Michael James Morris

This decision concerns a complex auto theft and revinning scheme involving ServiceOntario employees and a body shop operator.

The court found that Eric Johnson and Tonisha Baird conspired to traffic stolen vehicles and conceal their true ownership by using fraudulent or cloned VINs.

The evidence was largely circumstantial, including wiretaps, documents, and items seized during police searches.

Baird was found guilty of conspiracy, possession of property obtained by crime, and breach of trust.

Johnson was found guilty of conspiracy, trafficking, and possession of property obtained by crime.

The court analyzed the circumstantial evidence, the conduct of the accused, and the legal standards for each offence, ultimately finding that the only reasonable inference was guilt.

Mitchell Miskie was charged with sexual assault.

He relied on the defence of extreme intoxication akin to automatism, arguing that his consumption of alcohol, marijuana, cocaine, and Xanax rendered him an automaton with no willed control over his actions.

The defence presented expert psychiatric evidence supporting a blackout state.

The court, applying the principles from R. v. Brown and R. v. Sullivan, found that while the accused was significantly intoxicated and claimed no memory, his coherent speech and responsive actions during the assault, along with police observations post-arrest, indicated he was not in a state of automatism.

The court emphasized that a mere blackout or memory loss does not equate to involuntariness.

The defence of extreme intoxication was not made out, and the accused was found guilty.

The applicant, charged with robbery using an imitation firearm, brought an application seeking a declaration that his Charter rights under sections 8 and 9 were infringed and a stay of proceedings.

The application alleged that police improperly obtained identification information and lacked reasonable and probable grounds for arrest without relying on privileged information.

The court dismissed the application, finding no breach of section 8 Charter rights due to insufficient evidentiary foundation and concluding that the police had objectively reasonable and probable grounds for arrest, considering all accumulated evidence, including privileged information.

The accused was charged with multiple drug and Criminal Code offences.

The case proceeded as a blended Charter proceeding and trial.

The court found that the police used the Highway Traffic Act as a ruse to conduct a criminal investigation, thereby breaching the accused's section 9 Charter right against arbitrary detention.

Although the court found the police officers acted in good faith and the evidence was reliable, the seriousness and deliberate nature of the Charter breach, and its significant impact on the accused's rights, led to the exclusion of all evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter.

Consequently, with no evidence, the accused was found not guilty of all charges.

The applicant, T.D., sought a review of a detention order that had been upheld on tertiary grounds.

The application was brought during the COVID-19 pandemic, which was accepted as a material change in circumstances.

The court assessed the secondary and tertiary grounds for detention, considering a new bail plan that included three sureties (parents and girlfriend) and electronic monitoring.

The court found the proposed plan sufficient to address concerns about public protection, noting the sureties' track records and the applicant's lack of prior breaches.

For the tertiary ground, the court balanced the seriousness of the offence (possessing a loaded firearm) against the applicant's personal circumstances (asthma, heightened COVID-19 risk in detention, no violent record or compliance breaches).

The court concluded that continued detention was not necessary to maintain public confidence in the administration of justice.

The application for bail review was granted, and the applicant was ordered released on a $320,000 recognizance with conditions including house arrest and GPS monitoring.

The defendant was charged with assault perpetrated on his girlfriend.

The Crown sought to rely on a 911 call made by the complainant as evidence, as the complainant did not testify at trial.

The court considered whether the 911 call fell within the res gestae exception to the hearsay rule and whether the necessity criterion was met.

The court found that while the call was made under stress and related to the alleged assault, there was insufficient evidence to establish that there was little or no possibility of concoction or fabrication.

Additionally, the Crown failed to establish that the necessity criterion was met, as no evidence was presented regarding efforts to secure the complainant's attendance at trial.

The court excluded the 911 call and acquitted the defendant.

The accused was charged with accessing and possession of child pornography.

The court addressed the voluntariness of the accused's statement to police and the issue of whether the Crown had proven possession of the laptop containing the illicit material.

The court also considered a variance between the indictment's specified offence period and the evidence.

