Margaret Jill Dougherty

The College of Audiologists and Speech-Language Pathologists of Ontario brought disciplinary proceedings against the Member for professional misconduct.

The allegations included submitting improper OHIP claims using a retired physician's billing number, providing inadequate counselling and follow-up care for FM systems, and failing to maintain accurate patient records.

The Member pleaded no contest to the agreed statement of facts.

The Discipline Committee found the Member engaged in professional misconduct.

Accepting a joint submission on penalty, the Committee ordered the revocation of the Member's certificate of registration, a public reprimand, and $10,000 in costs, emphasizing the need for specific and general deterrence given the scope and intentionality of the improper billing scheme.

The College of Audiologists and Speech-Language Pathologists of Ontario brought disciplinary proceedings against the Member for professional misconduct.

The allegations included submitting improper OHIP claims using a retired physician's billing number, providing inadequate counselling and follow-up care for FM systems, and failing to maintain accurate patient records.

The Member pleaded no contest to the agreed statement of facts.

The Discipline Committee found the Member engaged in professional misconduct.

Accepting a joint submission on penalty, the Committee ordered the revocation of the Member's certificate of registration, a public reprimand, and $10,000 in costs, emphasizing the need for specific and general deterrence given the scope and intentionality of the improper billing scheme.

The appellant, a small distillery, challenged the LCBO's 139.7% mark-up on spirits sold at its on-site retail store, arguing it was an unconstitutional tax under sections 53 and 90 of the Constitution Act, 1867.

The application judge dismissed the challenge, finding the mark-up was a proprietary charge and not a tax, and that the appellant had voluntarily agreed to it by contract.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, confirming that the LCBO, as the owner of the spirits under the contract, was exercising its private law rights to determine prices in a commercial context.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for directions regarding the proper scope of questioning when examining a non-party witness on a pending motion under Rule 39.03 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court held that the scope of such an examination is limited solely to the personal knowledge of the witness.

A Rule 39.03 witness is not required to take reasonable steps to inform themselves prior to being examined, nor are they obliged to make enquiries of others if they cannot answer questions due to a lack of knowledge or recollection.

The applicant, a small craft distillery, applied for a declaration that the markup imposed by the LCBO on spirits sold at its on-site retail store was an unconstitutional tax under the Constitution Act, 1867.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the markup was a proprietary charge levied by the LCBO as the owner and commercial supplier of the spirits.

Alternatively, the court held that the markup was a contractual term freely agreed to by the applicant in exchange for the authorization to sell its products.

The Liquor Control Board of Ontario appealed a motion judge's refusal to grant a sealing order for Minutes of Settlement entered into with the respondents in 2001.

The appellant sought to rely on the settlement in its defence of new actions brought by the respondents while preserving its confidentiality.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that the motion judge erred by failing to recognize settlement privilege as an important interest under the Sierra Club test.

The Court held that the appellant had not waived privilege and that the salutary effects of protecting settlement privilege outweighed the deleterious effects on the open court principle.

The College of Optometrists of Ontario brought allegations of professional misconduct against Dr. Anthony Angelone for failing to maintain the standard of practice in his care of sixteen pediatric patients between 2009 and 2014.

The member admitted to the allegations, acknowledging failures to properly diagnose and treat conditions such as amblyopia and refractive errors.

The Discipline Committee accepted an Agreed Statement of Facts and found the member guilty of professional misconduct.

The Committee also accepted a Joint Submission on Penalty, ordering a reprimand, $10,000 in costs, mandatory continuing education, and a condition restricting the member from treating children eight years of age and under until the successful completion of a mentorship program.

A case conference was held to manage the scheduling of the defendants' outstanding motions to strike and for summary judgment, as well as the plaintiffs' proposed cross-motion and summonses to witness.

The court established a timetable for the delivery of affidavits of documents, notices of cross-motion, and the scheduling of motions to quash the summonses.

The court emphasized the need for efficient scheduling and discouraged the strict enforcement of procedural rights that would cause unnecessary delay.

The Liquor Control Board of Ontario (LCBO) sought judicial review of an Information and Privacy Commissioner (IPC) Reconsideration Order.

The IPC had ordered the LCBO to cease collecting the personal information of wine club members when processing special orders, finding the practice contravened s. 38(2) of the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act (FIPPA).

The LCBO argued the IPC's order forced it to violate liquor laws and that the IPC applied an unreasonably strict test for 'necessity' under FIPPA.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, holding that the IPC's decision was reasonable, the LCBO was exempt from the relevant liquor law prohibitions, and the IPC correctly applied the established legal test for necessity.

The defendants sought leave to appeal a motion judge's decision refusing a sealing order for Minutes of Settlement from prior litigation between the parties.

The motion judge had found insufficient evidence to justify sealing the documents under the Sierra Club test.

