HUMAN RIGHTS TRIBUNAL OF ONTARIO
B E T W E E N:
Jessica Maciel
Applicant
-and-
Fashion Coiffures Ltd. and Crystal Coiffures Ltd.
Respondents
DECISION
Adjudicator: Naomi Overend
Indexed as: Maciel v. Fashion Coiffures
Appearances by
Jessica Maciel ) Kate Sellar and
) Clara Matheson, Counsel
Fashion Coiffures Ltd. and ) Symon Zucker and
Crystal Coiffures Ltd. ) Jill Dougherty, Counsel
INTRODUCTION
1Jessica Maciel, the applicant, was hired to work as a receptionist in two related salons operated by the respondents in the Erin Mills Town Centre. At the time she was just over four months pregnant. She alleges that she advised the manager of the salons that she was pregnant on the first day of her job and was fired shortly thereafter. The respondents agree that her employment was terminated on her first day of work, but deny that they were aware she was pregnant. Instead, they assert that the decision to fire her was based on the applicant’s request to work part-time, even though she had been hired for a full-time position. The applicant denies that she requested part-time work.
2The hearing proceeded on June 8 and 10, 2009. The evidence was concluded on the first day and argument was heard on June 10, 2009.
EVIDENCE
3The evidence for the applicant consisted of her testimony and 11 documents. Two of those documents, employment letters dated June 12 and 17, 2009, were submitted on consent after the hearing.
4The respondents called two witnesses: Cinzia Conforti, who is the manager of the respondent companies, and Meena Gaidhu, who was training the applicant on the day her employment was terminated. The respondents intended to call a third witness, Ashley Arruda, but counsel for the applicant objected to her testimony on the basis of relevance and insufficient notice. For the reasons that follow, I did not allow the respondents to call her as a witness.
5The parties agreed that the applicant had been given notice of the respondents’ intention to call Ms. Arruda late in the afternoon the day before the witness was to be called (i.e., June 7, 2009). Late notice of the other two respondent witnesses was given on June 4, 2009, despite my direction to the respondents in an Interim Decision, 2009 HRTO 719, to immediately serve and file their witness list and summary of their evidence. It is not clear why Ms. Arruda was not included on this list filed June 4, 2009, although it was clear that her omission had nothing to do with the respondents’ access to her: Counsel for the respondents advised that she had been working for the respondent salons since her return from maternity leave in February 2009.
6The Tribunal’s Rules of Procedure require the parties to deliver their witness lists and a short summary of the witnesses’ intended evidence at least 45 days prior to the first scheduled day of hearing. The Rules also give the Tribunal discretion to admit such evidence even where the parties have failed to comply with the Rules. I refused to exercise my discretion to allow the respondents to call this witness because there were no circumstances justifying the breach of the Rules and because it appeared that the applicant would be prejudiced in her attempts to address this evidence in light of the extreme lateness of the notice. Moreover, as I will discuss in greater detail later in this Decision, I determined that Ms. Arruda’s proposed evidence was of little relevance to the ultimate issues in this case.
Background
7The relationship between the parties was brief and the facts of this case are not complicated. The respondents operate two salons in the Erin Mills Town Centre, a shopping mall in Mississauga. L’Attitudes International Image Centres (“L’Attitudes”), operating on the upper floor of the mall, is owned by Crystal Coiffures Ltd., while Nino D’Arena Salon (“Nino D’Arena”), located on the lower floor of the mall, is owned by Fashion Coiffures Ltd.
8Although owned by different holding companies, the respondents acknowledge they are interrelated and that staff working for one salon also worked at the other. Ms. Conforti managed and had some ownership interest in both salons. The job posting for the applicant’s position stated that it was for Nino D’Arena, but it was common ground that the applicant would have worked in both salons.
9The parties agree that on or around August 1, 2008, the applicant attended an interview conducted by Ms. Conforti for a receptionist position. Ms. Conforti advised the applicant that there was room to grow in the salons and that if things worked out she might one day be a spa coordinator. For her part, the applicant was excited about this opportunity as she had just graduated from Metropolitan College with a business diploma. This was to be her first full-time job following school.
10The interview went well and Ms. Conforti invited the applicant to attend at Nino D’Arena for a trial session, which was understood to be the second stage in the interview process. This trial also went well and Ms. Conforti offered the applicant the receptionist job. The applicant was to go through a training period of two or three weeks, during which time she was to be paid at a lower rate, following which she was expected to be able to perform the requirements of the job on her own. It is common ground between the parties that at the time she was offered the job, the respondents were unaware that the applicant was pregnant.
