Court File and Parties

Court File No.: CR-25-299 Date: 2025-10-22 Ontario Superior Court of Justice

Between: His Majesty the King -and- Deandre Palmer

Counsel: Michael Morris, for the Crown respondent Humza Hussain, for the applicant

Heard: August 12-13, 2025

Reasons on Charter Application

D.E. Harris J.

[1] Introduction

The applicant, charged with offences arising out of possession of a firearm, applies to exclude the firearm under section 24(2) of the Charter. He was accosted by police outside a strip club by the name of the Million Dollar Saloon in Brampton at about 2:30 a.m. on October 6, 2024, and the firearm was discovered in a satchel. The applicant argues that his rights not to be arbitrarily detained and to be secure against unreasonable search or seizure under Charter sections 9 and 8 were violated.

[2] Defence Position

The specific contention of counsel for the applicant is that the three uniformed police officers who formulated the grounds for arrest and conducted the search were rogue officers who, on this night, were marauding in their vehicle through Mississauga performing "shakedowns" of racialized men in the vicinity of strip clubs. It is the defence claim that they had no proper legal grounds but rather fabricated grounds ex post facto to justify their conduct. The defence relies on a cross-section of evidence to support this position.

[3] Crown Position

The Crown's position is that despite "challenges" in the evidence, there was no conspiracy between the three officers to perform illegal searches contrary to the law and the Charter. Police officers are not laypersons. They chose their occupation and swore an oath to uphold the law. This was the first time they had worked together. The Crown asserts that the picture painted by the defence is unthinkable.

[4] Structure of Analysis

In order to examine the factual and legal issues, the evidence will be broken down into categories going chronologically through the events.

I. THE OPPORTUNITY TO OBSERVE THE APPLICANT WAS INSUFFICIENT TO FORMULATE LEGITIMATE GROUNDS TO SEARCH

[5] Initial Observations and Video Evidence

Police Constable Mirza testified at the preliminary hearing that he had 45 seconds to one minute to observe the applicant and the other man who was searched, a man wearing a green tracksuit, before a decision was made, on reasonable grounds, to arrest and search them for possession of a firearm. They were standing with a third man outside of the strip club on October 6, 2024. Officer Mirza was in an unmarked police cruiser driven by Officer Clayton and in which Officer Ho was also a passenger. They had been in the parking lot earlier investigating and searching others and then left. Upon returning to the lot from the street, the vehicle drove up to the three men. At the time of the preliminary hearing, it was known that there was video surveillance of the area, but it had not yet been disclosed. On this application, however, there was video surveillance available from in front of the club, chronicling events from different angles. The video played an important role in the cross-examination of the police officers.

[6] Discrepancy in Observation Time

Contrary to his preliminary hearing evidence, Officer Mirza was compelled when confronted with the video surveillance to concede that his opportunity to observe was not 45 seconds up to a minute but was actually only between five and ten seconds. Officer Mirza's notes did not record the times of the observations but the surveillance video left no room for doubt. I agree with Mr. Hussain that ten seconds to observe is very different from one minute. While one minute is a relatively short span of time, five to ten seconds is barely a glimpse.

[7] Distance and Lighting Conditions

The police officers' vehicle slowly approached the men standing outside in the parking lot in front of the nightclub. The police were a considerable distance from the men when their vehicle entered the lot, probably about 100 feet. Then they drove forward, arriving at the men after about a total of ten seconds. The maximum opportunity to observe the men was ten seconds but when the vehicle first entered the lot, it was still a good distance from the men. Furthermore, because the officers were inside the vehicle, the ability to observe at nighttime when the scene was only illuminated by artificial light was quite poor.

[8] Formulation of Grounds and Arrest Plan

In addition, each of the three police officers—Officers Mirza, Ho and Clayton—testified that not only did they make their observations within less than these ten seconds, they each formulated reasonable grounds to arrest both men for a firearm and had a conversation in which they sketched a plan to affect the arrests. Officer Mirza was to arrest the applicant, Palmer, and Officer Ho was to arrest the man in the green tracksuit. Officer Clayton was driving and it was not clear from the conversation what he would do. The officers did not testify that Officer Clayton had any assigned role.

