Michael Perlin

The appellants were convicted of attempted mischief for blocking cattle trucks during a peaceful protest and received a conditional discharge.

Their summary conviction appeal was dismissed.

They sought leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal, arguing their protest was protected expression under s. 2(b) of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application for leave, holding that the appellants failed to serve a mandatory notice of constitutional question under s. 109 of the Courts of Justice Act, depriving the court of jurisdiction to grant a Charter remedy.

The appellant pleaded guilty to fraud over $5,000, fraud for the benefit of a criminal organization, and money laundering arising from a 'grandparent fraud' telephone scam.

He was sentenced to six years' imprisonment and a $500,000 fine in lieu of forfeiture.

On appeal, the court granted enhanced pre-sentence custody credit of 1.5:1, reducing his custodial sentence and resulting in his immediate release.

However, the court dismissed the appeal regarding the fine, finding the sentencing judge correctly concluded the appellant had control over the proceeds of the fraud and properly assessed the fine amount based on the value of the property controlled rather than the actual benefit received.

The Crown appealed a sentence imposed on the respondent for sexual offences, arguing the sentencing judge erred in granting 2:1 credit for pre-sentence custody.

The sentencing judge had found that the retrospective application of the Truth in Sentencing Act, which capped credit at 1.5:1, violated the respondent's s. 11(i) Charter right to the benefit of the lesser punishment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that pre-sentence custody constitutes punishment under s. 11(i) and that the statutory cap varied that punishment.

The Court further held that the Crown failed to justify the Charter violation under s. 1, as the transitional provision did not minimally impair the respondent's rights.

The appellant was convicted of multiple counts of armed robbery and related offences based primarily on recognition evidence from a former romantic partner who identified him from a wanted poster.

The trial judge accepted this evidence while dismissing conflicting eyewitness descriptions.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in law by failing to critically analyze the problematic aspects of the recognition evidence and by ignoring exculpatory eyewitness testimony.

The Court concluded the verdicts were unreasonable, allowed the appeal, and entered acquittals on all counts.

The appellant pleaded guilty to assaulting his wife with a weapon and assaulting his adult son, and was sentenced to 25 days in jail.

He appealed his convictions, seeking to withdraw his guilty pleas on the basis that they were equivocal, involuntary, and uninformed due to stress, lack of sleep, and a misunderstanding of the appeal process.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge conducted a proper plea comprehension inquiry, the appellant made unequivocal admissions of guilt, and his ability to make a conscious choice was not impaired.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possessing stolen vehicles, arguing the trial judge's rejection of his credibility was unreasonable and that the trial judge reversed the burden of proof by stating his explanations to police could not reasonably be true.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the credibility assessment was open to the trial judge and that the impugned statement related to the doctrine of recent possession, which the trial judge ultimately did not rely upon to find guilt.

The appellant appealed convictions for sexual touching and invitation to sexual touching arising from allegations by a child complainant.

The appeal challenged the trial judge’s final instructions on the basis that no express W.D. instruction was given and that comments about the complainant’s testimonial accommodation under s. 486.2 improperly suggested enhanced credibility.

The Court of Appeal held that the jury charge, viewed as a whole and in the context of the trial and counsel’s addresses, adequately conveyed the burden and standard of proof.

It also held that the impugned accommodation instruction, while inartfully phrased, would not have led jurors to conclude that the complainant was more truthful.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board, which found he posed a significant threat to public safety and denied him an absolute discharge.

The hospital and treatment team supported an absolute discharge, noting that while the appellant suffered from schizophrenia, he was not violent and could be managed under the civil mental health system.

The Court of Appeal found the Board's decision unreasonable, as it relied on speculative correlations between drug use, mental illness symptoms, and risk to the public, while ignoring the unique circumstances of the index offence and the appellant's lack of violent history.

The appeal was allowed and an absolute discharge was substituted.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession and distribution of child pornography, arguing the trial judge misapprehended evidence regarding his whereabouts on a specific date when illegal content was accessed on his home computer.

The Court of Appeal found ample evidence supporting the trial judge's conclusion that the appellant was home on that date.