11The parties agree that the applicant commenced work at Nino D’Arena on August 11, 2008 in the morning. The person training her was Meena Gaidhu. With respect to what happened that morning, the parties’ versions are in conflict other than that there was a meeting between Ms. Conforti and the applicant, and that the applicant was asked to leave. The parties also disagree as to what transpired in the days that followed her departure.
The Applicant’s Evidence
12The applicant testified that she discovered she was pregnant in approximately May 2008, shortly after graduating from school. Her due date was January 1, 2009 and so on August 11, 2008 she was approximately four and half months pregnant. She testified that she was just beginning to show, and that she believed Ms. Conforti was unaware of her pregnancy at the time she was hired.
13She testified that on the morning of August 11, 2008 she arrived at work at 9:50 to start a shift at 10:00 a.m. She had not previously worked with Ms. Gaidhu, the person training her that day, as her orientation or “trial” session had taken place with a woman named Caroline. One hour into her shift she experienced nausea, as she did randomly throughout her pregnancy, and was directed by Ms. Gaidhu to use the washroom at a restaurant across the hall. When she returned Ms. Gaidhu asked if she was okay, and at that point, the applicant states she disclosed her pregnancy to Ms. Gaidhu.
14According to the applicant, Ms. Gaidhu told her that there had been a problem with another employee who disclosed her pregnancy to Ms. Conforti, and advised the applicant to tell Ms. Conforti right away so that she found out about the applicant’s pregnancy from the applicant and not from someone else. The applicant testified that she immediately phoned Ms. Conforti, who was working upstairs that day at L’Attitudes and asked to meet with her.
15At first, the applicant testified, the meeting went well. Ms. Conforti congratulated her on her pregnancy. Then her tone changed and she expressed concern about the applicant’s long-term availability. The applicant told her that she was there for the long term, but this did not satisfy Ms. Conforti’s concerns. The applicant said that to allay Ms. Conforti’s concerns she offered to work part-time to see how it worked out, but this did not seem to make any difference. Ms. Conforti told the applicant she would speak to “head office” and let her know the decision.
16The applicant testified that she returned downstairs to the Salon to resume her training. Approximately 15 minutes later, she received a phone call from Ms. Conforti asking her to pack up her belongings and leave. Ms. Conforti said that she would contact head office and phone the applicant the next day with the decision. When she got off the phone, Ms. Gaidhu asked what had happened. The applicant testified that when told, Ms. Gaidhu said something to the effect of “I was afraid that would happen.”
17The applicant made notes during the training she received from either “Caroline” or Ms. Gaidhu (she was not able to say which). Counsel for the respondents questioned the applicant exhaustively on the fact that these notes did not reflect either telling Ms. Conforti that she was pregnant or the post-meeting conversation with Ms. Gaidhu. Nothing significant could be derived from these omissions as the notes are exclusively about administrative matters, such as pricing and data codes, related to the running of the salon.
18The following day, the applicant received a phone call from Ms. Conforti, as promised. She testified that Ms. Conforti told her she could not fill the receptionist position for which she had been hired. The applicant asked why, and Ms. Conforti responded that it was her availability. The applicant asked what she meant, and Ms. Conforti responded that she would be going off on maternity leave. The applicant responded that it was illegal to fire her for being pregnant, at which point Ms. Conforti said it was not because she was pregnant, but because she was only going to be there part-time. The applicant said she was willing to work full-time. The applicant testified that the conversation went back and forth like this for awhile but nothing was resolved.
19Altogether, the applicant testified that there were three phone calls between her and Ms. Conforti. By the time the second phone took place later that day, she had already contacted the Human Rights Legal Support Centre (the “Legal Support Centre”) for advice. She initiated that phone call with Ms. Conforti to ask for a copy of her employment contract. Ms. Conforti told her that the contract had already been shredded, although she did not explain why.
20The last conversation took place on August 13, 2008. Ms. Conforti phoned to tell the applicant that she had a letter for her. She suggested that the applicant pick it up, but the applicant asked for it to be mailed to her. The letter, dated August 12, stated that the applicant had asked for a position “which only allowed approximately 20 hours a week” and that no such position existed at that time. The applicant testified that she did not attempt to correct this, as she said the respondents had invented this explanation to mask the real reason for her termination. Instead, her counsel at the Legal Support Centre filed this Application on her behalf in early September.