[9] Implausibility of Timeline

The applicant argues that in these circumstances, the less than ten seconds the officers took to make their observations, formulate grounds to believe both men were in possession of firearms, and discuss a plan of arrest was implausible. It was simply not enough time. I agree.

II. THE STATED GROUNDS FOR ARREST DID NOT SATISFY THE OBJECTIVE TEST

[10] Overview of Grounds

The officers testified that there were several indications which together supplied them with reasonable grounds to believe that Palmer had a gun in his satchel and the other man in the green tracksuit had one too. These grounds for arrest were based on how Mr. Palmer looked and the circumstances of being in the close vicinity of a strip club, a place the officers testified was essentially a breeding ground for criminal activity. I will go through the grounds one by one, while in conclusion applying the law that it is the cumulative affect of the grounds which counts.

i. Palmer was Masked

[11] Medical Mask as Concealment

Palmer, as shown by the video, was wearing a medical mask. Officer Mirza and the two other officers concluded that Palmer was trying to conceal his identity. The defence argues that he may simply have been attempting to conceal his identity in order to not be identified by people he knew in the area around a strip club. Although this may be true enough, in my view, the bigger problem arises from the ubiquity of medical masks since COVID 19. They are worn everywhere in our society now and no eyebrows are ordinarily raised. That is particularly true in crowded places where people congregate, like strip clubs.

[12] Other Man's Appearance

The man in the green tracksuit was wearing a baseball cap and sunglasses. In their testimony, the police did not say much about him but they did conclude that he too was attempting to conceal his identity. They also formulated reasonable grounds that he like Palmer was in possession of a firearm.

ii. Palmer was Wearing a Hoodie

[13] Hoodie as Fashion Statement

Hoodies too are very common, particularly in outdoor places. They are generally more of a fashion statement than a means of concealment. But together with the mask, most of Palmer's face was not visible.

iii. Palmer and the Man in the Green Tracksuit Carried Satchels over their Shoulders and Kept Them Close to the Body

[14] Satchels as Common Items

Satchels are sometimes used to carry firearms. So are purses, knapsacks and other similar items. As judges, we see that regularly. However, satchels are very common in modern life across the board. They can be and are used for carrying many different items. Obviously, the fact that someone is wearing a satchel cannot be in itself sufficient grounds to search a person. In this instance, there was no attempt to hide the satchel from the police that may have garnered justifiable suspicion. Both Officers Mirza and Ho testified that the holding of the satchel close to the body was for quick access if necessary. Officer Mirza also testified that he had found handguns in satchels many times including earlier that night at a different location, the Atlantis club. If true, this still does not lend much weight towards the officers' equation of satchels with firearms.

[15] False Evidence Regarding Hand Placement

The man in the green tracksuit had a satchel as well. When it was ultimately searched, nothing of note was found in it. Officer Mirza testified, and it was recorded in his notes, that this man's hand was on the satchel for easy access to it. This was incorrect. The video clearly shows that this man's hands never touched the satchel but were in his pant pockets throughout the time he was observed.

iv. Palmer was Standing in Immediate Proximity to a Strip Club

[16] Strip Club as Criminal Location

Officer Mirza emphasized that strip clubs are dens of inequity in which criminal activity is rife. Statistically, it is true that there is likely more criminal behavior in and around strip clubs than in bowling alleys, to take one arbitrary example. But the generality of such a conclusion renders it of very little weight towards establishing reasonable grounds.

v. Both Men were Hypervigilant

[17] False Observations of Behavior

Officer Mirza testified that Palmer and the man in the green tracksuit were continually looking around in a suspicious manner. Their heads were "on a swivel." He was confronted with the video which definitively shows this to be false. Both men, as the police vehicle approached them and when the police emerged, did not flinch, attempt to look away, or appear hypervigilant. When the video was put to him leaving no room for doubt, Officer Mirza was reluctant to admit that his observations were inaccurate.

