Introduction

[1] The defendants Mr. Ali, Mr. Rodrigues-Martinez (“Mr. Martinez”) and Mr. Quidayan have been charged with various firearm offences related to the seizure by police of two firearms; a .38 calibre handgun and a .22 calibre handgun, on May 24, 2010. The firearms were recovered after a pursuit by police of a vehicle driven by Mr. Ali which had pulled into the driveway of 119 Giltspur Road, Mr. Martinez’s home. The three defendants and a young woman were in the vehicle. The theory of the Crown is that Mr. Ali fired the .38 calibre handgun in a nearby housing complex and that the defendants and the female then left the scene in his car. The female tried to hide that firearm but it was found in the backyard of the home. The .22 calibre firearm was found in the waistband of Mr. Quidayan’s pants.

[2] Following the arrest of the defendants, videotaped statements were taken from both Mr. Martinez and Mr. Quidayan by Detective Bois. The Crown asserted that the statements were voluntarily given and therefore admissible in evidence, which was disputed by these defendants. After hearing evidence and receiving the submissions of counsel, on September 19, 2012, I granted the Crown’s application and ruled that the two statements were given voluntarily and are admissible in evidence in this trial, subject to necessary edits. These are my reasons for that ruling.

The Issues

[3] At the outset of the voir dire, I was advised by counsel for Mr. Martinez and Mr. Quidayan that the issue was a very narrow one, namely that Detective Bois had not told either defendant that among the various firearms charges they were facing, they would also be charged with being occupants of a motor vehicle in which they knew there was a firearm contrary to section 94(1) of the Criminal Code. Mr. Ali and Mr. Martinez are charged with this offence in connection to the .38 calibre handgun. Mr. Quidayan is charged with this offence in connection with the .22 calibre handgun.

[4] As the defendants gave evidence, the issues on the voir dire expanded. Both defendants alleged that they had been physically assaulted by a police officer although only Mr. Martinez claimed that the alleged assault impacted on his statement to Detective Bois. Mr. Mergler also submitted that inducements were made to Mr. Martinez by Detective Bois and that the Detective engaged in police trickery in that he left Mr. Martinez with the impression that the victim had actually been shot in the head, when in fact the head injury resulted from the victim running into a pole.

[5] Neither defendant brought a Charter application to exclude the statement given to Detective Bois, although the argument advanced at least at the outset was essentially that there had been a breach of section 10(a) of the Charter in that Detective Bois had not sufficiently informed the defendants of the reasons for their arrest. Although I considered the issues having regard to the law with respect to voluntariness, apart from the important question of onus, the analysis would essentially have been the same if I considered section 10(a) of the Charter or section 7; the right to remain silent. Violations of the Charter would result in a finding that the statements were not voluntary, although the onus on this application is on the Crown to establish voluntariness beyond a reasonable doubt.

[6] At the time of his closing submissions, Mr. Melnik advised that he was not pursuing any issue with respect to the alleged assault of Mr. Quidayan, presumably because of an admission Mr. Quidayan made during the course of his evidence. That left only the common issue of what should flow from the fact that Detective Bois had not advised Mr. Quidayan of the fact that he would also be charged with being an occupant of a motor vehicle knowing there was a firearm in the vehicle. I advised Mr. Melnik however, that I failed to see how this omission could have made a difference in the case of his client’s statement, as he was only charged as an occupant of a motor vehicle in connection with the .22 calibre firearm that he admitted to police was in the waistband of his pants. There is no suggestion that he did not have this firearm on his person while he was in the motor vehicle. Mr. Melnik then abandoned his objection to the Crown’s application. As there were no other issues with respect to the voluntariness of the statement made to Detective Bois by Mr. Quidayan, either raised by counsel, or that I found, after considering the evidence with respect to that statement, I was satisfied that the Crown’s application should be granted with respect to Mr. Quidayan. That left the issues raised by Mr. Mergler in connection with the statement given by Mr. Martinez which are identified below.

The Evidence

[7] On the voir dire I watched the two videotaped statements and heard from Detective Bois, Mr. Martinez and Mr. Quidayan.

The Viva Voce Evidence

[8] There is no dispute that Detective Bois was not attempting to trick these defendants by not referring to the charge of being an occupant of a motor vehicle in which they knew there was a firearm. Detective Bois explained that he had been asked by his partner, Detective Perchase, who was the officer in charge for this case, to take the statements. At this point he did not have a lot of information and it was not his practice to identify all of the possible charges that could be laid in connection with the seizure of the two firearms. He had no involvement with this matter after the statements were taken. It was ultimately Detective Perchase who determined what charges would be laid subject of course to any involvement of the Crown.

