Nancy J. Spies

The appellants appealed an Assessment Officer's $1,000 costs award to the respondents following the discontinuance of an assessment action.

The appellants had discontinued the assessment to pursue a breach of trust claim in Small Claims Court regarding a retainer.

The Superior Court set aside the costs award, finding serious procedural unfairness because the appellants were ambushed with a Bill of Costs at the hearing, the Notice of Appointment was served out of time, and the costs claimed improperly included Small Claims Court attendances.

The appellant tenant appealed an eviction order issued by the Landlord and Tenant Board for rent arrears.

The appellant argued the Board failed to consider a previous order granting her a rent abatement and improperly proceeded in her absence due to a medical emergency.

On consent of the parties, the Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding the Board committed a reversible error by failing to account for the prior abatement order.

The matter was remitted to the Board for a fresh hearing to be held concurrently with a new eviction application filed by the property's subsequent owner.

The applicant, a psychotherapist, brought a motion to stay the Registrar's decision revoking her certificate of registration pending her application for judicial review.

The Registrar had revoked the certificate without a hearing, finding the applicant failed to disclose prior complaints and relationships on her application.

The court applied the RJR-MacDonald test and granted the stay, finding serious issues to be tried regarding procedural fairness, irreparable harm to the applicant's reputation and livelihood, and that the balance of convenience favoured the applicant.

The General Manager of OHIP sought judicial review of a decision by the Physician Payment Review Board to hold a hearing regarding the denial of a physician's billing claims.

The General Manager argued the Board lacked jurisdiction to review denials made under s. 18(3) of the Health Insurance Act.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application as premature, finding no exceptional circumstances to justify judicial intervention before the Board had fully considered the jurisdictional issue and the true basis for the claim denials.

The landlord appealed a decision of the Landlord and Tenant Board denying its request to review a rent abatement order made in its absence.

The landlord claimed it did not receive the notice of hearing or the order.

The Board found this unlikely, as the documents were mailed to the correct corporate address and not returned, inferring a lack of diligence by the landlord's head office staff.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the Board's factual finding of lack of diligence was supported by evidence and did not constitute an error of law.

The self-represented appellant brought a motion for an extension of time to serve and file a Notice for Leave to Appeal a costs endorsement.

The appellant had emailed the notice to the respondents' counsel on the 15th day, but the court office required personal service or an acknowledgment of receipt, which the respondents' counsel delayed providing.

The respondents' counsel then unreasonably refused to consent to late filing, forcing the motion.

The court granted the extension and awarded $1,000 in costs to the appellant, criticizing the respondents' counsel for their 'totally ridiculous response'.

The defendants were charged with multiple counts of fraud over $5,000, laundering proceeds of crime, and committing offences for a criminal organization in relation to a scheme to fraudulently obtain Canada Small Business Financing Program loans from various banks.

The Crown alleged that the defendants used sham corporations, forged financial documents, and inflated or fabricated invoices for leasehold improvements and equipment to deceive the banks into advancing loan funds, which were then laundered among the defendants.

The court found that Marshall Kazman and Gad Levy orchestrated the scheme and were guilty of fraud, money laundering, and the criminal organization offence.

Ali Vaez Tehrani and Madjid Vaez Tehrani were found guilty of fraud on specific counts but acquitted of the criminal organization charge.

Armand Levy, Ekaterina Chapkina, and Kamyar Ghatan were acquitted of all charges.

The applicants, estate trustees for their deceased mother's estate, sought an order requiring their brother, the respondent, to vacate the deceased's home.

The respondent argued he was a tenant protected by the Residential Tenancies Act.

The court found no evidence of a landlord-tenant relationship and noted the deceased's will left the property to the applicants.

The court ordered the respondent to vacate the property and pay $20,000 in occupation rent, plus maintenance costs and costs of the application.

The appellant general contractor appealed an order reducing the security required to bond its construction liens off title from over $32 million to approximately $13.8 million.

The Divisional Court first determined it had jurisdiction to hear the appeal, holding that an order reducing lien security under section 44(2) of the Construction Lien Act is a final order, not interlocutory.

On the merits, the court upheld the motions judge's finding that the appellant improperly calculated its lien claim on a 'costs plus' basis despite having a fixed price contract.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondents.

The plaintiff sought leave to appeal a costs order made following three motions.

The court determined that the costs order regarding the dismissed action was final, requiring leave under s. 133(b) of the Courts of Justice Act, while the costs order for the remaining motions was interlocutory, requiring leave under Rule 62.02(4)(b).

The court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding no matter of general importance for the interlocutory order and no strong grounds to find an error in discretion for the final order.