The Respondents’ Evidence
21Ms. Gaidhu testified that she was assigned to train the applicant on her first day. She testified that the applicant did not tell her that she was pregnant. The applicant did not tell her that she was ill either. She testified that she did not recall the applicant needing to use the bathroom, and that if she had, she would have directed her to use the one in the salon rather than sending her across the hall to use the washroom in the restaurant. On cross-examination, she testified that if the washroom in the salon was occupied or broken, the washroom in the restaurant, which was across the hall from Nino D’Arena in the food court, was the closest alternative.
22Ms. Gaidhu testified that a little more than an hour into the shift, the applicant asked her whether there was any part-time work and she said she did not know. She told the applicant to ask upstairs. She said that she did not ask the applicant why she was asking about part-time work as it was none of her business. The applicant did go upstairs. When she returned, she grabbed her purse and left. They had no conversation.
23Ms. Gaidhu testified that she was returning to university in September 2008, and that she took the last two weeks of August as a holiday. She had given her notice that she was leaving her part-time receptionist’s position one week prior to her scheduled holiday. She recalled working two shifts after August 11, 2008.
24Ms. Conforti testified that the applicant asked to meet on her first day of employment. The applicant came upstairs to meet with her as Ms. Conforti was filling in as the receptionist in L’Attitudes salon. Ms. Conforti testified that the applicant said she no longer wanted a full-time position and asked for a part-time position. Ms. Conforti testified that she was not surprised by this request as people change their mind: sometimes they are returning to school, sometimes they decide the job is not for them. She did not ask the applicant why she had changed her mind and at no point in the conversation did the applicant advise her of her pregnancy. She did not inquire as to the number of hours the applicant would be willing to work, at what times, or on what days.
25Ms. Conforti testified that she advised the applicant that she had no part-time work to offer her in the two salons she managed, but that there were two other related salons in the mall and she would inquire of them and get back to the applicant the following day. She told the applicant there was no point in proceeding with her training that day and sent her home. The other salons had no openings for part-time receptionists. Ms. Conforti testified she told the applicant this the following day during the first and only telephone conversation that took place between them.
26After that first phone call, Ms. Conforti testified that she wrote a letter, dated August 12, 2008, in which she advised the applicant that she had been hired into a position with set hours (totaling 31-33 hours, depending on which weekend day the applicant was scheduled to work), and reiterating that she did not have a part-time position to accommodate the applicant’s request for 20 hours a week. Ms. Conforti denied there was a second and third telephone conversation.
27Ms. Conforti testified that she required a full-time receptionist because she needed individuals who could work day shifts during the week. She said part-time employees tended to be able to only work in the evenings and on the weekends, often to accommodate their school schedules. She testified that she had trouble filling the receptionist position prior to the applicant being hired because a number of the applicants were students who were available to work during the summer, but who would be returning to school in the fall, at which point they would no longer be available on weekdays.
28Ms. Conforti testified that she did not know about the applicant’s pregnancy until the Application was filed. Specifically, she denied that the applicant’s pregnancy came up in the meeting with the applicant or during the call that followed the applicant’s departure.
29Neither salon had a written policy about pregnancy and maternity leaves, but Ms. Conforti testified that it is her practice to meet with pregnant employees to discuss their scheduling needs: namely, whether to increase or decrease their hours. She asks employees to notify her when they are leaving on maternity leave and when they are returning. During their leave, she finds replacements.
30Ms. Conforti testified that in 2008 she had one assistant who informed her after only one month of work that she was pregnant. She went on leave six or seven months later. Since her return in February this year she has been promoted to a stylist’s position. In addition, she had two stylists who went on maternity leave in February and June of this year respectively.
DECISION AND ANALYSIS
31The parties presented two divergent views of what transpired on the first (and only) day of the applicant’s employment, and the subsequent phone calls. If believed, the applicant’s version of events would amount to discrimination on the basis of pregnancy. The respondents’ version of events, if believed, amounts to a non-discriminatory explanation for the termination of the applicant’s employment.
32All three witnesses presented their evidence in a straightforward fashion and their versions of events were more or less internally consistent. The task that falls to me is to determine whether the story they presented was in “harmony with the preponderance of the probabilities which a practical and informed person would readily recognize is reasonable in that place and in those conditions.” See: Faryna v. Chorney, 1951 CanLII 252 (BC CA), [1952] 2 D.L.R. 354 (B.C.C.A). There are several factors that lead me to prefer the applicant’s version of events over the respondents’ version.