The Divisional Court granted leave to appeal, finding that there was reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge's decision, particularly in light of Supreme Court of Canada jurisprudence establishing settlement privilege as a class privilege.

The court also granted an interim sealing order pending the appeal and awarded costs to the moving parties.

The applicants sought to depart from the normal rule that costs follow the event after their application for judicial review of a Compensation Fund Committee decision was dismissed.

They argued that they had already suffered financial loss due to a lawyer's misappropriation, that the case involved a novel public interest issue, and that awarding costs would run contrary to the purpose of the Compensation Fund.

The Divisional Court rejected these arguments, finding the issues were not novel and that the applicants chose to pursue the judicial review knowing the costs risks.

The court awarded partial indemnity costs of $25,000 to the respondent Law Society.

The applicants sought judicial review of a decision by the Law Society of Upper Canada's Compensation Fund Committee, which denied their claims for compensation following the misappropriation of funds by their lawyer.

The Committee found that the lawyer had received the funds in the capacity of a banker rather than a lawyer, and thus the losses were not in connection with his professional business.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, holding that the Committee's interpretation of the Law Society Act and its application of the Guidelines were reasonable.

The Liquor Control Board of Ontario (LCBO) applied for judicial review of an Information and Privacy Commissioner (IPC) order directing it to cease collecting personal information from wine club members and to destroy previously collected information.

The LCBO argued the IPC breached procedural fairness by issuing the order without prior notice that such a remedy was being contemplated.

The Divisional Court agreed, finding that the IPC failed to provide adequate notice of the potential consequences of the privacy complaint investigation, thereby depriving the LCBO of a fair opportunity to be heard on the issue of remedy.

The IPC's order was quashed and the matter remitted for reconsideration.

The applicant sought judicial review of decisions by the Social Benefits Tribunal that found her disentitled to ODSP benefits after she inherited a house from her mother.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the applicant had an adequate alternative remedy in the form of a statutory right of appeal, which she failed to pursue within the time limit.

The court also noted undue delay in bringing the application and found no merit to the substantive arguments, as the applicant was the legal owner of the inherited house.

The applicant sought judicial review of the LCBO's decision to award an agency store authorization to a competitor following a Request for Proposal process.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, holding that the LCBO's decision was a commercial arrangement not subject to judicial review, as it did not involve the exercise of a statutory power of decision and lacked a sufficient public interest element.

In the alternative, the Court found that the procurement process was fair and the LCBO's decision was reasonable.

The applicant filed a human rights complaint alleging that the respondent College discriminated against him on the basis of sex and marital status when its Complaints Committee dismissed his professional misconduct complaint against a social worker.

The underlying complaint related to a custody and access assessment conducted by the social worker during family law proceedings.

Following a summary hearing, the Tribunal dismissed the application, finding no reasonable prospect of success as the applicant provided only bald allegations of bias and discrimination with no evidence connecting the Committee's decision to a protected ground under the Code.

The Information and Privacy Commissioner appealed a Divisional Court decision which held that confidential mediation and settlement records involving the Liquor Control Board of Ontario were exempt from disclosure under the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act (FIPPA).

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the term 'litigation' in the second branch of s. 19 of FIPPA includes both mandatory and consensual mediation.

The court held that the exemption is not limited to documents falling within common law litigation privilege, and therefore the disputed records were protected from disclosure.

The applicant sought an interlocutory injunction to restrain the LCBO from terminating its temporary authorization to operate an agency store and from fulfilling a new contract with a competitor, Daisy Mart, pending a judicial review of the procurement process.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that while there was a serious issue to be tried regarding fairness in the procurement process, the applicant failed to establish irreparable harm, as any financial loss was compensable in damages.

Furthermore, the balance of convenience favoured the competitor, who had already undertaken substantial renovations and incurred expenses in reliance on the contract.

The applicant was hired as a full-time receptionist at the respondents' salons.

On her first day of work, she disclosed that she was four and a half months pregnant.

Shortly after, her employment was terminated.

The respondents claimed she was fired because she requested part-time hours, which they could not accommodate.

The Tribunal found the respondents' explanation lacked credibility and concluded that the applicant's pregnancy was a factor in her termination.

The Tribunal awarded damages for lost wages, lost maternity benefits, and injury to dignity, feelings, and self-respect, and ordered the respondents to implement a written policy on accommodating pregnant employees.

The applicant applied for judicial review of a decision by the Information and Privacy Commissioner ordering the disclosure of mediation and settlement materials.

The materials had been prepared for the mediation of ongoing litigation between the applicant and the respondent.

The Divisional Court granted the application, holding that the records were exempt from disclosure under both the common-law settlement privilege and section 19 of the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act.

The court emphasized that the public interest in encouraging settlement trumps the public interest in transparency of government action in these circumstances.