[9] Mr. Martinez testified that while he was seated on the curb and after he had been handcuffed to the rear, one of the officers kneed him in the back of the head from behind because he was “mouthing off”. He admitted the hit was not that hard and that he was not injured. He alleged that the same officer later tried to slap him as he was being brought into the interview room but that the officer missed. Mr. Martinez was certain it was the same officer who hit him each time. On the morning of the first day of trial, he saw the officer outside the courtroom and the officer was identified as Officer Rea.

[10] Mr. Martinez testified that the treatment by this officer was “kinda” in his mind when he gave his statement to Detective Bois. He claimed that he was scared; he had never been struck by an officer before, and he thought the police were all going to beat him up. Mr. Martinez did not mention the first alleged assault to anyone until late in his interview with Detective Bois when he told Detective Bois that they had some “fucked up cops”. When asked what he meant he told Detective Bois that an officer had “tried to elbow me with his knee”. He did not report the alleged attempt to slap him by the same officer. When it was put to Mr. Martinez in cross-examination that Officer Rea was not at the police station at the time of the second alleged assault, he testified that it must have been the “next officer”.

[11] Mr. Martinez did not give any evidence as to whether or not his decision to make the statements that he did would have been impacted had he known about the fact that he would also be charged as an occupant of a motor vehicle knowing there was a firearm; namely the .38 calibre firearm, inside the vehicle.

[12] Mr. Quidayan testified that he saw something when Mr. Martinez was allegedly hit while sitting on the curb, but he described it as seeing a boot hit Mr. Martinez from the back. He saw this with his peripheral vision as he was facing forward. He saw Mr. Martinez crouch down in reaction to this. He agreed that he saw the reaction more than anything else. Mr. Quidayan also alleged that the same officer slapped him on the side of the head while they were sitting on the curb. In cross-examination however, he admitted that the slap did not have any impact on his giving a statement. He also admitted that if he had been told that he would also be arrested for being an occupant of a car in possession of the firearm; and in particular the .22 calibre firearm, it wouldn’t have changed his statement.

[13] The Crown called Officer Rea and his escort that night, Officer Moore. Officer Rea placed Mr. Ali under arrest and he denied having any physical contact with Mr. Martinez. Officer Moore dealt with Mr. Quidayan and he denied the allegation of Mr. Martinez. Both officers testified that they took Mr. Ali’s vehicle to the police garage and that they had no further contact with the defendants at the station. It was agreed that neither Mr. Martinez nor Mr. Quidayan alleged that any other officer assaulted them which meant the Crown did not have to call all of the officers who came into contact with these defendants.

The Statement of Mr. Martinez

[14] Mr. Martinez was 18 at the time of the statement. He gave his statement to Detective Bois at 4:49 a.m. on the morning of May 25, 2010; which was approximately five hours after his arrest. He had exercised his right to speak to a lawyer.

[15] Although there are references throughout the interview by Detective Bois, to the fact that two firearms had been found and that the defendants were in a car, Detective Bois did not read out a list of all of the charges that Mr. Martinez was facing at that point. He described them as “possession of firearms, possession of ammunition and the associated charges to that”.

[16] There is no dispute that Mr. Martinez was properly cautioned by Detective Bois. When he gave Mr. Martinez the secondary caution, Detective Bois told him that if any police officer had either said or done anything to either get him to give a statement or not to give a statement that he should disregard anything that officer might have said or done and only give a statement if he voluntarily chose to do so. Mr. Martinez confirmed that he understood this.

[17] Mr. Martinez stated at the outset that he did not want to give a statement. Detective Bois then told him what he understood the facts to be, including the fact that two guns were involved and that they had a car which might reveal some evidence. He went on to tell Mr. Martinez that shots were fired and they had a victim in the hospital with a head wound. Detective Bois commented on the surprise Mr. Martinez showed and told him that the head wound was “as a result of the shots being fired”. He then went on to explain that the ramifications and implications of this were “huge for everybody”. Mr. Martinez responded that he was “staying quiet”.