vi. The Man in the Green Tracksuit Warned Others that the Police were in the Area

[18] Unsubstantiated Warning

The police testified that several minutes before they accosted Palmer, the man in the green tracksuit called out "Police" loudly while in the parking lot to alert others to their presence. The moment when he supposedly called out is caught on video, but the video has no audio. Nonetheless, there was no indication that this was actually done based on the actions of this man and judging by the lack of reaction from the police. Also, it is odd that such a announcement would be made when because the police were in uniform, anyone could see that they were on the scene. I doubt whether this occurred.

vii. Analysis and Conclusion

[19] Legal Standard for Reasonable Grounds

To arrest a person without warrant under s. 495(1)(b) of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 (the "Code"), a police officer must subjectively believe on reasonable grounds that a person is committing a criminal offence. The grounds relied upon must also be objectively reasonable: R. v. Storrey, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 241, at pp. 249-251; R. v. Feeney, [1997] 2 S.C.R. 13, at para. 139; R. v. MacKenzie, 2013 SCC 50, [2013] 3 S.C.R. 250 at paras. 62-65; R. v. Canary, 2018 ONCA 304 at paras. 21-23.

[20] Importance of Objective Requirement

The objective requirement is crucial. As Justice Cory said in Storrey, at para. 14:

Without such an important protection [reasonable grounds], even the most democratic society could all too easily fall prey to the abuses and excesses of a police state.

[21] Definition of Reasonable Grounds

Reasonable grounds is defined as a credibly-based probability and, in its degree of certainty, lies below a prima facie case: R. v. Debot, [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1140, at para. 47. In understanding where this lies in terms of the level of certainty, "[c]redibly-based probability exceeds suspicion, but falls short of a balance of probabilities": R. v. Herta, 2018 ONCA 927, 143 O.R. (3d) 721, at para. 20, citing R. v. Sadikov, 2014 ONCA 72, 305 C.C.C. (3d) 421, at para. 81, Canary, para. 23. See also R. v. Golub (1997), 117 C.C.C. (3d) 193 (Ont. CA.), at paras. 19-22, leave to appeal refused [1997] S.C.C.A. No. 571.

[22] Objective Assessment Standard

In R. v. Tim, 2022 SCC 12, [2022] 1 S.C.R. 234, at para. 24, the Supreme Court summarized the objective ground:

The objective assessment is based on the totality of the circumstances known to the officer at the time of the arrest, including the dynamics of the situation, as seen from the perspective of a reasonable person with comparable knowledge, training, and experience as the arresting officer.

[23] Recent Application

See also R. v. Asante, 2025 ONCA 387 at para. 30.

[24] Police Experience and Grounds

The officers, and particularly Officer Mirza, leaned heavily on their police experience in vouching for the persuasiveness of the grounds. He testified that their grounds were strong. Officer Mirza claimed that his experience showed that criminals concealed their identity by masking themselves and wearing hoodies. Furthermore, his experience told him that strip clubs were places in which there was a lot of crime and, also, that satchels often concealed firearms.

[25] Role of Police Experience

Police experience and training is important in drawing conclusions from human behaviour and the totality of circumstances. For example, if a layperson were asked about satchels, they would not likely have known, as police officers do, that they are not infrequently used to conceal firearms. On the other hand, a reasonable person would likely have some inkling that there is often criminal activity in and around strip clubs. In examining grounds, the standard is that of a reasonable person standing in the shoes of the police officer: MacKenzie, at para. 63; Asante, para. 30.