The court found the accused's statement voluntary, the laptop in the accused's exclusive possession, and the time variance immaterial as time was not an essential element of the offences and no prejudice to the defence was demonstrated.

April Vuong and Hao Quach, a married couple, were found guilty by a jury of defrauding the public of over $5,000 through a sophisticated Ponzi scheme totaling $5,175,000.

The sentencing hearing addressed the appropriate sentence, restitution, and forfeiture.

The Crown sought a nine-year penitentiary sentence, restitution of $3,567,992, and a fine in lieu of forfeiture for the same amount.

The offenders, who were self-represented, argued for a conditional sentence, emphasizing their intent to repay victims.

The court found the fraud to be large-scale, complex, prolonged, and to have had devastating impacts on numerous victims, many of whom were vulnerable.

The court rejected a conditional sentence, emphasizing denunciation and general deterrence for such commercial frauds.

The offenders were sentenced to six years imprisonment (net 5 years, 8 months, 19 days after credit for pre-trial custody and bail conditions), ordered to pay joint and several restitution of $3,567,992, and a fine in lieu of forfeiture of the same amount, with a default term of five years imprisonment.

A 15-year prohibition from managing others' money and a DNA order were also imposed.

Stephan Headley was charged with fraud, personation, and forgery.

The Crown applied under s. 715 of the Criminal Code to admit the preliminary inquiry testimony of a deceased witness, Dean Karahojitis, a former Scotiabank loans officer who identified Headley as the person who impersonated Glenford Jones.

The defence argued the evidence was highly prejudicial and unfair due to new counsel and new evidence impugning Karahojitis's credibility.

The court granted the application, finding that the accused had a full opportunity to cross-examine at the preliminary inquiry, and the defence would still be able to challenge Karahojitis's credibility through other witnesses at trial.

The court balanced the fair treatment of the accused with society's interest in admitting probative evidence, concluding that admission, with appropriate jury instructions, would ensure a fair trial.

The offender pled guilty to making sexually explicit material available to a person he believed to be under sixteen years old, contrary to section 171.1(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

He also acknowledged responsibility for child luring and possession of child pornography.

The offender engaged in online communications with an undercover police officer posing as two adolescent girls over a two-week period, during which he sent explicit images and attempted to arrange a meeting.

The court imposed a sentence of twelve months imprisonment followed by three years probation, along with a section 161 prohibition order restricting internet use and contact with minors.

The court also addressed the availability of section 161 orders in cases involving undercover police operations.

The accused was charged with firearms-related offences after police conducted a traffic stop and subsequent arrest.

The central issue was whether the accused was subjected to racial profiling.

The court found that while the initial traffic stop was lawful and not racially motivated, the subsequent arrest lacked reasonable and probable grounds and violated the accused's Charter rights under sections 8 and 9.

However, the court admitted the evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter, balancing the seriousness of the Charter breach against society's strong interest in prosecuting serious firearms offences on the merits.

The defendant was charged with nine counts of fraud-related offences arising from personation to apply for and obtain credit cards that were allegedly used to defraud three financial institutions.

The defendant was also charged with two breaches of a recognizance of bail.

The central issue was whether the prosecution proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was the person who committed the offences.

The court examined identification evidence, including bank surveillance videos, financial transaction records, and officer recognition evidence.

The court found the defendant guilty on four counts (counts 1, 2, 4, and 5) and not guilty on five counts (counts 3, 6, 7, 8, and 9), primarily due to insufficient evidence linking the defendant to certain transactions and breaches.

The Crown sought to introduce viva voce evidence from a police officer to identify an individual in a bank surveillance video as part of a fraud prosecution.

The defendant opposed the evidence, arguing it did not meet the test established in R. v. Leaney and that the officer's evidence was tainted by prior dealings with the defendant.

The court conducted an admissibility ruling on a voir dire, examining whether the officer had sufficient acquaintance with the defendant and whether the officer was in a better position than the court to identify the person in the video.

The court found the Leaney test was satisfied and admitted the evidence.

A youth was convicted of dangerous driving causing death following a trial.

