Magdalena Wyszomierska

The offender pleaded guilty to robbery and use of an imitation firearm after robbing an escort in her motel room.

The court considered numerous aggravating factors, including the vulnerability of the victim, the use of an imitation firearm, and the fact that the offender was on statutory release for similar offences.

The court sentenced the offender to a total of 3 years and 1 day in the penitentiary, granting enhanced credit of 1.5:1 for pre-sentence custody due to frequent institutional lock-downs.

The Crown applied to admit a videotaped statement of a deceased witness under the principled exception to the hearsay rule.

The witness had reported finding a handgun in a backpack in his home.

The statement was not given under oath and no warning was provided.

The court found that necessity was established by the witness's death.

Threshold reliability was established because the statement was corroborated by the testimony of another witness who was present when the gun was found.

The court admitted the statement, subject to the redaction of certain prejudicial portions that implied the accused had a criminal record or other charges.

At a preliminary inquiry into charges of attempted murder and weapons offences, the Crown sought to ask the alleged victim to make an in-dock identification of the accused.

The defence objected, arguing that the probative value of such identification was outweighed by its prejudicial effect.

The court ruled that while in-dock identifications have minimal evidentiary value, particularly where the witness did not know the accused prior to the incident and was less certain in a prior photo lineup, the evidence was admissible at the preliminary inquiry stage.

The court distinguished between the preliminary inquiry context, where the Crown's case must be assessed at its highest, and the trial context, where a trial judge might exclude such evidence to protect a jury from undue prejudice.

The defendant was charged with assault following an incident in a Toronto apartment.

Three independent witnesses observed from across the street what they described as the defendant repeatedly striking the complainant about the face and head.

The defendant and complainant testified that the incident involved only a heated verbal argument that escalated into brief physical contact, with the complainant pushing the defendant and the defendant restraining her without striking her.

The court resolved the credibility conflict by finding the three rooftop witnesses credible and reliable, concluding that their contextual remove from the parties enhanced rather than prejudiced their reliability.

The defendant was found guilty of assault, with the court rejecting any defence of self-defence as the force used was objectively excessive.

The accused applicants brought a Garofoli application seeking to exclude wiretap evidence obtained pursuant to a Part VI intercept authorization, alleging a violation of their s. 8 Charter rights.

The investigation stemmed from an armed robbery at a pawn shop where the owner was shot.

The applicants argued the information to obtain (ITO) relied on unreliable confidential informant information and that police failed to exhaust alternative investigative methods.

The court reviewed the redacted ITO and found that, even excluding the contested informant information, the remaining evidence—including DNA matches and association evidence—provided reasonable grounds for the authorization.

A supplementary application regarding police obtaining contact information from Ontario Works without a warrant was also dismissed.

The application to exclude evidence was dismissed.

Pre‑trial motions concerning severance and the admissibility of similar fact evidence in a multi‑count indictment arising from four bank robberies and an attempted armoured truck robbery.

The Crown sought to rely on evidence from separate robberies as similar fact evidence to establish identity, motive, and intent.

The court held that evidence of the second, third, and fourth robberies was admissible count‑to‑count on the issue of identity for one accused due to significant similarities and linking evidence, but evidence from the first robbery was not sufficiently similar.

The court further ruled that the bank robbery evidence was not admissible as similar fact evidence to prove motive or intent regarding the attempted armoured truck robbery.

Applying the severance factors in R. v. Last, the court ordered the armoured truck counts severed from the bank robbery counts and also severed the first robbery from the remaining robbery counts.

The accused were stopped for speeding.

Police smelled marijuana, asked questions without providing rights to counsel, and observed a baggie in one accused's pocket.

The accused were arrested and a search of the vehicle incident to arrest revealed a large quantity of crack cocaine.

The accused brought a Charter application to exclude the evidence, alleging violations of ss. 8, 9, 10(a), and 10(b).

The court found breaches of ss. 8 and 10(b) regarding the initial questioning and a premature search of one accused's pockets, but dismissed the application to exclude the evidence under s. 24(2), finding the breaches were minor and the evidence was highly reliable and important.

The offender was convicted by a jury of second degree murder in the killing of his intimate partner.

The court was required to determine the appropriate period of parole ineligibility under ss. 745 and 745.4 of the Criminal Code, considering the offender’s character, the circumstances of the offence, and the jury’s recommendation.

The evidence established that the offender repeatedly struck the victim with a baseball bat in her home and subsequently attempted to access her bank account while leaving her gravely injured.

Aggravating factors included the brutality of the attack, the breach of trust in an intimate relationship, and the offender’s post‑offence conduct.

Balancing aggravating and mitigating factors, the court imposed life imprisonment with parole ineligibility for fifteen years.

During a jury trial for murder, the defence sought to cross‑examine the deceased’s daughters about threatening phone calls, visits by unidentified individuals, and safety precautions allegedly taken due to the accused’s drug‑related associations.

The defence argued the evidence was relevant to show animus against the accused and challenge the credibility of their testimony regarding the relationship between the accused and the deceased.

The Crown objected, arguing the questioning was an indirect attempt to introduce previously excluded third‑party suspect evidence.

The court held that while defence evidence may be excluded only where its prejudicial effect substantially outweighs its probative value, the proposed cross‑examination carried a significant risk of inviting the jury to speculate that unidentified drug associates committed the murder.

The court therefore ruled the prejudicial effect outweighed the limited probative value and prohibited the cross‑examination.

In a second‑degree murder trial, the Crown sought to introduce multiple autopsy photographs depicting the deceased’s injuries.