[26] Reasonable Suspicion Standard

Some of the most helpful statements commenting on the correct approach to determining objective grounds are those made in the context of cases considering the lower standard of reasonable suspicion, such as the sniffer dog case of R. v. Chehil, 2013 SCC 49, [2013] 3 S.C.R. 220. The difference between reasonable suspicion and reasonable grounds is that the latter is a higher, more demanding standard. The reasonable suspicion standard contains more leeway for error and for alternatives than does the higher reasonable grounds standard. But the methodology is identical otherwise. The Ontario Court of Appeal has used statements from the Chehil reasonable suspicion case in examining reasonable grounds issues on several occasions: see Canary, para. 22; R. v. Fyfe, 2023 ONCA 715 at para. 60; Asante, para. 30. It is helpful to do so in this instance.

[27] Chehil Framework

In Chehil, with respect to the reasonable suspicion standard, Karakatsantis J. wrote, at paras. 29 and 46 that the inquiry "must be fact-based, flexible, and grounded in common sense and practical, everyday experience." Furthermore, "Rigorous judicial scrutiny is an independent review that ensures that the suspicion relied on by the police is supported by factors that are objectively ascertainable, meaning that the suspicion is based on 'factual elements which can be adduced in evidence and permit an independent judicial assessment.'"

[28] Police Knowledge and Experience

On the question of police knowledge, experience and training, a question which is important in this case, Karakatsantis J. warned, at para. 47 of Chehil:

[47] An officer's training and experience may provide an objective experiential, as opposed to empirical, basis for grounding reasonable suspicion. However, this is not to say that hunches or intuition grounded in an officer's experience will suffice, or that deference is owed to a police officer's view of the circumstances based on her training or experience in the field: see Payette, at para. 25. A police officer's educated guess must not supplant the rigorous and independent scrutiny demanded by the reasonable suspicion standard. Evidence as to the specific nature and extent of such experience and training is required so that the court may make an objective assessment of the probative link between the constellation of factors relied on by the police and criminality….

[29] Cumulative Effect of Observations

It may well be that some weight should be granted to police experience with respect to the concealment of identity by masks, the use of satchels, and the activities in and around strip clubs. Even granting that, however, the cumulative effect of the observations of the police officers were woefully insufficient to attain the reasonable grounds threshold. The general nature of these observations was of the most ordinary type and held no significant probative value.

[30] Generalized Suspicion

Again, to quote Karakatsantis J. in Chehil, at paras. 30-31:

[30] A constellation of factors will not be sufficient to ground reasonable suspicion where it amounts merely to a "generalized" suspicion because it "would include such a number of presumably innocent persons as to approach a subjectively administered, random basis" for a search: United States v. Gooding, 695 F.2d 78 (U.S. C.A. 4th Cir. 1982), at p. 83. The American jurisprudence supports the need for a sufficiently particularized constellation of factors. See Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438 (U.S. Sup. Ct. 1980), and Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (U.S. Ohio S.C. 1968). Indeed, the reasonable suspicion standard is designed to avoid indiscriminate and discriminatory searches.

[31] While some factors, such as travelling under a false name, or flight from the police, may give rise to reasonable suspicion on their own (Kang-Brown, at para. 87, per Binnie J.), other elements of a constellation will not support reasonable suspicion, except in combination with other factors. Generally, characteristics that apply broadly to innocent people are insufficient, as they are markers only of generalized suspicion. The same is true of factors that may "go both ways", such as an individual's making or failing to make eye contact. On their own, such factors cannot support reasonable suspicion; however, this does not preclude reasonable suspicion arising when the same factor is simply one part of a constellation of factors. (Emphasis added)

[31] Additional Authority

Also see R. v. Urban, 2017 ABCA 436, 358 C.C.C. (3d) 55, at paras. 29-44.

[32] Application to This Case

This case fits the description in Chehil to a tee. The independent, exacting scrutiny of the police grounds exposes major problems: R. v. Ramelson, 2022 SCC 44, 475 D.L.R. (4th) 458, at paras. 53-54. It can be assumed that some weight ought to be given to some of the purported observations, assuming they were actually made prior to the arrest, an assumption that I have considerable doubts about in the context of the full record. But even in their cumulative force, they fall manifestly short of reasonable grounds to believe there was contraband in both satchels, let alone reasonable grounds to believe that there were firearms in them as all three officers testified.

