Nancy J. Spies

The accused, a former church treasurer, was charged with fraud over $5,000.

Over a five-year period, he used pre-signed blank cheques to pay himself and his companies, and altered bank statements to conceal his actions from the church board.

The accused claimed he was reimbursing himself for personal funds he had advanced to the church.

The court rejected this defence, finding his evidence lacked credibility and that an intention to repay does not negate fraud.

The accused was found guilty.

Sentencing following conviction for possession of crack cocaine and breach of probation.

The offender was found with 7.01 grams of crack cocaine and cash but was acquitted of possession for the purpose of trafficking after the court found a reasonable doubt that the drugs were intended for personal use.

The court considered the offender’s extensive criminal record, longstanding addiction issues, and diagnosis of schizophrenia, as well as the significant quantity of crack cocaine involved.

While denunciation and deterrence were important, the court emphasized rehabilitation and treatment as the most effective means of reducing the risk of reoffending.

A suspended sentence with two years’ probation focused on addiction treatment and community service was imposed, along with a $300 fine for the probation breach.

The offender was convicted of possession of child pornography and possession of methamphetamine.

The child pornography collection was of moderate size and mostly in the middle range of severity.

The offender was a 52-year-old first-time offender with health issues.

The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence, sentencing the offender to 15 months' imprisonment for the child pornography charge and time served concurrently for the drug charge, followed by two years of probation and ancillary orders including a 10-year section 161 prohibition.

The plaintiffs brought a motion under Rule 7.08 of the Rules of Civil Procedure seeking court approval of a settlement involving a minor plaintiff arising from the death of her father in a motor vehicle accident.

The proposed settlement allocated $206,875 to the minor for loss of care, guidance and companionship under the Family Law Act.

The court found the settlement amount reasonable but raised significant concerns regarding counsel’s disclosure and the proposed solicitor‑client fees.

The materials were confusing and inconsistent, and the court concluded the firm had already been adequately compensated through costs recovered from the defendant and premiums charged to other plaintiffs.

The settlement was approved, but no further fees or disbursements were permitted to be deducted from the minor’s portion.

The Crown brought an application to admit videotaped statements made by two defendants following their arrest for firearms offences.

The defendants argued the statements were involuntary because the interviewing officer failed to inform them they would also be charged with being occupants of a motor vehicle knowing there was a firearm.

One defendant also alleged he was assaulted by an officer and that the interviewing officer used inducements and trickery.

The court found that the defendants generally understood the serious jeopardy they faced regarding the firearms investigation, and that the failure to specify the occupant charge did not invalidate their waiver of rights.

The court also rejected the allegations of inducements, oppressive trickery, and the impact of the alleged assault, ruling the statements voluntary and admissible.

The applicant mother brought an urgent motion regarding the schooling of the parties’ children, seeking an order that the twins attend a public school rather than a private Jewish day school preferred by the respondent father.

The court considered the best interests of the children under s. 16 of the Divorce Act and s. 24 of the Children’s Law Reform Act.

Relevant factors included the children’s existing familiarity with the public school, proximity to the primary residence, social connections in the neighbourhood, travel logistics, financial feasibility of private school, and potential impact on the mother’s employment at the private school.

The court found no evidence that the children’s Jewish education would suffer if they attended the public school supplemented by extracurricular religious instruction.

On balance, the court concluded that attending the public school for Grade 1 better served the twins’ best interests.

The mother brought a motion seeking temporary sole custody of a 13‑year‑old child and an order requiring the child to return to live with her after the child had begun residing with the father.

The father sought continuation of an earlier temporary custody order granting him sole custody and primary residence of the child.

The court considered the child’s clearly expressed preference to live with the father, concerns regarding potential parental alienation, and the impact of family conflict and difficulties involving a sibling.

Balancing the child’s best interests, the court held that the child should continue living primarily with the father with temporary sole custody remaining with him, subject to structured access with the mother and siblings.

The court also ordered school arrangements, access schedules, and ongoing monitoring by the Office of the Children’s Lawyer and child welfare authorities.

The applicant spouse brought a motion seeking an order authorizing the sale of the matrimonial home and dispensing with the respondent spouse’s consent to documents necessary to effect the sale.

The parties’ separation agreement required the property to be listed and sold within one year, but the respondent refused to cooperate and stated he would not sell the property.

The court found the respondent was unreasonably withholding consent within the meaning of s. 23(b)(iii) of the Family Law Act and had failed to file responding material or comply with prior orders.

The court authorized the applicant to list and sell the property through a specified real estate agent, dispensed with the respondent’s spousal consent to sale documents, and ordered preservation of the property pending sale.

Costs were awarded to the applicant.

Following approval of an infant settlement, the plaintiffs sought clarification of an earlier endorsement regarding alternative relief requested in their motion.

The moving parties had asked, in the alternative to sealing the record, that all references to the settlement amount be redacted from the motion materials and judgment pursuant to s. 137(2) of the Courts of Justice Act.

The court confirmed that it had been aware of the request but declined to grant it.

The judge held that the parties’ agreement to keep settlement terms confidential was not sufficient to justify either sealing the file or redacting the settlement figures.

The evidentiary record did not support restricting public access to the court record.

The mother brought a motion to terminate an ex parte restraining order and vary a temporary custody order granted to the father after she was charged with assaulting one of the children.

The court considered whether the outstanding criminal charge and related allegations justified maintaining the father’s temporary custody.

After reviewing the evidence, including the Office of the Children’s Lawyer investigation and the historical caregiving status quo, the court found no evidence that the mother could not provide a safe environment for the children.

The restraining order was terminated and temporary custody of two children was returned to the mother, restoring the pre‑incident status quo.