33First, there was no credible reason given for why the applicant, having applied for and accepted a full-time position, would propose on her first day of employment that she work part-time. She was no longer a student, and gave evidence, which I accept, that she had no other obligations or restrictions on her timetable.
34Counsel for the respondents suggested in final argument that the applicant may have calculated that she only needed to work a certain number of hours (which all sides agreed was 600) in order to be eligible for Employment Insurance (“E.I.”) maternity benefits, and that by working 20 hours a week, plus overtime, she would have been able to accumulate enough hours to reach this threshold. At no time was this theory (or any other alternative theory) put to the applicant by the respondents in cross-examination.
35This theory suffers from an inherent problem that there were only 21 weeks between the applicant’s start date (August 11, 2008) and her due date (January 1, 2009). At 20 hours a week – assuming that her pregnancy went to term – she would have only accumulated 420 hours. I do not accept that the applicant would have told Ms. Conforti that she wanted to work 20 hours a week if, in fact, she knew she needed to work 30 hours a week, and was intending to make up the shortfall with overtime.
36The respondents’ letter of August 12, 2008 sets out the applicant’s expected hours of work. As indicated earlier, these varied from 31 to 33 hours a week, depending on whether the applicant was assigned to work Saturday or Sunday. This number is very close to the 30 plus insurable hours the respondents theorized the applicant would need to be eligible for E.I. leave.
37The question of hours highlights another problem with the respondents’ case, namely Ms. Conforti’s complete lack of curiosity about what the applicant meant when she purportedly asked for 20 hours a week. Assuming the respondents’ theory of the case presented at the hearing was correct – that the applicant was, in fact, looking to work 30 hours – a simple probing by Ms. Conforti would have revealed this. Instead, Ms. Conforti testified that she did not ask any questions about what hours the applicant was willing to work.
38Ms. Conforti said that part-time work was problematic for her because in her experience part-timers did not like to work weekdays, instead preferring to work evenings and weekends. She explained that this was because these hours suited students. She said she wanted a full-time receptionist so that she had someone to work days during the week. However, on her own evidence, at no point did she ask the applicant whether she would be willing to work weekdays. The applicant was not going back to school in September, and was not otherwise employed, so there was no impediment to her working day shifts during the week.
39This failure to inquire about when, and for how many hours, is even more peculiar in light of the promise Ms. Conforti testified she made – and fulfilled – to ask whether the other salons in the mall were looking for a part-time receptionist. As pointed out by counsel for the applicant in cross-examination, she would have had no information to give to these salons about the applicant’s availability in light of her failure to ask.
40The respondents’ defence is premised not just on the fact that the applicant asked for part-time work, but also on the fact that no such work was available. Although Ms. Conforti testified that she did not have a part-time position to offer the applicant, Ms. Gaidhu testified that just around this time (i.e., three weeks before the end of August), she had given her notice to Ms. Conforti that she would be leaving her part-time reception position at the end of the month.
41Then there is the letter, which Ms. Conforti wrote to the applicant following her conversation with the applicant. I find it inconsistent that she would go to the effort of confirming that there was no part-time position and specifically set out which hours the applicant was expected to work, but then shred the contract of employment between the parties. This carefully constructed letter is more consistent with the applicant’s evidence that in one of the post-termination telephone calls she advised Ms. Conforti that it was discriminatory to fire someone because they were pregnant and asked for her contract of employment.
42During cross-examination, respondents’ counsel pointedly suggested to the applicant that the situation set out in her Application was remarkably consistent with a scenario set out in the Ontario Human Rights Commission’s (“OHRC”) Policy on Discrimination because of Pregnancy and Breastfeeding. However, being fired after disclosing one’s pregnancy is not a highly unusual scenario and I can conclude nothing from the so-called striking similarity.
43Moreover, it would be strange that that she would have consulted the OHRC’s Policy on Pregnancy if, as the respondents assert, she had never disclosed her pregnancy to Ms. Conforti. Rather than undermining the applicant’s credibility, I find that the fact that she may have been consulting the Policy and otherwise inquiring about her rights, is consistent with her having disclosed her pregnancy and lost her job as a result.