The plaintiffs sought leave to appeal an interlocutory order that dismissed their motion for additional documentary production from the Crown, upheld claims of solicitor-client privilege between a Crown prosecutor and Environment Canada investigators, and allowed the Crown to claw back inadvertently disclosed privileged documents.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding no good reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge's decisions, which properly applied principles of proportionality and solicitor-client privilege.

The court also found that the proposed appeal did not involve matters of general importance, as the issues were specific to the parties.

The applicant sought an extension of time to bring a motion for leave to appeal a costs order made three years prior.

The applicant argued that his periods of incarceration prevented him from filing the materials on time.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, finding that the applicant failed to adequately explain the lengthy delay and that he could have prepared the materials while incarcerated.

Furthermore, the court held that the proposed appeal lacked merit, as there were no strong grounds to suggest the motion judge erred in exercising his discretion regarding costs.

The moving party, a lawyer whose license was revoked for professional misconduct involving mortgage fraud, brought a motion for an extension of time to file a Notice of Appeal from a decision of the Law Society Tribunal Appeal Division.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the moving party failed to explain the delay in seeking leave to appeal and that the proposed appeal lacked merit.

The appellants, representing a local union, appealed a trial judgment that dismissed their claims for breach of fiduciary duty and breach of confidence against former union employees who left to form a competing union.

The respondents cross-appealed the trial judge's finding that they breached their duty of loyalty by soliciting union stewards before resigning, and the damages awarded for that breach.

The Divisional Court upheld the trial judge's findings on liability, concluding that the former business manager was not a fiduciary and that the employees breached their duty of loyalty by competing while still employed.

However, the court allowed the cross-appeal on damages, reducing the awards to nominal damages of $500 per employee because the union failed to prove the breach caused actual financial loss.

The applicant sought to stay academic disciplinary proceedings before the University Tribunal pending his application for judicial review of the Tribunal Chair's interim decisions refusing to recuse himself and refusing to disqualify the university's counsel.

The university brought a cross-motion to quash the judicial review application.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for a stay and granted the cross-motion to quash, finding that the application for judicial review was manifestly premature as the hearing on the merits had not yet proceeded and the applicant had an adequate alternative remedy through an internal appeal.

The applicant union sought judicial review of an arbitration award that dismissed a policy grievance concerning the employer's amendment to its photo identification policy.

The amendment discontinued the practice of allowing non-management employees to bring an occasional visitor on transit vehicles without paying a fare.

The Divisional Court held that the arbitrator's interpretation of the collective agreement was reasonable, as the plain wording did not require consideration of past practice.

The Court also found that the arbitrator reasonably concluded the employer's past practice did not give rise to an estoppel, as there was no representation by the employer that the practice would continue.

The application for judicial review was dismissed.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of her defamation claim against a hotel and its night manager.

The claim arose from a log entry made by the manager describing the appellant and her husband as 'very intoxicated' and belligerent during a late-night dispute over a hotel room.

The trial judge found that while the appellant was not intoxicated, the description of her belligerent behaviour was justified and the log entry was protected by qualified privilege.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding errors in the trial judge's conclusions on justification, qualified privilege, and the absence of malice.

The lien claimants appealed a decision declaring that the respondent's mortgage had priority over their construction liens.

The respondent challenged the Divisional Court's jurisdiction, arguing the priority decision was not a 'judgment' under the Construction Lien Act.

The court held it had jurisdiction because the priority decision was a final order.

On the merits, the court upheld the motions judge's factual finding that the mortgage funds were advanced to the owner as a joint borrower, rather than merely serving as collateral security, thereby giving the mortgage priority under section 78(6) of the Act.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a trial judge's damages award in an undefended defamation action involving statements made by his nephew on Facebook.

The appellant sought $1,000,000 in damages, arguing the trial judge's award of $30,000 in general and aggravated damages was too low.

The Divisional Court dismissed the substantive appeal, finding the trial judge made no palpable or overriding error and the award was within the appropriate range for personal defamation.

The appeal was allowed only to rectify typographical errors in the formal judgment to reflect the trial judge's actual award and to add pre-judgment interest.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment order that found they breached a settlement agreement regarding trademark infringement and directed a reference to fix damages.

The Divisional Court raised the issue of its jurisdiction to hear the appeal.

The court held that under s. 19(1.2) of the Courts of Justice Act, an order directing a reference for damages where the claim exceeds $50,000 does not fall within the Divisional Court's monetary jurisdiction.

The appeal was quashed for lack of jurisdiction and transferred to the Court of Appeal.