Louis LeBel

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexually assaulting his young daughter, arguing the verdict was unreasonable.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal from the bench, agreeing with the majority of the Court of Appeal that the trial judge's verdict was supported by careful reasons and was not unreasonable.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault to the Supreme Court of Canada as of right.

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, finding no reason to differ with the disposition arrived at by the majority of the Court of Appeal regarding the reasonableness of the verdict.

LeBel J. dissented and would have allowed the appeal and quashed the conviction.

The Crown appealed the accused's acquittals for careless storage of a firearm and storing a firearm contrary to regulations.

The trial judge found the accused had temporarily hidden loaded handguns in a panicked state.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that this temporary hiding constituted 'storage' within the meaning of s. 86(1) of the Criminal Code.

The appeal was allowed, convictions were entered, and the matter was remitted for sentencing.

The respondent artist authorized the reproduction of his paintings on paper posters.

The appellant art galleries purchased these posters and used a chemical process to transfer the ink from the paper onto canvas, which they then sold.

The artist obtained a seizure before judgment of the canvas-backed reproductions, claiming copyright infringement.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the transfer process did not constitute a 'reproduction' under section 3(1) of the Copyright Act, as no new copies were created.

The Court distinguished between economic rights and moral rights, finding that the artist was improperly asserting a moral right in the guise of an economic right to justify the seizure.

The appellant was rendered a quadriplegic in a motor vehicle accident when the impaired driver failed to negotiate a sharp curve on a rural road.

The trial judge apportioned 35% liability to the municipality for failing to post a warning sign.

The Court of Appeal overturned this finding.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and restored the trial judge's decision, holding that the trial judge's finding of negligence was a question of mixed fact and law that should not be overturned absent a palpable and overriding error.

The Court clarified the standards of review for questions of law, fact, and mixed fact and law.

The accused was charged with murder.

A third party, the appellant, had allegedly confessed to the murder to his girlfriend and to his lawyers.

The accused brought a McClure application seeking production of the appellant's solicitor-client files to raise a reasonable doubt.

The motions judge granted the application.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appellant's appeal, finding the application was premature.

The accused had not established that the information was unavailable from any other source, as the girlfriend's testimony might be admissible.

Furthermore, it was not yet clear that the accused could not raise a reasonable doubt in any other way.

The appellant First Nation challenged the constitutionality of provisions in British Columbia's Heritage Conservation Act that allowed the Minister to issue permits authorizing the alteration or destruction of aboriginal heritage objects, specifically culturally modified trees.

The appellants argued the provisions were ultra vires the province as they intruded on the federal power over Indians and lands reserved for Indians.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the impugned provisions were valid provincial legislation falling within the province's jurisdiction over property and civil rights.

The Court found the legislation did not single out aboriginal peoples or impair their status, but rather established a balanced scheme for heritage conservation that applied generally across the province.

The appellant, a victim of a motor vehicle accident, had her statutory accident benefits terminated by the respondent insurer.

The insurer's notice of termination advised her of the right to seek mediation but did not outline the full dispute resolution process or the relevant limitation periods.

After unsuccessful mediation, the appellant filed an action more than two years after the termination.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the two-year limitation period under the Insurance Act does not begin to run until the insurer provides a valid refusal, which requires adequate compliance with s. 71 of the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule.

Because the insurer failed to inform the appellant of the complete dispute resolution process, including the right to arbitrate or litigate and the applicable time limits, a proper refusal was not given, and the limitation period was not triggered.

The appeal was allowed.

The accused was convicted of second degree murder after shooting a criminal accomplice in the back of the head.

He claimed self-defence, testifying that he believed the victim and another accomplice were planning to kill him.

The trial judge left the defence to the jury but made errors in the charge.

The Court of Appeal ordered a new trial.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal and restored the conviction, holding that the defence of self-defence lacked an 'air of reality' because there was no evidence upon which a reasonable jury could conclude that the accused reasonably believed he had no alternative but to kill the victim.

Therefore, the defence should not have been left to the jury, and the errors in the charge were harmless.

The appellant, an inmate at a federal penitentiary, was seriously injured while working on a prison farm.

He subsequently qualified for and received Canada Pension Plan (CPP) disability benefits.

He sued the Crown in tort for his injuries.

The Crown moved for summary judgment, arguing the action was barred by s. 9 of the Crown Liability and Proceedings Act, which precludes proceedings against the Crown if a pension or compensation has been paid out of the Consolidated Revenue Fund 'in respect of' the injury.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that s. 9 does not bar the action.

The Court reasoned that CPP disability benefits are contingent on a contributor's disabled status and adequate contributions, not on the specific event of death, injury, damage, or loss.

Therefore, the benefits were not paid 'in respect of' the injury within the meaning of s. 9.

The respondents were convicted of manslaughter and aggravated assault following a drive-by shooting, based primarily on eyewitness identification.