[33] Grounds Fall Below Reasonable Suspicion

The observations relied upon were of the most general nature. They "apply broadly to innocent people" and "include such a number of presumably innocent persons as to approach a subjectively administered, random basis." I agree with defence counsel that the grounds stated do not even cross the reasonable suspicion threshold. The grounds to believe there were firearms in these satchels were completely lacking and, in the end, were plainly specious. The undermining of the grounds is made all the more glaring by reason of there supposedly being grounds with reference to two men, not just one. Each were insufficient. That helps to rebut any suggestion that this was a simple mistake.

[34] Officers' Retreat on Cross-Examination

The deficiency in the stated grounds of the police officers is confirmed by their ultimate testimonial position. In the face of the skillful and tenacious cross-examination of Mr. Hussain, Officer Ho testified that in retrospect, he only had grounds for an investigative detention, not for the arrest that was actually carried out. Officer Clayton also fully retreated, testifying that with more time to think about it, he realized that they should only have detained the men. There were no grounds to arrest.

[35] Officer Mirza's Credibility

Officer Mirza, who testified first, adamantly defended his position that he possessed reasonable grounds to believe that there were firearms in the satchels. He became an advocate for the sufficiency and truthfulness of his own grounds. A witness who becomes an advocate for their own evidence often undermines his own credibility.

[36] Conclusion on Grounds

In conclusion, the police officers' grounds for arrest failed the objective sufficiency test. The grounds were not compelling and were generic in nature. They fell so far short that they did not even come up to the level of reasonable suspicion.

[37] Charter Violations

As will be discussed below, it is not clear if the officers did actually arrest Palmer. They did unquestionably detain him and the man in the green tracksuit. They did search them. But in any case, the police lacked grounds for either an arrest or a search, both standards being reasonable grounds to believe that the person was in possession of a firearm. The arrest or detention were unlawful and therefore arbitrary and a violation of s. 9 of the Charter. In addition, the warrantless search was not supported by reasonable grounds and was therefore also unlawful and unreasonable contrary to s. 8 of the Charter: R. v. Grant, 2009 SCC 32, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 353, at paras. 55-57.

[38] Additional Aspects

There are several other aspects of the police conduct here which impact on s. 9 and s. 8 of the Charter and should be discussed.

III. THE POLICE ACTIONS BELIE THE PRESENCE OF GROUNDS

[39] Police Conduct Upon Exiting Vehicle

The police testified that based on their observations, they more or less immediately formed reasonable grounds to believe, while still in their vehicle, that there were firearms in both satchels. They intended to arrest Palmer and the man in the green tracksuit, each for possession of a firearm. The video shows that Officers Mirza and Ho got out of the police vehicle, and Officer Mirza approached the applicant and Officer Mirza, the man in the green tracksuit. Officer Clayton remained in the vehicle. None of the officers were able to describe what his role was to be.

[40] Officer Ho's Account

In his notes, Officer Ho wrote that he approached the man in the green tracksuit and "quickly secured him." He was evasive and was slightly pulling away from him. Officer Ho advised him that he was under arrest for possession of a weapon.

[41] Officer Mirza's Account

Officer Mirza wrote that Palmer said to him, "I'll pop [kill] you, motherfucker." Neither Officer Ho nor Officer Clayton testified that they heard this. Officer Ho was just inches away. Officer Mirza testified that this remark furthered his already crystalized grounds for arrest. His notes do not specifically say that he ever told Palmer that he was under arrest. He grabbed Palmer's satchel and then felt a firearm in it.

[42] Video Evidence Contradicts Police Testimony

But contrary to their evidence, the video shows that Officers Mirza and Ho did not immediately arrest or secure the two men for possession of firearms, as they said they planned to do. Nor did they fully search them right away as they would have had a right to do if they indeed possessed reasonable grounds to arrest: R. v. Debot, (1986), 30 C.C.C. (3d) 207 (Ont. C.A.) at pp. 223-225 (aff'd by S.C.C.); R. v. Sinclair (2005), 2005 MBCA 41, 192 Man. R. (2d) 283 (Man. C.A.); leave denied, [2005] S.C.C.A. No. 263 (S.C.C.) at paras. 20-22). Instead, the video shows that Officer Mirza spoke up close to Palmer and Officer Ho spoke in the same confrontational manner with the man in the green tracksuit. These conversations went on for about 40 seconds before the officers began to attempt to take hold of the men.