[18] As Detective Bois persisted in questioning Mr. Martinez, he told Detective Bois that he didn’t fire the gun and that no one fired the gun at anybody. Throughout the interview Detective Bois kept responding that they had someone in hospital who had been shot at and had a head injury. It is certainly clear that Mr. Martinez assumed as a result of this information that the person who was in hospital had actually been shot in the head, and that Detective Bois knew that he was inferring this and made no steps to correct him. In fact Detective Bois made it clear that this meant the stakes were “huge”. Notwithstanding this, Mr. Martinez continued to insist throughout that the shots were not fired at anyone.

[19] Although initially Mr. Martinez did not want to identify who shot the firearm, he very quickly went on to say that he was innocent and that “my boy got cheesed” when others fired firecrackers at them. This was before any alleged inducement was made by Detective Bois. When he was asked who he was referring to by “my boy”, Mr. Martinez refused to give the name as that would be “snitching”. He also asked Detective Bois why it would make any difference if he gave a name. At this point Detective Bois responded by what is alleged to be the first inducement, as follows: “If you didn’t fire a gun, then you wouldn’t be facing these firearms charges, would you? … or ammunition charges?” In response, Mr. Martinez said that the police would know who fired the gun because of the gunshot residue test. Detective Bois responded “that doesn’t mean you didn’t possess one. Right? That’s one of the charges, because there’s two guns out there.” (at p. 22)

[20] Looking at this particular exchange, in my view there was no inducement or misrepresentation. It is not clear what Detective Bois meant by “these” firearms charges, but clearly he was not referring to the charges of possession given his express statement to this effect and the reference to the two guns.

[21] After the first alleged inducement, Mr. Martinez took the position he didn’t know who fired the gun. When he told Detective Bois that an officer had come into the room and told him some of the others had fifteen charges, Detective Bois gave him a long explanation about how one gun has a “whole bunch of charges attaching to it”. In connection with that explanation, Detective Bois told Mr. Martinez, what Mr. Mergler submitted was a second inducement: “but if I can determine that you’re not the guy that fired the gun, you’re not the guy that had the gun, then why would I lay firearms charges against you? I wouldn’t. …It’s my job to figure that shit out and decide who gets charged and who doesn’t.” In response to this statement, Mr. Martinez told Detective Bois that if they went off camera and tape recorder he would tell him some more. Detective Bois said he couldn’t do that. Detective Bois then went on to say that if someone took ownership of the firearm and pleaded guilty then no one would go to trial. In response to this Mr. Martinez said he would “stick with my lawyer”, in other words not talk. He stated that he had helped Detective Bois enough. Mr. Martinez continued to state that he would only talk to his lawyer. When he was told by Detective Bois that his lawyer wouldn’t tell the police anything, he began to give a narrative of the events. As part of this narrative he did tell Detective Bois more than once that the gun went off but again refused to say who fired the gun.

[22] Detective Bois continued to press as to who fired the gun and pointed out that a firearm had been found in Mr. Martinez’s room and queried whether someone was trying to set him up. It was in response to the statement “Does that sound like someone is trying to protect you?” that Mr. Martinez finally told Detective Bois that the man with the “R had it [the gun] you know”. He then told Detective Bois that it was Roger and that he fired the gun into the air. Mr. Martinez then continued with the rest of the chronology. He told Detective Bois that although he was not close to Mr. Ali, he was able to see the gun and that it was pointed up in the air.

[23] After Mr. Martinez told Detective Bois that his girlfriend never touched the firearm, he explained how it got into her purse. He admitted to putting the firearm into Chanele’s purse after it was tossed into the backseat by Mr. Ali who was driving the car. At this point the police were already there.

The Law

[24] Counsel were in agreement as to the test as the Supreme Court of Canada set out in R. v. Oickle;[^1] for a statement to be found to be voluntary, the Crown must establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the statement was not the result of a threat (fear of prejudice) or a promise (a hope of advantage) held out by Detective Bois or as a result of circumstances of oppression or other police trickery. The lack of an operating mind was raised as an issue in this case to the extent it is relevant to Mr. Martinez making an informed decision to give a statement; there was no suggestion that Mr. Martinez did not understand the cautions.

[25] A court should not focus on any particular aspect of the police conduct in isolation. Rather, factors going to voluntariness may work in combination. Conduct by persons in authority becomes improper when “inducements, whether standing alone or in combination with other factors, are strong enough to raise a reasonable doubt about whether the will of the suspect has been overborne”.[^2]

Analysis

Was Mr. Martinez properly informed of the charges he was facing?