The defence objected, arguing the photographs were highly graphic and unnecessary given admissions regarding the cause of death, the injuries, and the expert pathologist’s conclusions.

Applying the probative value versus prejudicial effect analysis described in R. v. P.(R.) and R. v. Handy, the court held that several close‑up images of the head and face were extremely graphic and their probative value was diminished by the defence’s proposed admissions.

Those photographs were excluded, while less prejudicial images illustrating the body’s condition and certain injuries were admitted to assist the pathologist’s testimony.

The ruling balanced the evidentiary value of visual evidence against the risk of reasoning prejudice for the jury.

In a second-degree murder prosecution, the Crown sought to admit antemortem hearsay statements made by the deceased to friends and family regarding the accused’s drug use, theft, and deterioration of their relationship, as well as evidence of prior discreditable conduct.

The court considered the admissibility of the statements under traditional state-of-mind exceptions and the principled approach to hearsay, assessing necessity and threshold reliability under authorities including R. v. Khelawon.

Most statements from close family members and trusted confidants were admitted as evidence of the deceased’s state of mind and the relationship context relevant to motive and identity.

Statements from casual acquaintances lacking sufficient indicia of reliability were excluded.

Evidence of the accused’s drug use and related conduct was largely admitted as contextual relationship evidence, while certain items, including a prior push and some duplicative or prejudicial evidence, were excluded.

During a murder trial, the defence sought to adduce evidence suggesting that two third parties were responsible for the killing.

The court considered whether the proposed evidence established a sufficient nexus between the third parties and the offence to meet the “air of reality” threshold for third‑party suspect evidence.

Applying the principles from Supreme Court of Canada jurisprudence, the court held that there was no evidence of motive, opportunity, propensity, or other connection linking the proposed suspects to the homicide.

The alleged inconsistencies in their statements and cell phone records did not reasonably support an inference of involvement and amounted only to speculation.

The application to introduce third‑party suspect evidence was dismissed.

The Crown sought certiorari and mandamus to review a preliminary inquiry decision that committed two accused to trial for second‑degree murder rather than first‑degree murder and discharged another accused.

The Crown argued the preliminary inquiry judge failed to consider the whole of the evidence and improperly rejected inferences supporting constructive first‑degree murder under s. 231(5) of the Criminal Code based on unlawful confinement.

The reviewing court held that the justice committed a jurisdictional error by failing to address evidence of unlawful confinement of a second victim, which could support first‑degree murder within the same transaction.

Mandamus issued requiring committal of two respondents to trial for first‑degree murder.

The application regarding the third respondent was dismissed because the justice properly applied the limited weighing permitted for circumstantial evidence and committed no jurisdictional error.

The accused was charged with possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking and multiple firearms and ammunition offences following the execution of a search warrant at an apartment in Oshawa.

Cocaine, two loaded handguns, and ammunition were found hidden under a desk drawer in the bedroom normally occupied by the accused's mother.

The Crown argued the accused had knowledge and control of the contraband.

The defence contended there was no direct evidence linking the accused to the items and that other residents and visitors had access to the bedroom.

The court found that while the accused or his brother likely brought the contraband into the apartment, the evidence did not establish beyond a reasonable doubt which brother was responsible.

The realistic possibility that the brother hid the items without the accused's knowledge was fatal to the prosecution's case.

The offender was sentenced following convictions for multiple firearms offences including possession of a prohibited or restricted firearm, possession of firearms obtained by crime, possession of firearms and ammunition while prohibited, careless storage, and occupying a motor vehicle knowing of the presence of firearms.

The offences arose after police discovered several unsecured rifles and ammunition in the offender’s vehicle during a traffic stop and a loaded revolver at his residence, despite existing weapons prohibitions.

The court considered the offender’s prior criminal record, substance abuse history, and family support, as well as mitigating factors including remorse and some cooperation during proceedings.

Emphasizing denunciation, deterrence, and the totality principle, the court imposed consecutive sentences for the most serious offences resulting in a global custodial term exceeding mandatory minimums.

A lifetime weapons prohibition, forfeiture order, and DNA order were also imposed.

The offender was sentenced following convictions arising from a shopping mall incident in which he fired a loaded handgun while fleeing loss‑prevention officers after committing theft.

The offences included discharging a firearm to evade arrest, unlawful possession of a prohibited firearm and magazine, possession while prohibited, and multiple breaches of recognizance conditions.

The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence given the risks created by firing a weapon in a crowded public place and the offender’s extensive criminal record.

Applying the totality principle and considering comparable sentencing ranges for serious gun offences, the court imposed a global sentence of nine years’ imprisonment.

Credit was granted for pre‑sentence custody and harsh detention conditions, resulting in a remaining sentence of six years and eleven and one‑half months.

The accused was stopped for a traffic violation and found to be driving while suspended and subject to weapons prohibitions.

The officer noticed an ammunition box in plain view, asked the accused about it, and subsequently seized the box and several gun cases from the truck.

The accused later made statements and directed police to a handgun in his girlfriend's apartment.

The court found a minor s. 10(b) Charter breach regarding the initial questions and excluded the answers, but upheld the seizures under the plain view doctrine and consent.

The physical evidence and statements were admitted, and the accused was found guilty on all weapons charges.

The offender was convicted by a jury of second degree murder for his role in the stabbing death of the victim, whose body was subsequently burned and dumped in a ditch.

The Crown sought a parole ineligibility period of 20 years, while the defence argued for 12 to 14 years.

The court considered the brutal nature of the group attack, the extensive efforts to destroy evidence, and the offender's continued violent behaviour while in custody.

The court sentenced the offender to life imprisonment with no eligibility for parole for 15 years.