44On behalf of the respondents, Ms. Conforti asserts that it is her practice to accommodate maternity leaves and so to fire someone would be out of keeping with her usual practice. By way of example, she cited three recent examples – one that pre-dated the termination of the applicant’s employment and two that followed the Application. This evidence was of limited relevance since it was not alleged in this case that the respondents never or rarely accommodate their pregnant employees.
45I can assign no weight to the two examples that follow the receipt of the Application, and little weight to the one example Ms. Conforti was able to give that pre-dated the Application. With respect to the latter, Ms. Conforti testified that the woman she accommodated had already worked a month (and thus had gone through the training period) when she announced her pregnancy. She then worked six or seven months following that, which the applicant would have been unable to do. Moreover, Ms. Conforti seems to have valued this employee’s contribution to the salon as she is now training to be a junior stylist. In the end, whether or not the respondents accommodated this one individual in the same year they fired the applicant is not of any assistance to me in determining what happened to the applicant at the relevant time set out in her Application.
46For the reasons set out above, I am of the view that the applicant has made out a prima facie case of discrimination on the basis of sex (pregnancy), contrary to sections 5(1), 10(2) and 9 of the Ontario Human Rights Code, R.S.O. 1990, c. H.19, as amended (the “Code”), and that the respondents have failed to prove a non-discriminatory explanation for the precipitous termination of the applicant’s employment. I find that, on the balance of probabilities, the applicant’s pregnancy was a factor, likely the only factor, in the respondents’ decision to terminate her employment.
REMEDIES
47The Tribunal’s remedial powers are set out in section 45.2 of the Code:
45.2 On an application under section 34, the Tribunal may make one or more of the following orders if the Tribunal determines that a party to the application has infringed a right under Part I of another party to the application:
An order directing the party who infringed the right to pay monetary compensation to the party whose right was infringed for loss arising out of the infringement, including compensation for injury to dignity, feelings and self-respect.
An order directing the party who infringed the right to make restitution to the party whose right was infringed, other than through monetary compensation, for loss arising out of the infringement, including restitution for injury to dignity, feelings and self-respect.
An order directing any party to the application to do anything that, in the opinion of the Tribunal, the party out to do to promote compliance with this Act.
Monetary Compensation
i. Wage and Benefits Loss
48The applicant testified that after she was terminated from the respondents’ salons, she attempted to look for work, but did not have any success. She attributes her lack of success, in part, to the fact that her pregnancy was increasingly obvious to any potential employer. She had two interviews, but at each of these interviews, testified that the interviewers expressed their opinion that the physical nature of the work would be dangerous for a pregnant woman. At seven months pregnant, she gave up her job search.
49With no insurable hours, she was ineligible for maternity and parental benefits following the birth of her son. As pointed out in paragraph 74 of Dodds v. 2008573 Ontario Inc., 2007 HRTO 17:
It is reasonably foreseeable that a pregnant woman will be unable to find alternate employment during her pregnancy to make up for any shortfall in eligibility requirements to qualify for full maternity leave and parental benefits.
50The respondents testified that the applicant would have made $8.75 per hour during the period of her training, following which her wage would have been raised to $11 per hour. Although the hours specified in the August 12, 2008 letter suggest that the applicant’s regular hours were between 31 and 33 hours, Ms. Conforti testified that they were looking for someone who could work 40 hours per week. The Tribunal accepts the applicant’s testimony that she was planning and able to work until her due date. Accordingly, her wage loss can be calculated as follows: Two (40 hour) weeks at $8.75 an hour and 19 (40 hour) weeks at $11/hour. The total wage loss is $9,060.00.
51With respect to the maternity and parental leave, the applicant would have met the threshold for eligibility had she continued to work with the respondents until her due date. The applicant testified that she was planning to and was physically able to work until her due date These benefits would have been payable at 55% of the applicant’s averaged insured earnings (i.e., $242 / week) for 50 weeks. The gross total loss of benefits is $12,100.00.
52During the period the applicant would have received maternity benefits, she worked part-time for Argosy Partners, earning a total of $441.00. The applicant acknowledged that this would have been deducted dollar for dollar from her maternity benefits had she collected them. Accordingly, the loss in benefits must be reduced by that amount. The net loss in benefits is $11,659.00 (i.e., $12,100 - $441).