[26] Counsel for Mr. Martinez, Mr. Mergler, relies on a decision of Mossip J., R. v. Curlin.[^3] When Mr. Curlin was first arrested, he was only given his rights to counsel with respect to a charge of possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking. When he gave his statement to police, he had not had the benefit of counsel’s advice but he had been re-cautioned and told that in addition to the drug charge he was also charged with possession of a firearm and other specific firearms offences. Although the officer who took the statement had been told that Mr. Curlin was also being charged with being an occupant in a vehicle in which he knew there was a firearm, the officer failed to tell Mr. Curlin this although it was not suggested that this was deliberate. When Mr. Curlin gave his statement to police, he provided the evidence that would be used to convict him of that offence, which at trial was the only charge he was still facing.

[27] Although Mr. Curlin did not testify, Mossip J. concluded (at para. 37) that she was not satisfied the Crown had established voluntariness beyond a reasonable doubt because “Mr. Curlin did not know his jeopardy with respect to the section 94 charge and therefore did not make an informed decision to waive his right to counsel and speak to the police in his videotape statement. In that statement he incriminates himself with respect to that offence only; the statement was exculpatory with respect to the other offences.” She went on to say (at para. 48) that Mr. Curlin did not know that the possibility of his committing the section 94 offence was one of the reasons for his detention prior to giving his videotape statement. She found that as this was the only evidence the Crown had to secure a conviction it would result in unfairness to the defendant and bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

[28] Mr. Poon argued that this case is distinguishable from the case at bar and that in any event, it is an outlier decision. He focused on the fact that unlike Mr. Curlin, Mr. Martinez had the benefit of legal counsel. Mr. Poon submitted that he had searched hundreds of cases and could only find two where a statement was ruled not to be voluntary where the defendant had received legal advice. In fact he went so far as to say that any criminal lawyer worth his or her salt would have let Mr. Martinez know that being an occupant of motor vehicle in which he knew there was a firearm was a likely charge given the facts surrounding his arrest. In my view however, I cannot draw an inference as to what Mr. Martinez was told by counsel, apart from the fact he was clearly told to remain silent.

[29] The Curlin case was distinguished in the one case that was drawn to my attention; R. v. Williamson,[^4] a decision of Tranmer J. It appears however, Tranmer J. may have misinterpreted the facts in Curlin, as he made no reference to the fact that when Mr. Curlin was re-cautioned before the interview he was told about the firearms offences. That brings the Curlin decision much closer to the facts of our case, particularly as Mr. Martinez made exculpatory statements concerning who fired the gun but in so doing incriminated himself on the occupant of a motor vehicle charge. In Williamson a number of issues were raised including the fact that Mr. Williamson was only told that he was “under arrest for historical sexual offences”. It is not clear however, that much was made of the fact that apparently no other details were provided before Mr. Williamson was questioned. This case therefore, is not of much assistance in determining whether or not I should follow Curlin on these facts.

[30] As I see the issue, it is really a question of whether or not a defendant needs to know about all of the charges he or she is facing, to the extent that there are different constituent elements to the charges or whether it is enough that on the facts of this case, Mr. Martinez knew that he was facing serious firearms charges; charges more serious than that of being an occupant of a motor vehicle knowing there was a firearm present. There is no dispute that this charge is not as serious as the possession of a firearm charge. It does not have a mandatory minimum sentence. This is not a case where the investigation took a more serious turn as the investigation unfolded, like, for example, the facts in R. v. Gonzales,.[^5] another decision referred to by Mr. Mergler.

[31] Mr. Mergler drew the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada; R. v. Smith,[^6] to my attention. In that case, (at paragraphs 26-28), the court stated as follows:

These cases establish that, regardless of whether the focus is on the sufficiency of the initial section 10(b) advice or on the waiver, what is required is that the accused understand generally the jeopardy in which he or she finds himself and appreciate the consequence of deciding for or against counsel. …

It has never been suggested, however, that full information is required for a valid waiver. Indeed, if this were the case, waivers would seldom be valid, since the police typically do not know the whole story when the accused is arrested. Nor is the failure of the police to precisely identify the charge faced in the words of the Criminal Code necessarily fatal. In the initial stages of an investigation the police themselves may not know the precise offence with which the accused will be charged. Moreover, the words of the Code may be less helpful to a layperson than more common parlance in communicating the extent of jeopardy. Finally, the degree of awareness which the accused may be reasonably assumed to possess in all the circumstances may play a role in determining whether what the police said was sufficient to bring home to him the extent of his jeopardy and the consequences of declining his right to counsel.