The Court of Appeal quashed the convictions, finding the trial judge's reasons inadequate for failing to sufficiently analyze the frailties of the identification evidence.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal and restored the convictions, holding that the trial judge's reasons met the functional test set out in Sheppard, as they clearly explained the basis for accepting the identification evidence and permitted meaningful appellate review.

The accused was convicted of possession of stolen property based solely on the uncorroborated testimony of his estranged girlfriend.

The trial judge provided boilerplate reasons that failed to address the conflicting evidence or explain the basis for the conviction.

The Court of Appeal set aside the conviction and ordered a new trial due to the absence of adequate reasons.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the Crown's appeal, holding that a trial judge's failure to provide reasons that are sufficiently intelligible to permit meaningful appellate review constitutes an error of law.

The accused was convicted at trial of sexual assault with a weapon after penetrating the complainant with a bamboo dildo.

The Court of Appeal substituted a conviction for sexual assault simpliciter, finding the object was not a weapon.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal and restored the trial conviction.

The Court held that an object used in causing physical or psychological injury during a sexual assault constitutes a weapon under section 2 of the Criminal Code, even if the injury does not amount to bodily harm and the object was not specifically designed to cause injury.

The respondent was convicted of possessing instruments adapted and intended to be used to commit forgery under s. 369(b) of the Criminal Code.

The trial judge instructed the jury that 'adapted' meant 'suitable for'.

The Court of Appeal overturned the conviction, finding the word ambiguous and interpreting it in favour of the accused to mean 'altered or modified'.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal, holding that the French version of the statute clearly resolves any ambiguity, confirming that 'adapted' in s. 369(b) means 'suitable for'.

The appellants, foreign nationals living in Canada, challenged s. 16(4)(c) of the Public Service Employment Act, which gives preference to Canadian citizens in open competitions for federal public service employment.

They argued this preference violated their equality rights under s. 15(1) of the Charter.

A majority of the Supreme Court of Canada held that while the provision infringes s. 15(1) by discriminating on the analogous ground of citizenship, it is saved under s. 1 as a reasonable limit demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.

The Court found the objectives of enhancing the meaning of citizenship and encouraging naturalization to be pressing and substantial, and the preference to be rationally connected and minimally impairing.

The insured died accidentally when a cocaine-filled condom burst in his stomach.

The appellant insurer refused to pay the life insurance proceeds to the respondent, the insured's former spouse and designated innocent beneficiary, arguing that public policy prevents a person from insuring against their own criminal act.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the public policy rule preventing a criminal from profiting from their crime does not apply to an innocent beneficiary claiming in their own right, rather than through the criminal's estate.

The appeal was dismissed, and the respondent was entitled to the insurance proceeds.

The respondent's husband died when a bomb he was attempting to plant exploded.

The respondent claimed the $50,000 life insurance indemnity as the designated beneficiary.

The insurer refused to pay, arguing that the insured's death during the commission of a crime triggered a public order exception preventing recovery.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the insured's act was not an 'intentional fault' because he did not intend to cause his own death.

Furthermore, while the public order principle that 'no one may profit from their own crime' exists in Quebec civil law, it cannot be set up against an innocent third-party beneficiary.

The appeal was dismissed, and the respondent was entitled to the insurance proceeds.

The parties entered into a joint venture for a golf course and residential development.

They reached a prior oral agreement regarding the dimensions of the land subject to a development option.

The appellant fraudulently drafted the written contract to reflect a much smaller parcel of land, and the respondent signed it without reading the specific clause.

When the respondent discovered the error, he sought rectification of the contract.

The Supreme Court of Canada upheld the trial judge's decision to grant rectification, finding that the respondent's lack of due diligence in reading the contract was not a bar to equitable relief, particularly given the appellant's fraud.

However, the Court declined to restore the trial judge's award of punitive damages, concluding that the substantial compensatory damages awarded were sufficient to achieve the goals of retribution, deterrence, and denunciation.

The appellant's home was destroyed by fire.

The respondent insurer denied the claim, alleging arson, despite its own experts and investigators concluding the fire was accidental.

The insurer maintained this bad faith defence through a lengthy trial to force a lower settlement.

The jury awarded compensatory damages and $1 million in punitive damages.

The Court of Appeal reduced the punitive damages to $100,000.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and restored the $1 million jury award, holding that the insurer's breach of the duty of good faith was an independent actionable wrong and the jury's award, while high, was a rational response to the insurer's exceptionally reprehensible conduct.

The respondent, a licensed sealer, was charged with selling blueback seal pelts contrary to s. 27 of the Marine Mammal Regulations.

He challenged the constitutionality of the regulation, arguing it was ultra vires Parliament.

The trial judge upheld the regulation under the federal fisheries power, but the Court of Appeal reversed.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that s. 27 is in pith and substance concerned with the management of the Canadian fishery by curtailing the commercial harvest of young seals to protect the economic viability of the resource.

It is therefore a valid exercise of the federal fisheries power under s. 91(12) of the Constitution Act, 1867.