53In total, the applicant’s damages for lost wages and benefits is $20,719.00.
ii. Injury to Dignity, Feelings and Self-Respect
54Section 45.2(1) of the Code authorizes the Tribunal to order compensation for injury to dignity, feelings and self-respect. In ADGA Group Consults Inc. v. Lane, 2008 CanLII 39605 (ON S.C.D.C), the Divisional Court confirmed that there is no ceiling on the amount of compensation that can be awarded. On this point, the Court noted at paragraph 153:
Among the factors that Tribunals should consider when awarding general damages are humiliation; hurt feelings; the loss of self respect, dignity and confidence by the complainant; the experience of victimization; the vulnerability of the complainant and the seriousness of the offensive treatment.
55While the events in this case took place over a matter of two days, the applicant testified that she felt the impact of the discriminatory treatment for a much longer period of time. The applicant testified that she suffered from depression after she was terminated, for which she sought assistance from her family doctor, but because she was pregnant she was unable to take any medication for it. Her unsuccessful job search further compounded that depression.
56Because she had no source of income, she was dependent on her parents, and others, to purchase the equipment and accessories for the upcoming birth of her child, which was another source of distress for her. Moreover, her enjoyment of her newborn son was tempered by the fact that she had no income other than the monthly Canada Child Tax Benefit. She felt compelled to seek employment during a time she would normally have received maternity benefits and been able to remain off work. Her ability to spend this time with her newborn son was curtailed by her financial situation.
57In addition to the above, I am mindful of the vulnerability of the applicant. She was young, just out of school, and coping with an unplanned pregnancy. This was to have been her first full-time job, which she testified she was very excited about, making the experience that followed that much more distressing.
58In light of the above, I find that $15,000.00 is an appropriate amount for the infringement of the applicant’s right to be free from discrimination under the Code.
Interest
59The applicant sought prejudgment and post-judgment interest. I award prejudgment interest on the award of compensation for injury to her dignity, feelings and self-respect in accordance with the Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990 c. C. 43, from September 5, 2008, the date on which the Application was delivered to the respondents.
60With respect to the applicant’s damages for her loss of wages, I award pre-judgment interest on the full amount from October 21, 2008, the mid-point between the date on which she commenced employment and the date on which she indicated she would have commenced her maternity leave.
61As of the date of this award, the applicant would still not have accrued the full amount of her parental benefits. It is, therefore, appropriate to award prejudgment interest on the full amount that would have accrued as of the date of this order, from the mid-point between January 15, 2009 (the point at which her E.I. benefits would have commenced) and the date of this order.
62In addition, I award post-judgment interest in accordance with the Courts of Justice Act, supra, 30 days from the date of this Decision.
Remedy for Future Compliance
63As indicated above, Ms. Conforti testified that the respondents do not have a written policy on the accommodation of pregnancy. Given the overwhelming number of women who work in the respondents’ two salons, the applicant suggested that a written policy be developed and distributed to all employees. This is an eminently reasonable suggestion, not only with respect to current employees, but future employees as well, and it is so ordered.
ORDER
64The respondents are jointly and severally order to pay to Jessica Maciel the following amounts within 30 days of this Order:
(1.) $9,060.00, minus applicable statutory deductions, as compensation for her loss of employment income;
(2.) $11,659.00, minus applicable statutory deductions, as compensation for her loss of maternity leave and parental leave benefits;
(3.) $15,000.00 as compensation for injury to her dignity, feelings and self-respect;
(4.) Prejudgment interest in accordance with the Courts of Justice Act, on the amount set out in (1) from October 21, 2008;
(5.) Prejudgment interest in accordance with the Courts of Justice Act, on the amount accrued as of the date of this Decision on the payments set out in paragraph (2), from the mid-point between January 15, 2009 and October 28, 2009, the date of this Decision; and
(6.) Prejudgment interest in accordance with the Courts of Justice Act, on the amount set out in (3) from September 5, 2008.
65In the event that the respondents fail to make the payments described in (1) through (6) above within 30 days of the date of this Decision, the respondents shall pay post-judgment interest in accordance with the Courts of Justice Act.
66In addition, the respondents shall jointly prepare a written policy on the accommodation of pregnant employees working in the two subject salons and maternity/parental leave practices. This policy shall be consistent with the respondents’ obligations under the Code and the Employment Standards Act, 2000, S.O. 2000, c. 41.
A copy of this policy shall be forwarded to the applicant’s counsel within three months of the date of this Order and shall be distributed to all existing employees, as well as to any new employee hired following its distribution.
Dated at Toronto, this 28th day of October, 2009.
“Signed by”
Naomi Overend
Vice-chair