The question reduces to this: In this case was the accused possessed of sufficient information to make his waiver of counsel valid? To my mind, to establish a valid waiver of the right to counsel the trial judge must be satisfied that in all the circumstances revealed by the evidence the accused generally understood the sort of jeopardy he faced when he or she made the decision to dispense with counsel. The accused need not be aware of the precise charge faced. Nor need the accused be made aware of all the factual details of the case. What is required is that he or she be possessed of sufficient information to allow making an informed and appropriate decision as to whether to speak to a lawyer or not. The emphasis should be on the reality of the total situation as it impacts on the understanding of the accused, rather than on technical detail of what the accused may or may not have been told. (emphasis added)

[32] The court went on to find that the trial judge, who had concluded on all the evidence that Mr. Smith “well knew that he had been involved in a most serious crime” was entitled to conclude that Mr. Smith had sufficient awareness of the jeopardy in which he stood and that his waiver of the right to counsel should not be considered invalid.

[33] Although most of the comments of the court were made in the context of a waiver of the right to counsel, as set out at the outset of this passage they apply equally to the sufficiency of the initial s. 10(a) advice. There is no doubt that the information Detective Bois provided to Mr. Martinez made it clear to him that he was being charged with very serious crimes, even though he was not aware of the precise charges that he faced.

[34] I note that a portion of this extract from the Smith decision was set out in the Curlin decision, when Mossip J. referred to the decision of Hill J. in R. v. Van Wyk[^7] (at para. 186). In that case after setting out paragraphs 26 and 27 from the Smith case, on the facts before him Justice Hill concluded that Mr. Van Wyk “generally understood the jeopardy to which he was exposed” (emphasis added) and that the police were not required to give every reason for his arrest in the sense of “articulation of all Criminal Code crimes which may arise from the transaction under investigation. Where, however, the reason for detention is different from ‘the subject matter of the investigation’, the authorities are obliged to inform the detainee of both to permit the jeopardy to be understood in the sense of the measure of risk of self-incrimination…” (at paras. 187 and 188, emphasis added)

[35] Justice Mossip concluded, in light of these authorities, that it was:

…arguable that detention for being an occupant in a car where a person knows there is a gun is quite different from the investigation into who possessed the gun and who possessed the crack cocaine. Mr. Curlin was entitled to be informed of that distinct jeopardy in order to ‘measure the risk of self-incrimination’ as Hill J. wrote at the end of para. 188.

Mr. Curlin did not know or understand that jeopardy and was unable to measure the risk of incriminating himself on that charge when he waived his right to counsel and spoke to police. (at paras. 45-46)

[36] With respect, in my view what is important here was that Mr. Martinez knew the seriousness of the offences that he was facing and that they related to firearms. He generally understood the extent of the jeopardy that he was facing. The charge of being an occupant in a car where a person knows there is a firearm is not a different subject matter of the investigation; it is a charge related to the firearms found which were the focus of the investigation. Furthermore, in my view I cannot conclude that Mr. Martinez would have proceeded differently, if he had known of this additional charge. He clearly had received advice from his counsel to remain silent and chose to speak to Detective Bois nevertheless. He testified on the voir dire and could have been asked whether or not his statement might have been different had he been told of this additional charge. Neither counsel asked him about this.

[37] In my view on all the evidence, and particularly the emphasis placed by Detective Bois on the seriousness of the firearms charges, Mr. Martinez adequately understood the jeopardy he was in, exercised his right to counsel, and then decided what he would say to Detective Bois in response to his questions.

Were there inducements that undermine the voluntariness of the statement?

[38] As I have already stated, in my view what Mr. Mergler described as the first inducement was not an inducement at all. As for the second alleged inducement, the language used by Detective Bois is a bit confusing as he was not the officer who was going to be “laying” charges. In any event, even if what Detective Bois said at this time could be considered an inducement, Mr. Martinez did not testify that this statement had any impact on his decision to answer questions of Detective Bois. Although at the time he did respond to the comment by asking to go off camera in which case he would tell Detective Bois some more, he refused to immediately identify who fired the gun when Detective Bois said that could not be done. It was once Detective Bois’ strategy changed to ascertain if Mr. Martinez believed someone was trying to set him up, that Mr. Martinez finally disclosed that the man with the gun was Mr. Ali. In the transcript I see no evidence that he ultimately began to provide this information in response to this alleged inducement. I have therefore concluded it has no impact on the voluntariness of his statement.