The offence occurred when the youth, who has Autism Spectrum Disorder, struck and killed a pedestrian with a rental car in a parking lot.

The incident arose from a confrontation in which the victim, acting as a Good Samaritan, attempted to stop the youth after witnessing him hit a stroller.

The youth, frightened and perceiving a threat, reversed the vehicle and struck the victim.

At sentencing, the Crown sought 12 months open custody followed by six months community supervision and probation, plus a 10-year driving prohibition.

The defence sought probation only with a maximum three-year driving prohibition.

The court imposed a two-year probation order with conditions including 100 hours of community service and a five-year driving prohibition, finding that custody was not necessary and that the youth's autism spectrum disorder was a significant mitigating factor.

The Crown applied for an order permitting a witness residing in Saanich, British Columbia to testify via video link pursuant to section 714.1 of the Criminal Code.

The defendant opposed the application.

The court dismissed the application, finding insufficient evidence regarding the witness's personal circumstances, the costs of attendance, the technology to be used, and practical logistics such as document presentation and examination site integrity.

The court held that while section 714.1 provides a valuable mechanism to reduce witness attendance costs, it requires a proper evidentiary foundation and balancing of statutory and common law factors.

The applicants, charged with fraud over $5,000, sought a stay of proceedings based on an infringement of their s.11(b) Charter right to be tried within a reasonable time.

The total delay was 41.25 months, exceeding the presumptive ceiling established in R. v. Jordan.

The court analyzed the delay under both the Jordan framework and the pre-Jordan Morin framework, considering defence delay, Crown delay, institutional delay, and prejudice to the accused.

While acknowledging significant institutional delays in the Brampton courthouse, the court found that the case did not meet the "particularly complex" exceptional circumstance under Jordan.

However, applying the transitional exceptional circumstance, the court determined that the Crown's reliance on the previous Morin framework was reasonable, and under Morin, the delay was not unreasonable given the serious charges and minimal prejudice attributable to the delay itself.

The application for a stay of proceedings was dismissed.

The applicant sought a stay of proceedings, alleging breaches of his Charter rights (s. 7 and s. 12) due to excessive police force during his arrest for robbery and other charges.

Police used a service dog and tasers to apprehend the non-compliant suspect who was believed to be armed and dangerous.

The court found the police use of force objectively reasonable, necessary, and proportionate given the exigent circumstances, and dismissed the application.

A young person was charged with dangerous driving causing death under the Youth Criminal Justice Act.

The defendant was driving a rental car in a mall parking lot when he struck a pedestrian with his vehicle, resulting in the pedestrian's death.

The defendant admitted to the dangerous driving but claimed self-defence under section 34 of the Criminal Code.

The court found that while the defendant reasonably believed force was being used against him and acted for the purpose of self-protection, the force used was not reasonable in all the circumstances.

The court convicted the defendant of dangerous driving causing death, finding that the defendant overreacted to a limited use of force by immediately employing maximum force without considering alternative options.

The defendant was charged with aggravated assault by wounding and uttering a threat to cause death following an incident in which she stabbed the complainant twice.

The Crown's case relied on the evidence of the complainant and a witness.

The defendant testified that she acted in self-defence after being thrown to the ground and pinned down by the complainant, who was about to punch her.

The trial judge found credibility issues with all three witnesses but determined that the defendant's evidence, while not fully believed, left reasonable doubt regarding the circumstances of the incident and the availability of self-defence.

The defendant was acquitted of both charges.

The accused was charged with assaulting his pregnant partner and threatening to kill her and their unborn child on November 25, 2013.

The Crown's case relied entirely on the credibility of the complainant, who alleged the accused pushed her onto a bed, straddled her, grabbed her arms, and applied pressure to her neck.

The accused denied all allegations and claimed the bruising on the complainant's arms resulted from consensual rough sexual activity.

The trial judge found the complainant's evidence lacked credibility due to multiple inconsistencies, including contradictions regarding whether the accused had been drinking, whether he had previously choked her, and discrepancies between her police statement and trial testimony.

The judge found the accused's evidence consistent and credible, and acquitted him of all charges.