Furthermore, the court held that even if an error occurred, it was not essential to the conviction, as the distinctive pattern of internet browsing pointed to the appellant.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board under Part XX.1 of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the Board's decision was reasonably supported by the evidence.

The Crown appealed the conditional sentence imposed on the respondent.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, set aside the conditional sentence, and substituted a sentence of 12 months' incarceration followed by two years of probation.

The Crown appealed a conditional sentence imposed on the respondent for impaired driving causing bodily harm.

The respondent conceded the sentence was illegal, as the offence is a 'serious personal injury offence' under s. 752 of the Criminal Code, precluding a conditional sentence.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and substituted an 18-month custodial sentence.

The Court granted one-for-one credit for the five months and ten days the respondent had already served under house arrest, resulting in a net sentence of 12 months.

The appellant appealed a disposition order of the Ontario Review Board.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the Board's reasons justified the disposition and were supported by medical evidence.

The Court noted that a conditional discharge could be possible in the future if the appellant accepts the proposed hospital treatment.

The appellant appealed a criminal conviction on the basis that identity had not been proven.

The court held that witnesses merely looking at the accused in the courtroom had no evidentiary value as identification, particularly where the Crown had not sought any in-dock identification and had conceded at trial that there was no evidence of identification.

The circumstantial evidence also did not permit a reasonable finding that the appellant was the assailant.

The conviction was quashed and an acquittal entered.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault and touching for a sexual purpose.

He argued the trial judge applied different standards of scrutiny to his evidence compared to the complainant's, and erred in drawing an adverse inference from his failure to call his father as a witness.

The appellant also sought to introduce fresh medical evidence explaining his father's absence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application to admit fresh evidence, finding it was a strategic decision at trial not to call the father.

The Court upheld the trial judge's credibility assessments and found no error in the limited adverse inference drawn regarding the missing witness.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants appealed their convictions, arguing the trial judge erred in applying the doctrine of recent possession and the W.D. framework.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge correctly applied the law from R. v. Kowlyk by considering all circumstances to determine if an inference of knowing possession or theft was available.

The court also held the trial judge properly assessed the evidence under W.D. and concluded it did not raise a reasonable doubt.

The appellant appealed a nine-month custodial sentence and probation order imposed following a guilty plea to sexual exploitation of a 16-year-old employee over whom he held a position of authority.

The court rejected submissions that the exploitation was minimal, that the sentencing judge undervalued rehabilitation, and that an intermittent sentence would have been fit, emphasizing the statutory primacy of denunciation and deterrence in offences involving abuse of persons under eighteen.

The court also held that any issue with the form of the victim impact statement did not disclose reversible error, particularly given the absence of objection and the statutory ability to consider other victim evidence.

Fresh evidence was admitted but found immaterial.

The sentence appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his sentence, raising constitutional arguments regarding the Truth in Sentencing Act and the Charter.

The Court of Appeal found it unnecessary to address the constitutional arguments, noting the parties agreed to credit the appellant with an additional 315 days of pre-sentence custody.

The court held the resulting sentence was fit and at the low end of the range given the aggravating factors, including a lengthy record and the theft of vehicles worth almost $150,000.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant pleaded guilty to possession of a restricted firearm with ammunition and was sentenced to nine and one-half years' imprisonment.

He appealed his sentence, arguing that his prior youth conviction for the same offence should not trigger the enhanced mandatory minimum for a 'second or subsequent offence' under the Criminal Code due to the protections of the Youth Criminal Justice Act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that because the adult offence was committed within the statutory access period for the youth record, the appellant lost the protection of the YCJA.

Consequently, the prior youth conviction constituted an earlier offence, and the enhanced mandatory minimum applied.

The appellant, who was found not criminally responsible for failing to comply with a probation order and uttering threats, appealed the Ontario Review Board's disposition ordering his continued detention.

The appellant sought an absolute discharge and sought to introduce fresh evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the Board's decision was reasonable and supported by evidence of the appellant's delusional disorder, lack of insight, and continued threat to the community.

The fresh evidence would not have affected the outcome.