Was Mr. Martinez’s decision to make some statements to police influenced by any alleged assault?

[39] Although I accept that the evidence Mr. Martinez gave to Detective Bois about the alleged assault seems to be spontaneous, enhancing the credibility of his evidence, there were a lot of other problems once he testified. Mr. Martinez’s insistence that the same officer also attempted to slap him, was clearly not correct. Although I can understand why he would not necessarily remember precisely who the officer was, he clearly was not being candid in his responses. Mr. Quidayan’s evidence provides some corroboration for the evidence of Mr. Martinez although it is fundamentally different as Mr. Martinez did not testify that he was kicked, but was very clear it was the officer’s knee that hit him.

[40] Allegations of assault by a police officer are very serious. Given the onus on the Crown to establish voluntariness beyond a reasonable doubt, I proceeded on the basis that I would assume that what Mr. Martinez said about the first alleged assault was true, although I specifically state that I have made absolutely no finding of any improper conduct on the part of Officer Rea or any other officer. I concluded, for the reasons that follow, that even if I accepted all of Mr. Martinez’s evidence at face value, it would not have any impact on my decision with respect to voluntariness.

[41] I do not accept Mr. Martinez’s evidence that this alleged assault was forefront in his mind, given the way the interview with Detective Bois unfolded. He made no mention of it until the end and then it seemed to be an afterthought or just information he was providing to Detective Bois for his information. I also do not accept Mr. Mergler’s submission that Mr. Martinez did not complain as he feared a further assault. Throughout the interview, Mr. Martinez appeared to be reasonably comfortable and relaxed and the tone of the conversation between him and Detective Bois was at all times cordial. No improper pressure was applied by Detective Bois at any time. On a number of occasions Mr. Martinez chuckled at things Detective Bois said. Having viewed the video a second time, there is absolutely no evidence of Mr. Martinez exhibiting any fear of Detective Bois or any stress apart from what one would expect from someone in his situation.

Was there improper police trickery in describing the victim’s injury?

[42] Although Detective Bois at all times clearly knowingly left Mr. Martinez with the impression that the victim had been shot in the head, and revisited this subject a number of times, he never expressly said so. His statements never amounted to an actual misrepresentation of the facts. The fact was that the victim had run following the shots so in that sense his head injury was as a result. I considered in particular one statement that was different, when after the first alleged inducement, Detective Bois stated that the victim was in hospital because “somebody fired at him”. However, although it is the position of Mr. Martinez, based on what he told Detective Bois later in the interview, that the shots were fired straight up into the air, there is no evidence that Detective Bois knew this at the time he made this statement to Mr. Martinez. This statement therefore was not a misrepresentation either. In my view, if this was any trickery, it is not of the sort that would shock the community.

Disposition

[43] For these reasons I decided that the Crown had met its onus and had established the voluntariness of the statements given by Mr. Martinez and Mr. Quidayan to Detective Bois beyond a reasonable doubt and that they are admissible in this trial.

SPIES J.

Date: September 26, 2012

[^1]: R. v. Oickle, 2000 SCC 38, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 3, at paras. 48-67. [^2]: Oickle, supra at para. 57 (emphasis added). [^3]: [2009] O.J. No. 1739 (S.C.J.). [^4]: 2011 ONSC 6584, [2011] O.J. No. 5161 (S.C.J.). [^5]: 2011 ONSC 543, [2011] O.J. No. 395 (S.C.J.). [^6]: 1991 CanLII 91 (SCC), [1991] S.C.J. No. 24. [^7]: (1999), 6 M.V.R. (4th) 248 (S.C.J.) at pages 291-295 (upheld on appeal [2002] O.J. No. 3144).

His Majesty the King v. Roger Ali, Daniel Rodrigues-Martinez, and Edgar Quidayan, 2012 ONSC 5284

Case Summary

Introduction

The Issues

The Evidence

The Viva Voce Evidence

The Statement of Mr. Martinez

The Law

Analysis

Was Mr. Martinez properly informed of the charges he was facing?

Were there inducements that undermine the voluntariness of the statement?

Was Mr. Martinez’s decision to make some statements to police influenced by any alleged assault?

Was there improper police trickery in describing the victim’s injury?

Disposition

Judge

Counsel

Parties

Areas of Law

Fact Patterns

Issues

Statutory Provisions 4

Legal Tests 2

Legislation 1