[43] Physical Struggle and Tasering

The video shows that both officers touched the men they were talking to repeatedly during this time. Finally, as the two officers seemed to apprehend Palmer, he tried to run from the officers and a struggle ensued. During the ensuing struggle, Palmer was able to break away from the police. However, he fell in the parking lot shortly afterwards. The police then tasered him as he lay on the ground.

[44] Implausibility of Police Conduct

These circumstances lead to further skepticism of the police evidence. According to the officers, even before the confrontation began, each of them had reasonable grounds to believe that there were two deadly firearms in the possession of two young men outside a strip club. Firearms pose an ominous, ever-present threat to the safety of police and the public at large. There were a number of people in the vicinity, either in their cars or on foot. These police officers recognized the obvious safety concerns throughout their evidence. Usual arrest protocol in a firearms case would be to immediately apprehend the men and handcuff them, defusing any danger that the firearms represented. An arrest usually consists of a touching of the body and must be accompanied by a statement that the person is under arrest: R. v. Whitfield, [1970] 1 C.C.C. 129, [1970] S.C.R. 46 at paras. 3, 4, 18.

[45] Failure to Follow Protocol

But these officers instead engaged in fairly lengthy discussions with the men and took no immediate action to control them or the firearms. Officer Clayton remained in the vehicle and was of no use to his two colleagues. No back-up units were called in. This is even more remarkable by reason that there was a third man with Palmer and the man in the green tracksuit who could have been a potential antagonist against them. Officers Mirza and Ho were outnumbered in a situation where they believed that the two men they were speaking to were each carrying firearms. That entire scenario is implausible.

[46] Grounds as Post-Hoc Reconstruction

This circumstance, particularly placed in context with the lack of objectively justified grounds, also suggests that the police, contrary to their evidence, did not actually leave their vehicle in possession of grounds to arrest the two men. Grounds were a reconstruction after the fact.

IV. OTHER SEARCHES CONDUCTED BY THE OFFICERS THAT NIGHT

[47] Multiple Searches Documented

The video surveillance captured two searches of men outside the strip club conducted by the three officers before the search of Palmer. These were documented in the officers' notes. In each instance, the officers said that they had seen the person searched in possession of cannabis, justifying a subsequent search. There were also many other searches testified by the three officers which occurred earlier in the night.

[48] Cannabis Searches Without Seizure

The testimony of the officers was that they did not want to ruin anyone's night and so no tickets were written or seizures of cannabis made. Officer Mirza said that he "educated" people on the Cannabis Control Act, 2017, S.O. 2017, c. 26, Sched. 1 telling them that if a container of cannabis is open, it must be in the trunk of their vehicle. Officer Mirza ultimately admitted to searching about eight other people who were seen with drugs. There were no arrests made, no charges laid and none of the cannabis was seized but the people were educated about cannabis storage. Also, the officers testified that they searched a satchel at Café Atlantis before the search of Palmer and found a gun and drugs.

[49] Dereliction of Duty

Officer Ho, when questioned why he did not seize the cannabis the officers found the men to be in possession of or why he did not charge them, said that the officers exercised their discretion not to seize the marijuana or charge the men when these other searches were conducted. The police did not want to be a "buzz kill." He was asked what he would do if open alcohol were found and he said that, similarly, he would "educate" the person in possession but let them go on their way without seizing the alcohol. That was a surprising answer and constituted an astonishing admission of dereliction of duty. Impaired driving either from alcohol or cannabis, as decades on Ontario roads has shown, is an offence that jeopardizes the safety of everyone.