The issue of temporary custody of the third child was adjourned for further evidence and submissions.

The applicant brought a motion seeking an order preventing the Family Responsibility Office from suspending his driver’s licence and garnishing his employment insurance benefits in relation to outstanding child support obligations.

He argued that he did not understand the terms of a previously consented refraining order requiring ongoing support payments and arrears payments.

The court held that Rule 25(19)(b) did not apply because the applicant was not alleging a mistake in the order, but rather misunderstanding of its terms.

The court further found no material change in circumstances under s. 35(10) of the Family Responsibility and Support Arrears Enforcement Act, 1996 to justify varying the refraining order.

The motion was dismissed.

The applicant brought a motion seeking enforcement of a parenting coordination provision contained in a previously executed separation agreement.

The agreement required the parties to retain a named parenting coordinator and complete the intake process, but the respondent refused to comply and argued that communication difficulties and financial hardship justified varying the agreement.

The court held that the respondent failed to establish any material change in circumstances or provide updated financial evidence to support her position.

The court found the agreement had been negotiated with counsel and remained in the child’s best interests.

The motion was granted, requiring the respondent to complete the intake process and pay her share of the parenting coordinator retainer.

The applicant mother brought a motion for a temporary order to move the parties' 12-year-old child from a private school to a public school gifted program for Grade 7.

The respondent father opposed the motion, arguing the child should remain at the private school and that the issue required a trial.

The court found it had jurisdiction to make a temporary order regarding school choice if it was in the child's best interests.

However, the court dismissed the motion, finding the mother had not met the onus of demonstrating that a change in schools was in the child's best interests at this time, particularly given the child's preference to remain at his current school and the lack of comprehensive expert evidence evaluating both options.

The court ordered an independent assessment under section 30 of the Children's Law Reform Act to determine the issue for trial.

The mother brought a motion to terminate a restraining order and vary a temporary custody order that had granted the father temporary custody after the mother was charged with assaulting one of the children.

The court considered the urgency of restoring the status quo where the children had historically resided with the mother and the recommendations of the Office of the Children’s Lawyer.

The court found that the mother provided a safe environment and terminated the restraining order to permit renewed contact between the children and their mother.

Temporary sole custody of two of the children was granted to the mother, while the issue of the third child’s residence and custody was adjourned for further evidence and submissions.

The accused was charged with possession, making, and making available child pornography, as well as possession of methamphetamine.

Following a search of his apartment, police seized hard drives and CDs containing child pornography, along with a small amount of crystal meth.

The court found the accused guilty of possessing the CDs containing child pornography and the methamphetamine.

However, the court acquitted the accused of making child pornography, holding that the Crown failed to prove he copied the files, and further ruling that merely copying child pornography does not constitute 'making' it under section 163.1(2) of the Criminal Code.

The accused was charged with possession of crack cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, possession of proceeds of crime, simple possession, and breach of probation following his arrest outside a supportive housing building.

Police seized 7.01 grams of crack cocaine and cash, and the Crown relied primarily on circumstantial evidence and expert testimony that the quantity and surrounding circumstances were consistent with street‑level trafficking.

Defence witnesses suggested the accused was a drug user who had purchased the drugs for personal use after receiving cash from a car sale.

Applying the principles governing circumstantial evidence and the reasonable doubt framework from W.(D.), the court held that although trafficking was highly probable, a reasonable inference consistent with personal use remained.

The accused was acquitted of possession for the purpose of trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime but convicted of simple possession and breach of probation.

The accused was charged with drug offences after police found crack cocaine in his pocket during a search incident to arrest.

The accused brought a Charter application to exclude the evidence, arguing his rights under ss. 8, 9, and 10(b) were violated.

The court found that the initial pat down search was justified for officer safety reasons, and the subsequent arrest for possession of cocaine was based on reasonable and probable grounds.

Although a s. 10(b) breach occurred, it did not lead to the discovery of the evidence.

The application to exclude the evidence was dismissed.

The accused was charged with sexual assault, unlawful confinement, robbery, assault causing bodily harm, and aggravated assault against a sex trade worker.

The court found the accused's testimony regarding the events leading up to the physical altercation to be plausible and the complainant's evidence to be unreliable.

The court held that the accused was justified in using force to retrieve his keys from the complainant under s. 34(1) of the Criminal Code, and that the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused intentionally hit the complainant with his van.

The accused was acquitted of all charges.

Following settlement of the main action concerning a defective retaining wall, the defendants sought indemnity from a third‑party contractor for costs they were required to pay the plaintiffs.

The court had previously found the contractor liable for defective construction and awarded damages and substantial indemnity costs to the defendants in the third‑party trial.

The remaining issue was what portion of the plaintiffs’ settlement costs should be borne by the contractor under the contractual indemnity clause.

The court held that although the defendants failed to mitigate some damages and not all claims were attributable to the contractor, the contractor’s refusal to accept responsibility and failure to meaningfully participate in settlement significantly increased litigation costs.

Balancing those factors, the contractor was ordered to reimburse 75% of the plaintiffs’ costs paid by the defendants.

The applicant sought prerogative relief in the nature of certiorari or mandamus to quash a justice of the peace’s endorsement under s. 515(9.1) of the Criminal Code, which stated that detention was primarily due to a previous conviction and thereby barred enhanced pre‑sentence custody credit under s. 719(3.1).

The Superior Court held that mandamus was unavailable because it cannot compel a judicial officer to exercise jurisdiction in a particular manner.

The court further held that certiorari could be available where there is either a jurisdictional error or an error of law on the face of the record, even outside the preliminary inquiry context.

However, the alleged errors relating to the test applied, the record of the detention decision, and the interpretation of s. 515(9.1) were not established.

The application was therefore dismissed.