine, sought a review of his detention order under s. 520 of the Criminal Code.

The court found a material change in circumstances based on a newly proposed surety (the applicant's brother) and a strict 24/7 house arrest plan.

Despite the applicant allegedly committing the second set of offences while on bail for the first, the court concluded the new supervision plan, which included a monitored alarm system and relocation to a different city, sufficiently mitigated the substantial likelihood of re-offending.

The application was granted and the applicant was released on a recognizance.

The defendant was arrested by police who mistakenly believed he was his brother, a suspect wanted on a warrant.

During a search incident to arrest, police found a loaded revolver in the defendant's pocket.

The defendant brought a Charter application arguing the arrest was unlawful due to mistaken identity and sought to exclude the firearm.

The court found the arresting officer had subjective and objective reasonable and probable grounds to make the arrest given the striking physical resemblance between the brothers and other corroborating surveillance details.

The Charter application was dismissed, and the defendant was found guilty of all firearms charges.