[50] Extent of Searches

These officers appeared largely indifferent to the issue of operation of a motor vehicle while impaired by cannabis. Ultimately, Officer Ho said that there were three other searches performed that night. But when confronted with Officer Mirza's testimony that they had done many more than just three, he did not disagree. Officer Clayton's evidence was similar. He said there were more than five but not more than ten other searches. He recounted the circumstances when a gun and drugs were found at the Atlantis club.

[51] Blocking Vehicle Exit

In the first search caught on video in the strip club parking lot, only a small part of the individual's car can be seen. It is parked in the lot. The police vehicle driven by Officer Clayton pulls in front of it, blocking its exit. Officer Mirza testified that this was before any cannabis had been seen. He said the car was blocked because it was common for people to flee. This was high-handed in advance of any cannabis being suspected to be in the car. It suggests that the police intended to search before they had grounds to believe under s. 12(3) of the Cannabis Control Act that there was unpackaged cannabis in the vehicle. It is only with this evidence that a valid search under this provision can be conducted. It therefore appears that the detention of this individual prior to seeing any cannabis was a Charter violation.

[52] Pattern of Improper Searches

Police actions taken before grounds are evident correlates with and mirrors the evidence with respect to the search of Palmer and the man in the green tracksuit. It demonstrates in the context of the evidence as a whole a tendency towards conducting improper searches not backed up with proper grounds.

[53] Extensive Search of Vehicle

In the other search caught on video, it can be seen that all three officers conducted the search. Supposedly the person was rolling a marijuana joint in his car in plain view of the officers. The search was not cursory. The front seat and back seat of the vehicle were searched carefully and at some length. An extensive pat down was performed and the person was asked to put his hands on the car to facilitate it. At the end, the police opened the trunk to look in there as well. This is somewhat curious as Officer Ho testified that when he "educated" people, he told them to put cannabis in the trunk as this was the proper and legal place to store it. This advice was based on the cannabis search power being premised on cannabis being accessible to the driver. Cannabis stored in a car trunk, because it is inaccessible, does not contravene the Act and cannot justify a search of it. It may be that officers, after having found unpackaged cannabis in the main part of the car, do not have carte blanche to search everywhere in the car, including the trunk: R. v. Sappleton, 2021 ONSC 430 at paras. 62-63. In any case, this search seemed extremely extensive in the wake of finding a single cannabis joint.

[54] Indiscriminate Searches

The bigger concern is the large number of searches with no seizures and no charges. According to the officers, there were a lot of people with cannabis in cars in plain view of uniformed officers. That is somewhat surprising, particularly coming from officers whose testimony was already very much in question. What occurred is consistent with the police using their powers to search people in order to discover serious criminal offences, and not being truly interested in simple violations of the Cannabis Control Act.

[55] Pattern of Abuse

When combined with the evidence summarized in the categories above, there is a real possibility that these other searches were based on ruses or pretexts. The Cannabis Control Act is vulnerable to this misuse. In conclusion, looking at the cumulative weight of these prior searches, they fortify the conclusion that these officers were travelling around to different strip clubs, searching people indiscriminately.

V. RACIAL PROFILING

[56] Racial Profiling Analysis

It was argued that the police engaged in racial profiling in this case. The basis for this argument was the paucity of legitimate grounds, the poor credibility of the officers, and the fact that everyone searched, including the other individuals searched, were Black or Brown-skinned men. However, that may simply have been the result of who happened to be in the proximity of the police that night. I cannot find on this record that the applicant has met his onus to show racial profiling.

VI. CHARTER VIOLATION CONCLUSIONS

[57] Summary of Violations

The subjective and objective requirements underlying reasonable grounds for arrest or search claimed by these police officers cannot withstand scrutiny. The same reasonable grounds standard pertains to both and is insufficient in relation to both: Debot (Ont. C.A.). The officers' evidence that there were arrests, based on all the circumstances considered above, is unreliable and incredible. The best evidence is the video and it strongly suggests that there was no effort made to arrest these men initially